PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND DISPLACED & THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
Source: Montreal Studies on the Contemporary Arab World
by Ramzi Rabah
Member of Palestinian Democratic Cultural Forum
Translated
from Arabic by: Wafa' Issa
First Edition: 1996
ARAB PROGRESS HOUSE
FOR PRESS, PUBLISHING AND DISTRIBUTION
BEIRUT - LEBANON
P.O.BOX 6047-14 TEL: 305596
The Refugees, The Displaced and the Permanent
Status Negotiations
Besides the land problem, the issue of the refugees is the other cornerstone
of the Palestinian national question in the present phase. The Right
of Return embodies the right of self determination along with establishing
an independent national state. This is what international law has granted
as reward for the Palestinian People's National Liberation struggle
as well as an expression of its inalienable national rights.
The importance of this study is that it coincides with the start of
the permanent status negotiations which include on their agenda the
issues of the refugees and the displaced. Furthermore its publication
follows the annulment of the national covenant by the Palestinian National
Council (PNC) during its twenty first session meeting, under the pretext
of canceling the clauses which call for the elimination of Israel's
right of existence.
Undoubtedly relating these two events is essential. To advancing the
issues of the refugees and the displaced, on the Palestinian street
level there exists a deep feeling that the Palestinian Oslo Team will
offer the biggest concessions on these two issues.
It will be clear to the reader that the study has focused on new cornerstones
of the refugees and displaced issue, including the important and significant
role that is supposed to be played by the Palestinian refugees in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their own land" - The Palestinian refugees
in the state of Israel. The Hebrew State has succeeded in suppressing
the latter issue while at the same time the Palestinian side has avoided
it although it is a national and a human issue whereby Arab Community
depends on local laws to defend their rights as much as on the U.N.
Resolutions like their compatriots the 1948 refugees and the 1967 displaced
people.
If the study aims at focusing on new sides of one of the national
Palestinian issues, it does not claim to cover all angles. Rather it
is considered to be an invitation to those concerned to take matters
into their own hands.
The publisher
May 1996
Introduction
The PNC's twenty first session held in Gaza (22-25 April 1996) accomplished
its work by addressing the actualities of the Oslo Agreements. It also
reformulated the programme and structure of the official institution
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) in accordance with
these requirements, including the annulment of the Palestinian National
Covenant as had been agreed in the "Oslo B" Agreement, the transitional
Agreement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (28 September, 1995).
The cancellation of the "National Palestinian Covenant" and the assignation
of the national committee's law commission to reconstitute the covenant
so that it conforms with the Oslo Agreements and the letters exchanged
between Arafat and Rabin on 9 and 10 September 1993 enforce a one sided
Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist. Thus acknowledging
the legality of the Zionist plan on the land of Palestine. At a time
when Israel still refuses to recognize the right of the Palestinian
people to self-determination and the refugees' Right of Return in accordance
with Resolution 194.
The gratuitous recognition from one party of Israel's right to exist
means the rendering of the "Right to Return" and self-determination
from an unquestionable, legal, internationally recognized right to
simply a Palestinian demand. Hence the Israeli insistence on calling
the P.N.C. to modify or cancel the covenant before commencing the permanent
status negotiations. This step reduces the Palestinian negotiation
position and weakens its support, while guaranteeing full Israeli control
of the results of these negotiations which started officially in Taba
Egypt, on 5 May 1996.
The permanent status negotiations include Jerusalem, the settlements,
the refugees, and the political placement and position of the Palestinian
entity (Borders, security arrangements, relations and co-operation
with neighboring states ....) as well as other issues that concern
the two parties (water, religious sites ...). These subtitles by their
nature touch upon the larger national issues which together constitute
the essence of the national question at this stage.
The negotiations thus far have not addressed all the issues of the
transitional period, concentrating mainly on the Occupied Homeland
through its familiar topics reflecting negatively on the whole national
cause and on the people, while at the same time minimizing the role
of the Palestinian Diaspora and its capability in affecting events...
The nature of the subjects of the permanent status talks leads to an
increased involvement of Palestinians outside the homeland and provides
the nationalist powers with the possibility of continuing the national
rights struggle on a wider scale and more fundamental co-operation
between the Occupied Homeland and the Diaspora.
Furthermore the issues involved in the permanent status negotiations
are more regionally inter-related than the issues of the transitional
period, these inter-relations would provide possibilities - should
the correct policies be undertaken - beneficial to supporting the national
struggle within this framework the renewed reappraisal of the issue
of the refugees and (displaced) would be forcefully advanced considering
it an issue of a unified struggle between the homeland and the Diaspora,
an issue that is inter-related with its regional surroundings and its
negotiating courses.
The Refugees ... The International Legal Referal/Authority
Resolution 242 deals in general but not specifically with the case
of the refugees (as does Resolution 338 which in part calls for the
implementation of Resolution 242). It calls for `a just settlement
of the problem of the refugees' without explaining the contents of
such a settlement, and this framework does not exceed what was contained
in the preface of the Oslo A or Oslo B Agreements ("that the permanent
status negotiations will lead to the implementation of both Resolutions
242 and 338") in accord with the Madrid negotiating framework.
The contents of the Oslo B Agreement, in addition to its ambiguous
wording which skillfully avoids a clear text regarding the negotiations
to implement the above mentioned U.N. Resolutions, besides providing
Israel with to exceed the proper bounds of the 1948 U.N. Resolutions
considering them out of date and irrelevant whereas Resolutions 242
and 338 are concerned with the `67 and `73 wars.... What is contained
in this agreement and therein lies the danger, it does not refer the
Refugee issue to its limited and associated international legal authority,
or to Resolution 194 (Specifically paragraph number 11) issued by the
United Nations General Assembly on 11/12/'48, but bypasses this Authority
and ignores it.
The related Resolutions of international legitimacy guarantee for
the Palestinian refugees their status from a legal stand point. This
is a political definition which maintains that the refugees are not
individuals but a group that belongs to source from which it has been
uprooted in exceptional circumstances and they possess an identity
which unites them with their origin, which primarily gives them the
right to return to their homes and to reclaim their possessions and
the possibility to claim compensation which is part of the recognition,
and official, and public acknowledgment of the right to return, but
is not an alternative of this recognition.
This is what is embodied in Resolution 194 (which deals with three
issues, amongst which are "acknowledgment of the rights of refugees
to return to their homes") which linked the acceptance of Israel as
a member of the United Nations (Resolution 373 of the General Assembly
on 11/5/'49) with its co-operation in applying the Right of Return
which is included in the text.
Until the Refugee problem is solved according to the above mentioned
basis, the United Nations authorizes a specific organization (U.N.R.W.A.)
to handle their affairs (assistance and employment). The General Assembly
on establishing U.N.R.W.A. (Resolution 302 dated 18/12/'49), has confirmed
on the renewal of its mandate that the financing of U.N.R.W.A. and
its activities does not diminish the right to return established by
Resolution 194. U.N.R.W.A. is an agency which consolidated the refugees
legal and political status dealing with them as a group (assistance
is the acknowledged right of refugees and does not apply only to the
needy, the same applied to educational & medical services ..),
and grants them refugee identity cards and the setting up of refugee
camps as units that are distinct from their environment and outside
the responsibility of the countries in which they are found (service-side
and not sovereignty-wise).
Resolution 194 remains the Refugee issue's primary reference. Therein
lies the danger of the text of the Madrid negotiations with its declared
conditions and the Declaration of Principles and what succeeds it,
which by excluding Resolution 194, deprived the Refugee portfolio of
its International Legal Authority referring it to the same negotiating
framework which in turn consists of numerous frameworks and tracks
(the Refugee Working Group in the Multiple Negotiations and what results
from it, the bilateral negotiations with Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and
the P.L.O.).
The Oslo Agreement has divested the Refugee issue from its international
referal Jurisdiction on the one hand, and transformed it into a regional
Arab-Israeli issue in its Palestinian-Israeli dimension and its inter-relationship
with it. This has lead and will lead to negotiating conditions that
serve Palestinian rights adversely and well serves the Israeli position
in its essence: A liquidatory solution of the Refugees issue with regional
compliance on the basis of resettlement and rehabilitation and annulment
of the right to return.
The Displaced ... The International Legal Referal Authority
As with the Refugee issue the Oslo B Agreement has denied the `67
War Displaced issue its international legal authority: Security Council
Resolution 237 (14/6/'67) which defined dealing with the Displaced
as a group (and not as individuals or factions on a selective basis)
and comes under the heading "calling on Israel to respect human rights" and
clearly mentions the unconditional return ... furthermore, Resolution
237 "calls on Israel to facilitate this return".
On the other hand, the Oslo B Agreement did not address the issue
of the `67 Displaced separately but dealt with it under the collective
heading: "Linkage and co-operation with Egypt and Jordan "(Item 27)
which called for an increase in the arrangements for linkage and co-operation,
it was noted that - as a part of these arrangements - the formation
of a committee consisting of the four parties (Palestinian Representatives
+ the Governments of Israel, Egypt and Jordan) dealing with - amongst
other issues - the issue of the Displaced on an individual basis and
in accordance and this committee would decide "How to approve the persons
as well as taking the necessary steps so as to avoid confusion and
disorder". This serves the Israeli view point which states that the
return of hundred of thousands of people threatens to cause a state
of disorder which could threaten the Peace progress considering the
weak state of the infra-structure and the economic situation in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip which would render the absorption of the
newcomers impossible (!) ..
The Oslo Agreement approach towards the Displaced issue provides Israel
with the advantage of raising its right to Veto the return of the Displaced
for allegedly social and security considerations on the one hand, and
for the categorization of the Displaced into sub groups, Israel relies
on this to realize two goals:
- Decreasing the assigned number of the Displaced to diminish
the size of those permitted to return (estimated number in `67 to
be 280,000 in `68 the numbers reached almost 400,000 and now estimated
to be in excess of one million. However Israeli estimates vary between
150,000 and 220,000).
- Organizing the return in stages and over a long period of time
(averaging 4,000 every year and for humanitarian
considerations. This would take, should we consider the higher Israeli
estimation and without calculating natural increases ... fifty years
(!) Whereas the Palestinian side is demanding the return of 300,000
every year).
Not dealing with the Displaced as an indivisible group guaranteed
by international jurisprudence its right to unconditional return leads
-- amongst other thing -- to this gap between the Palestinian and Israeli
estimates. This gap is not due to a statistical shortcoming but to
an Israeli classification which automatically excludes those factions
which do not possess political significance concerning major issues
over which Israel seeks to compile facts in accordance with their preconceived
self interests. Within such a framework Israel principally banished
the return of those Displaced listed amongst the following subgroups:
- The 1948 refugees who lived in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
before the 1967 war and left during or after
that war, they constitute more than half the total number of the
Displaced, in accordance with the Israeli Resolution of the Refugee
portfolio through re-settlement, which entails resettling this subgroup
wherever they reside presently (predominately in Jordan).
- Inhabitants of East Jerusalem who left during or after the war.
Within the context of the continued Israeli efforts
to diminish the number of the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem,
considering that East Jerusalem is an inseparable part of a united
Jerusalem the Eternal capital of Israel.
- Those who belong to villages or lands expropriated by the Israelis
or that have had settlements built upon them,
from the viewpoint of avoiding the introduction of added pressure
on the issue of settlements which Israel endeavors to hold on to
(in the most part).
- Those who have conducted military operations against Israel,
or those classified as a security risk in compliance with Israel's
policy of deportation which is specifically aimed against those groups
that are more resistant to the occupation.
The quadripartite technical committee, concerned with the Displaced
issue held its seventh meeting (13/2/'96) and is still turning around
in circles trying to find a precise definition to the concept of the
Displaced and the numbers of the Displaced according to an agreed upon
reference! the digression of the negotiations to the level of conceptualizing
the issue instead of discussing the mechanism by which the return is
to take place, its organization and a timetable for the return of the
Displaced is primarily due to the absence of a predetermined authority.
The Israeli position vis-a-vis the Displaced issue transfers its discussion
from the transitional period where it was originally scheduled to the
permanent status discussions, whereupon the negotiations concerning
a timetable for the return of those whom it has been agreed as having
the right to return will affect the negotiations in principle as a
result of the discussions about the sovereignty of the Palestinian
entity. Whereas concerning the groups exempted by Israel which we have
listed above, the negotiations about their return will be affected
by the results of the talks regarding the refugees, Jerusalem and the
settlements. since the most significant group of Displaced belong to
the first wave of Refugees (1948). The Israeli standpoint will exert
pressure towards unifying the solution's framework, according to the
same sanctioned liquidatory basis towards the Refugee issue: rehabilitation
and resettlement in the place of sanctuary. Placing the Displaced issue
in the hands of the quadripartite committee which practically consists
of the two countries that host the refugees: Jordan in the first place
and Egypt to a lesser degree, eminates from a preconceived view of
Jordan's role (as a location and an entity) for the resettlement and
absorption of the majority of the Displaced.
U.N.R.W.A. AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT FOR THE CAUSE OF THE REFUGEES
The cause of the refugees draws upon its particularity before the
international community and vis-a-vis international legality from the
United Nations responsibility for its formation when it adopted Resolution
181, the Resolution to partition the land of Palestine (an Arab state
+ a Jewish state + international rule specific to the city of Jerusalem).
However only the establishment of the state of Israel was implemented
thus creating the problem of the refugees. This is what distinguishes
the relationship between the issue of the refugees and the United Nations
and its Resolutions, and differentiates it from other Refugee issues
that were created as a result of practices in contradiction to the
Resolutions of the United Nations and its aims. The United Nations
organization is directly responsible for the issue of the refugees
which is closely related to Resolution 194 which is textually mentioned
in both United Nations Resolutions 273 (Accepting Israel's membership
of the U.N.) and Resolution 302 (concerning the establishment of U.N.R.W.A.)
Resolution 194 being the common denominator between the two Resolutions
273 and 302.
On the other hand, the U.N.'s special refugee agreement (1951) had
clearly and deliberately exempted the Palestinian refugee from its
definition, and excused the U.N. high commissariat for refugees, which
is a U.N. body, from the supervisory responsibility over Palestinian
refugees, wherever U.N.R.W.A. was assigned such a responsibility in
providing them with assistance. The positive value of this step is
represented in protecting the Palestinian Refugee issue from liquidation
and marginalization, since accepting the general definition of refugees
entails the loss of their basic Right of Return. In return the distinct
definition and the apportioning of responsibility to a particular institution
responsible for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian refugees
until paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 is implemented, which guarantees
the Right of Return. The negative aspect of this distinction whereby
the Palestinian Refugee issue is exempted from the general framework
and its danger lies in the loss of any international protection if
for any reason the Agency is dismantled.
The direct U.N. responsibility towards the Refugee issue and relating
this responsibility to a specific institution (U.N.R.W.A.), require
the inviolability of such an institution and the requirement that it
is not dissolved before finding a permanent and comprehensive solution
to the Refugee problem to guarantee it is not wasted and lost.
The founding of the U.N.R.W.A. relied totally on Resolution 194 (specifically
paragraph 11) which is mentioned in the founding Resolution (302) in
more than one place: in the preface ("specific confirmation of the
regulation relating to paragraph 11"), in paragraph 5 ("the continuation
of assistance for the refugees without violating the regulations of
paragraph 11"), and in paragraph 20 ("UNRWA's consultation with the
UN Conciliation Committee for Palestine, so both may best accomplish
their missions, specially, those related to paragraph 11 ...").
Hence the importance of the following: if Resolution 194 is the principle
international reference concerning the Refugee issue then U.N.R.W.A.
is the legal, political and foundational embodiment of the international
commitment to this issue, through full and secure engagement with this
Resolution and the regulations of its paragraph 11. Therefore the negative
aspects of interference with U.N.R.W.A. before solving the Refugee
issue are not limited to depriving them of what U.N.R.W.A. had to offer,
however important that is, but goes further by interfering with the
political and legal position of the Refugee issue and their internationally
legislated rights, paramount amongst which is their Right of Return.
Preparation is steadily taking place to change U.N.R.W.A. from an
institution that provided the refugees with assistance without infringing
the regulations of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 into an institution
that channels its assistance and builds a plan that aims to sabotage
the regulations of the above mentioned paragraph 11, and replaces the
right to return with a scheme of resettlement and rehabilitation. This
is the direction in which U.N.R.W.A. is being steadily pushed since
the first Oslo Agreement. Preserving the budgets of UNRWA and even
increasing them and prolonging its mandate do not point towards the
infallibility of its position, but in reality paves the way to interference
with that position to terminate its services, towards the elimination
of the Refugee portfolio. This is proven by "The Peace Implementing
Programme" in the Self-rule areas which were set up on 6/10/1993 less
than two months after signing the Declaration of Principles agreement
in accordance with the directions of the Refugee Working Group with
the support of the donating countries. By its adoption of this programme
the Agency has placed itself in a position compatible with the directives
of the Oslo Agreements, and participates in supporting its implementation.
U.N.R.W.A. ... LATEST PRIORITIES
The fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly at the
end of last year (1995) saw the vote on Resolution 194 as witnessing
the precedent of -- for the second year running - the abstention by
the Untied States, and opposition from Israel. The abstention was connected
to a request from the United States for the reconsideration of all
United Nations Resolutions on the Middle East: so long as these issues
- including the Refugee issue - had been referred to the negotiations
with the consideration that U.N. Resolutions form a pre-assumption
of the results of these negotiations and interference in their course
of action (!).
This vote has pointed to the diminution of the strength of Resolution
194 as well as pointing out the destabilization of its position by
the rise of plans to terminate U.N.R.W.A. services that had been renewed
until June 1999, the date for ending the transitional period and the
date on which the permanent status negotiations are due to reach their
end.
And despite the fact that the meeting of the donor countries held
in Jordan in march 1995 did not designate June 1999 as a final date
for terminating the services of the Agency. The general trend followed
by the international institution continues in that direction expecting
the negotiating parties to reach agreements concerning the Refugee
issue, evidences of this trend are: setting up of a Peace Implementation
Programme and the creation of a compensation fund for the Agency's
employees, and the subjection of new employees of Agency to temporary
contracts with a time limit ending in 1999.
Further evidence of this is the inclusion of U.N.R.W.A. in the United
Nations delegation to the meeting on the Refugees Working Group in
the multilateral negotiations (in the last two meetings 7th and 8th)
after the Israeli opposition supported by the U.S. prevented the United
Nations from attending the initial meetings, due to what that would
signify in conjuring Resolution 194. The attendance of U.N.R.W.A. came
about due to its responsibility for the realization of the Peace Implementation
Programme and all other projects that effectively assist in the work
of the Refugee Working Groups. The Agency's participation in the work
of this group was considered as outlining the path to be followed by
the Agency in the coming period with international agreement and acceptance
by the Oslo team.
The task of the "Peace Implementation Programme" is defined by the
mobilization of the resources and experiences of U.N.R.W.A. in the
service of the institutions of the Self-rule Authorities, and the construction
of the required infra-structure for the formation of such an authority,
as well as harmonization between the services of the Agency and the
Authority until such a time when the latter is capable of fully taking
over the Agency's services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and integrating
the Palestinian refugees in these two regions with their surroundings
thus excluding them from the Refugee portfolio, hence it has become
clear that the remit for U.N.R.W.A. during the remaining years of its
existence is working towards bettering the status of the refugees and
improving their living standards (relatively and wherever possible)
to facilitate their merger into their surroundings (re-settlement,
absorption, integration etc....) as an alternative to the Right of
Return.
In view of the existing development in the Agency's task is evident
from a financial viewpoint that the donor countries, concerned with
implementing the solution for the area have provided the Agency with
the budget for the Peace Implementation Project which has provided
the Occupied Territories with additional qualitative services, even
though it is incorporated in a political context contradictory in its
results to a just solution of the Refugee issue, although on the other
hand it has provided sole recompense for the deprivation buffered by
the refugees in the camps of West Bank and Gaza Strip. In this context
is relevant to point out, that the issue of provision of budgets for
the Agency is related to political decisiontaking. Hence the stinginess
practiced towards ordinary budgets is no more than an expression of
a political stance the essence of which is the provision of minimal
services that would give the refugee a feeling that he is not being
neglected, until a permanent solution to his issue becomes evident.
The latest priorities incumbent on the UNRWA programme if it responds
to the resettlement and rehabilitation plan, pushes it in the direction
of abrogating its responsibilities (Self-rule Authority, Host Countries)
towards liquidating its services. Seeking to prohibit the liquidation
of the Agency's work is based on the consideration of what the Agency
signified in terms of a commitment to the cause of the refugees and
the Right of Return interlinked with the consideration of the programmes
it provided in response to various requirements. Thus criticizing the
Peace Implementation Programme does not interfere with its awards,
and criticism of the contraction of normal budgets does not merely
interfere with its subsistence, but such criticism arises out of an
awareness of the intended goal, in both cases: A step in the direction
of annulling the institution. so the pivot of the work programme in
this sphere is the struggle for maintaining UNRWA and improving its
services until the Refugee issue is resolved, and within such a framework
defending the interests of its employees (Twenty thousand employees,
workers and recruits).
The Negotiations: A Multiplicity of frameworks and Parties
Despite its
dependence on four bilateral tracks which are crucial and various (parties
and objectives) which are supportive, to advance the bilateral negotiations,
the Madrid negotiating structure guaranteed, despite its overwhelming
negativeness - a minimum level of correlationship, a relationship built
on the possibility of realizing parallel and simulateous progress between
the different tracks. Thus Israel realized a major gain through the Oslo
Agreement which led to the cancellation of the Madrid structure and seperation
from the system of equivalence and balance to the totally seperate line
of advance with each side seperately in relation to all subjects for
discussion, including the Refugee and Displaced portfolios. Oslo Agreement has transformed the Refugee issue, having denuded it
of its international judicial referal authority, into negotiary, bilateral,
independent heading Arab - Israeli titles (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon)
beside the Palestinian - Israeli track, as well as a joint case to
be discussed within one of the five groups of the multiple track negotiations.
The Oslo Agreements and those of Wadi Araba have consolidated this
trend and merged it through the quadripartite committee of the Displaced
portfolio. In this framework the multiple track concentrating on improving
the living standards to achieve a solution based on resettlement and
rehabilitation complements what is taking place in the bilateral and
consolidates the results achieved upon it.
Such a negotiating arrangement is in harmony with the Israeli strategy
of avoiding facing the Refugee issue as a singular case and permits
distributing it to the Host Countries to be negotiated seperately,
which consolidated dealing with the refugees as demographic groups
on the one hand, while it propels towards a solution based on a formula
of rehabilitation and resettlement having invalidated the Right of
Return.
The Jordanian - Israeli Treaty (26 - 10 - 94) puts forward in article
8, a blatant prototype of the bilateral arrangements that Israel seeks,
following its misleading talk concerning major humanitarian problems
for both sides (!) and the invalidation of the relative international
legal resolutions and mysteriously exchanging them with international
law regulations... The transformation to the essence is realized by
all this, talking plainly about resettling the Refugees and Displaced
(paragraph 2/c)
To this bilateral arrangement, and in the framework of the evident
role assigned by Israel for Jordan in the permanent status negotiations
(in the negotiations... and not only in the spheres agree upon as a
result of these negotiations). thus the aformentioned article 8 (Paragraph
2- B/ 2) sheds light of the Jordanian role concerning the Refugees
in the region mentioned in article 3 of the Treaty (in other words,
the West Bank ) in addition the Palestinian party (with and parallel
to). That Jordan concerning the Refugee portfolio, is independent from
the Palestinian side in its bilateral arrangements with Israel, but
it is party and a partner in this portfolio in the permanent status
negotiations.
The Multiplicity of Negotiating frameworks concerning the refugees
and the multiplicity of parties in the absence of the relevant international
legal referal authority and in consideration of the lack of Arab coordination
and the loss of a negotiating Arab strategy coordinated in its general
outlines, with the continued Arab imbalance in Israel's favor and the
advance in the formulation of the bilateral and unilateral solutions.
All this weakened should it not cancel, the Palestinian Influence on
what occurs in the Refugee issue negotiations.
A principal aspect of the Palestinian destiny and national future
is being formed without Palestinian participation. whether on this
level of the masses of refugees or ruling institutions (The Self-rule
Authority, The remnants of the PLO institutions abroad, The local Leaders
in the Diaspora). Hence the necessity and importance of total coordination
between the Palestinian side and the other Arabs concerned with this
subject, specifically the countries hosting the refugees. Parallel
to this it becomes essential that a comprehensive, democratic and open
discussion is conducted between the various refugee groupings regarding
their problem and how to regain their rights. One of the main ways
to contain the weakness of the Palestinian role and overcome its absence
comes about by:
- Stimulating and rebuilding the Diaspora's role with its organized
mass movement and the authority of its leaders.
- Highlighting the Refugees issue in the occupied land as an independent
case supported by a mass movement under the banner
and demands of the refugees.
- Unifying the working framework and movement and coordinating
the tactics of the struggles between the Occupied land and the Diaspora
concerning the refugees.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation: The Broad Outline and its Implications
Ever
since the Refugee issue arose the plan for resettlement
was in confrontation with the Right of Return.
Up to the present, resettlement correlates with a
stable relation contradicting the return . To start with, resettlement
does not impose exchanging the Palestinian identity for another - though
it might lead to it - but basically the cancellation of the Right of
Return and the political and legal status of the refugees on the one
hand, and on the other the rehabilitation of the sheltering conditions
of the refugees and their living conditions, elevating their living
standards to the required material level on the one side, and to minimize
the role of camps, with a view to what they represent as an international
commitment towards the Refugee issue and the Right of Return.
The general outline for resolving the Refugee issue, as defined in
the Oslo Agreement is the plan for resettlement and rehabilitation.
This plan lies at the heart of the current conflict concerning national
rights and the existing attempts to facilitate its passage (or to draft
antecedents to ease its imposition) started to spread its influence
quietly before the start of the refugee negotiations considering it
one of the banner headline in the Permanent Status Negotiations (Jordanian-Israeli
Treaty, the Refugee Working Group within the framework of the multilaterals,
the Oslo Agreement itself, the framing of UNRWA tasks with its requirements
to support its implementation ...). The struggle against the resettlement
plan is a struggle with a plan that has already moved some way on the
negotiation and implementation levels. This on the one hand....
... On the other, it is a struggle against a plan that does not present
itself in the same form in various areas, the current attempts to impose
it takes its tangible characteristics from the prevailing conditions
at the place of application, and they are the defined conditions for
the situation of the refugees in that place. The legal framework within
which the refugee presence, embodied in various countries, is not the
basis to shed the light on the refugees conditions to indicate the
various possibilities ( Diversification) of resettlement plans and
outcomes, thus enjoying civil rights - in Syria - does not necessarily
advance resettlement, the deprivation of these same rights in Lebanon
does not avert its dangers but may be the opposite. The legal framework
is one component which plays a role, beside which and preceding it
the following should be taken into account: The political, economic
and social structures of the specific country and the proportion of
internal powers that affect the Refugee portfolio plus the size of
the external pressures exerted on it in addition to the position of
the Palestinian national movement and its alliances, and the historical
relations of each country with the Palestinian issue and the development
of this relationship and its stand which is formed within the settlement
process and its regional task...
These are the conditions to be considered to comprehend what is being
prepared to ensure the passage of the resettlement plan in its various
forms, in order to derive the method of confronting this plan with
its potentialities and the dangers resulting from it, this plan affects
national future and destiny of a main portion of our people, according
to official UNRWA statistics in 1995 the number of registered refugees
reached 3 million 185 thousand, amongst whom one million 200 thousand
were in the West Bank and Gaza (37.3%) and one million 983 thousand
in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (62.3%) This will be discussed later taking
into consideration the determining conditions of the refugee situation
in the Occupied Homeland and in all Host Countries.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation: The West Bank and Gaza
Indications of
resettlement in the West Bank and Gaza are clear enough not to ignore
the facts collected up till now. After the original abandonment of Resolutions
194 and 237 the Authority's representatives yielded to matters prejudicial
to the Refugee issue among which are:
- Participation by West Bank and Gaza refugees
in the Self-rule council elections. This is a political
pointer that shows acceptance of the existing Israeli
assumption on resettlement in the Self-rule area,
and consolidates the Israeli pretext, and help
it to repudiate its responsibilities towards their
rights and challenge their refugee status.
- Practical imposition by Israel of its perception
for dealing with the portfolio of Displaced who
were originaly refugees, with resettlement where
they currently reside, Mostly in Jordan which is
committed to resettlement through the Treaty's
Regulations.
- Dealing with UNRWA by accepting its designated
role post Oslo Accord in developing structures
and institutions that the Authority depends on
through transferring its responsibilities and its
employees to it while terminating its services
and subsequently releasing it from its political
commitment to the international legal Resolution
for resolving the Refugee issue.
The dangers of these pointers should not be under-estimated under
the pretext that the permanent status negotiations have not yet commenced
vis-a-vis the refugees. We have shown that the negotiations and what
sometimes follows (practical arrangements with certain aspects of the
Refugee issue) have progressed some what. What increases the dangers
of resettlement is the reality of the national identity, people and
land related, to the domain where it is to be applied ( The West Bank
and Gaza), in addition to the prolonged time lapse since the 1948 exodus
and its consequences of interrelationships between the refugees and
the non- refugees of their people in the Occupied Territories.
With this background, we should perceive the atmosphere prevalent
among the higher strata of the Palestinian Authority and its parties
and some sections of the middle classes who affect public opinion,
about the uselessness of demanding the implementation of paragraph
11 of Resolution 194 ( because it conflicts with the Israeli concept
of being a threat to its Existence) and replacing it with the demand
for the Right of Return to the 1967 Territories.
This Prevarication based on bypassing Resolution 194 and combining
its subject matter to Resolution 237 which was not originally mentioned
in the negotiatary authoritative source and as well as the Israeli
refusal principally to categorize the Displaced refugees origin among
those included in the discussion of the Displaced portfolio. This prevarication
that is predestined to be in-effective on the Israeli side as long
as the general conditions covering the negotiations have not changed,
does not generate pressure that serves the return of the Diaspora Refugees
to the 1967 Territories, but instead exclusively serves the resettlement
plan of the refugees originally residing in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.
What has been stated, as important as it is, ant the dangers of its
intentions, does not necessarily impose the possibility of the resettlement
solution in the West Bank and Gaza - A thorough examination shows the
recalcitrant nature of the resettlement plan and the real obstacles
in its way, and it manifested another facet of the issue which embraced
important instigatory factors as well as signs of a national solution
of the issue of the refugees. For a start it is important to remember
that the refugees in the West Bank and Gaza form a major demographic
grouping that is not easily overlooked (According UNRWA statistics
for the year 1995, The refugees counted for 52.5% of the total residents.
Distributed as follows: 684 thousand in Gaza representing 77% of the
residents of the Strip , and 518 thousand in the West Bank representing
37% of its residents). What consolidates the importance of this data
is the preserving of social and residential state of this bloc (55.6%
of the refugees in Gaza live in eight camps, and 25.6% of the refugees
in the West Bank live nineteen camps).
This situation with its heritage of struggle background which protected
the Refugee issue (before 1967) as a banner headline for the national
issue externally and the issue of the return as a pivot of the Palestinian
national struggle, during which the camps and the refugee masses were
transformed post 1967 into a principle base to resisting the occupation
and a springboard of the Intifadah, and they are still performing their
progressive role until today. This situation with its objective elements
and its accumulated combativeness takes the Refugee issue in the West
Bank and Gaza as obstacle to be controled hidden behind the walls of
Resettlement.
The first people's conference for the refugees in the West Bank held
in Al-Fare'a camp (8/12/1995) by an invitation from "Social Youth Centers
Union" in the West Bank camps. This conference indicates the refugees
political mood and the existing combative readiness in refugee circles
in the Occupied Homeland via the decisions and directives eminating
from it:" The political national and historical unity of the Palestinian
people is indivisible. The Refugee issue is the central Palestinian
people's national issue as in the issue of Jerusalem and the borders
and the national identity issues. The international legal Resolutions
are the basis for the solution of the Refugee issue uppermost being
Resolutions 181 and 194 which both originated from the United Nations.
The Refugee issue is political and not economic concerned with improving
their living conditions. Rejection of the resettlement plans and any
relevant agreements or programmes regarding this issue whether resettlement
occurs within the Occupied Homeland or outside it. Rejection of attempts
to transfer the refugees from the Jordanian camps and the current attempts
to resettle the Lebanese camps refugees as well as the refusal to accept
compensation against foregoing the Right of Return. Rejecting the plans
to annul UNRWA and terminating its services or transferring its authority
to local or international institutions or parties and preserving the
Agency until such time when a just and permanent solution to the Refugee
issue according to UN Resolutions is reached. Calling on the refugees
in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to hold similar conferences and
handling their own cause, and finding a mechanism to coordinate the
refugee standpoints and communicating among themselves in all their
gathering places.
According to Israel, the Refugee portfolio in the West Bank and Gaza
is an internal portfolio which directly affects the Israeli situation.
Hence forth, its priority over the other Refugee portfolios in the
Host Countries, and the Israeli insistence on imposing a resettlement
solution in the West Bank and Gaza is based upon canceling the three
status ( the refugee ---- refugee camp and the UNRWA). The complications
of this portfolio and its charged Palestinian factors that is faced
with on the opposite side by the Israeli planning to impose a solution
that is liquidatory, make the Refugee issue a hot topic in the permanent
status negotiations, at the same time commending the refugees in the
West Bank and Gaza to perform a pivotal role in crystallizing a mass
current that compliments the impetus of its counterpart in the Diaspora.
The Refugee issue is a principle united banner that penetrated their
rallying points in the Occupied Territories and the Diaspora, and represents
a burden of concern and interest internally and externally, which required
it to occupy its natural position in a wider working programme by the
powers and activists of the West Bank and Gaza.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation... Jordan
Palestinian presence exiled
in host Arab countries since 1948 created a problematic matter with extreme
sensitivity. Before this problematic substance being the offspring of
demographic data or a legal situation, it is the result of the nature
of the political project specifically concerned with the refugees based
on resettlement, that Israel sought and continues to seek to impose,
on the Palestinian People and the peoples of the region. This is what
becomes evident from the examples of the Host Countries, starting with
Jordan. Historically, the relationship between the Jordan Regime and the Palestinian
People (including the refugees) has been governed by an Entity structural
dimension. In 1948 the aftermath of the Palestinian catastrophe on
Jordan was not limited to receiving the refugees as did the other Arab
countries, but quickly superseded it by annexing part of the land of
Palestine to the Jordanian Entity (Jericho conference 1950) which entitled
the Palestinians in the West Bank and East Bank (including the refugees)
legally to citizenship rights which won them the Jordanian nationality
as well.
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Jerusalem (1967) and the
Jordanian seperation of legal and administrative connections with the
West Bank (1988) did not essentially alter this fact. Excluding certain
group of the 1967 displaced who won granted rights of residence and
movement without attaining nationality and full civil rights, The following
reality was established: The Palestinians in Jordan are granted citizenship
right which entitles them to individual rights, but denies them the
right to express fully their Palestinian National Identity.
This disturbing equation ( citizenship right is not connected with
the right to express national identity) spotlights the tense situation
which has often impaired Palestino-Jordanian relationships at all levels.
The latest developments exemplified by Wadi Araba Treaty and the Oslo
Agreement, are based on additional strained factors that reflect negatively
on these relations. The Oslo Agreement, despite not mentioning resettlement
in its text, it did not close the door on the subject, but kept in
open to all possibilities.
The Treaty adopts - as mentioned beforehand- the resettlement solution
for the dual issues of the Refugees and the Displaced, that is why
it does not mention the relevant international legal Resolutions, and
ignored mentioning UNRWA when addressing the agreed upon United Nations
programmes and other international economic programmes... and what
some of the refugee camps face from the dangers of dismantlement and
its consequences, or the diminution of camps superficies under the
pretexet of returning the built upon land to their owners in compliance
with legal Resolutions, legal wranglings are not coincidental and they
comply with the intended resettlement trend that also passes through
the plan to eliminte the refugees camps.
The government plan under the banner of " The strategic plan for the
residents in Jordan" to solve the residential problems including overcrowding
is specially directed at the refugee camps, which the World Bank plan
aims to transform to urban development regions. The problem of course
does not lie with these plans, in that they claim to improve residential
and living conditions, but in their aim to eliminate the political
character of the camps or its international stature.
The current efforts to change the relationship between Jordan and
the UNRWA fall in this context. Changing the title of "Director of
UNRWA in Jordan" to " Director of Operations in Jordan" as if the Agency
has become an institution whose operations or programs can be annexed
to similar programmes in the state or the private sector, further evidence
of releasing the Agency of its responsibilities, and a step towards
transforming these responsibilities to another party. Changing the
Title is part of the necessary political preparation for changing the
relationship between Jordan and the Agency thus making Jordan not a
host country, it is a further step on the road to transforming Jordan
from a state that hosts the refugees to a state with refugee citizenry.
This step converges with the resettlement plan, with it latest decisions
on citizenship in the government programme, the latest of which was
opening the gates to the people of Beersheba bedouins to attain Jordanian
passports. This step points in turn to Jordanian readiness to play
a direct role in the Refugee issue within the permanent status arrangement,
whether by proceeding these negotiations or participating in them,
and then dealing with their results based on the resettlements and
rehabilitation plan in Jordan , and what goes beyond its borders......
in the Occupied Territories. This is what article eight is based upon
in the treaty as previously mentioned
The resettlement plan in Jordan is a problematic issue that is highly
sensitive, and despite the distinct nature of the demographic factor
in nurturing this sensitivity (1.3 million refugees, i.e. 40.8% of
all registered refugees who form 32% of Jordanian residents. This proportion
rises automatically if we take into account that the number of Palestinians
exceeds the number of registered refugees), Despite its importance
this peculiarity is not the source of the problematic issue, but principally
the political project, which preparation continues for its imposition.
Namely resettlement, which in Jordan's particular case releases, for
various reasons, a destructive dynamism known as the " alternative
homeland" Which naturally will not lead to an alternative never mind
a homeland, but aims principally to create conditions and devising
a climate of rivalry between an Arab People and another brotherly Arab
People in conflict over the components of sovereignty and statehood.
This is what attributes added importance in Jordan to the slogan of
confronting resettlement and the Alternative Homeland. It reflects
on the one hand the insistence on the Right of Return considering it
at the core of national rights, and one of the constituents of practicing
the Right of Self Determination (The independent state + the Return).
On the other hand working to transform this slogan to a political and
popular working plan... is the fundamental guarantee to bury the plan
of civil strife between the two peoples to establish the relationship
between them on healthy and principled foundation.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation: Lebanon and Syria
Lebanon:
An exaggeration exists in some circles in Lebanon concerning the risks
of the Palestinian presence and its effects on the country's internal
situation should resettlement occur, due to the delicate sectarian
- political balance, and the high number of Palestinians resident on
its territory (346 thousand registered refugees representing 10% of
the residents in Lebanon). The Oslo Agreement served the purposes of
this trend and reinforced the pretext of its perpetrators.
It is admissable, that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has an
effective demographic dimension, and with Oslo's resettlement line
of action, and the tried Israeli efforts to effect this plan, make
its dangers tangible and real.... The trend to overcome the dangers
of resettlement in its proper dimension rather than exaggerating these
dangers and inflating them to create fabrications in some instances,
is governed by the constant fear of the direct link between the Palestinian
presence and their National Issue, and what that relationship represents
with its direct combative potential with Israel as a burden on the
Lebanese situation in the past and the burden it could represent presently
and in the future.
Whatever the considerations and motivations, Israel has succeeded
and the Oslo Agreement came about to reinforce this success, in making
the resettlement issue dominate any objective and quiet discussion
of the Palestinian situation in Lebanon. Moreover it has become the
compulsory path towards any approach of this subject and its sole headline
most of the time.
Rejection of resettlement under the pretext of a conspiracy against
the entity and disturbing the internal balance, and the rejection of
resettlement as mentioned in the Taif Agreement, contained in the constitutional
modifications derived from that agreements, is the official political
banner and declared position of all political powers in Lebanon and
its sectarian authorities. The main pretext in denying the Palestinian
People their civil and social rights is the reality of resettlement
which leads to exercising these rights, hereby complete or partial
ratification precedes the results of the negotiations with Israel,
further more, it propels it to adhere to resettlement plans. (!)
With this background the door has not been closed only concerning
discussions of civil and social rights, but has transferred official
proecdures to encroach on the legal rights previously guaranteed for
Palestinian refugees, most prominent among which is the right to travel
from and to Lebanon under Lebanese travel documentation, whereby this
movement was restricted in accordance with ruling number 478 issued
by the Interior Ministry which imposed visas on Palestinians holding
these documents regarding their entry into Lebanon.
This procedure falls within the framework of a policy to stimulate
Palestinian migration from Lebanon, to arrive at the end of negotiation
with the lightest possible Palestinian demographic (and political)
burden. The fear of the coming resettlement dangers from now leads
to preclusive attempts at early emigration.
With the imminence of the negotiations around the permanent status
and the point at which the negotiation has arrived at in general, the
coming period shall witness increased pressure on the Refugee portfolio
in the Host Arab Countries, and these pressures will be felt specifically
by the Palestinians in Lebanon so as:
- To disminish the group of Palestinian masses through enforced
emigration as well as other procedures (e.g. deleting
names form the refugee register....)
- Restrictions on the camps and their residential space, its infrastructure,
its services to dim their specific role and geographic-demographic
distinctiveness.
- Attempts to prevent the development of the means and frameworks
to independently express the Palestinian character
and the defense of its direct national interests.
This policy is based on incitement to emigrate so that the Palestinian
position is at its lowest level possible vis-a-vis numbers, rights,
demographic-geographic particularity and national expression ( National
identity and the framework to express it). This policy based in preceding
resettlement with emigration is of dubious benefit up till now, it
has been tried without success, its danger lies in the probability
that it will lead to the opposite of the goals it aspires to, in other
words maintaining the Palestinian presence in Lebanon although in fewer
numbers and lesser civil rights.
Resisting resettlement is to no avail with the continued deprivation
of the Palestinians in Lebanon of their natural rights to freedom of
work, movement and travel unconditionally nor with encouraging emigration,
but in enabling this people to protect its national identity and preserve
its social cohesion and its human rights to continue the endeavour
for their national rights within the Lebanese ability, respect of its
sovereignty and observing its national priorities.
The struggle of the Palestinian People in Lebanon for the Right of
Return to their homeland is not held to the extent of its secured rights
that guarantee it just conditions to a decent life. Undoubtedly the
availability of these rights provide its struggle with greater validity.
the Lebanese national interest will be realized also by protecting
the Palestinian identity against dispersal and dissolution, protecting
its social cohesion, and with a Palestinian voice united in all its
strengths and sensibilities in its demand for the return and rejection
of resettlement.
Syria:
Israel considers the resettlement conditions apply adequately to the
Palestinian presence in Syria with its social stability since 1948
and with indiscriminate civil and social rights, while at the same
time not forming any demographic stress (337 thousand registered refugees
representing 2.5% of the residents in Syria) nor does it exert economic
pressure on a large country rich in resources.
Thought correct, this data does not enhance the Palestinian situation
in Syria. and does not prove its acceptance of resettlement, and does
not point towards the fulfillment of the conditions of this resettlement.
facts show that the role performed by our people in Syria in re-establishing
and rebuilding the Palestinian movement post 1948 and becoming affiliated
in its ranks and being part of the journey at all its different stations,
produced frameworks and gave birth to an awareness specifically render
the Palestinian reality in Syria being the most difficult obstacle,
in the path of the plan for resettlement and confronting it. The Palestinians
example in Syria asserts that guarateeing civil and social rights maintains
the national identity, protects it from the dangers of resettlement
and cuts the road in front of the trend for discarding this identity,
to avoid melting into the existing surroundings.
The Refugees In Their Land: Extirpation And Expulsion In The Lands
of 1948
The Uprooted .. the Displaced in their land, "Arab citizens of the
state of Israel" local refugees. The majority expelled from their villages
during the war of 1948 and in the subsequent period
in the fifties. They form a major bloc of the Palestinian people within
the borders of Israel (40% of its numbers) in excess of 300 thousand
(approximately 60 thousand families).
It is well known that Israel destroyed 80% of Palestinian villages,
specially in the north of the country (385 villages from a total of
475 as well as 150 shanty centers and farms ..). Jewish settlements
were constructed on the ruins of these villages, its lands registered
in the land registry were considered "state land", expulsions from
the villages coincided with the confiscation of the lands, so they
became two sides of the same coin entitled: Extirpation and expulsion
within the judaisation plan.
In this context the goal of settling these lands took on a broader
aspect:
- To threaten the Palestinian presence in general and in some
regions to threaten it totally ( in NEGEV and others
...)
- To prevent the villages natural development and to bring about
the urban underdevelopment of Arab towns (e.g.
NAZARETH).
- To create a settlers block on the green-line (between the West
Bank and the 1948 Territories) which will prevent
drawing such a line, and to connect these groupings
of settlers in the Occupied Territories to create an Israeli expanse
from the coastal plain to the West Bank mountains (the seven star
plan in the Arab triangle region expanding from Kafr Kassem to Um
Al-Fahem).
Along with the settlement issue and expropriation, the problem of
the extirpated, refugees in their own lands, formed one of the crucial
pivots from the struggle of the masses in the 1948 territories. In
this context inspired examples came to the fore, amongst which was
the struggle of the villages of Iqrith and Kafr Bor'om to return to
their homes and land.
Commencing by confronting this issue through a representative framework
and united combative programme, required a great transformation on
the scale of the Madrid track (30-10-91). The shock of the event galvanized
the Arab Minority in the 1948 Territories who became aware that their
case was not listed in the current negotiation schedule, despite being
an indivisible part of the Palestinian People, and any agreements or
settlements that, this operation might result in, will not take into
account the problems and the vital interests of this minority.
In this climate, the call for self reliance, preparation to lead a
more vigorous struggle and a system of defending the rights of "the
Refugees in their own land" in order to return to their villages and
possessions met with an encouraging response. On this basis a wide
discussion procedure was initiated to scrutinize the work possibilities
open to the Uprooted and to inspect the various alternatives, so they
may regain their rights. This operation was crowned in mid 1992 with
the announcement of the formation of "The Initiation Committee for
the Defense of local refugee rights", which in turn formed through
intense endeavor focused on surveying the situation of the extirpated,
linked to their various frameworks and highlighting their specific
demands for the Ibleen conference (11.3.95).
Representatives of local Arab committees, 280 deputies representing
30 different villages participated in the works of this conference.
From the conference emerged "the Regional Committee for the Defense
of the Displaced Rights in Israel" (which is the palliative expression
of refugees in their own land). From that instant this framework was
transformed into the sole representative of local refugees in the 1948
territories.
The Right of Return for the "refugees in their own land" is guaranteed
by Resolution 194 (paragraph 11) due to the comprehensive nature of
this Resolution and its application to the situations of all refugees
whatever the reason for their seeking refuge (beyond Israel's borders
or inside them). To this foundation, could be added specific UN Resolutions
which confirmed the return of those expelled and uprooted post 1948.
Interspersed between these Resolutions examples such as: Security Council
Resolution number 89 (17-11-1950) concerning a complaint by Egypt about
the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians outside Israel's borders,
the Resolution which stipulated their return. Also Security Council
Resolution number 93 (19-5-1951) which requested Israel to immediately
permit the return of those expelled to the large of the 1948 territories,
to their villages in the demilitarized Palestinian territories adjacent
to the Syrian border.
The method of dealing with the Refugee portfolio, which institutes
the co-ordination of frameworks and work programmes, in the West Bank
and Gaza and the various Diaspora countries, and the collating of the
common areas between them. This line does not apply to the problem
of uprooted in 1948 land due to its specific nature. Naturally this
does not cancel out the possibility of crystallizing certain reciprocal
from support whenever this possibility occurred.
The struggle of "the refugees in their land" is a struggle against
the policy of discrimination and state oppression under whose rule
they live and which does not principally recognize the existence of
their problem. They have a right to return tot heir villages and possessions.
It is a basic right guaranteed by the International Declaration of
Human Rights and international law regulations, as well as U.N. Resolutions
previously mentioned. Lately the need by the Israeli government to
grant the Right of Return to the villages of Iqrith and Kafr Bor'om
served as a glaring example of what can be achieved through endeavor
according to the struggle to regain usurped rights.
This struggle entails the mobilization of the refugee capacities in
the 1948 territories, through local committees representing all the
destroyed villages. As well as mobilizing the resources of the whole
Palestinian community within the Israeli Entity in all its frameworks,
political and civil institutions. Unrelenting efforts should be spent
to broaden this base, which provides the springboard to gain the support
and solidarity of the Israeli progressive and democratic forces who
carry the banner of a just peace with the peoples and states of the
region. Those who seek justice and peace with their neighbors, should
foremost call for justice as the road towards peace with the oppressed
citizens of their state.
The Liquidatory Solution to the Refugee problem
The perseverance of the
Refugee problem assures the endurance of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
This is a prevalent fact, and Israel is foremost in recognizing this
as it considers it impossible to have permanent realistic and radical
solution to the conflict with the Palestinians, without putting an end
to the Refugee problem. Therefore any agreement about the Refugee issue from an Israeli viewpoint,
must form:
- A solution to end the Refugee problem in all its aspects, so
any political agreement leaves this matter open,
even only some of its components, can not last
in the long run.
- For a solution that has been tried and tested, not only drafted,
among the headlines of the permanent status the
issue of the refugees forms one of the subjects
where the Palestinians are going to be placed in
the position of applying the peace that will be arrived at. Therefore,
the comprehensive time table to apply the agreement about the permanent
status is the period required to complete the goal of resolving the
Refugees issue.
The Israeli view of the solution, has been mentioned in the previous
chapters and we re-focus on the following points: "Israel refuses to
deal with the Refugees issue (and the Displaced) on the basis of any
International Legal Referal Authority. Upon this it seeks to cancel
out the three positions that embody this authority: The refugee - UNRWA
- the refugee camp. The negotiation framework is the authority and
what it arrives at is the solution, and it is a bilateral course between
Israel, the Palestinians and the Host Countries each by itself. Each
track independent in its mechanism and results and does not require
the approval of the other parties, including the Palestinian party.
The Refugee portfolio to be distributed to the bilateral, and the comprehensive
solution is the sum total of all the tracks. No in response to any
legal-political request for the Right of Return according to United
Nation Resolutions or any other international Resolutions. Israel refuses
the return of any number of refugees, not according to any gained Palestinian
right nor according to any bilateral agreement even if it was based
on humanitarian considerations, allowing the bilateral agreement in
principle, means permitting an external party to be a partner in a
sovreignity decision. Rallying together individual cases according
to humanitarian considerations, is nothing but, Israel maintaining
alone the total right to decide. The solution is re-settlement and
re-habilitation. The cancellation of UNRWA and transference of its
services and employees to the Palestinian Authority and the Host Arab
countries.
Regarding its standpoint concerning the Refugee issue (the Displaced)
Israel relies on the following effective factors:
- The existing negotiating structure does not rely on U.N. Resolutions.
The Referal Authority is formed by the negotiating
structures, they are numerous frameworks independent
and separate from each other, the Refugee problem
distributed among them without a common denominator.
- The progress achieved, to date, on the negotiating tracks from
vies of its appropriateness with the Israeli
stand as in the Jordanian Treaty that relied on re-settlement and
re-habilitation as a solution. And the results of the tasks of the
Refugee Working Group of the multilateral track and its movement
within the sphere of the rehabilitation programme. And the re-definition
direction of Oslo Accord and its applications, specially the re-settlement
of the tasks of UNRWA and its priorities in what serves the resettlement
programme on the way of dissolving the institution.
- Weakness of Arab coordination or lack of it. The existing negotiating
structure strengthens this trend. As well as
the differences of the views and priorities of the Arab parties:
Jordan has resolved its viewpoint as previously mentioned. The Lebanese
priority is to anticipate resettlement with a policy of dubious benefit
and not participating in exerting pressure to ensure the Right of
Return. Syria which restricts its demands post Oslo with the Syrian
and Lebanese portfolios does not address the Refugee issue at the
time being and consequently the Right of Return among its priorities.
With the knowledge that some Syrian actions point to caution regarding
the possibility of pressure being exerted for resettlement (in the
Refugee camps not allowing financed programmes from the budgets of
the Peace Implementation Programme which is estimated to serve this
direction - not dealing with the off shoots of the multilaterals,
denying Palestinians holders of (Egyptian and
Jordanian) passports from entry, fearing the possibility of increasing
the Palestinian demographic grouping in the country.
- The official Palestinian policy, with its background of affiliation
in the Oslo option, with the Refugee portfolio
accorded less significance that the issue represents. Added to that
the scattering of the efforts of the opposition and its non-focusing
on the portfolio when it is considered one of the tow main headlines
of the Palestinian national issue (the refugees and the land).
These factors make us stand at the point of the commencement of the
permanent status negotiations concerning the Refugee issue not as an
issue which is being prepared for discussion, but an issue that has
already gone some distance along the way with the Israeli perception
towards its Resolution, whereby its ceiling has been defined through
the definition of the negotiating framework and its principles, and
its negotiating and practical steps have started to be realized on
the ground. But despite the afore mentioned, there remains major obstacles
and difficulties that stand in the way of the eliminating solution
of the Refugee (Displaced) issue. This portfolio is the most complicated
and urgent of all the negotiation's items, and it subsquently opens
a broad area to improve the conditions of confrontation on the road
to satisfying a just solution of the Refugee issue.
Towards A Just Solution for the Refugees issue a) The present negotiation framework and the resulting agreements,
despite overpassing the limits of the international legal reference
with its resolutions, regarding the Refugees (and the Displaced), could
not cancel its role in preserving the political-legal status of the
Refugees cause, and could not harm the international commitment with
this issue. The above mentioned requires the following:
- Holding to the International Legal Resolutions as the basis
for solving the Refugees issue, particularly resolution
194, that includes the Right of Return, to which
Resolutions 273 (Accepting Israel's membership
in the UN) and 302 (founding the UNRWA) are based, and which the
resolutions related to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
People and its right in self-determination are built upon... within
this frame also, holding to resolution 237 ( Security Council) for
the unconditional return of the Displaced, and the refusal of any
attempt to include the Displaced file with the Refugees, since it
is an open attempt to eliminate the implementation of this resolution
and weakening the Displaced issue.
- Rejecting the plans of liquidating the UNRWA, exterminating
its services, and transmitting its works and employees
to the Self-rule Authority and the Hosting Arab
Countries . Also, keeping the Agency since it embodies
the International legal and political commitment with the Refugees
issue, as its establishment was based on Resolution
194 paragraph 11, that states the Right to Return. Moreover, providing
the appropriate conditions for the Agency to continue with its commitments
towards the refugees until reaching a just and permanent solution
to their cause
- Refusing to change the status of the camps and confronting the
liquidation plans or moving the refugees from
them within the frame of the rehabilitation plans,
because of its international placement and what
its presence means of materialistic and psychological
power to the refugees cause . Holding to the camps placement for
what it represents of political and legal commitment with the refugees
rights does not contradict the necessary projects to improve the
prevailing living circumstances of the camps and the services presented
to their residents.
b) The Refugees issue is a political one in the first place, and an
inseparable part of the Palestinian National Issue. Its solution falls
into giving the Palestinian people the right of self-determination
based to the right to return and the refugees freedom in practicing
this right. The present negotiating framework for the refugees cause
- on both levels: the Palestinians and the Arab - is not based on any
International Legal Reference, which paves the way for Israel to impose
its speculations of the solution which is based on resettlement and
rehabilitation. That requires confirmation of the followings:
- The refugees cause is a unified one between the Occupied Territories
and the Diaspora, which requires frames, programs,
and line of work, that are coordinated and in harmony
between the Inside and the Outside.
- One of the main reasons for the least attention given to the
Refugees issue, regionally and internationally
refers to the weak movement of the masses within
the refugees under the mottoes of Return and for
attaining their rights. The pivot of the national and social programme
in each grouping of the Diaspora is the right of return and the struggle
for its achievement. therefore, the masses working-direction should
be activated in the Diaspora and the Homeland through calling on
the refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon, to hold popular conferences, and to take their cause in
their own hands to establish a mechanism of coordinating the refugees
positions and communicating with each other in all their groupings.
- Political, and mobilization activities, internationally and
Arab levels, occupy an important position in keeping
the Refugees issue alive and present in the international
mind. In this cause, the NGO conferences, research,
seminars etc. play a crucial role in providing the material support
to the plans of development in the camps, and mobilization of the
international support abilities for refugees rights and especially
that of returning Home.
c) Distributing the Refugees issue on several dual tracks, independent
from each other by its negotiating mechanism and results, leads practically
to extract the Palestinian participation which would also lead to redraw
their destiny.
What the Palestinians have to do are the followings:
- Seeking to enforce consultation, cooperation and coordination
between the concerned Arab negotiating tracks regarding
the Refugees issue, on the basis of unifying any
resolution taken by the Arab sides, to avoid taking
solely any direction that effect the refugees file in general.
- The Palestinian dispersion in the host Arab countries gives
the Refugees issue a regional trait, and creates
in these countries - besides the boundaries with
Israel - an internal contact with the Palestinian
cause. This double contact creates a common ground of interest and
issues of mutual importance that should be invested to support the
Refugees issue
- The Israeli solution, based on the liquidation of the refugees
file in the Diaspora for the resettlement, does
not only contradict the Palestinian interest ,
but also with interest of the Host Country. The
resettlement plan is an internal dissension project
between the Palestinians and the Arab peoples. Hence the true interest
is in the joint struggle against the resettlement for the Right of
Return.
d) A mass Palestinian movement that unifies the refugees struggle
in the Occupied Territories and the Diaspora, armed with the international
legal resolutions, and what these resolutions reflect of international
commitment to the refugees rights above all the Right of Return , is
a movement seeking to coordinate its efforts and to unify it in the
different places of existence, and between them, and establishing close
relations with the brotherly Arab peoples on the basis of rejecting
the resettlement and holding to the Right of Return home, and be active
in the different international and institutional instances... Such
a movement with such an agenda is capable of creating new facts in
favor of the refugees rights.
Despite the impression that is emerging from respective facts of an
advancement of the Israeli solution in the Refugees (and the Displaced)
line, proceeding an opposing movement of the Refugees to the liquidation
solution of their issue, can create an opposite dynamics to the Israeli
advancement: dynamics that opens to a just solution to the Refugees
and Displaced issue under the banner of return as a free choice and
as an inseparable part of the national rights.
Annex
No I.
Resolution 194 / Paragraph 11 of 11 December 1948.
Establishment of the United Nations Conciliation Commission; Resolution
to accord Jerusalem an international specific regime; Resolution on
the refugees' Right of Return to their homes, in order to adjust the
situation, promoting the realization of Peace in Palestine in the future.
The General Assembly ...
11.
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live
at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property
of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; ... "
Instructs the conciliation commission to facilitate the repatriation,
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees
and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with
the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and,
through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United
Nations.
No. II
Resolution 273 (the introduction)
11 May 1949
Israel Joins the United Nations
The General Assembly ...
"Recalling its Resolutions (181 and 194) of 29 November 1947 and 11
December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations
made by the representative of the government of Israel before the ad
hoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said
Resolutions ...
No. III
Resolution 302/Para. 5 and 20
8 December 1949
Establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East.
The General Assembly,
Recalling its Resolutions 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 and 194 of
11 December 1948, affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph
11 of the latter Resolution ...
5. Recognizes that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph
11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 ... continued assistance for
the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions
of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of
peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken
at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance
for relief;
20. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation
Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective
tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly
Resolution 194 ...
No. IV
Resolution 237
14 June 1967
Calling upon Israel to respect human rights in the areas affected
by the Middle East conflict of 1967.
The Security Council,
... "Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should
be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,
Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied
with by the parties involved in the conflict,
1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare
and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations
have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants
who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;
2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect
of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners
of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained
in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;
3. Requests the Secretary General to follow-up the implementation
of this resolution, and to report to the Security Council.
No. V
Jordano-Israeli Peace Treaty
26/10/1994
Article 8: Refugees and Displaced Persons.
1-Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both Parties, by
the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made by
them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the Parties will seek
to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.
2-Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the conflict
in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level,
the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in accordance
with international law, including the following:
(a) In the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee
together with Egypt and the Palestinians.
(b) In the case of refugees,
(I) In the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees.
(II) In negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise,
in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations,
pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of this treaty.
3-Through the implementation of agreed United Nations programmes,
and other agreed international economic programmes, concerning refugees
and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.
No. VI
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank & the Gaza
Strip.
28/9/1995
Article XXVII
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt.
1-Pursuant to Article XII of the Declaration of Principles, the two
Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate
in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between
the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the
one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand,
to promote cooperation between them. As part of these arrangements
a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations.
2-The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities
of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and
disorder.
3-The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common
concern.
Article XXXI
Final Clauses.
9- The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration
of the Council, the Palestinian National Council
will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to
the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the
Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel,
dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994. |