UNRWA in Transition
by Ben Schiff
Oberlin College
Department of Politics
email : ben.schiff@oberlin.edu
February 22, 2000
This paper was written following the workshop meeting: "The Future
of UNRWA", held February 19-20 in Minster Lovell, U.K. It is for
discussion purposes only. Do not quote or cite without the author's
permission. Comments are welcome.
1. Assumptions
The discussions explored many aspects
of UNRWA operations and refugee needs
from the present until some time
after a final status agreement (FSA)
is reached, a planning horizon of
perhaps10-15 years. The discussions
were sometimes difficult because
the outcomes of as-yet unresolved
political controversies may shape
aspects of UNRWA's future activities.
Assumptions to be made about such
outcomes are themselves politically
charged. I take the following planning
assumptions to be reasonable:
- 1.1. UNRWA will continue to face
financial difficulties and refugee
per capita funding will decline
because of the natural increase
of the client population and donor
resistance to expanded funding
of ongoing programs.
- 1.2. UNRWA will seek to avoid
engaging in activities and discussions
that it perceives to entail political
liabilities for its relations
with hosts, clients, and donors.
- 1.3. Some kind of FSA will emerge
(although it may take several
years) as a consequence of which
the current formal status of UNRWA's
clients may change, but how and
when this change will occur is
unclear.
- 1.4. Because Palestinian refugee
status is anomalous (as compared
to UNHCR refugees) and has been
defined operationally but not clearly
in legal terms, refugee status
and identity may persist beyond
creation of a Palestinian state
and citizenship.
- 1.5. Because of humanitarian
and political concerns, UNRWA will
not be rapidly terminated even
upon conclusion of an FSA.
- 1.6. The material circumstances
of many of UNRWA's clients will
remain relatively unchanged by
the final status agreement, barring
rapid and large-scale compensation.
- 1.7. The institutional capabilities
of the host states and the Palestinian
Authority to provide for the
needs of the refugees will change
slowly, if at all, during the time
period under consideration.
2. Issue typology
In an effort to begin developing
a typology of issues that UNRWA planners
should consider, the following dimensions
can be used to characterize various
planning and activity areas. The
purpose of the typology is to assist
in thinking about which activities
can and should be undertaken or planned
for soon, as opposed to those that
can or must wait:
- 2.1. Political content : Planning
exercises and organizational actions
that are politically sensitive
will be hard to initiate in the
short-run.
- 2.2. Logistical/technical component
: Exercises and actions that
focus on logistical and technical
planning with the Agency, host governments,
the PA, and U.N. and NGOs will be
easier to undertake than those that
are more politically sensitive.
- 2.3. Inevitability : Planning
exercises and organizational actions
on issues that will arise regardless
of the outcome of the final status
negotiations should be considered
for initiation prior to conclusion
of the final status negotiations.
- 2.4. Urgency : Some
kinds of planning and information
gathering will be very useful rapidly
upon conclusion of the final status
agreements and may be of intrinsic
value even in the absence of an
FSA. Such planning and research
should be undertaken soon.
- 2.5. Range and variety of participants
: The more parties involved
in an issue, the more difficult it
may be to engage in fruitful discussions
and constructive actions, but it
may also be more important to begin
soon.
3. Minimizing resistance
and maximizing benefits
A top-down,
comprehensive planning exercise for
UNRWA's future role would be both
politically very difficult, requiring
planning assumptions that would be
highly controversial, and practical
assumptions whose basis would be
problematic in advance of the FSA.
The more heroic the assumptions,
the likelier such a plan's irrelevance.
The more options considered, the
more costly the exercise itself.
Therefore, following the proposed
typology, activities should be considered
for initiation by UNRWA that will
generate minimal resistance while
serving the most useful possible
purposes.
Sample evaluation of possible
UNRWA programmatic initiatives:
|
Political content |
Logistical content |
Post-FSA need |
Urgency |
Participants-UNRWA
plus: |
Suggested UNRWA
programming |
1. Service harmonization/
turnover planning |
Low |
High |
High |
Medium |
Hosts*, UNESCO,
WHO, NGOs |
Resume efforts
now |
2. UNRWA aid to
host/PA institutional capacity
building |
Low |
High |
Low |
High |
UNESCO, WHO,UNDP,
etc., hosts |
Increase operational
interaction with host/PA ministries
now |
3. Convert microfinance
program to NGO or UN development
agency |
Low |
High |
High |
Low |
Hosts, clients,
donors, other NGOs and IGOs,
clients |
Continue to operate
program quasi-independently,
explore issues of NGO or privatizing
spin-offs |
4. Infrastructure
provision |
Medium |
High |
High |
High |
Hosts, donors,
IGOs, NGOs, clients |
Continue needs
assessments under hypothetical
demographics |
5. Demographic research |
Low-medium |
Research activity |
High |
High |
Hosts, clients,
RWG |
Begin developing
research program immediately |
6. Return, resettlement,
reintegration planning |
High |
High |
High |
High |
Hosts, clients-IGOs,
NGOs |
Initiate methodological
studies and needs assessment
for the agency; initiate personnel
exchanges and consultations with
HCR and other refugee and development
organizations |
7. Reversion of
camp areas |
High |
Medium |
Medium |
Low |
Hosts, private
owners |
Determination of
original camp areas' landowners
and boundaries would be useful |
8. Protection role |
High |
Low |
Depends on FSA |
|
UNGA, HCR, hosts,
PA, clients |
None |
9. Refugee compensation
evaluation |
Very high |
High |
Depends on FSA |
|
Designated UN agency
(could be UNRWA), Israel, clients |
UNRWA could provide
information to other entities
upon request |
*Hosts here includes the Palestinian
Authority
1. Service harmonization/turnover
Demographic projections and likely
donor funding patterns imply that
UNRWA will decreasingly be able to
maintain the quality of its services
to the refugees as they are currently
delivered. The growing Palestinian
refugee population and alternative
demands upon donor state humanitarian
assistance in cases of greater material
privation mean that the Agency is
unlikely to be able to increase its
operations to keep pace with the
expanding refugee population.
UNRWA appears already to be operating
at high efficiency. The per capita
costs of its programs are generally
regarded as quite low, in proportion
to the quality and extent of services
provided. Thus, while further rationalization
and economies are possible, it is
unlikely that they will enable savings
of a magnitude capable of offsetting
the financial squeeze caused by the
expanding population and constant
or declining contributions.
Under these circumstances, the Agency
and the stakeholders in its operations
(hosts, donors, clients, NGOs, other
UN organizations) need to consider
changing what the Agency does.
One possibility mentioned at the
workshop was a switch from the provision
of services on the basis of (refugee)
status to provision on the basis
of (material) need. This has already
taken place in the relief and social
services are to a large extent; however,
to save significant amounts of money
would require reducing expenditures
for UNRWA's education program and,
to a lesser extent, its health program.
Were the host states and the PA
to take over UNRWA's operations,
the agency could reduce its expenditures.
Turning these duties over to the
host states would not alleviate the
general shortage of resources in
the region, however, since the hosts
face their own financial problems.
The hosts could be expected to resist
efforts to saddle them with the costs
of UNRWA's operations unless they
would thereby gain external financing.
If donors are equally unlikely to
finance ongoing programs of host
countries as they are of UNRWA, the
most likely outcome is simply a decline
in the availability and quality of
services that the refugees receive.
In line with current thought in many
countries (including UNRWA's largest
donors) this kind of pressure, in
that it may result in individual
initiative and privatization of services,
may be desirable in the long term.
In the past, however, the refugees
and their host governments have argued
that the likely consequence of such
a decline in material standards is
political upheaval threatening to
the stability of the peace arrangements.
This argument is likely to remain
persuasive for some time to come,
even beyond conclusion of the FSA.
It implies that UNRWA will likely
continue to seek donations on the
basis of the threat to stability,
and the donors will have to weigh
the consequent risks to regional
peace against their desires to shift
their attention to other humanitarian
causes. Calls for donor support might
be more successful were they based
on a positive program ("education
for democracy", "health for independence")
than upon political threats. Efforts
should continue to harmonize UNRWA
operations with those of host countries,
in anticipation of turnover, and
the agency should explore with donors
the possibility of transferring support
to development assistance budgets
rather than humanitarian aid.
2. UNRWA aid to host/PA institutional
capacity building
Following 1., UNRWA
might be proposed as a long-term
administration and technical services
provider to the host states, rather
than the primary operational agency
in education and health activities.
UNRWA-host bureaucracy exchanges
could be initiated in order to expedite
harmonization and to transfer UNRWA
administrative patterns to host ministries.
Until host capacity to absorb most
of UNRWA's operational personnel
exists, such planning will be very
sensitive for UNRWA's internal staff
relations, and must be clearly articulated
as a long-term endeavor. Staff associations
should be included in consultations
to the extent possible, in order
to reduce "conspiracy" charges.
3. Convert Income generation activities
to NGO or UN development agency
The
Microfinance operation is financially
very successful and is operating
with a high degree of independence
from UNRWA. Its continued operations
will be little affected by either
staying within UNRWA or being independent,
as long as it is not absorbed into
government structures in the host
states. In long-term anticipation
of UNRWA's withdrawal, some consideration
should be given to the program's
being spun off into a free-standing
NGO or U.N. development aid structure.
Perhaps more importantly, host states
should be helped to understand that
the success of the program is due
to its high degree of independence,
and its capture and subordination
to state authorities will destroy
it.
4. Infrastructure provision
UNRWA
has long planned infrastructure development
projects for implementation in the
event that additional resources became
available, as they did after the
Oslo Accords. These efforts should
continue, but with attention paid
to demographic projections based
on refugee return/resettlement discussions.
Planning should be initiated that
would grapple with the difficult
issue of how current camp areas might
be converted into more permanent
and more desirable living areas,
in the event that some but not all
of their current residents depart
(particularly in the West Bank and
Gaza).
5. Demographic research
UNRWA should
expand demographic/economic research
beyond the requirements of the special
hardship case evaluation, in order
to assist in eventual refugee return/resettlement/reintegration
planning. Characterization of the
refugee population does not have
to be done with specific FSA assumptions
in mind, and thus could be relatively
unpolitical.
6. Return, resettlement, reintegration
planning
UNRWA could initiate methodological
studies and needs assessment under
the assumption that the agency will
need to reorient toward serving the
eventualities of the FSA at some
point. It cannot, however currently
go far in planning the actual return/resettlement/reintegration
strategies since to do so requires
major assumptions about the shape
of the FSA, assumptions that are
inherently political and will thus
be highly controversial among agency
stakeholders. Meanwhile, however,
it can initiate personnel exchanges
and consultations with HCR and other
refugee and development organizations
to consider the likely problems that
will confront it in the event that
refugee mobility becomes possible
under the FSA.
7. Reversion of camp areas
Similar
to 6., research relevant to eventual
status change should begin soon,
however planning for implementation
should await greater political clarity.
8. Protection role
In the absence
of a UNGA resolution altering the
status of Palestinian refugees (which
seems unlikely), formal consideration
of a protection role will not likely
be productive. UNRWA cooperation
with UNHCR on matters of refugee
status determination and documentation
should continue.
9. Refugee compensation evaluation
Because
of the extreme political sensitivity
of this issue, and because the need
for it will depend upon the FSA,
UNRWA should not initiate action
in this area. However, it should
respond to informational requests
initiated in other quarters, such
as the Refugee Working Group.
Final Thoughts
UNRWA's massive operational
and informational assets can continue
to serve its client population throughout
this period of transition. No other
agency has the combination of experience,
connection to the refugees, credibility
and resources to carry out many important
tasks.
The agency will experience pressure
to reduce its operational activities
in education, health and social welfare
services because of limited financial
resources. It should respond to these
pressures by (1) continuing its fund-raising
efforts and if possible reorienting
them from the negative objective
of averting instability to the positive
role of contributing to the development
of strong local institutions; (2)
smoothing as much as possible the
transfer of its operations from its
own administration to that of host
countries, including making good
provision for the futures of its
employees and including them as much
as possible in the discussions and
negotiations toward that end; (3)
maximizing the production of information
useful for the transition process,
even before the FSA clarifies the
shape of that transition; (4) maximizing
the flexibility needed to carry out
different kinds of activities in
different fields, since it is likely
that the needs of its clients will
not evolve consistently in all areas.
To successfully pursue this course
will require large-scale consultation
and coordination with stakeholders
including refugees, governments,
NGOs and other elements of the UN,
and it will require a commitment
to flexibility at the highest levels
of the agency. For an organization
with a 50 year history and well established
bureaucratic routines, shifting the
nature of its operations and increasing
its responsiveness to new demands
will be a challenging task. However,
UNRWA has faced challenges before
to which it responded with flexibility
and innovation, and there is no reason
to expect that it is incapable of
doing so again. Top administration
should resist the compelling power
of inertia, consider their agency
to be in part a research and development,
rather than service production organization,
and thus encourage and reward innovation
and imaginative thinking in connection
with the new tasks that will likely
arise in the near future. |