Preliminary Thoughts on US Financing of a Compensation Regime for Palestinian Refugees
Source: FOFOGNET Digest 197 (17 July
2000)
by Maren Zerriffi
During the current
Camp David talks, one of the issues
under discussion is the issue of Palestinian Refugees, including
a compensation regime. Although little is known about the potential
features of this regime, one particularly noteworthy aspect is
the fact that it is reported that the US would fund between $15
and $25 billion of an approximately $100 billion regime which would
go towards Palestinian compensation and refugee "rehabilitation." 1 Although
it has been noted that the US would seek additional financial support
for this regime from Japan, the EU and other donors, I have yet
to see a report where Israel's contribution to this regime is detailed.
I am therefore concerned that negotiations appear to be moving in a dangerous
direction: minimal Israeli contribution to Palestinian refugee compensation
and maximal financing by the international community, especially the US. This
apparent potential outcome has been the Israeli position for some time; Israel
has consistently refused to finance refugee compensation arguing that it cannot
accept responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. On the other hand,
Israel has been supportive of an internationally financed compensation mechanism
(to which its contribution would be minor) presumably because of the benefits
such a regime would offer in terms of security stability and economic development
for the region.
While the Israeli domestic political reluctance to finance Palestinian refugee
compensation has received considerable attention (in fact far more attention
than the similarly problematic domestic political responses of Palestinian
refugees to the proposed regime), potential domestic response in the US has
received little attention despite the fact that the US will likely be a large
(and perhaps the largest) contributor to this regime. 2 However,
there are several reasons to wonder if such an amount of assistance ultimately
could be provided and, furthermore, should be provided.
My doubts stem in part from the fact that, although I am deeply committed to
high levels of Palestinian compensation and restitution (involving return),
I am unsure if I myself would be willing to foot part of this bill--which I
would be required to do as an American citizen. While my per capita portion
of a $25 billion bill will equal a paltry $91.70 total and $4.58 per year, 3 I
can't help but feeling...Why me and not an Israeli? Why this and not long term
social security solvency? Or why not UN back dues or funds to fight global
AIDS? Finally, I wonder if implementation could even be assured? It is not
that I do not support Palestinian compensation (even an internationally funded
mechanism) and I am not a stereotypical American isolationist by any stretch
of the imagination, but I am nevertheless hesitant. My hesitation stems from
several considerations.
First, why the US and not Israel? It has been argued both that Israel should
not pay and cannot pay. The argument that Israel should not pay is founded
on two aspects: the issue of responsibility and Jewish claims. It is argued
that Israel is not responsible for generating the refugee problem and furthermore
that such responsibility would be difficult to causally evidence. However,
with the opening of archives there is increasing evidence of Israeli responsibility
in generating the refugee problem and, furthermore, mechanisms for resolving
the issue of responsibility abound. This includes the attribution of "objective
responsibility" 4 as
well as a possible ICJ fact finding mission similar to that in the case of
the Western Sahara. 5 Irrespective
of the "responsibility" issue, it has also been noted, even by those advocating
a minimalist Israeli contribution, that Israel has benefited considerably from
expropriated Palestinian properties. 6 Therefore,
not only is the "responsibility" issue surmountable, the argument can quite
easily be made that Israel should pay at the very least because, regardless
of the responsibility issue, Israel now possesses the property and unless they
are willing to give it back, they (and not the US) should pay for it.
It is also often argued that Israel should not be required to pay compensation,
by pointing to the fact that a "de-facto" population transfer has occurred
and that Palestinian claims are cancelled out by Jewish claims against Arab
states. However, while the pressing of Jewish claims against the Arab states
is completely legitimate, the notion of linking Palestinian and Jewish claims
is not. Not only has it been pointed out that this could hold the peace process
hostage to the veto-power of a few states, 7 but
it is also unclear why Palestinian people should be held accountable for the
expropriations of the Iraqi government of the 1950's. Furthermore, the historical
accuracy of many of the Israeli government's assertions has been called into
question recently. 8 I
therefore find the arguments that Israel should not pay most of the costs entirely
unconvincing.
In addition, there is the long-standing argument that Israel cannot afford
to single-handedly pay compensation. However, the Israeli economy has changed
considerably since the early years. According to one estimate, the value of
total agricultural property is only 4% of current GDP, in contrast to the 150%
of GDP of the early Israeli state. 9 In
addition, another author has suggested that $25 billion over ten years represents
the "extreme upper boundary of what is economically possible," which is only
a mere 2.95% of Israel's GNP. 10 Presumably,
with the time frame now doubled, the total figure could be adjusted upwards
and perhaps even doubled. Surely this indicates a far different ability to
pay than in the early years of negotiations. Therefore, the economic inability
to pay position has become a far less convincing argument than it once was.
So it seems that it is not that Israel can't pay or shouldn't pay, but won't
pay. Israeli preference for an internationally financed scheme in which Israel
is not a major contributor stems from an intransigence to address the issue
of responsibility. True, this is a contentious issue domestically. But, it
is also important to note that part of the Palestinian compensation demand
has included acknowledgment of Israel's role in creating the Palestinian refugee
problem, sometimes called "moral compensation." It is often argued that this
is an important component of the reconciliation process for the Palestinians. 11 However,
while proponents of a minimal role for Israel in financing compensation note
the reconciliation benefits of compensation, they often reject a role of an
examination of even partial responsibility for the creation of the refugee
problem. Thus, the preference is for reconciliation without truth--or even
the search for it. Therefore, Israel seeks the benefits of reconciliation and
peace (as well as the economic benefits of having expropriated Palestinian
movable and immovable property) while externalizing the costs (to the US).
And it is entirely unclear to me why American citizens should finance the luxury
of peace without self-examination.
In addition, in my research on past cases of compensation in population transfer,
war and mass expulsion, 12 I
have not encountered a single case where the international community has financed
compensation on this level. There are two cases where the international community
has provided a degree of financing for a compensation commission, but it is
not clear that these funds have gone to compensation rather than the initial
running of the commissions. These two cases are the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC) which handles compensation claims from the Second Gulf War
and the Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC) which handles compensation
and restitution under the Dayton Accord. It appears that in both of these cases,
international funds were used mostly for start-up and administrative costs.
In fact, in the case of the CRPC, there have been considerable problems in
obtaining the pledged international funds. Therefore, not only is international
(especially US) funding of compensation unjustified, it is also unprecedented.
Furthermore, the case of the CRPC illustrates that such a scheme may also ultimately
be unlikely.
Therefore, there are plenty of questions regarding whether the US (rather than
Israel), should foot a whopping $25 billion. But even if these are answered
in the affirmative, there remains questions as to whether the US COULD fund
compensation. For starters, social spending concerns such as long term social
security solvency and the crumbling public educational system are figuring
quite prominently in this election year and will additionally serve as strong
competitors (rightly or wrongly) to international aid over the course of the
next 20 years. On top of these looming social spending needs, there are potential
indigenous compensation demands on US funds. In developing a bibliography of
materials concerning other compensation cases which could yield valuable lessons
for the Palestinian case, 13 I
came across a vast literature concerning past and pending Native American claims
against the US government which America will likely have to deal with in the
coming 20 years. In fact, Native American self-rule and land claims are already
becoming election year issues in some states. Furthermore, Americans have benefited
from the use of lands and resources which were originally those of Native Americans.
We have not benefited at all from Palestinian refugee property and it is entirely
unclear to me why we (instead of Israelis) should pay for Palestinian compensation,
especially when we have our own outstanding debts. Even cynical US officials
should realize that providing funding to a Palestinian compensation scheme
on this large a scale is a potential public relations problem. This is also
in addition to the increasing demands among African-Americans and the descendents
of slaves for compensation. Therefore, American's have plenty of expenses and
debts (not to mention the deficit!) without assuming Israeli ones!
There is also international competition for US funds. International assistance
as a percentage of the US budget is an embarrassingly low 1.2%. 14 In
fact, even if Americans became more forthcoming with international assistance,
there are many other competing claims to international aid. The fact that the
UNAIDS conference and the Middle East Summit were held near simultaneously
should not be overlooked. The levels of international assistance to combat
this serious global threat should not be forgotten. One estimate notes that
in Africa alone, $3 billion will be required per year for "basic measures" on
top of "tens of billions of dollars more each year to provide in Africa the
standard drugs used in developed countries." 15 In
discussing the competing claims to international aid and expressing his pessimism
concerning the overall availability of international funds for Palestinian
refugee compensation, one scholar has relayed the words of an aid official
writing: "the cost of increasing support for Palestinian refugees is more dead
children in the Congo." 16 With
the focus on the increasing threat of AIDS especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
the cost of US (rather than Israeli) financing of Palestinian refugee compensation
could be quite high for sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the potential competition
between aid to the Middle East and funds to combat AIDS has already been noted. 17
In addition to these general demands on US funds, there are a number of questions
about the long term ability (and willingness) of the Congress to appropriate
these funds. Although the annual amount over the course of years is still less
than annual US aid to Israel, it is still unclear if this amount could be raised.
For starters, it as yet undetermined if this would be taken from or in addition
to current foreign aid to Israel. One scholar has noted that he seriously questions "Congressional
support for shifting former aid to Israel to the Palestinians." 18 Indeed,
since there are already discussions of a tighter US-Israeli security agreement
following a framework agreement, it appears that the agreement would be accompanied
by increased US (military) assistance to Israel. It appears that Palestinian
compensation would be additional to this assistance. One wonders if such a
large amount would be consistently appropriated by Congress.
While some would be tempted to point to the fact that aid under the first Camp
David Accord has proven resilient, there is reason to be cautious. First, that
agreement was during the Cold War which had an overall impact on American's
willingness to provide aid (especially when it ensured stability). Second,
is the fact that AIPAC has proven central in the continuation of Camp David
aid. It is not entirely improbable that a long term winding down of the conflict
would lead to changes in AIPAC as well. Also, the problem in deriving generalizations
from the past 20 years of Camp David aid is brought home when one imagines
what would have happened had a leader supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood
come to power in Egypt? Even if Egypt had maintained the peace agreement, it
is unlikely that US aid levels would have been maintained. Now imagine a Hamas
leader becomes the president of Palestine. Would the US Congress continue to
support compensation at committed levels (especially forms of collective compensation
which would go to Palestinian institutions)? Under a more likely scenario,
it is possible the Congress could make appropriating compensation funds extremely
(and perhaps unacceptably) conditional. In short, there are a number of ways
in which compensation to Palestinian refugees could be held hostage to politics.
Even the most committed believer in the US ability to fulfill its international
financial obligations would be sobered by an examination of the US Congress'
reluctance to appropriate funds for the UN. Despite the recent overdue payment
of $93 million, the US is still $1.65 billion in arrears due to the unilateral
modification of the percentage of US contribution to peacekeeping operations
from 31% to 25%. 19 And
this is US dues (not assistance!) to a peacekeeping body whose contribution
to global stability Americans enjoy--not payment for expropriated property
paid to Palestinians or a Palestinian entity!
Also, in considering the domestic reaction, the nature of the assistance
warrants considerable consideration. It has been pointed out that: "compensation" falls
outside of the mandate of most development agencies; cash schemes will likely
be viewed askance by legislative bodies; and that rehabilitation and development
projects are preferable as the primary form of aid. 20 However,
these observations do not seem to be accounted for in the current package (as
far as one can currently tell). In addition, the American public's reaction
to compensating Palestinian refugees for their property that Israelis are using
should be considered. Compensation is quite different from other forms of foreign
aid. Americans are (sometimes justifiably but sometimes not justifiably) not
exactly known for their global generosity. While Americans have provided support
(although sometimes limited) for foreign humanitarian aid or military assistance,
I am not sure that foreign aid in order to pay for the expropriation of someone
else's property (combined with the absolute refusal of Israel to return it)
will be warmly received by the American people. This problem is further compounded
by the fact that this compensation regime in, which a right of return will
likely be denied, runs directly counter to refugee preference for return. In
addition, according to one account, return is also the cheaper alternative. 21 Thus,
the average American may start to wonder why they are paying for movable and
immovable Palestinian property so that Israel can deny their internationally
recognized right to return, especially since there will likely be a well publicized
international outcry if return is forsaken. Even if due to semantic spin or
other slights of public relations hands, this were to be "sold" to the American
public as rehabilitation aid, rather than compensation, it is still unclear
that Americans would ultimately support this.
As an internationalist American who supports Palestinian rights, it is unclear
to me why, given all the other completely justified demands on my income, I
should be asked to pay for Israeli expropriation of Palestinian refugee property.
My reluctance to do so is determined not only by the fact that this runs directly
counter to the preferences of the refugees themselves but also by the fact
that the reasoning for me to do so is based almost entirely on concerns for
Israeli public opinion and reluctance to admit (or even examine) culpability.
I understand that it is considered unrealistic to hold the view that Israel
would be the sole or primary financier of compensation, but it is equally naive
to not anticipate problems concerning American public opinion. In many respects,
as an internationalist committed to justice for the Palestinians, I may be
the "best case" scenario for Joe (Joan?) Q. American. But I am also hesitant
to pay for such a compensation package and I may not be unique in that respect.
Although many would balk at such an assertion, the idealist in me still believes
in the resilience of Wilsonian ideals among the American people which would
make them unwilling to support the denial of self-determination. (Although
this idealism is certainly tempered by a quick review of the American foreign
policy record, I nevertheless hold this view). More to the point, the cynic
in me notes American unreliability (particularly of the US Congress) on matters
of aid. The analyst in me brings these two elements together to question altogether
whether policymakers can assume that Americans would be willing to underwrite
for 20 years an immense compensation regime which goes against the expressed
preferences of Palestinian refugees for return. Therefore, given the problems
likely to be encountered in mobilizing this aid, I am entirely unsure whether
making such a promise to the Palestinian people, which we may not be able to
keep, is ultimately a fair and honorable thing to do--especially since it would
likely involve the relinquishing of the right of return.
Notes
1 While the US portion would possibly pay for
resettlement, rehabilitation, and
regional development schemes, it
is still quite clearly compensation
as it is a non-consumptive form of
collective compensation and would likely be counted against other
forms of collective and individual compensation.
2 There has been
some consideration of the issue.
In an July 7, 2000 op-ed in the LA
Times , entitled "In the Middle East, Money
and Bear Hugs Only Go So Far," Robert Satloff argues that the administration
should "make Congress a full partner in these negotiations" because "even
in this era of surpluses, no Republican-controlled Congress is going to meekly
acquiesce to the promise-making of a lame-duck president without a stake
in the effort." While valuable in noting the importance of Congress in this
effort, it still underestimates the scope of the domestic problem. A commitment
spanning 20 years will surely outlast a Republican controlled Congress and
the (perhaps overstated) so-called budget surpluses. In addition to the Satloff
op-ed, in discussing the financing of Refugee Compensation, Brynen identifies
some aspects of donor preferences. Although largely resting on institutional
preferences (such as maximizing visibility and political and economic leverage),
there is some mention of domestic politics (such as the reluctance to finance "compensation" and
cash support) which bear on the design of the compensation regime. Rex Brynen, "Financing
Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Paper prepared for International Development
Research Centre's Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa,
July 14-15, 1999 http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html .
3 According to my calculations, it would the per capita
amount for the same figure for Israeli's would be: $4348.01 total and $217.40
per year.
4 Donna Arzt, "The Right to Compensation: Basic Principles
Under International Law" Paper prepared For International Development Research
Centre's Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15,
1999 http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/arzt.html .
5 John Quigly, Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990): 225. While the current state of the
Western Sahara (especially the complete and utter failure of the UN, especially
the "neverendum" process run by MINURSO) does not bode well for this option
(especially a timely solution), the general proposal is not without merit.
6 Shlomo Gazit, "The Palestinian Refugee Problem" Final Status
Issues: Israel-Palestinians Study Number 2 (1995)10. He writes, "no one denies
that Israel greatly benefited from the Arab property that came under its
control" The author then goes on to argue that Israel's opposition to paying
composition was due to the absorption of Jewish refugees from Arab countries
and that "it is reasonable to assume that were such a calculation made, the
result would demonstrate at least parity between the two groups properties,
if not a balance favoring the Israeli claims." This assertion is taken up
further below.
7 Joseph Alpher and Khalil Shikaki, "The Palestinian Refugee
Problem and the Right of Return" Paper 98-7 (Cambridge: Weatherhead Center
for International Affairs, May 1998):16-17, 25, and 31 and Rex Brynen, "Financing
Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Paper prepared For International Development
Research Centre's Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa,
July 14-15, 1999 http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html
8 For example, see: Yehuda Shehnav, "The Jews of Iraq, Zionist
Ideology, and the Property of the Palestinian Refugees as of 1948: An Anomaly
of National Accounting." International Journal of Middle East Studies 31.4
(November 1998): 605-630
9 Frank D.Lewis "Agricultural Property and the 1948 Palestinian
Refugees: Assessing the Loss." Explorations in Economic History 33.2 (April
1996): 186. The author also notes that this is roughly equivalent of one
year of Israel's defense-related imports.
10 Rex Brynen, "Financing Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Paper
prepared for International Development Research Centre's Workshop On Compensation
for Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15, 1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html .
11 See for example, Rashid Khalidi, "Attainable Justice:
Elements of a Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Problem" International
Journal 53.2 (Spring 1998): 233-252. The centrality of moral compensation
has also been noted by observers. On this Brynen has written, "On the Palestinian
side, linking compensation and admission of moral guilt serves to enhance
the political efficacy of compensation, especially where the right of return
to 1948 areas is unlikely to be realized." Regarding the Israeli position,
Brynen goes on to write, " Conversely, the mobilization of Israeli resources
is inversely linked to the moral dimension of compensation; the more it looks
like reparations, the less likely it becomes that Israel (and the Israeli
public) will provide the required resources." Rex Brynen, "Financing Palestinian
Refugee Compensation" Paper prepared for International Development Research
Centre's Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15,
1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html .
However, it is important to note that it appears that he Israeli's may be
having their cake and eating it too (an internationally financed cake!):
getting the international community to finance a substantial amount of compensation
as well as retaining the "red-line" of non-recognition of responsibility
for the Palestinian refugee problem.
12 Maren Zerriffi, "Refugee Compensation: Selected Cases
and Source Materials." Paper prepared For International Development Research
Centre's Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15,
1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/biblo.html .
13 Maren Zerriffi, "Refugee Compensation: Selected Cases
and Source Materials." Paper prepared For International Development Research
Centre's Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15,
1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/biblo.html .
14 L. Craig Johnstone, "Feature Story: Foreign Policy on
the Cheap - You Get What You Pay For" State Magazine August 1996. http://www.state.gov/www/publications/statemag/statemag_nov-dec/statemag_aug/feature1.htm .
15 Comments of Dr. Peter Piot, the head of Unaids, as discussed
in Rachel L. Swarns And Lawrence K. Altman, "Amid Controversy, South Africa
Opens World AIDS Forum" New York Times July 10 2000
16 Rex Brynen, "Financing Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Paper
prepared for International Development Research Centre's Workshop On Compensation
For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15, 1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html .
17 John Lancaster and Dan Morgan, "Congress Alerted to
High Price of Peace," Washington Post July 15 2000.
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50573-2000Jul15.html .
18 Rex Brynen, "Financing Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Paper
prepared for International Development Research Centre's Workshop On Compensation
for Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15, 1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html .
19 "World Briefing: U.S. PAYS DUES" New York Times (July
13 2000).
20 Rex Brynen, "Financing Palestinian Refugee Compensation" Paper
prepared for International Development Research Centre's Workshop On Compensation
for Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15, 1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/brynen.html .
21 BADIL "The Impact of Return on Compensation for Palestinian
Refugees" Paper prepared for International Development Research Centre's
Workshop On Compensation For Palestinian Refugees Ottawa, July 14-15, 1999. http://prrn.mcgill.ca/prrn/badil.html . |
