Review of: Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation
Source: FOFOGNET Digest, 23-24 March 1996. Refugees Unto the Third Generation:
UN Aid to Palestinians , by Benjamin N. Schiff. Syracuse,
New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995. xvi +
285 pages. Appendices, notes, bibliography to p.
325. Index to p. 337.
by Elia Zureik
After nearly half a century of
operation, the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA), which
was mandated by the United Nations
General Assembly in late 1949 to
assist Palestinian refugees after
dispersal from their homes in 1948,
is about to wind down its activities
in accordance with a United Nations
Resolution. As a first step, it
will be moving its offices from
Vienna, where its headquarters
is located, to Gaza, and eventually
handing over its responsibility
to the Palestinian Authority there.
This is not the first time that
UNRWA is forced to relocate, although
the conditions are now different.
In 1978, with the civil war in
Lebanon raging full scale, UNRWA
moved its headquarters from Beirut
to Vienna, and away from its field
offices in the Middle East, which,
as Schiff remarks, created immense
administrative problems in terms
of coordination between headquarters
and field offices.
In this book, Benjamin Schiff,
a professor of political science
at Oberlin College, does not provide
us with a partisan obituary of
UNRWA, but an objective, yet sympathetic,
and in places highly critical,
account of the organization's management,
and the plight of the refugees
it has served. UNRWA's detractors
are many, and since the start of
the Middle East peace talks in
1992 various scenarios have been
advanced to bypass, if not liquidate,
the organization. For example,
UNRWA was not formally invited
to attend the opening of the multilateral
peace talks on Palestinian refugees,
which were held in Ottawa in May
1992. Israel and its supporters
blame UNRWA for politicizing the
refugee communities and even perpetuating
their refugee status. Had it not
been for UNRWA, they argue, the
refugees, now numbering in excess
of 3 million and almost four times
their original size of 1948, would
have been absorbed in the neighboring
Arab countries. As well, UNRWA
did not escape severe criticism
from the constituency it was set
up to serve. Palestinian refugees
have at times blamed the organization
for working towards their resettlement,
and training them for jobs which
will facilitate their emigration
from the occupied territories and
absorption in the host countries.
UNRWA went through several phases
in defining its objectives, although
Schiff claims it has now reached "an
evolutionary dead end." As Schiff
points out, when it became clear
that the prospects for repatriation
were slim, the organization turned
to devising ways to integrate the
refugees in the region through
initiating economic, agricultural
and irrigation projects, and even
providing them with loans for small
businesses. However, these efforts
during the first seven years of
the organization's history also
failed. From 1957 onward, UNRWA's
efforts turned to improving the
quality of life for the refugees
by providing them with free health
care, financial assistance in hardship
cases, shelter, and in particular
free education from grades 1-9.
It is the latter which distinguished
UNRWA and earned it respect, even
by its critics, and enabled Palestinians
to leave their mark on modernization
of the Middle East.
But what kept UNRWA, which Schiff
calls "an organizational anomaly," "a
sideshow" of the UN system, and "an
avatar of colonialism with a paternalistic
culture," in business for so long,
after its original plans for refugee
integration had failed? Schiff
provides a complex explanation
of UNRWA's longevity: first, as
long as the refugee problem was
not resolved, UNRWA's mandate remained
operative and its work needed;
second, lack of receptivity to
the integration scheme by the host
countries; third, Israel's intransigence
in refusing to accept even a modest
number of repatriated refugees;
and fourth, the determination of
the refugees themselves to reject
resettlement plans in favor of
returning to their homes. In short,
according to Schiff, in light of
the conditions on the ground, Arab
governments would have had to invent
UNRWA or an organization like it
to cope with the refugees in their
midst.
With responsibility for 59 camps
scattered in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
West Bank and Gaza, a staff of
20,000, mostly local Palestinians
who were managed by so-called international
staff of 160, and an annual budget
of $350 million for 1995, UNRWA
might as well be another multinational
corporation. Its experience in
operating in the highly volatile
and unpredictable environments
of the Middle East has provided
the organization with a wealth
of experience in survivability,
which I reckon can be the envy
of other international aid organizations.
Its programs in teacher training,
vocational education, health care,
administration and management have
transmitted much needed skills
to the refugees. Its innovations
in educational training were described
in 1986 by a Jerusalemite as "a
model for the whole Third World." (p.62)
Students attending UNRWA schools
do much better than students attending
the host countries' own public
school system. The problem with
UNRWA is that, for the most part,
its educational cycle ends with
grade nine, after which students
have to transfer to local secondary
schools, which in the case of Lebanon
is not possible either now or ever
due to Lebanon's hostile attitude
to the Palestinian refugees. But
above all, it is UNRWA's ability
to deliver aid to millions of refugees
in hostile environments which is
the hallmark of its success.
Schiff details UNRWA's political
and financial fortunes, and shows
how UNRWA's resources, money and
expertise, were the envy of the
host countries whose relationship
with UNRWA fluctuated from hostility
towards the organization to grudging
respect. The author shows how the
emergence of the PLO, particularly
after 1969, became both a blessing
and a curse for the organization:
a curse, for politicizing the camps
and UNRWA's local employees, who
were mostly Palestinians, thus
jeopardizing the agency's non-political
status with host countries; a blessing,
for acting as a lobby group with
Arab governments to secure financial
support for the organization. The
mode of operation of the PLO was
not something UNRWA could appreciate,
however. Here is how Schiff described
a bizarre exchange between a PLO
official and an agency representative. "When
an UNRWA representative met with
a PLO official in Syria to protest
charges in a newspaper that the
agency was seeking to liquidate
the Palestinian problem, the PLO
official explained that this was
part of a long-term strategy to
help the agency!" (p.129) The lesson
to be drawn from this, is that
only by scaring Arab governments
with the prospects of dismemberment
of the organization and resettlement
of the refugees will they would
be motivated to offer financial
aid to keep it in business.
UNRWA did not escape Schiff's
critical evaluation. For example,
he shows how UNRWA's arcane accounting
system tended to exaggerate the
agency's financial woes. But strangely
enough, the agency seemed to do
well in times of crises. Schiff
points out that the 1982 Israeli
invasion of Lebanon and few years
later the intifada, increased the
level of sympathy to the Palestinians
from the international community,
and with it came an increase in
financial support for the agency.
However, as Schiff notes in his
postscript, the signing of the
Oslo agreement between the Palestinians
and Israelis in September 1993
and the apparent normalization
of relations between the two sides
may signal ominous sign for UNRWA's
future funding prospects.
Schiff's most critical comments,
quite accurate in my view, were
saved for the colonial culture
of the organization. Originally
managed by British, U.S, and other
European ex-colonial bureaucrats,
the organization from the outset
embodied a condescending attitude
towards its local employees. This
was most evident in the differential
treatment accorded to its international
staff compared to local ones, the
so-called "uncrowned kings of UNRWA," which
included huge salary gaps, and
other financial inducements from
housing allowance, duty free shops,
and other perks, to sheer status
and authority of being "International." No
doubt, this caused resentment among
Palestinian employees, but there
was little they could do, being
themselves refugees and dependent
on the organization for their livelihood.
Here is how Schiff described the
relationship between the organization
and its local staff in an opening
passage to Chapter Six, titled "Residual
Colonialism": "British, U.S., and
European bureaucrats naturally
cast UNRWA's structure from enduring
colonial alloy, a fusion of refugees'
impoverished circumstances, the
agency's hierarchical organization,
and its leaders' benevolent paternalism.
The agency's colonialism proved
resilient. When the old mold was
finally shattered by labor and
political activism, instead of
emerging with a more egalitarian
structure, the hierarchy was reinforced,
and local officials downgraded." (p.138)
The author devotes two chapters
to discussing UNRWA's relationship
with Israel, before and during
the intifada. Israel related to
the organization in ways similar
to those followed by other host
countries. It interfered with its
personnel decisions, disregarded
immunity given to it as a UN agency,
accused the organization of engaging
in political activism, considered
the school system as a breeding
ground for anti-Israel activity,
refused to apply the Fourth Geneva
Convention to protecting the Palestinian
population, and so on. But UNRWA
stood its ground, and defended
the refugees to the extent it could.
The unintended consequence of Israeli
attitudes is that the organization
widened the scope of its activities,
and developed its own policies
geared to offer the Palestinians
physical and legal protection,
as well as general economic assistance,
and "protection by publicity." Thus
the organization expanded its role
by facilitating access to the territories
by the international media, protecting
human rights, and by providing
temporary assistance to non-refugees.
The agency added to its international
staff in the field a new category
of employees called Refugee Affairs
Officers (RAO), who roamed the
territories and monitored closely
the situation on the ground (human
rights violations, logistical requirements,
etc.) during the intifada, and
became an important source of information
to both journalists and the Civil
Administration. RAO's function
was to "ensure a degree of passive
protection of the refugees." As
the agency's role expanded, it
found itself increasingly engaged
in bureaucratic warfare with the
Civil Administration. Thus, when
after instituting the new system
of protection, the Civil Administration
complained to UNRWA about transgressing
its role, "the field directors
and the commissioner-general seemed
to relish tossing back at the Israelis
the line that they had so many
times received: they urged the
Israelis to provide concrete information,
to bring complaints to their attention,
and they promised to investigate,
just as the CA had many times promised
the agency." (p.254) On one level
at least, in UNRWA the Civil Administration
found its match, something which
can hardly be said for the current
Palestinian Authority. The reviewer
found the book full of insights,
but it is regrettable that Schiff
could not make the trip to Syria
and Lebanon and write the definitive
study of UNRWA. |