CLS/RIIA Project: Palestinian Refugees in the Quest for Middle East Peace - Summary of Points Raised
Source: Minster Lovell Workshop April 2004
Background
The CLS/RIIA refugee project was designed to address
the absence of an inclusive framework for discussion
of the refugee issue in the quest for Middle East
Peace. The activities help raise awareness of the
regional dimension of the Palestinian refugee issue
in the Middle East; facilitate contact, communication
and information exchange between the Arab stakeholders
in the refugee issue, notably the refugee communities
around the region and the Arab host countries (including
the PA), and members of the international community
concerned with the issue; and gather and circulate
expert opinion on refugee rights and host country
rights and responsibilities.
The activities of the project occur at three levels:
(1) at the regional level, bringing together members
of the refugee communities, advocacy groups and Arab
host country nationals; (2) at the international level,
bringing together members of the international donor
community and others concerned with the Palestinian
refugee issue with refugees and host country nationals;
and (3) at the expert technical level, bringing together
legal specialists and others with relevant expertise
with members of the refugee community and Arab host
country nationals.
At the international level consultation workshops
are held approximately twice a year, usually at Minster
Lovell in Oxfordshire. The following summary highlights
substantive points raised and discussed in the workshop
held in Minster Lovell in April 2004.
The Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Dr Rantisi
just before the workshop was to take place meant that
some prospective participants sent their apologies
in order to pay condolences.
The following is a summary of the main points raised
and discussed at the workshop.
I. US Policy and Pronouncements:
the implications
The exchange of letters between US President George
W Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon delineated
four facets to the Sharon ‘unilateral disengagement
initiative’.
(1) Unilateral Disengagement
By definition, the initiative involved no negotiations
with the Palestinians. Instead, it involved negotiation
between the Israeli leadership and the Bush administration,
resulting in the exchange of letters between Bush
and Sharon.
(2) Withdrawal from Gaza
On the surface, any Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territory should be welcome. However, as envisaged
in Sharon’s unilateral initiative the proposal
poses significant dangers for Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip.
As proposed, the withdrawal portends isolation of
the community in Gaza behind Israeli security barriers
around the Strip, with the Israelis in control of
access and egress. How will the Palestinians conduct
essential trade and communications under these circumstances?
How viable will be economic and social life in the
Gaza Strip?
By withdrawing the Israelis will divest themselves
of the responsibilities incumbent upon an occupying
power, but who will fill the vacuum? The international
donor community may not succeed in marshalling new
funds to facilitate sustainable development within
the Strip. A community dependent on emergency support
is not a viable or sustainable prospect.
(3) Settlements on the West Bank
Again, any withdrawal from settlements on the West
Bank should be welcome. Again, however, the nature
of the proposal, portends dangers if, as indicated
by Bush, the Israelis are able to consolidate their
major settlement blocks along the Green Line as part
of the arrangement.
Consolidation of these settlement blocks, along with
completion of the barrier currently under construction
portends a further confiscation of Palestinian land,
leaving the bulk of Palestinian population centres
in isolated enclaves. Assuming movement between and
beyond these enclaves remains restricted and under
Israeli control, it is impossible to see how the result
can constitute a viable prospect.
(4) Trading the Right of Return
While President Bush may, as he said, envisage the
Right of Return being exercised only within the context
of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, he has no
legal authority in this matter. His statements also
represent a departure from long standing US policy
and legal precedent. The Right of Return is an individual
right which cannot be traded away by third parties.
In pronouncing as he did, Bush dashed the hopes and
prospects of all refugees. Critically, he helped Sharon
to draw a line under the issue and declare that it
is now closed, thereby preventing any further progress
in the foreseeable future and removing it from the
minds of most Israelis as an issue for the final negotiations.
And by supporting Sharon’s announcement, Bush
has succeeded in erasing years of work by the international
community to develop a comprehensive, multidimensional
understanding of the rights and issues involved in
returning refugees.
Presumably, Israeli thinking and strategy is the
result of calculations about the implications of demographic
trends and ambitions to consolidate the Israeli state
and its Jewishness. Seemingly, US calculations are
more about short term considerations, not least election
politics and preoccupation with Iraq.
Policy Implications
The Bush-Sharon pronouncements represented a major
departure from approaches to the peace process to
date.
• In Taba, the discussion centred around the
agreement of territorial adjustments on the basis
of reciprocal territorial exchanges. No such exchanges
were mentioned by Bush and Sharon, implying that they
are not necessary.
• Acceptance of the permanence of some settlement
blocks translates into rewarding Israel’s creation
of facts on the ground.
• Bush and Sharon acted as though they could
negotiate over Palestinian rights without consulting
them. So the United States can no longer pose as an
impartial mediator.
• A deal that excludes the Palestinians from
its formulation is not a peace deal.
• Were the Bush-Sharon pronouncements to come
to fruition there would be nothing left for the Palestinians
to negotiate.
All these considerations run counter to the argument
that Bush has done everyone a favour by saying the
unsayable and declaring what is realistic. So even
if the Palestinians end up with what Bush envisages,
they cannot agree to it and so the conflict cannot
be formally resolved on the basis outlined by Bush.
However, what Bush said is not legally binding, even
on the United States, and so it may be possible to
regroup and, with concerted effort, reconnect with
the requirements of the Road Map and the principles
of a negotiated peace. Much trust has been lost, however,
among the parties and will take time and work to rebuild.
It is not only the position of the Palestinians which
has been undermined, but that of Syria too.
Rescue Strategies
In their statement of 26 March, the EU Heads of Government
clarified that while they support the withdrawal from
Gaza, things should be agreed by negotiations. They
have five requirements or proposals:
1) the initiative must be part of a wider plan, not
just Gaza;
2) the initiative must operate within the framework
of the Roadmap;
3) no settlements/settlers should be transferred to
the West Bank;
4) any handover of power should be to the PA and
5) Israel has to positively contribute to the regeneration
and redevelopment of the Gaza Strip.
The EU was expected to take forward these requirements
at its meeting (with the Quartet) on 28 April. The
position of the British government is to capitalize
on the Gaza withdrawal proposal and work with the
Palestinian community to make it work for them.
Meanwhile, for the donor community in general there
is a concern that any actions they may take now to
alleviate the suffering of Palestinians could be interpreted
as facilitating implementation of the Bush-Sharon
proposals.
II. Iraq and Regional Fallout
To accurately review the Palestinian-Israeli situation
it is important to look at developments in the wider
region, notably Iraq.
Iraq – Developments and Possibilities
Three alternative scenarios for Iraq can be envisaged.
1) Fragmentation – with internal fissures between
various elements (urban, rural, professional, tribal,
secular, religious, ethnic, sectarian) undermining
social and national cohesion;
2) Centralisation – the state/society hold together,
maybe within a weak federal system, and with outside
help, notably from the UN, such that the country does
not fall apart;
3) Regionalisation – Trans-state forces, triggered
by the war, unleash new regional forces, such as Shia
assertiveness, a Sunni backlash, interference in Iraq
by neighbouring countries, anti-Americanism and US
selectivity in its dealings with different states,
could all combine to shift the regional landscape
and potentially undermine the existing Arab state
system.
Much depends on US capacity to rescue the security
situation in Iraq. (The revelations about abuse of
Iraqi prisoners in detention in Iraq had not entered
the scene at the time of the workshop.) For the bulk
of the Shia population there is more to be gained
than lost from the political transition in Iraq envisaged
by the United States. However, the US is now definitely
wearing out their welcome and risks alienating more
and more of the Iraqi population. Furthermore, they
are in danger of failing in their objective of creating
a strong, viable state and politically stable region
through their mismanagement of the situation on the
ground. It is also not evident that following the
June 30th handover to an Iraqi Administration that
the situation will be any more viable for the US.
This is partly because it will be difficult for them
to only have a security role, and not meddle in other
affairs. Also, their position in Iraq will not have
the legitimacy they would like because they have been
unable to secure a ‘Status of Forces’
agreement which would facilitate their transition
from occupying forces to invited guests.
There have been several losers following the invasion
of Iraq, not least Iraq’s neighbours. Many of
them want to have a stake in the emerging Iraqi state,
because they have so much at stake and because, for
them the issue of Iraq’s future is very political.
For now the United States won’t countenance
working in partnership with the neighbours. But none
of them stand to benefit from a total collapse in
Iraq, even if they do not relish a strong, resurgent
Iraq of whatever character.
Regional Reactions and Implications for
the Palestinians
Iraq was a significant source of financial support
to the Palestinians and that has now been lost. But
with the spread of opposition to the US-led occupation
of Iraq, the perception among many Palestinians is
that they and the Iraqis are two communities fighting
against a US and/or US/Israeli oppressor. There are
some illustrations of how the links are being made,
for example Jenin will be twinned with Fallujah and
a group called the Sheikh Yassin brigade has surfaced
in opposition to the US occupation in Iraq.
For many Palestinians a US failure in Iraq would
represent a blow to Israel and its US-backers. It
would be a victory for the Arabs and Muslims and thence
the Palestinians. Others warn that a US failure in
Iraq could be very damaging for the Palestinian cause
because it will result in increased US support to
Israel in the face of Arab hostility. Meanwhile, linkages
between the Palestinians and Iraqis may support Sharon’s
assertion that there is a link between Palestinian
terrorists and Iraqi terrorists and Al Qaeda.
Across the region, a resurgence of both pan-Islamism
and pan-Arabism, together with a weakening or fragmentation
of some state structures can be discerned. Many tribes
are now trying to gather their support and coordinate
their efforts in an attempt to deal with the current
realities in the region, for example support to the
people of Fallujah. However, there are also many examples
of the state strengthening its role, for example in
Lebanon.
III. Aid, Diplomacy and Insecurity
Before considering what is to be done in the current
circumstances, a review of past experiences would
seem in order. A disconnect is apparent between developments
on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza (continued
conflict and confrontation, settlement consolidation
and expansion, construction of the barrier, economic
deprivation, humanitarian crises and lawlessness),
the activities and intentions of the donor community
and the official policy positions of concerned governments.
This disconnect will be the subject of a separate
project, but some discussion of the issues was thought
useful in the context of this workshop. The disconnect
is cause for bewilderment. The conditions in the Occupied
Territories, particularly in Gaza, are dire, and while
there have been efforts by international donors to
try and improve things, instead there is ‘accelerated
de-development’ and a deterioration of the realities
on the ground. In part recognition of this, the international
donor community has acknowledged the change in circumstances
and the majority of aid to the Territories is now
humanitarian and emergency assistance, rather than
development aid.
However, at the policy level donors continue to support
the idea of a two-state solution, even through this
goal now appears increasingly unreachable. The question,
therefore, is this – in what sense has international
assistance made a positive contribution towards peace?
More specifically, to what extent has the provision
of funds to the PA relieved the Israelis from having
to provide financial support and shoulder other obligations?
Has the diplomatic community been kept sufficiently
informed of the changing circumstances on the ground?
Are there lessons to be drawn from and for other conflict
situations?
Has aid been effective?
Since Oslo, the PA has received approximately $15
billion in aid (while Israel has been in receipt of
approximately $60 billion including military aid),
of which around 90% has gone to the PA and the remainder
to NGOs. Of the money the PA received, over half paid
for government salaries, therefore supporting their
families or around 600,000 Palestinians. While donors
may have preferred to directly support more NGOs in
the Occupied Territories, post-Oslo the PA was seen
as the most appropriate mechanism to filter money
through to agencies in the West Bank & Gaza. Indeed
for many, there were few other legal ways of disbursing
money.
The intention was to build a viable Palestinian entity
capable of pursuing the peace process and realising
the goal of statehood. However the aid disbursed has
failed to support the evolution of a sustainable development
process for the Palestinians. Part of the explanation
is that much of the technical assistance that was
provided was simply not effective. While donors may
prefer to provide capacity-building support, because
this is a longer-term commitment, they are more likely
to find themselves opting for short term results and
so undertaking much of the work themselves. Also,
while the international community has poured considerable
resources and finance into the West Bank & Gaza,
this has not had a positive, long-term effect because
a large percentage of the goods and equipment which
was purchased has been destroyed by repeated Israeli
incursions and attacks.
In addition, the international aid which has supported
the PA and Palestinian communities since Oslo, has
succeeded, up until recently, in keeping the situation
just below boiling point in the West Bank and Gaza,
and thus it has, in effect, perpetuated the status
quo.
How ‘fussy’ were the donors?
In their eagerness to support the fledgling Palestinian
entity, donors may also have overlooked the details
of how their funds were used. In this connection it
is important to distinguish between the levels at
which various decisions were made. For example, at
a local level donor representatives may well have
been asking the right questions about the nature and
implications of any aid package, but back in their
home capitals, there were other international political
issues to take into account when determining an aid
package. In the initial stages of the Oslo process,
the US made it very clear that the PA should be kept
alive regardless, and as such, it did not welcome
questions from any members of the international community
about the appropriateness of aid provision. Similarly,
if donors had felt that in many cases it should have
been Israel providing key support services, rather
than the international community, again this would
not have been well received by the US.
With hindsight it might have been more beneficial
in the long term for the PA to have disbanded itself
once the second intifada was established, rather than
continuing with the pretence that it was able to manage
the Occupied Territories. Such a move would have had
to have come from the Palestinians, because the donor
community was not permitted to make such a suggestion
even if it had been in the best interests of Palestinians
in general.
Context of aid
The context in which much of the aid was agreed post-Oslo
is also important. Up until 1996, when corruption
within the PA became a more pressing issue, many within
the donor community were willing to tolerate weak
accountability because the PA was still seen as a
facet of a liberation movement, and Arafat needed
to be in a position to be able to ‘buy’
support when necessary, to ensure the success of the
Authority. However, over time, it became increasingly
apparent that the funds were simply not being spent
in a way that could be justified by individual donors.
When untangling the complex donor issues of the West
Bank & Gaza, it might be useful to have a better
understanding of the objectives motivating international
donors. However, this is often difficult because any
objectives will not only vary over time but also between
and within donors at a local and international level.
Indeed their situation is further complicated because
donors often find it very hard to measure progress/developments
on the part of either of the parties, and therefore
they are unable to develop a clear strategy for any
aid programme. This was particularly the case post-Oslo,
because there were many issues unfolding and a number
of bilateral donors had not developed a coherent plan
for disbursement of their funds.
Given the change in international priorities generally
since 9/11, it was questioned whether there has been
any fallout from 9/11 on the amount of international
assistance being channelled to the PA and Palestinian
NGOs specifically. The conclusion was that the overall
volume of aid is probably the same, however, there
are now more strings attached. For example, all Palestinian
NGOs that now receive money from USAID must pledge
that they are not a terrorist organisation or support
terrorism. There are implications for non-US donors
as well, since organisations like the Ford Foundation
now require that organisations like IDRC must also
confirm that they are not funding terrorist organisations.
While there are many examples of how international
assistance may not have always contributed to the
peace process, it should be remembered that up until
2001 aid allowed the PA to develop and grow. Furthermore,
had final status negotiations been more successful,
we might now be talking about the success of the donor
community, rather than where that community went wrong.
IV. Implications for the donor community
Gaza
Looking at the situation in Gaza, there are arguments
both for and against the international community supporting
the Israeli proposal to withdraw. For example, the
international community should beware getting into
a position where it has to make the Israeli withdrawal
work, partly because it represents little more than
the establishment of another Area A. Given the foregoing
discussion, this may not be a contribution toward
resolution of the conflict.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear whether Gaza
is actually economically viable as an entity in its
own right, and therefore whether the Israeli withdrawal
is sustainable on economic grounds. The question of
access and egress is unresolved. For their part the
Israelis will be dictating the terms for Gaza’s
future, relinquishing the political and financial
costs of occupation and walking away. For some observers,
what is proposed looks distinctly like the establishment
of the ‘homelands’ in apartheid South
Africa. Though, in South Africa the homelands were
not seen to be a precursor to the formation of a state.
There could be opportunities within the Gaza withdrawal,
because in the short term the international community
could get to work on the economic and infrastructural
development of the area, which is being hampered at
present. But the fear remains that, in the long term,
the stability of the area, in terms of political,
economic and security issues, will be limited and
this will prevent a real, sustained improvement in
the lives of those Palestinians in Gaza.
The Broader Picture
In terms of the broader Sharon initiative, across
the Palestinian community it has contributed to a
real sense of hopelessness. This is partly because
it is being marketed as a comprehensive solution even
though any future Palestinian state within the West
Bank looks more precarious with the consolidation
of various settlements. But more importantly it has
caused despair because the hope, which many in the
Palestinian Diaspora have kept, of having the option
of returning, has been extinguished. If you add this
to the fact that many families in the West Bank are
being displaced because of the erection of the barrier,
continuing attacks from Israel, the absence of any
real alternative to Sharon’s initiative and
the lack of any real Palestinian leadership, the situation
looks bleak.
Therefore, from the Palestinian perspective, there
are many reasons why they are wary of the initiative
and also why they would prefer the international community
not to support the initiative and concentrate instead
on improving the realities on the ground in the West
Bank & Gaza. However, there will be strong pressure
on the PA to accept the plan, not least because they
may be labelled as a terrorist organisation if they
do not. Within the PA, while there has been support
for the announcement of the withdrawal of settlements,
and various ministries have begun looking into the
minimum requirements necessary in order to make the
situation in Gaza viable following an Israeli withdrawal
– the disengagement plan is not seen as an opportunity
because the IDF can return at any time. A further
problem the PA has encountered is that by considering
the implications of the plan they are seen to be engaging
with the initiative as a political opportunity, and
by default supporting it.
From the perspective of the donor community, it may
be difficult to obtain a collective agreement on the
way forward in general and a response to the Sharon
initiative specifically. Some donors will find it
very difficult to voice a political opinion, while
others will either reject the initiative or promote
it as the only option on the table at present. This
divergence of opinion will result in the process being
driven solely by the US and Israel and may mean that
donors are able to create the impression of action
(carrying out needs assessments, donor conferences,
etc) while failing to address the ever-changing issues
and realities.
One option would be for the donors to develop a strategy
of conditionality which would state the minimum conditions
on which they would engage with the process and provide
assistance – the most obvious would be that
there must be complete freedom of movement to and
from Gaza. Similarly the donors could identify the
specific issues involved in the withdrawal plan (e.g.
infrastructure, borders, resources, etc) and then
identify those issues which must be addressed/resolved
prior to any withdrawal. The Israelis could be obliged
to listen if the donor community makes it clear that
any support for Gaza will be tied to the resolution
of particular issues and that there will be performance
tracking and penalties for non-compliance. In parallel,
it is essential that the donor community restates
the importance of negotiating with the Palestinians
and not proceeding unilaterally. If these approaches
are to work it is very important that the donors work
together, and not in isolation.
V. What is needed now? Refugees
and Host Countries
Lebanon
For the majority of Lebanese, the refugee camps represent
a security issue which is demonstrated by vivid depictions
on TV of clashes and demonstrations in the camps.
However, in so far as security is as much a Syrian
as a purely Lebanese concern, Damascus could have
a bearing on the issue. The position of the Lebanese
government is that those Palestinians residing in
camps do not have the right to remain beyond any peace
agreement.
Following the announcement of the Sharon initiative,
the argument that the Palestinian refugee community
resident in Lebanon would be able to return to their
homes in Palestine collapsed for two reasons –
the Bush/Sharon abrogation of the Right of Return
and the reduction in Palestinian territory in the
West Bank. This leaves politicians in Lebanon with
a dilemma as yet to be confronted.
There has been limited movement on the refugee issue
within Lebanon, with a special committee dealing with
the refugee issue visiting a number of Gulf and European
countries to explain the Lebanese position. However,
there is no mechanism within the Government, to formulate
policy on those refugees residing in Lebanon –
indeed the Office for the Directorate of Palestinian
Affairs has been reduced to a registry and the main
body dealing with the refugee community remains the
security forces. In the face of the Bush declaration
and the lack of any peace process, the Lebanese could
allow the international community to provide greater
welfare support to the refugee communities, though
structural impediments any significant improvement
in their living conditions will remain.
Syria
With regard to Syria, in a way the government has
been strengthened by the Bush declaration because
it has illustrated that their steadfast stand against
Israel and support for radical Palestinian groups
is justified. In contrast to Lebanon, in Syria the
refugee community does not pose a threat to the demographic
balance, and so those Palestinians living in Syrian
camps enjoy much better services and living conditions
than those resident across the border in Lebanon.
That said it would be very useful if Syria could take
a more supportive and positive position with respect
to improving the conditions of those Palestinians
in Lebanon.
Jordan
Meanwhile, the situation in Jordan is more complicated.
There are some four categories of Palestinian refugees
in Jordan at present. The first applies to those refugees
who left Palestine in 1948, who have a national security
number, and therefore access to any of the services
available to a Jordanian citizen. Those who resided
in the West Bank until the 1988 Jordanian disengagement
have Jordanian passports but no national security
number, and so only have access to limited services.
Lately, they have been issued with a ‘Green
Card’ by Jordan. In the third category are those
who arrived in 1967 and were given a two-year passport,
but no national security number, and thus while they
reside in Jordan they are considered foreigners. This
group numbers 150,000 to 200,000 people. The fourth
category covers people who are permanent residents
in Jordan but have access to the West Bank and are
considered by Israel to be citizens of Palestine.
This group have Jordanian passports and national security
numbers, but also have Palestinian documents. It is
anticipated that the approximately 180,000 people
concerned will at some stage be expected to choose
between the two nationalities they currently hold.
UNRWA, working in all these host countries, takes
careful account of the specific circumstances in each
country. The need for the support provided by UNRWA
is as great as ever following the Israeli targeting
of Palestinian camps in the West Bank & Gaza,
both with military hardware and by preventing access.
In Lebanon specifically, it was noted that for a variety
of reasons, including that there is a new UNRWA Director
and Deputy Director, there may be opportunities to
work with the government, civil society and NGOs to
improve living conditions in the camps.
More broadly, UNRWA recognises that, as a result
of recent events, it is likely to continue to operate
in the area for some time. Therefore, it has organised
a one-time replacement for the usual biannual donors
meeting and will instead host a Conference in Geneva
involving up to 60 countries. Although the meeting
is intergovernmental, refugees were included in the
preparation process and so will indirectly have a
voice. Also, by discussing support for UNRWA the Conference
will provide a mechanism for donors to demonstrate
their concerns about the Bush-Sharon initiative. Finally,
UNHCR and UNRWA, as the two primary UN organisations
responsible for refugees, will be working more closely
together sharing best practice and experience.
In summary, the situation of Palestinian refugees
in host countries will be that much more difficult
as a result of the Bush-Sharon threat to the Right
of Return – particularly for those refugees
resident in Lebanon. UNRWA recognises that it will
need to continue supporting the refugee communities
throughout the region. However, in deciding how to
best support the refugees, UNRWA and particularly
the donors that fund it, should take care not to prevent
another generation of refugees from meeting their
potential because of concerns about ‘settling
them’.
VI. Project Issues
At present, in the West Bank and Gaza, there is a
continuing occupation, the erection of the wall, closures,
and the end of the Roadmap. The refugee community
is also growing as 200,000 Palestinians may be displaced
because they live on the wrong side of the Israeli
barrier. These issues are resulting in a radicalisation
of Palestinian views, particularly among the young
as people do not have any mechanism through which
to channel their frustrations. There is thus a greater
need than ever for projects and fora which support
Palestinian refugees and which give people a voice.
In terms of what the Palestinian community can do,
it is important that there should be an internal dialogue
bringing all the parties active in the West Bank &
Gaza together to stop any further fragmentation and
agree on a common position for issues like the Right
of Return. A more united approach would also help
the donor community because it would be better able
to allocate support if there is a clearer enunciation
of priorities. There is also a need for co-ordination
with and between the host countries. To a certain
extent there is already an attempt to bring the Palestinian
parties together, with a recent rapprochement between
the factions and the PLO. In the diaspora there is
a meeting planned for the 15 May in Berlin, on the
Right of Return.
In terms of what the international community can
do, one suggestion is to return to first principles
as a way of breaking the current cycle and initiating
a discourse. A return to principles may be particularly
relevant in refugee discussions, given the dominant
neo-conservative agenda at present which seems to
pay little attention to established principles –
as illustrated by Bush’s current approach to
the peace process. Also, having clearly articulated
principles might assist the donor community in deciding
how to best support the needs of refugees. This has
to go hand in hand with enabling the Palestinians
to have a stronger voice.
Lobbying and support for UNRWA is essential.
Regarding RIIA/CLS work on the regional dimension
of the refugee issue, the need for a safe discussion
forum remains. And it has been useful in coordinating
between the Arab stakeholders and the international
donor community. Before going forward, however, an
evaluation will be carried out on the work to date,
its content and impact, as well as a survey to determine
useful future directions that the project can take.
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