The Harvard Project on Palestinian Refugees
Source: A Paper Presented To The United Nations
Department of Political Affairs
International NGO Meeting
European NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine
Palais des Nations
Geneva, Switzerland
by George Borjas,
Leonard Hausman, and Dani
Rodrik
Institute for Social and Economic Policy in the Middle
East
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
September 2, 1996
I. Introduction
Peace in the Middle East will not endure without resolving
the Palestinian refugee question. The absence of such
an agreement will leave a large number of people feeling
ignored and aggrieved by the peace process. Although
formal talks have been held on the matter intermittently
for over three years, no progress has been made on
formulating a consensus plan for the resolution of
the question.
In this context, a “Track II” effort has
proceeded at Harvard University with two goals. The
first is to have a group of Palestinian, Israeli,
and Jordanian social scientists contribute to the
formal talks by reaching a consensus on the essential
facts of the problem, as well as on the nature and
strength of the economic and social forces that will
have an impact on the resolution of the problem. The
second is to have this group analyze alternative options
for resolving this refugee question; reach agreement
on the outlines of a particular plan; and then recommend
this particular plan to the Track I negotiators. Professors
George Borjas and Dani Rodrik of Harvard’s Kennedy
School co-chair this project, and work with a team
of roughly fifteen professionals, principally Israelis,
Jordanians, and Palestinians who reside in the their
home countries. The “gavel holders” for
the multi-lateral talks on refugees, first Mr. Marc
Perron and then Mr. Andrew Robinson, of Canada’s
Ministry of Foreign, have encouraged the work of this
project since its initiation on February 15-16, 1994.
The Harvard Project on the Palestinian Refugee Question
has produced to date a consensus among its members
on a research plan, and on the broad outlines of a
set of solutions to the essential economic and social
aspects of the problem. In this brief paper, we discuss
the key concerns which the research plan will address.
Then we offer comments on a feasible set of plans.
The latter comments reflect our view of understandings
reached by the group; they have not been reviewed
or approved by the group. Until the research is concluded,
the group cannot agree on the details of feasible
consensus plans. The expertise, including political
awareness that stems from important relationships
in the Middle East, and neutrality of this Harvard
group, should commend its ultimate product to those
seeking a compromise agreement. The work of the Harvard
Refugee Project is greatly enhanced by the data collection
efforts of Norway’s FAFO, and the discussions
held thus far in the multi-laterals.
II. The Research Questions
In 1995, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) enumerated 3.2 million
registered Palestinian refugees, with about 38 percent
of them living in the Palestinian National Authority
(PNA), another 41 percent living in Jordan, and the
remaining split evenly between Syria and Lebanon.
So, roughly, four-fifths of the refugees resided in
the PNA and Jordan. Others have produced different
estimates of the size of the Palestinian refugee population,
some as low as 1.2 million. At this lower estimate,
the distribution of refugees by country, however,
is the same as when the estimate is 3.2 million. The
United Nations has affirmed the “right of return”
for these refugees, as well as the right to financial
reparations.
Beginning with the Camp David agreements, a series
of historic events in the past fifteen years have
opened a window of opportunity for the permanent resolution
of the Palestinian refugee problem. The shape of the
proposed agreement will obviously depend on a host
of economic, social, and political issues. Remarkably,
despite the substantive importance of the refugee
problem, little is known about many of the economic
and social issues which are likely to be a crucial
component of these negotiations. For example, what
is the absorptive capacity of the economy of the PNA?
What policies should the various parties put into
effect now to ensure that the emerging Palestinian
state has a vibrant economy? How many Palestinian
refugees will “return” to the PNA? What
are the costs of converting the refugee camps in the
PNA into permanent and vibrant communities?
A parallel set of questions also exists for Jordan
which currently, as noted, hosts a large number of
Palestinian refugees. The Jordanian economy faces
the dual challenge of a potentially large out-migration
along with the integration of camp populations into
the regular economy. How large are these outflows
likely to be and how can the adjustment costs be minimized?
What are feasible strategies for transforming refugee
camps in Jordan? Our view is that these questions
have to be answered no matter what form the eventual
settlement takes with Israel on the reparations issue,
and therefore should not await this more comprehensive
settlement.
The main objective of the Harvard Refugee Project
is to provide much-needed empirical evidence, in an
objective and reliable manner, on the economic and
social underpinnings of the Palestinian refugee problem.
Secondly, by measuring the various costs and benefits
of particular solutions to the problem, we believe
that our research findings can facilitate the formal
negotiations by pointing to possible solutions to
this extremely difficult problem.
The central research questions being currently analyzed
by the members of the Harvard Refugee Project include:
- A determined effort will be made to reach a consensus,
using old and new data sources, on the characteristics
of the population of Palestinian refugees.
- How many Palestinian refugees can be expected
to “return” to the areas that will be
ruled by the PNA? Even though there are as many
as 2 million Palestinian refugees living outside
the West Bank and Gaza, many of these refugees,
particularly those living in Jordan, have become
established members of their adopted communities,
have relatively high incomes, have extensive if
not full political rights, and have by now grown
roots in their new environment. The empirical evidence
obtained from the study of migration flows in many
other countries around the world suggests that not
all of the Palestinian refugees will exercise their
“right to return”. Obviously, the social
and economic consequences of any permanent solution
to the refugee problem will depend crucially on
the fraction of refugees which chooses to return.
The Harvard Refugee Project can make a very useful
contribution by providing systematic empirical evidence
on the projected size of the return flow to the
PNA, and on likely outflows from specific countries
(such as Jordan).
- What types of immigration policies should the
PNA pursue so as to ensure that the return migration
flow can be absorbed easily by the emerging economy
and social structure of the Palestinian state? Even
if only a small fraction of the Palestinian refugees
residing in other countries choose to return, their
absolute number might be sufficiently high to raise
concerns about the economic and social capacity
of the Palestinian Authority to absorb all of them
in a short period of time. There seems to be some
consensus that a permanent solution to the Palestinian
refugee problem could be achieved in a time frame
of several years. If the time frame were part of
the negotiated settlement, we can then “amortize”
the return migration over that period, giving time
for the various types of social and economic adjustments
to occur in an orderly fashion in the affected areas.
The Harvard Refugee Project will consider alternative
scenarios of how the refugee flow can be handled
and quantify the social and economic adjustments
that will take place as the flow continues. This
phase of the research project will provide a careful
analysis of the experience that Israel encountered
in the late 1980s, when a large flow of Soviet émigrés
entered the country. The lessons learned from that
experience--in particular, the social and economic
adjustments experienced by Israel, as well as the
types of policies that were developed to “smooth
out” these adjustments--could play an influential
role in the negotiated settlement.
- The economic consequences of any agreement will
depend crucially not only on how many refugees exercise
their right to return, but also on which Palestinian
refugees choose to return. It is important to realize
that the sample of refugees who return to Palestine
is a self-selected group. Obviously, different types
of economic adjustments will occur depending on
the types of refugees who exercise their right to
return. As a result, the economic policies that
will be developed to smooth out the adjustment period
will be quite different if the refugees bring with
them substantial human and physical capital, or
if the refugees need substantial financial assistance
and retooling of their skills. The Harvard Refugee
Project will attempt to describe the nature of the
flow that will likely occur, and will help formulate
policies that will be most successful in ensuring
that the refugee flow can make an important (and
rapid) contribution to social and economic life
in the emerging Palestinian state.
- What types of economic and social resources are
required to turn the refugee camps in the West Bank
- Gaza and Jordan into vibrant economic communities?
What types of improvements in the infrastructure
are needed? As noted earlier, two-fifths of the
registered refugees now live in the West Bank and
Gaza; and many of these persons live in refugee
camps. Another two-fifths lives in Jordan, and of
them many also reside in camps. The Harvard Refugee
Project will provide a systematic analysis of the
conditions in the camps, of the improvements required
to upgrade their social and economic infrastructure,
and of the costs that will have to be incurred.
The refugees already residing in the PNA along with
non-refugees living there, are, in effect, the “founding
members” of the emerging state. The speedy
transformation of the refugee camps into successful
economic communities could provide the much-needed
spark that will be required for the development
of the surrounding regions.
- What is the value of the economic benefits that
accrued to Israel and to the PNA through employment
in Israel of Palestinian “commuters”?
Throughout much of the 1980s, Israel depended heavily
on labor imported from the then Occupied Territories.
Recent studies show that upwards of 100 thousand
Palestinians were employed in Israel, and these
“commuters” made up perhaps as much
as 40 percent of the working-age Palestinian male
population in the West Bank and Gaza. The employment
flow from the then Occupied Territories to Israel
probably generated sizable economic benefits both
for Israel and for the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli
economy got an infusion of various types of much-needed
labor, while the Palestinians had access to a wider
array of job opportunities. What types of labor
market adjustments will occur if the flow is discontinued
by “closures” of the West Bank and Gaza?
What types of employment arrangements will persist
after the refugee problem is settled?
- What types of social services can UNRWA provide
today that would be most effective in hastening
the rehabilitation of the region under the control
of the Palestinian Authority, and in the relevant
parts of Jordan, as well as the long-run prospects
of the refugees themselves? Should all of the programs
now sponsored by UNRWA be “rolled over”
to the Palestinian Authority and the government
of Jordan? (It should be noted that such a rollover
does not mean that refugees would forego their claims
to reparations in the process. It also does not
mean that the Palestinian employees of UNRWA would
lose their jobs). How much will this roll-over cost,
and what will be the fiscal basis for the funding
of these programs? What is the size of additional
resources required, and what are the likely levels
of funding available? What is the best use of these
funds, and in what form are they best dispensed
(loans or grants? transfers to the Palestinian Authority
or the households directly?). For the past five
decades, UNRWA has provided an array of social services
to the Palestinian refugee population, such as education,
medical services, and food rations. UNRWA now spends
about $300 million annually to provide social and
economic resources to this population--or about
$100 per registered refugee. A comprehensive solution
to the refugee problem will require additional resources
from abroad. It seems prudent that before the above
questions are answered, we should engage in some
program evaluations. Not all social programs provide
equal value for a given expenditure. The Harvard
Refugee Project, therefore, will evaluate the impact
of the existing social programs on Palestinian social
and economic well-being. This evaluation would be
extremely helpful in the construction of a post-settlement
social “safety net” offered by the PNA.
The Harvard Refugee Project either has or is commissioning
research studies to be done in all of these substantive
areas by a large number of researchers, principally
from Palestine, Israel, and Jordan. The permanent
solution to the Palestinian refugee problem must,
of course, be a political solution--after all, it
will have to deal with the political realities of
the area. Nevertheless, the questions that the Harvard
Refugee Project will explore--and the answers that
the systematic research will provide--can help towards
attaining this political goal. By providing a clear,
objective picture of the economic and social adjustments
that will occur as the refugee problem is solved,
the research supported by the Project will make it
easier for the various parties in the dispute to find
a common ground on which to settle what is surely
a central political problem of our time.
III. An Approach to
a Plan
As the Harvard team proceeds with its research on
the above questions, it has discussed the elements
of a plan for the resolution of the Palestinian refugee
question. Below are initial thoughts on key components
of a plan.
- Professor Rashid Khalidi has said
that “it is inconceivable that most refugees
will be allowed to exercise their right of return
to their original homes in what is now Israel for
the foreseeable future, or perhaps ever.”[1]
When the PLO signed the Oslo I and II accords with
Israel, and then in altering its charter, it traded
its people’s claims to residing in the State
of Israel for the opportunity to create the State
of Palestine. Under the rubric of family re-unification,
there may be token return to Israel; perhaps 5,000
persons per year would return to Israel for each
of ten years.
- It follows that the Palestinian refugee problem
-- as a social and economic problem -- will have
to be solved largely within the PNA, and Jordan
as well. Regarding refugees, the main challenge
that will face the Palestinian government will be
that of turning refugees into citizens and absorbing
refugees into the Palestinian economy at low adjustment
costs. Refugee camps must be converted into normal
towns, the inhabitants of which will be transformed
from refugees into citizens in their own country.
- Return to the emerging Palestine will depend in
good part upon the differences in economic opportunities
for Palestinian households in Lebanon, Jordan, and
Syria as compared to the new state. Since conditions
are worst in Lebanon (as compared to Jordan and
Syria), “return” would be greatest from
there. Many, perhaps most refugees, living in Jordan
are likely to continue to work and reside there.
Hence there will have to be a program of camp conversion
and refugee transformation in Jordan as well as
in the PNA.
- The process of return will likely be gradual,
perhaps distributed over a period of ten years.
The key matter here is the capacity of the PNA to
generate jobs which are economic. Creating such
jobs through economic growth takes time.
- A plan for the return of refugees may make
the issue of reparations more susceptible to solution.
This matter will be difficult for anyone to address
because the data that could support claims is unavailable
or of poor quality. Our project views “return”
and reparations as separable matters. It should
be clear that “return” should not result
in any diminution in claims to reparations. We will
study the former and not the latter. We would do
so were the data that are available very good and
the matter of reparations not highly controversial.
It is on the matter of return that we can make a
contribution to the solution of the problem. If
the question of return is satisfactorily addressed,
the parties may more easily reach agreement on reparations.
- The resources that will be available from
international donors to make reparations are likely
to be more limited than people imagined.
- The Harvard Refugee Project expects to complete
its work and submit its plan to the negotiators
and to the public in 1997.
[1]
Khalidi, “The Palestinian Refugee Problem: A
Possible Solution,” Palestine-Israel Journal
of Politics, Economics And Culture, vol. II, no.,
Autumn 1995, p. 74
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