Return, Resettlement, Repatriation:
The Future of Palestinian Refugees in the Peace Negotiations
Source: FOFOGNET Digest, 22 April 1996
by Salim Tamari, Institute
of Jerusalem Studies
Final Status Strategic Studies
Institute for Palestine Studies
Beirut, Washington, and Jerusalem
February 1996
X. Highlights of a Strategy on Refugees: Difficult Choices for the Palestinian
Negotiator
Here we will the issues raised in section VIII above
will be recast as negotiating strategies. As final
status negotiations draw closer one should expect
a hardening of position on both sides,dictated on
the Israeli side by electoral considerations, and
by wide scale resistance against the notion of 'return';
and on the Palestinian side by the attempt to buttress
its legitimacy in the eyes of diaspora Palestinians
that the refugees have not been forgotten.
It might be mentioned here that although UN resolution
on Palestinian refugees, particularly GA Res 194 and
SC Res 237, are the proper international legal framework
to address these issues,it is futile to reiterate
these documents as magical refrains,hoping that they
will have the desired effect. The consensual nature
of the multilateral negotiations, as well as final
status talks require that these resolutions be reexamined
and operationalized into manageable categories.
Furthermore concern over the attitudes and reactions
of diaspora Palestinians, is not only a question of
political expediency, beta deeply rooted matter in
public consciousness and in the yearning for uniting
dispersed families across the regions of Palestine.Palestinian
negotiators on the other hand are bound by constrains
which dictate that issues of principle and ideological
predisposition have be tempered by what is realizable
and obtainable. The main constraints are:
(1) Since the borders between Israel and Palestine
are more likely to be 'porous' than hermetically sealed
(especially since the Rabin assassination) the Israeli
negotiators are likely to slow down the return of
large numbers of Palestinians to PNA areas on the
grounds that either it might destablize the Palestinian
authority (for economic reasons), or create a large
pool of illegal labourers infiltrating to Israel.
(2) The possible return of large number of refugees
within the next three years is going to create major
pressure on the existing[underdeveloped] infrastructure
of the Palestinian economy. One of the major challenges
for the PNA is to create the necessary institutional
structures (ministries and agencies of absorption),as
well as to generate sufficient economic growth to
absorb large number of returning Palestinians.
(3) Relations with Arab host countries, and the
status of Palestinians in these countries are likely
to be deeply affected by rising expectations among
Palestinians to return. Among possible responses are:
***pressure on Palestinian refugees to 'go home'
(Libya, Lebanon)before the conditions of return have
matured;
***compelling Palestinians to make a decisive choice
between resettlement and naturalization in the host
country, or return to Palestine, before the conditions
for such a choice have matured;
***refusal of Arab host countries to accept dual
'nationality' for Palestinians who chose to remain
in the host countries while acquiring Palestinian
permanent residency.
The Palestinian negotiator must therefore take into
account both Arab and Israeli constraints, while attempting
to respond to rising expectations for return on the
part of tens of thousands of refugees in the diaspora.
A public campaign should be launched,based on clearly
delineated policy which would assure the Israelis
that the return of Palestinian refugees, according
to a phased plan, is in their ultimate interest since
it would stabilize the Palestinian National Authority,
and defuse the volatile political conditions of Palestinians
in diaspora camps.
On the basis of the analysis made in section VIII
above I would propose the following themes as constituting
a viable Palestinian strategy towards the refugee
negotiations:
1. Residency and Returning Palestinians:
The modalities of Oslo 2 on residency and the realities
created by the election of the Palestinian legislative
council have created anew situation pertaining to
Palestinian residency/citizenship requirements. The
Palestinian National Authority should now begin negotiations
for granting residency to all returning Palestinians
who chose Palestinian citizenship. Priority should
be given to displaced persons. Israeli rights to interfere
with the granting of Palestinian citizenship should
only involve the strictest definition of security.
The use of demographic arguments for security should
not be acceptable. To facilitate the absorption of
returning Palestinians, and insure their proper economic
and social integration in society, a Ministry of Absorption
for Returnees should be established. Transitional
arrangements should be negotiated with host countries
for the protection of those Palestinians who chose
to acquire Palestinian nationality but who opt to
stay in their host country. In general the right of
return to Palestine should be a collective right,
though its exercise should be voluntary and based
on individual choice.
2. Separation of the two tracks:
Until the status of displaced persons is resolved
in a satisfactory manner the track dealing with the
future of DPs (the QuadripartiteCommittee) should
be kept separate from both the Refugee Working Group
(in the multilaterals) and from bilateral negotiating
teams dealing with 1948 refugees.
3. The Status of Refugees in Arab Countries:
The PLO should push for the granting of full residency
rights (but not citizenship) for all Palestinian refugees
residing in Lebanon and Syria, as well as in other
host Arab countries. This includes the right to receive
employment, legal protection from harassment,and the
freedom of physical mobility--including travel outside
the country, and return to it. Individual naturalization
should be by choice, but collective naturalization
should be subject to final status agreements, which
includes the right of return or compensation. Palestinians
should strive to abolish Arab League statues which
prevent Arab citizens to hold dual [Arab citizenship].
4. The Right of Return to Israel and
Compensation:
In return for Arab and Palestinian acceptance to absorb
the bulk of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank,
Gaza, and the host Arab countries, Israel should absorb
a limited number of refugees inside its own territories.
Proper compensation should be paid for all refugees
who chose to return, and for those who chose to be
naturalized in the host countries. Donna Arzt has
made the cogent suggestion that it would be in Israel's
basic interest to admit a modest number of Palestinians
inside the Green Line since then it can make stronger
claims for similar adsorptions on the part of host
Arab countries and the Palestinian authority.
A fund for compensating Palestinian refugees should
be established to which the world community will be
requested to subscribe. Israel should be a major contributor
to this fund. Israeli claims for compensating, or
repatriating, Jewish refugees from the Arab countries
should be negotiated bilaterally with the respective
Arab states concerned. The Palestinian negotiators
should not get involved in a package deal based on
the notion of 'exchanged population'.
Compensation should be paid at two levels: a. through
a collective fund to be vested with the Palestinian
National Authority in order to develop its own infrastructure
and facilities destined to aid the absorption of returning
refugees, and b. a family fund which will pay restitution
to refugees on the basis of individual claims.
5. UNRWA and Refugee Camps:
UNRWA should continue to administer refugee camps
in the Arab host countries as well as in PNA areas.
UNRWA operations will reliquidated gradually after
the status of Palestinian camp residents are resolved
through exercising their right to return or compensation.
UNRWA operations in the West Bank and Gaza will be
then gradually transferred to the PNA. A special committee
should be established to assess the rights and claims
of owners of properties on whose land camps were established.
A special fund will be established to aid the public
sector in host countries to integrate UNRWA staff
in the respective service sectors where they were
employed. The PNA should negotiate the transfer of
UNRWA archives in Vienna and Amman to a newly established
state archive administration.
6. Bilateralism and Final Status:
Who will represent Palestinian refugees resident in
the Arab host countries? It is quite likely that Israel
will attempt to negotiate the future status of these
refugees bilaterally with the respective Arab countries.
The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty already contains
clauses concerning the bilateral resolution of refugee
problems. The Palestinians, on the other hand, will
make claims for representation of refugees in the
Arab host countries, and not only in PNA areas. It
will be more appropriate for the PLO, and not the
PNA to make these representations, since the PLO is
the appropriate body acting on behalf diaspora Palestinians.
7. Jerusalem Refugees and Displaced
Persons:
The status of Jerusalem refugees require a special
attention because it will be negotiated separately
in final status talks.Displaced persons who decide
to return to their homes should be given Jerusalem
residency if their families originated from Jerusalem
before the war of 1967. Compensation for lost properties
in West Jerusalem should be subject to the same procedures
that apply to other 1948 refugees. If Israeli negotiators
insist on special privileges for Jewish residents
in East Jerusalem colonies(e.g. Ramot, Gilo, etc.)
then Palestinian negotiators should insist on the
unhampered return to previously Arab neighbourhoods
in West Jerusalem (e.g. Katamon, Talbieh, Lifta, etc.)
One alternative vision is to make the whole of Jerusalem
open to both Israeli and Palestinian residency, subject
obviously to certain administrative and zoning requirements,
but those should not be based on differential discrimination
according to nationality.
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