The Last Negotiation: How to End the Middle East Peace Process
Foreign Affairs, Volume 81; Issue 3
by Hussein Agha;
Robert Malley
1 May 2002
CUT TO THE CHASE
Since the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
and the outbreak of the second intifada, two propositions
have gained wide acceptance. The first is that trying
to find a comprehensive solution to end the conflict
has already been attempted -- and at this point, if
tried again, can only fail. The second is that an
interim solution is therefore the only way out of
the current crisis and might succeed if properly implemented.
The mounting death tolls on both sides seem to confirm
the notion that conflict management rather than conflict
resolution should be the order of the day, and that
now is the time for taking incremental steps in order
to rebuild the torn fabric of trust. In fact, now
is precisely the time for a U.S.-led international
coalition to put forward an end-of-conflict deal.
The idea that only incremental steps can resolve
the current crisis flies in the face of the experience
of the past decade. Everything Israelis and Palestinians
have tried since 1993 has been of the interim sort
-- whether the Oslo accords themselves, the 1995 Interim
accords, the 1997 Hebron agreement, or the 1998 Wye
memorandum. However sensible it may have seemed at
the start, in practice the incremental approach has
demonstrated serious shortcomings.
Lacking a clear and distinct vision of where they
were heading, both sides treated the interim period
not as a time to prepare for an ultimate agreement
but as a mere warm-up to the final negotiations; not
as a chance to build trust, but as an opportunity
to optimize their bargaining positions. As a result,
each side was determined to hold on to its assets
until the endgame. Palestinians were loath to confiscate
weapons or clamp down on radical groups; Israelis
were reluctant to return territory or halt settlement
construction. Grudging behavior by one side fueled
grudging behavior by the other, leading to a vicious
cycle of skirted obligations, clear-cut violations,
and mutual recriminations.
By multiplying the number of obligations each side
agreed to, the successive interim accords increased
the potential for missteps and missed deadlines. Each
interim commitment became the focal point for the
next dispute and a microcosm for the overall conflict,
leading to endless renegotiations and diminished respect
for the text of the signed agreements themselves.
Steps that might have been easy to win support for
domestically if packaged as part of a final agreement
were condemned as unwarranted concessions when carried
out in isolation. Increasingly beleaguered political
leaderships on both sides thus were tempted to take
compensatory actions: incendiary speeches by Palestinians,
building more settlements by Israelis, and from the
two parties, a general reluctance to prepare their
people for the ultimate compromises. Designed to placate
angry constituents, these moves had the unintended
consequence of alienating the other side, making a
final deal all the more difficult to achieve. Finally,
the succession of piecemeal, incremental agreements
made it more difficult to mobilize the support of
other countries.
Yet another interim agreement could not cure ills
that are inherent in the culture of interim agreements.
It would not rebuild trust, it would not lead to a
durable political agreement, and it would use up considerable
local and international energy in the process. The
same defects plague plans that call for the immediate
establishment of a Palestinian state with negotiations
to follow over its size, prerogatives, and other final-status
issues. As for the notion of unilateral Israeli withdrawal
from parts of the West Bank and Gaza, such a gesture
would only add to these problems the real risk of
emboldening those Palestinians who believe that Israel
can be forced by violence to pull out. As all of these
factors suggest, the current confrontation is not
an argument in favor of acting small, but rather a
call to start thinking big.
ALL THE WAY
History demonstrates that the incremental method has
failed. Yet because Israelis and Palestinians did
not reach an agreement at Camp David in 2000 or at
the talks in Taba, Egypt, that followed, because the
parties are deemed unripe, because their leaders seem
uninterested and the gaps between them seem unbridgeable,
proponents of moving toward a final agreement immediately
are dismissed as being at best naive and idealistic,
at worst desperately out of touch.
In truth, however, the final-status negotiations
that took place in 2000-2001 were not an exception
to or a departure from the approach that had prevailed
since 1993, but rather its extension and culmination
-- conducted in the same spirit, and with the same
vices, as that which prevailed during the rest of
the interim period. No common principles guided these
latter discussions; instead, a vision was meant to
emerge from an incremental process of give-and-take.
As a result, neither side was able to rebut its domestic
opponents or rally potential supporters behind a comprehensive
vision. Negotiators who might have been able to market
a comprehensive deal were uneasy defending its constituent
parts in isolation. And the parties were unable to
rally significant regional or international backing
for a clearly articulated package deal.
The process that started at Camp David suffered from
another basic flaw: it was predicated on the widespread
but erroneous belief that genuine, durable agreements
can emerge only from direct negotiations between Israelis
and Palestinians. Although this might be true when
it comes to interim or technical agreements, it does
not hold for a permanent accord. With the stakes so
extraordinarily high for both sides, Israelis and
Palestinians have been reluctant to put forward or
accept proposals that risk undermining their bargaining
position absent the certainty of reaching a comprehensive
deal.
Indeed, as a result of the character of the parties'
interactions, the inherent power imbalance, and the
existential nature of their dispute, negotiations
between Israelis and Palestinians have now reached
the point of diminishing -- even negative -- returns.
Rather than bring the two sides closer, negotiations
serve to play up remaining disagreements and to play
down the broad scope of actual convergence. The time
for negotiations has therefore ended. Instead, the
parties must be presented with a full-fledged, non-negotiable
final agreement.
The arguments routinely deployed against making an
immediate effort to end the conflict are flawed. Some
say, for example, that a permanent solution must await
the building of trust between the two sides. But the
belief that the conflict cannot be ended so long as
mistrust persists is a seemingly logical argument
that actually stands reason on its head. Mistrust,
enmity, and suspicion are the consequences of the
conflict, not its cause. A deal should not be made
dependent on preexisting mutual trust; the deal itself
will create it.
Other skeptics point to the rightward move of the
Israeli public in reaction to the intifada and supposed
Palestinian intransigence in 2000 and 2001 as an insuperable
obstacle to the acceptance of a final-status deal
anytime soon. But this same public moved swiftly from
supporting the most peace-oriented government in the
country's history to electing one of its most aggressive
-- suggesting that it could swing back just as quickly.
Every poll confirms that Israelis want quiet, normalcy,
and safety in their everyday lives. If they were presented
with a U.S.- backed, realistic, end-of-conflict agreement,
in all likelihood most of them would embrace it. The
impact that the recently proposed Saudi offer (full
normalization in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal
from the territories conquered in 1967) has had demonstrates
just how hungry Israelis are for a conclusive way
out of the quagmire. And just as one ought not read
too much into the Israeli public's apparent frustration,
so would it be a mistake to read too much into past
Palestinian behavior. Neither the substance of the
ideas at Camp David and subsequent talks, nor the
process by which they were presented adequately tested
the Palestinians' readiness to accept a fair, end-of-
conflict deal that met their core interests.
Many argue, finally, that as a matter of principle,
any political effort must await the end of the violence
so as not to reward it. Yet violence is a byproduct
of the political relationship between Israelis and
Palestinians and cannot be divorced from it. That
relationship is unfortunately destined to remain a
conflictual one until its core issues have been, or
are in the process of being, resolved. It would be
a historical anomaly for a conflict between two fundamentally
unequal antagonists to be resolved without violence.
In that sense, violence is latent in the interim approach
as much as it contradicts it. Unless the two parties
reached an accord, in other words, Oslo all but ensured
that their perceptions and expectations would clash,
and from that point on the cycle was bound to become
ever more vicious. Israel believes it cannot negotiate
under fire, and the Palestinians fear that, absent
fire, the Israelis will have no incentive to negotiate.
The violence so inconsistent with the spirit of Oslo
thus became its natural successor. The only certain
way to stop the killing is to offer the parties a
tangible and fair way to end the underlying conflict.
LET'S MAKE A DEAL
The case for seeking a comprehensive deal ultimately
depends on whether one believes it is possible to
design a package that both sides can accept. Such
a deal must protect both sides' core interests without
breaching either party's "redlines," or
non-negotiable demands.
Israel's basic interests are to preserve its Jewish
character and majority; safeguard its security and
the safety of its citizens; acquire international
legitimacy, recognition, and normalcy; maintain its
attachment and links to Jewish holy sites and national
symbols; and establish with certainty that the conflict
with the Palestinians and the Arab states has ended
once and for all and that there will be no further
claims. These principles translate into a core set
of policy redlines: no mass influx of refugees that
would upset Israel's demographic balance; Jerusalem
as the capital of Israel; recognition of the sacred
Jewish link to the Temple Mount; no return to the
1967 borders; the incorporation into Israel of the
vast majority of settlers in their current locations;
no second army between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean
Sea; and the perpetuation of the Jordan Valley as
Israel's de facto eastern security border.
As for the Palestinians, their basic interests can
be defined as living in freedom, dignity, equality,
and security; ending the occupation and achieving
national self-determination; resolving the refugee
issue fairly; governing and controlling the Muslim
and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem; and ensuring
that whatever deal is finally struck is accepted as
legitimate by members of the Arab and Muslim worlds.
These principles similarly translate into a set of
policy redlines: Palestinian statehood, with genuine
sovereignty over the equivalent of 100 percent of
the land lost in 1967; a solution to the Palestinian
refugee problem in which refugees are given the choice
of returning to the areas where they or their ancestors
lived before 1948; Jerusalem as the capital of their
state; and security guarantees for what would be a
nonmilitarized state.
A close examination of past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
and informal discussions shows that a solution does
in fact exist that would be consistent with both sides'
needs. The key concept on the territorial issue is
swaps: Israel would annex a minimal amount of land
in the West Bank and in return provide Palestine with
the equivalent amount of land from Israel proper.
These swaps would be based on demographic and security
criteria and be designed to preserve the viability
and contiguity of both states. Israel would incorporate
a large number of its West Bank settlers and the Palestinians
would achieve their goal of 100 percent territorial
restitution. Physically linking Gaza and the West
Bank could be achieved without splitting Israel by
providing the Palestinians unhindered access to and
control of a safe-passage route connecting the two
areas.
On security issues, the essentials are the nonmilitarization
of the Palestinian state and the introduction of an
international force -- led by the United States and
initially including an Israeli presence -- stationed
on Palestinian territory in the Jordan Valley and
along the border with Israel. This force would serve
as a political deterrent to any attack, thereby enhancing
both sides' sense of security. The fact that it would
be an international force would meet Palestinian concerns,
while the fact that it would, at first, include an
Israeli component would help assuage Israeli fears.
Solving the problem of Jerusalem -- claimed by both
sides as their political and religious capital --
will require a deal based on the dual notions of demographic
and religious self-governance. In other words, what
is Jewish -- namely, West Jerusalem and the Jewish
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, including those established
since 1967 -- should become the capital of Israel,
and what is Arab should become the capital of Palestine.
Each religion would have control over its own holy
sites. Provisions would be made to ensure the territorial
contiguity of both capitals as well as unimpeded access
to each community's religious sites.
The remaining question is the status of the Haram
al-Sharif or Temple Mount, which both sides claim
as sacred. Israel's priority is to preserve its connection
to this holiest of sites, the cradle of Jewish identity.
For the Palestinians, the key is to make it plain
to their people and the larger Arab and Muslim worlds
that the Haram is theirs. One of the fundamental flaws
of prior negotiations was that they viewed this issue
through the lens of sovereignty rather than focusing
on the practical arrangements required to meet both
sides' needs. What should ultimately matter is ensuring
that both sides have power over that which affects
and concerns them most. Control over the Haram would
remain in Palestinian hands -- where, indeed, it has
rested since Israel captured East Jerusalem in 1967.
At the same time, Israel -- which is less interested
in governing the area than in preserving its physical
integrity -- would be provided with guarantees against
any digging or excavation without its express consent.
Those guarantees would be backed by the international
community and monitored by an international presence.
HOMEWARD BOUND
This leaves what is perhaps the most vexing topic
of all: the question of the Palestinian refugees.
With one side clamoring for their right of return
and the other adamantly rejecting it, this problem
seems like one on which no compromises are possible.
Throughout the 2000-2001 negotiations, the Palestinians
underestimated the degree to which Israelis associate
even a theoretical Palestinian right of return with
the prospect of the end of Israel as a Jewish state.
Israelis simply cannot comprehend why Palestinian
refugees, if given a chance to live in their own country,
would instead choose to move to what has become an
alien land. The only plausible explanation, in their
eyes, is that the Palestinians continue to harbor
the desire to undermine Israel's long-term viability
as a Jewish state. Given the already uneasy demographic
realities in Israel -- which now has a 20 percent
Arab minority growing faster than the Jewish population
-- it is no wonder that the idea of an Arab influx
rings alarm bells.
If the Palestinians seem blind to Israelis' fears,
the Israelis, for their part, have belittled the seriousness
of the Palestinians' demand. With two-thirds of the
Palestinian people still living as refugees, Palestinian
nationalism remains, at its roots, a diaspora movement
-- born and bred in refugee camps and animated by
the desire to recover lost homes and belongings. The
sense of injustice at being evicted from their land
pervades Palestinians' national consciousness and
has defined their struggle -- even more than the desire
to establish an independent state.
A solution that satisfied the political demands only
of the nonrefugees in the West Bank and Gaza while
appearing to ignore the moral, historical, and political
demands of the refugees, would be inherently unstable.
It would have questionable legitimacy, would undermine
the new Palestinian state, and -- most alarming from
an Israeli perspective -- would leave open the prospect
that a sizeable number of Palestinians would decide
to carry on the struggle. Although denying outright
the Palestinians' right of return might seem a way
to end Israelis' immediate anxiety, it would not end
the conflict; it would only transfer the seat of unrest
to the Palestinian diaspora without eliminating the
threat to Israel's security.
The challenge is to find a stable and durable solution
that accommodates both the refugees' yearning to return
to the areas they left in 1948 and Israel's demographic
fears. This can be accomplished by relying on two
basic principles. First, refugees should be given
the choice to return to the general area where they
lived before 1948 (along with the choice to live in
Palestine, resettle in some third country, or be absorbed
by their current country of refuge if the host country
agrees). Second, any such return should be consistent
with the exercise of Israel's sovereign powers over
entry and resettlement locations. Many of the refugees
presumably want to go back to their original homes.
But these homes, and indeed, in many cases, the entire
villages where they were located, either no longer
exist or are now inhabited by Jews. The next best
option from the refugees' own perspective would be
to live among people who share their habits, language,
religion, and culture -- that is, among the current
Arab citizens of Israel. Israel would settle the refugees
in its Arab- populated territory along the 1967 boundaries.
Those areas would then be included in the land swap
with Palestine and thereby end up as part of the new
Palestinian state.
Together with generous financial compensation and
other incentives to encourage refugees to resettle
in third countries or in Palestine, this solution
would promote several key interests. On one side,
Palestinian refugees would carry out the right of
return. For them, returning to the general area from
which they fled or were forced to flee in the 1948
war would be extremely significant because it would
cross an important psychological and political threshold.
Although they would not return to their original homes,
the refugees would get to live in a more familiar
and hospitable environment -- and one that would ultimately
be ruled not by Israelis, but by their own people.
Through the swap, Palestine would acquire land of
far better quality than the desert areas adjacent
to Gaza that have been offered in the past. For Israelis,
meanwhile, this solution would actually improve the
demographic balance, since the number of Arab Israelis
would diminish as a result of the land transfer. Most
important, it would pave the way for a stable outcome
in which Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and
the diaspora would all have an important stake.
Of course, such a solution would not be problem-free.
Israelis might fear that it will add to the anxiety
and discontent of the Israeli Arabs who remained under
Israeli sovereignty. But the demographic and political
problems posed today by the Israeli Arab community
already demand urgent attention. How better to neutralize
their potentially irredentist feelings than to resolve
the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
Some Palestinians might argue that the above plan
represents nothing more than a sleight of hand, disguising
resettlement in Palestine as a return to their pre-1948
lands. But do the refugees actually want to live in
Jewish areas that have become part of an alien country?
Would they rather live under Israeli rule than Palestinian
rule? And short of calling into question Israel's
Jewish identity, is there any other way of implementing
the Palestinian right of return?
USE THE FORCE
Lurking behind every dispute over the substance of
an Israeli- Palestinian deal is the problem of its
implementation. Over the past decade, Israelis and
Palestinians have routinely balked at carrying out
obligations they have agreed to. Just as routinely,
the international community has watched these violations
helplessly and done nothing to stop them. Achieving
a lasting final-status agreement now will require
some means to persuade both parties that this time,
commitments will actually be upheld.
A U.S.-led international force would help provide
such assurances. This force would do more than merely
verify compliance on the ground -- although it would
do that too, adding an element that has been missing
from previous accords. The international force would
also act as a neutral broker and referee. It would
be the recipient for each side's assets during the
initial period of implementation -- receiving weapons
from the Palestinians, for example, and land from
Israel. Handing over valuable assets to a dependable
foreign trustee would be much easier for each side
than turning them over to a partner deemed untrustworthy.
Implementation of these steps could be tied to a transparent
system of international incentives and disincentives
(such as economic aid to the Palestinians or security
assistance to Israel), thus further promoting accurate
and timely compliance.
HOW TO GET THERE
The paradox is that, although the outlines of a solution
have basically been understood for some time now,
the way to get there has eluded all sides from the
start. The lesson of the interim period, and the type
of final-status negotiations that concluded it, is
that relying on the intentions of Israeli or Palestinian
leaders is a strategy with scant chance of success.
The nature of the conflict, the imbalance of power,
domestic politics on both sides, the character of
the negotiators, the psychological makeup of the leadership
-- all these factors have prevented the parties from
moving toward a solution.
What is needed to overcome this deadlock is a novel
process, a means of waging diplomacy that is independent
of the will and whims of the parties' leaderships,
one that does not cater to their immediate preferences
and that bypasses their immediate constraints. Achieving
such a deal will require the forceful intervention
of outside actors who can present a package that resonates
with both the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples,
addressing their fears and concerns and showing that
some way out of the impasse is actually possible.
Led by the United States, the effort should involve
a broad coalition of European, Arab, and other countries
and institutions capable of providing security, as
well as economic and political support, to Israelis
and Palestinians. The proposal should be sanctioned
by a UN Security Council resolution and complemented
by a number of third-party arrangements such as a
U.S.-Israeli defense treaty, possible Israeli membership
in NATO, a pledge by Arab nations to recognize Israel
and move toward the normalization of their relations
(a process that, to be completed, would also require
a peace deal with Syria), American and European security
guarantees to the Palestinian state, and a sizable
aid package to help build the new state's economy.
The forceful presentation by a U.S.-led international
coalition of a deal like the one outlined above would
oblige the leaderships of both sides to either sign
on or defy the world -- along with large segments
of their own publics. Indeed, even an immediate negative
reply from one or both sides would neither erase the
initiative nor rob it of its importance, for the very
proposal would marginalize those reluctant to espouse
it and set in motion a new political dynamic that,
in due course, would force a change of heart among
the leaders -- or else a change of leaders.
Some will argue that anything coming from the outside
will be viewed as a foreign imposition and therefore
be rejected. However, if the deal is based on past
and present Israeli-Palestinian discussions it will
not be viewed as imposed from outside; and if it is
fair, it is unlikely to be rejected. This would not
be a case of outsiders seeking to force a secretly
concocted agreement on unwilling parties, since the
core of the agreement will have derived from the parties'
own previous interactions. Moreover, the mechanism
of ratification should be predicated on popular referenda
in Israel and among the Palestinian people and should
be built into the proposal itself.
The danger is to believe that what looks practical
and down-to-earth -- step-by-step rebuilding of the
process, resumption of security cooperation, gradual
improvements on the ground -- is the preferable approach.
The incrementalism of the previous decade has proved
bankrupt time and again because it was based on a
misunderstanding of the nature and dynamics of the
conflict. The approach did not fail as a result of
the parties' ill will or a lack of faithful implementation;
rather, it was the approach that contributed to both.
Seldom has more ink been spilled than over the issue
of whether Israeli or Palestinian leaders genuinely
want or can make a final deal. These are assumed to
be the key questions, the answers to which can unlock
the door to a peaceful settlement. But they are not
and cannot. The point now should not be to accommodate
the Israeli and Palestinian leaders' limitations and
shape the effort to fit their proclivities; it should
instead be to make the limitations of both sets of
leaders irrelevant. As violence continues to threaten
and the outlines of a fair agreement lie idly by for
all to see, the notion of simply waiting for these
leaders to finally negotiate a deal or for the two
sides to gradually regain their trust in each other
is ringing increasingly hollow. The time has come
for an effort that is neither top-down nor bottom-up,
but outside-in: the forceful presentation by external
actors of a comprehensive, fair, and lasting deal.
Hussein Agha is Senior Associate
Member of St. Antony's College, Oxford University.
He has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian affairs
for more than 30 years. Robert Malley
is Middle East Program Director at the International
Crisis Group. Between 1998 and 2001, he was President
Clinton's Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs. |