Return, Resettlement, Repatriation:
The Future of Palestinian Refugees in the Peace Negotiations
Source: FOFOGNET Digest, 22 April 1996
by Salim Tamari, Institute
of Jerusalem Studies
Final Status Strategic Studies
Institute for Palestine Studies
Beirut, Washington, and Jerusalem
February 1996
VII. 'Breaking the Taboos on Refugees': Peron's Vision
In Mid-March 1995 the Canadians, gavel holders of
the refugee working group, circulated a document,
with an initiative coming from the US delegation,
whose purpose was to break the deadlock reached by
the negotiations.
This was by far the most ambitious, and probably
the most controversial, position put forth by the
team headed by Marc Peron in attempting to draw some
guideline for the future work of the RWG in the multi-lateral
negotiations. It attempted, following the steering
committee meeting in Tabarka, Tunis (July 1994), to
project strategic vision for the refugees for the
next 10 years. The paper had a further significance
in that it was based on consultations with regional
parties and anticipates that the co-sponsors (the
US and Russia) would assume the coordination and management
of this vision, with particular attention to funding
projects that are involved in the implementation of
its recommendations. It should be noted here that
much of the problems associated with the discussion
of the vision paper and its possible implementation
has to do with the consensual framework required for
reaching decisions in the multilaterals.
The controversy began with the definition of the
'vision' itself: "a new Middle East...[in which]
our vision is a future without refugees...in which
no one displaced by the Arab-Israeli conflict (or
their descendants) considers themselves to be a refugee".
It envisioned the replacement of "statelessness
by identity, poverty by development, camps by neighbourhoods,
precariousness by normality" (VP 2.2, emphasis
added). The assumption of 'normality' and achievement
of civic rights to Palestinian refugees, without presenting
it a package with the achievement of their political
aspirations, has always generated fears of putting
the cart before the horse from the perspective of
Arab and Palestinian protagonists.
In order to alley these fears the Vision Paper insisted
that refugees must be provided 'with options from
which they can make a free and informed choice'. These
options included an open discussion of issues like
'the right of return' and compensation. It included
'the possibility of some Palestinians being resettled
(although not necessarily naturalized)--with full
economic and civil rights--in the countries of current
asylum' (VP 3.1.5).
RWG Achievements?
The Vision Paper then attempted to delineate the main
achievements of the Group so far. Those achievements
can be summarized into the following categories: (1)
defining the scope the refugees and their problems
as undertaken by the Norwegian shepherds in collaboration
with UNRWA; (2) the mobilization of resources for
improving the living standards, and socio-economic
development, of refugees undertaken by the US, Italy,
Sweden, and the European Union, and (3) humanitarian
schemes such as improving Family Reunification procedures
undertaken by the French shepherd.
On the issue of defining the scope of the problem
of refugees (data and qualitative studies) the Norwegian
shepherd--together with UNRWA--have produced a number
of useful survey data (including the FAFO study and
the ongoing demographic survey) but none of these
actually answered any of the critical questions expected
from the RWG on the number of refugees, their categories,
and their preferences as to future options. In fact
most of these studies have avoided entering into this
rocky terrain precisely because of the sensitivity
of the issues involved. The current difficulties of
FAFO in getting basic data of this sort in the forthcoming
Jordanian survey (not to speak of similar attempts
for Syria and Lebanon) indicate the limitations embedded
in these studies. On the other hand independent surveys
that have been made outside the scope of the multilaterals
(such as the PASSIA survey on West Bank refugee opinions
on their future by N. Guerre, and Suhail Natour survey
of the legal status of Palestinians in Lebanon) have
been able to achieve considerable clarity on these
issues precisely because they are not hampered by
being part of the 'peace process'.
On the issue of 'mobilization of resources' it should
be pointed out, without neglecting the importance
of funding development projects among refugees, that
much of these projects mentioned in the report are
general aid projects to Palestinian development that
are only partly aimed at refugees. Many of them in
fact were announced simultaneously in the five working
sessions of the multilaterals and should not be seen
as exclusively, or even primarily 'refugee projects'.
In fact it would help refugee standard of living--both
in Palestine and the host Arab countries-- if these
development schemes are seen (and implemented) as
integrated economic projects for the population at
large.
Thirdly, it is well known that the French vision
for family reunification is far from being implemented,
and that the concrete achievements in this regard
is quite unsatisfactory--namely the raising of the
ceiling of family reunifications from 1,000 cases
to 2,000 after three years of intensive negotiations.
Much of the procedural improvements for these schemes
approved by the RWG, including Israel, are far from
being implemented. It would have been more helpful
if the Vision Paper made some reference to these limitations
and failures in order to surmount them in future deliberations.
Where Do We Go From Here?
Here the paper suggested concrete steps on how to
get out of the present impasse in the work of the
RWG.
On the issue of mobilizing resources it suggested
the following approaches:
- visible projects to demonstrate effectively to
refugee populations the benefits of the peace process
(how exactly will this be done in Lebanon and Syria
it is not clear--the paper should have been more
concrete)
- stress should be given to the practical needs
of refugees outside the West Bank and Gaza, particularly
in Syria and Lebanon. (It seems to me that until
Syria become involved in the multilaterals, this
is going to be very difficult. The RWG delegation
that visited refugee camps in Lebanon in 1994 to
demonstrate this point was almost confronted with
immense hostility, partly due to the negative attitudes
prepared in the Lebanese press and by government
circles).
- 'concrete projects need to be sensitive to, and
endeavour to advance, the refugees' aspirations
to live in dignity with a sense of identity' (VP
4.6). This 'concreteness' is too abstract. It is
not clear what it means. To avoid being labelled
as fluff it should point out what sort of projects
can translate this aspirations.
On the issue of 'conceptualization and definition
of the refugee problem' (VP 4.7) opened the subject
of "breaking down of taboos".These 'taboos'
were addressed directly in two particular items, both
dealing with final status issues:
the report called for the implementation of surveys
among refugee communities for providing 'objective
and subjective assessments of intentions and preferences
with regard to final status' issues. Those included
addressing the questions of the 'right of return'
and 'the admission of displaced persons to Palestinian
territories' (VP 4.10.2)
This 'taboo' subject was counterbalanced by breaking
another taboo, this time by one that usually raised
by the Israeli side, namely, those issues involving
the integration of Palestinian refugees in the host
Arab countries:
to achieve this objective the report advocated studies
on questions of naturalization, resettlement, and
long-term residency in the host countries, with the
aim of "informing how present refugee camps could
be integrated into the surrounding communities",
and the "comparative examination of immigration
requirements regarding Palestinian refugees in countries
outside the region" (VP 4.10.5).
Given the volatile atmosphere surrounding these
two sets of issues (which for reasons of argumentation
can be broadly divided into issues of repatriation
and resettlement) it would have been more feasible
to raise them as two political options within a single
package precluding a final status resolution of the
refugee question. From the Palestinian side, as well
as from the perspective of most regional Arab states,
the issue of re- settlement cannot be considered meaningfully
unless it is part of an option that includes repatriation.
The report further proposed five concrete proposals
which, if implemented, would be likely to make a qualitative
difference in the work of the RWG:
- Refugee Statistics: Conducting a comprehensive
census of refugee communities to provide "basic
data on the numbers, living conditions, citizenship
and employment status, links to family/property
in Israel and the territories", etc. (VP 4.10.1)
- Absorptive Capacity: Assessment of the absorptive
capacity of the West Bank and Gaza for returning
Palestinians. (VP 4.10.3)
- UNRWA's Future: Assessment of the implications
and consequences of the transfer of UNRWA services
to the Palestinian Authority. (VP4.10.4). This is
a problematic clause since the PA seems to be reconsidering
it's earlier position on the transfer of UNRWA functions.
- FR Claims: Provision of a data base on the pool
of potential claimants to the family reunification
schemes. [The report suggests that "...in the
context of final status arrangements...comprehensive
peace may be associated with significant increases
in the level of family reunification" (VP 4.10.6).
Here the authors seem to be hinting that since Israel
has been opposed to any substantial repatriation
of refugees to their homes--both in Israel and in
the West Bank and Gaza--then an expansion of FR
schemes may provide an outlet to this dilemma.
- Compensation Files: The report called for preparatory
work on claims, valuation of claims, adjudication,
"modes of balancing claims", and "the
advantages and disadvantages of individual versus
collective claims" (VP 4.10.7). It also calls
for conducting comparative studies of compensation
schemes that might be relevant to the Palestinian
case.
This suggestion might have clarified an important
issue:compensation is often (falsely) seen as a final
status issue. There is no reason why compensation
claims should not be considered for victims of the
1967 war, in the context of the work of the quadri-
partite committee as part of the agenda of its technical
team. Similarly claims of compensation are often discussed
in the current literature (particularly in recent
reports in the Arab press) as an alternative to the
right of return. There is nothing in various UN resolutions
(including G.A. res. 194) that treats compensation
claims as an alternative to repatriation of refugees.
A Major Flaw
Perhaps the major flaw in the Vision Paper was the
absence of a clear mechanism to implement these perspectives.
Indeed a mechanism is lacking for carrying through
principles that have already agreed on in the six
meetings of the multi-laterals.
This limitation has to do with the procedural consensualism
that has so far paralysed the work of multilateral
proceedings. Only matters that receive the agreement
of all parties to the conflict receive the stamp of
approval of the RWG. This is why the final statement
issued by each of the multilateral meetings has so
far reflected the lowest common denominator of collective
consensus. It is ironic that this limitation is seen
by the report as a major source of strength in the
multilaterals (VP 4.18) since it seeks to supplement
bilateral negotiations.
This is equally true of substantive issues dealing
with refugees, such as upgrading the status of family
reunification procedures, whose limited achievements
reflect the balance of forces on the ground.
How did the Vision Paper deal with this constraint?
Two approaches and a monitoring mechanism are suggested:
The first approach was referred to as 'enhanced dialogue'
in which "flexibility and informality be utilized
in dealing with sensitive problems" in order
to minimize public constraints (VP 4.12).
Another approach was to open second track (ie secret
or informal)negotiations in which NGOs, media people,
and academic communities are involved in order to
supplement or complement formal negotiations. This
mechanism is suggested as a means also of bringing
Syria and Lebanon into participating into RWG work
(VP4.14)
This 'solution' is problematic. It attempts to deal
with the deadlock in one of the multi-laterals (in
this case the RWG) in the same manner that the stalled
official Palestinian negotiations were dealt with
in 1993 (Oslo). The part cannot be treated in the
same manner as the whole. Furthermore the context
here is different. The issue of refugees has become
(or rather has been upgraded) into a bete noire of
the outstanding issues in the transitional period.Within
Israeli political discourse any concession on the
issue of refugees has become tantamount to breaching
the future security of Israeli citizens. Quite often
Israeli collective fears on the question of refugees
has been utilized by the Israeli negotiating team
to preempt rational discussion of this matter. Second
track and informal dialogue may be helpful to deal
with final status issues, where the ideological obfuscation
and intransigence can be defused, but not in dealing
with transitional issues of residencies, family reunification
and return of displaced persons,where agreements has
been made in principle, but not on the modalities
of their implementation.
If we accept this procedural distinction (between
final status issues and transitional ones) then the
main strength of the Vision paper can be located in
the whole range of monitoring mechanisms are suggested
(VP 4.15) for ensuring the implementation of decisions
taken. Four areas were suggested as a monitoring role
for the RWG:
- monitoring family reunification procedures
- support for implementing decisions of the quadripartite
committee pertaining to displaced persons
- helping the Palestinian NA to deal with the consequences
of UNRWA devolution in the West Bank and Gaza
- monitoring the implementation of decisions pertaining
to refugees in final status negotiations
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