Articles by Akiva Eldar featured in Ha'aretz
Source: Ha'aretz, 2001 by Akiva
Eldar
Email: eldar@haaretz.co.il
"How to solve the Palestinian refugee
problem" (Ha'aretz, Tuesday, May 29, 2001)
"Sir, if you please, tear down your
house" (Ha'aretz, Thursday, May 31, 2001)
How
to solve the Palestinian refugee problem
Source: Ha'aretz. Tuesday, May 29, 2001
by Akiva Eldar
Senior officials of the Palestinian Authority are
aware of the damage that has been done to their cause
by the confrontational statements by some leading
figures in the PA in favor of the right of return
of the refugees. In private conversations many in
the PA nod their heads in mute understanding when
friends from the Israeli left tell of traditional
voters for the Meretz Party who no longer want to
hear about Yasser Arafat or Yossi Beilin. The Israeli
right has long understood the value of this development
for them. Almost every day settlers can be heard on
radio talk shows flaunting with unabashed delight
the red rag of the right of return: What do people
want from the settlers? Is it they who are the obstacle
to peace? After all, Arafat was not content with the
97 percent of the territory of Judea and Samaria that
Ehud Barak offered him. The process collapsed because
the Arabs demanded the return of the refugees to Jaffa
and Haifa. Beilin, the justice minister in the Barak
government, headed the Israeli team that conducted
negotiations on the refugees at the Taba conference.
He told a meeting of the peace camp not long ago that
the agreement was almost worked out and that top Palestinian
negotiator Abu Ala rejected his proposal to publish
the principles of the agreement that had been hammered
out in the talks. Abu Ala's rationale: publication
of the principles would scuttle the already damaged
prospects of Ehud Barak winning the elections; his
concern was that a victory by Ariel Sharon would leave
Arafat without a partner for an agreement of any kind,
and subject him to sharp criticism by the refugees.
The result was that the negotiating teams went their
separate ways without reporting to the nation on the
state of negotiations over refugees, leaving the public
with the impression that the Taba talks failed because
the Palestinians refused to forgo the right of millions
of refugees to return the homes they had in 1947 and
1948. In the Zionist perception, the implication of
an influx of refugees on that scale would be the liquidation
of the Jewish state.
In an article he published in the Washington Post
on May 15, 2001, and in Ha'aretz on May 24, Nabil
Sha'ath, the PA's minister of
planning, intimated that the picture harbored by the
Israeli media and general public concerning the state
of negotiations on the refugees does not reflect the
"remarkable progress" that was made at Taba.
Sha'ath, who headed the Palestinian team to the talks
on refugees, reported that a "breakthrough"
was achieved at Taba on this recalcitrant subject.
On the one hand, he noted, "we made clear our
continued commitment to UN resolutions that call for
two distinct states in historic Palestine," while
on the other hand, Israeli officials for the first
time "acknowledged a degree of responsibility
for the Palestinian refugee crisis."
These general formulations conceal a series of impressive
understandings reached during in-depth negotiations
on the refugees. Concurrent with the wording of a
declaration that would absolve Israel of legal responsibility
for the refugee problem (an expression of regret in
place of guilt), a mechanism was worked out at Taba
with the aim of defusing the highly charged issue
of the "right of return." Principles of
a deal The following are the principles of the settlement,
as recorded by Israeli and Palestinian sources who
took part in the negotiations. Most of the details
were confirmed by international sources who closely
monitored the negotiations.
The international body that will be established to
deal with the subject will present each refugee with
five options: rehabilitation in his current place
of residence including citizenship of the state in
which he lives; absorption in the new State of Palestine;
settlement in Halutza, in the southern Negev in Israel;
immigration to a country outside the region (the external
affairs minister of Canada, who visited Israel a short
time ago, reiterated his country's commitment to take
in refugees as part of a comprehensive peace agreement);
return to Israeli territory.
The five options will be shaped in a manner that
will channel immigration as much as possible to options
other than a return to Israel. This will include a
series of incentives, an accelerated rehabilitation
program and generous economic aid, which will be offered
to Palestinians who forgo the option of immigration
to Israel.
The immigration quotas will also be geared to induce
refugees to opt for the alternatives to living in
Israel. It was agreed that the
immigration quotas for Israel will be lower than those
set for other destinations. (According to an estimate
by foreign sources, it will be possible, in negotiations,
to reach agreement on a quota of 40,000 refugee immigrants
to Israel over a period of five years.) In any event,
it was agreed that Israel has the sovereign right
to decide who will enter her territory and who will
be barred from entering.
Dealing with the personal status of each refugee
will be conditional upon his relinquishing refugee
status and accepting the same rights as those in whatever
place he chooses to reside. This means that the refugee
agrees the place he chooses will be his final place
of residence. In addition, this will mean forgoing
claims to property in Israel. The Israeli side attached
great importance to this point, viewing it as confirmation
of the end of Israel's commitment with respect to
the refugee problem.
The new international body will replace the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA), which will be dismantled
within five years. The new body will assume responsibility
for dealing with the refugees at both the personal
and the community level. This will include establishing
infrastructure and making provision for education,
housing, health and welfare, and professional training.
Israel would like the UNRWA to shut down its operations,
on the grounds that the organization's existence perpetuates
the Palestinian refugee problem. It was agreed that
refugee certificates that UNRWA issues would be canceled.
Refugee camps containing those who choose to be rehabilitated
where they are will be annexed to adjacent cities.
Thus the refugee camps will lose their extraterritorial
status.
The international body will raise funds and give
compensation for private real estate that was expropriated
from the refugees. There is still an unresolved dispute
concerning property of common ownership, collective
compensation, and movable property, such as vehicles
and the other items that the refugees left behind.
Israel demanded that a ceiling be set for the amount
of compensation to be paid; this would then become
part of the permanent agreement. The Palestinians
demanded that compensation be set on a case-by-case
basis, with no ceiling - that is, with a separate
assessment of the worth of each refugee's case. Israel
argued that the adoption of that system would perpetuate
the problem, because the Palestinians would quickly
find themselves in a confrontation with the administration,
which would attempt to reduce the assessed value of
their property. One idea that was discussed was for
the amount to be calculated within a designated time,
using a method that would take account of macro-economic
considerations and individual case-by-case calculations.
The Palestinians tried to monopolize the solving
of the refugee problem. They wanted the compensation
and rehabilitation funds to be transferred to them,
following which they would distribute the money to
the refugees. In other words, the Palestinian state
(not the Palestine Liberation Organization) would
represent the entire Palestinian people, including
those who reside in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Israel's
concern was that such an arrangement would adversely
affect the stability of the region, and proposed instead
that the solution be effected within a comprehensive
regional context and not be confined to the geographic
boundaries of the territories. Israel wanted the international
mechanism to deal with all the refugee communities
and take into consideration the demographic and financial
interests of the Kingdom of Jordan.
People who took part in the negotiations share the
opinion that Arafat wanted to retain the idea of the
right of return as his Doomsday weapon. They believe
he would have set aside that weapon in return for
a generous territorial deal in the territories and
Jerusalem. Beilin and Sha'ath continue to meet and
to conduct negotiations on the practical and symbolic
resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem, beginning
from the point they reached in Taba. They know that
as long as that explosive issue is not defused, the
Israeli peace camp will stay hunkered down in its
bunker.
Sir,
if you please, tear down your house
Source: Ha'aretz. Thursday May 31, 2001
By Akiva Eldar
Politicians and radio announcers did not withstand
the temptation to link the disaster that occurred
a week ago, last Thursday night, at the Versailles
wedding hall - entirely the work of Jewish hands -
to the latest Palestinian effort to sow death among
the residents of Jerusalem. One commentator even complained
that the terrorists were inconsiderate of the capital's
police officers, who have not slept a wink since that
terrible night in Talpiot. The Arabs did not show
mercy to the tired police reporters, either.
No one dared point out another connection between
the Talpiot disaster and the political conflict: two
days before the collapse of the building in the west
of the city, the Jerusalem Municipality demolished
two buildings in the eastern part of the city.
"The owners of the hall thumbed their noses,"
said Jerusalem municipal engineer Uri Sheetrit after
the disaster. In other words, the municipality knew
that all of the reception halls in the building were
operating without a business license and permitted
the owners to flout the law and endanger public welfare.
The two structures that the municipality destroyed
on Tuesday were also built illegally. There is no
claim, however, that they endangered anyone's life.
However, when it comes to Arab citizens of the united
city, Mayor Ehud Olmert's inspectors do not let the
owners "thumb their noses." They do not
trust them, as they do in the west of the city, to
demolish by themselves the illegal structure that
they built. Arabs receive a shipment of bulldozers
right to their homes. In their case, an administrative
order is sufficient.
In order to demolish the Versailles hall, a judicial
order would be needed. If the court were to issue
such an order, it would order the owners to raze the
structure. The legal department of the municipality
would have closed the case. After all, the court acceded
to its demands. The department that oversees construction
would also have filed the judge's decision. After
all, it was not ordered to do anything. According
to city statistics, there is a chance that the disaster
would have been prevented had the court ordered the
building demolished. In contrast, there is a great
probability that if the reception hall had been located
in united Sheikh Jarrah [in East Jerusalem], Olmert
would not have permitted its owners to endanger the
lives of celebrating Arabs. City council member Gilad
Barnea estimates the number of demolition orders that
have not been carried out at no less than 3,000. None
of the city council members knows the exact number.
On July 25, 2000, city council member Arnon Yekutieli
wrote to the municipality's legal adviser, Asa Eliav,
asking for a legal opinion regarding the considerations
(or criteria) according to which the local planning
and building committee [in other words, the municipality
- A.E.] could be asked to carry out a judicial demolition
order. Yekutieli sought data on the cases in which
such requests were granted in the last three years.
He ended with the words, "when the accused does
not carry out the order imposed on him, it is important
that the committee take action to enforce the law
and remove the offense."
Yekutieli died last month, without receiving a response.
On March 6, fellow council member Ran Wolf, asked
the municipality's legal department, the municipal
engineer and the licensing and inspection department
for the number of cases where a judicial demolition
order instructing the defendant to carry out the order
was issued and not performed. Wolf asked how orders
prohibiting use of a building issued as a criminal
verdict were enforced, and whether there were cases
in which those who violated such orders and were tried
for failure to obey them were sent to prison.
Three weeks later, on March 28, when he had still
not received an answer, Wolf sent a reminder and asked
the officials for a rapid response. On April 3, he
wrote them to say he had not received a response addressing
his questions.
This time Wolf sent copies of his letter to the director-general
of the municipality, Ra'anan Dinur, and city comptroller,
Shlomit Rubin. On May 2, Wolf wrote to the clerks:
"What's going on? Why the disregard? Not only
does it show a lack of seriousness, it is not polite
either."
On May 9 a letter finally arrived from Israel Ben
Ari, acting deputy director of the licensing and inspection
department, together with an apology for the delay.
Ben Ari reported that the cases were found and that
"we are in the midst of examining the criteria
that is used to decide when to order that the demolition
be carried out by the local [planning and building]
committee." He added that "the examination
process, which takes a great deal of time, is not
yet complete."
It must be hoped that the examination process will
be completed when the government commission of inquiry
asks [as Yehoram Gaon sang in the musical "Kasablan"],
"who gets more respect?" The citizen whom
Olmert's municipality allows to thumb his nose at
the law, or the citizen that the municipality helps
to obey the law. By the way, Yehoram Gaon is a member
or the local planning and building committee.
Update of understandings
On Tuesday, this column contained initial details
on agreement reached in talks between Israel and the
Palestinians to solve the refugee problem. Since then,
Ha'aretz has received from Palestinian sources additional
details that help to round out the negotiations picture
on this important issue.
The question of a quota on the number of Palestinian
refugees that Israel would absorb in the framework
of a comprehensive agreement to solve the refugee
problem is considered one of the most difficult and
sensitive issues. Conventional wisdom holds that Yasser
Arafat is plotting to flood Israel with hundreds of
thousands of residents of refugee camps in Lebanon,
Syria and Jordan. According to this horror scenario,
which has penetrated into the Israeli left as well,
natural increase among the Palestinians would rub
out the Zionist entity within a number of years.
A Palestinian source involved in the refugee negotiations
relates that what concerns them is that not enough
candidates will be found to fill the agreed-upon immigration
quota. For that reason, says the Palestinian official,
no importance should be placed on the numbers bandied
about on the last day of the talks. [Israeli negotiator
Yossi Beilin spoke of 40,000 in five years, while
his Palestinian counterpart responded with 500,000
- A.E.]
The criteria have not yet been agreed for Israel's
acceptance or rejection of a refugee's request to
settle within its borders. However, the Palestinians
accepted the principle that Israel, as a sovereign
state, has "the last word" regarding immigrants.
The Palestinians suggested that a refugee who does
not submit a request within five years for one of
the five proffered options loses his or her refugee
status; the timetable for dissolving the UN Relief
and Works Agency shall be determined by progress on
the resettlement of refugees in states; Israel will
play a central role in raising funds; a committee
of experts will appraise the value of property belonging
to refugees using a method that calculates in macroeconomic
factors and individual considerations. The committee
shall complete its work within six months, at the
end of which the parties will agree on the overall
upper limit of compensation. Every refugee will be
able to select a fast track for receiving compensation
or submit a detailed application involving long deliberations
(similar to the model used for compensation in Bosnia).
According to the Palestinian version, they also support
having an international mechanism managing the compensation
issue ("so we won't be accused of corruption
and nepotism." |