THE RIGHT OF RETURN
  
 
Khalil Shikaki
30 July 2003,
  WALL STREET JOURNAL
RAMALLAH, West Bank- When 
  the Palestinian national movement decided in the mid-1970s to abandon the ideology 
  of liberating all of historic Palestine in favor of a two-state solution, it 
  failed to explain to its refugee constituency the implications of that shift 
  for their right of return to their homes and towns inside Israel. Once it had 
  agreed to a division of the land, it could not have logically advocated a division 
  of the people with some becoming Israeli and others Palestinian. 
  
  As a national movement, the PLO stood for self-determination and the protection 
  of the national identity. Fear of losing legitimacy in the eyes of its largest 
  constituency -- the refugees-- deterred the PLO leadership from confronting 
  the emerging anomaly: how can you be a Palestinian nationalist and at the same 
  time advocate the de-Palestinianization of a large segment of your people.
  
  Perhaps the most surprising finding I came out with from the refugee surveys 
  that I have conducted among 4500 refugee families in the West Bank-Gaza Strip, 
  Lebanon, and Jordan in the first half of this year is the extent to which the 
  refugees -- without help from their own leaders -- have internalized the dramatic 
  shift and have acted on it, favoring their national identity over land and legacy. 
  
  
  We have always known that almost all refugees viewed the right of return as 
  sacred and can never be abandoned. Now we know also that only 10% of the refugees 
  surveyed want to exercise the right of return in Israel. The overwhelming majority 
  want to exercise the same right in the state of Palestine in the West Bank-Gaza 
  Strip. While a small number is willing to immigrate to third countries, like 
  Canada, the US, or Australia, a large number of refugees in Jordan elected to 
  stay in that host country. Less than 10% of those seeking to go to Israel -- 
  1% of all surveyed refugees  will seek an Israeli citizenship upon returning 
  to Israel; the rest want Palestinian, and in some cases Jordanian, citizenship. 
  
  
  Needless to say, what facilitated the decision for the majority of the Palestinian 
  refugees in seeking to live in a Palestinian state is the fact that their national 
  identity can still be embodied in a part of the historic homeland; they can 
  have the best of the two worlds: to be on the land, and with the people, of 
  Palestine. 
  
  The significance of this finding should not be underestimated. We have always 
  recognized the timidity of the Palestinian leadership in addressing the issue 
  of refugees. Today, we need to see how courageous the Israeli leadership can 
  be. 
  
  It is now clear that an Israeli recognition of the refugees right of return 
  does not carry with it the kind of risks Israelis have always feared. Yet, only 
  the recognition of that right can give Israel what it seeks: to close the refugees 
  file without undermining its Jewish character. It is a win-win situation for 
  all: the refugees, driven by a deep historic collective consciousness, can have 
  the right to choose; the Israelis, driven by a very old search for security 
  in a Jewish majority, can finally breathe with relief; and the Palestinian national 
  movement can feel the pride embodied in the triumph of the national identity. 
  
  
  All pay a price. To exercise self-determination, the refugees need to build 
  new homes and lives in a new environment. The process of their socio-economic 
  and political integration could be extremely painful. To close the file, the 
  Israelis need to face up to their responsibility for the creation of the refugee 
  problem. They need to accept guilt and responsibility sharing it with all others: 
  the British with their unjust mandate and the Arab countries that did little 
  or nothing about the terrible refugee suffering of more than fifty years. To 
  protect the national identity of its people, the Palestinians state will have 
  to prepare for the absorption of more than 750,000 refugees in the first five 
  years of its existence. It must plan for this process lest it becomes yet another 
  catastrophe for the Palestinian people as a whole. For all, the challenges are 
  tremendous and the task painful.
  
  Reducing the risks and pain for all is a task only the US can undertake. Israelis 
  will ask for assurances that the exercise of the right of return by going to 
  Israel will not exceed an agreed limit and the Palestinians will seek assurances 
  that the right to choose is real, not merely symbolic. The financial and logistical 
  requirements will be enormous requiring significant US investment and sustained 
  commitment. 
  
  Some among the Palestinians and the Israelis will resist the logic embodied 
  in the findings of my surveys. By doing so, they will perpetuate the conflict 
  indefinitely. Those who attacked my center and me on 13 July, seeking to prevent 
  the release of the surveys findings, acted on the belief that scared rights 
  cannot be tampered with, not even by other refugees, let alone researchers. 
  This unhealthy obsession with idealized rights at the expense of vital, or even 
  existential, needs threatens to perpetuate the suffering of millions of refugees. 
  Rights and suffering need not go together, not for so long. 
  
  Those in Israel who would continue to keep alive the myth that an Israeli recognition 
  of the right of return is tantamount to committing national suicide are responsible 
  for the continued impasse at the negotiating front and the persistent suffering 
  at the human front. Admitting guilt and responsibility is hard, but people and 
  nations do it quite often without fearing for their survival. Indeed, it is 
  a sign of maturity and security. 
  
  While more survey research is needed to verify the details of my findings, the 
  essential compromise is now clear and it is a win-win solution: Israel must 
  recognize the right while the Palestinian state must shoulder the bulk of responsibility 
  for its exercise. It would be a mistake for the US and the international community 
  to let hardliners on both sides perpetuate the agony and the conflict. 
Mr. Shikaki is the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, in Ramallah.
© 2003 Palestinian Development Research 
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