Chapter 4
From Refugees to Citizens
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This chapter is excerpted from Donna Arzt, Refugees Into Citizens: Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996). The book is distributed by the Brookings Institution. |
This chapter outlines the basic components of a plan for permanent regional absorption of Palestinian refugees that is intended to result in a mutually agreeable division of responsibilities among all of the parties to the peace process. It is offered as a proposal, not a formal blueprint, so that participants in the negotiations can borrow some parts, reject other parts, improve on those for which future fact-finding may shed more light, and be prompted to generate other possible solutions. Chapter 5 elaborates on some of the major components of the plan by examining similar efforts in other countries or regions of the world and suggesting relevant legal standards to facilitate implementation within the Middle East.
The plan develops from the assumption that because the conflict is regional, the solution must be regional. Accordingly, it can best be worked out within the context of the multilateral rather than the bilateral negotiation process (even if, like most of the post--Oslo agreements, it is initiated in bilateral discussions).1 The collective approach is more suitable because it recognizes that refugees are not merely individuals residing in isolated enclaves but also members of a regional community that transcends national borders. Because of its roots in the post--World War II era, much of the preexisting framework for resolving refugee crises has been grounded in the ideology of individualism.2 Yet a postmodern refugee framework appropriate to the 1990s and the 21st century requires a collective perspective: a mutually satisfactory solution to a jointly shared, regional problem.
No plan to resolve the refugee question will work without a comprehensive, viable, and bona fide peace that can be carried out in good faith. Realistically, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and other states are not likely to grant citizenship to Palestinian refugees unless such a commitment is preceded by, or offered concomitant with, a final settlement of the entire Arab--Israeli conflict. But that only proves that the refugee question is ultimately inseparable from the underlying cause of the decades-long conflict: the failure to accept the reality that Israelis and Palestinians, Arabs and Jews, live together in the same neighborhood. Thus, only when the burdens and benefits of peace are distributed in a regionally balanced fashion will all the parties be willing to come on board.
Components of the Plan
A common denominator of the plan's basic components is the
underlying premise that only through the granting of citizenship
to Palestinians, wherever they will eventually reside, both within
and without the Middle East, will a permanent and viable solution
to the Arab--Israeli conflict be achieved. The international
refugee regime has traditionally posited three "durable solutions"
to the global refugee crisis, each of which is a form of permanent
absorption. In descending order of generally accepted preference,
they consist of repatriation, or voluntary return to the country
of national origin or state from which the refugees fled;
permanent integration in the locale of asylum; and resettlement in
a third country that has agreed to take them. Given the nature of
most refugee flows and of global conditions, the first two
solutions have rarely been achieved. Voluntary repatriation has
been unlikely when refugees are unwilling to reexperience the
persecution that caused their flight originally. Moreover, asylum
countries, which are usually contiguous to the country of origin,
are often too poor and unstable themselves to absorb a large new
population. And given the reluctance on the part of wealthier,
more stable states to absorb poor and racially or culturally
divergent masses, even resettlement is becoming less viable an
option.3
All three of these obstacles have, until recently, been reflected
in the Palestinian refugee crisis. Comprehensive repatriation,
although desired by the Palestinians, was impossible while the
ongoing "cause" of their flight, the fact that Israel existed on
the land that was considered to be Palestine and refused to
recognize Palestinians as a distinct people, continued. Moreover,
the neighboring countries of the Palestinians' asylum were either
too poor (Jordan), too unstable (Lebanon), or too anxious to use
the refugees as political pawns in a long--term regional conflict
(Syria). Although the Palestinians were not so culturally
divergent from the peoples of the wealthier, more stable Arab
states (Kuwait and Saudia Arabia, for example), these countries
also followed the "pawn strategy," refusing to absorb the refugees
because, as they refused to recognize the reality of Israel, they
insisted that full repatriation--as the sequel to Israel's
destruction--was the only possible resolution.4 Yet even as early
as 1950, the U.N. General Assembly was recommending that either
"repatriation or resettlement" be employed as a means of absorbing
Palestinian refugees "into the economic life of the Near
East."5
The Madrid and Oslo frameworks have altered all these barriers,
because Israel's right to exist has now been acknowledged by all
the participants, including the Palestine National Council, and
Israel has likewise acknowledged the Palestinians to be a people.
Therefore, while no one of the three durable solutions is viable
or realistic in itself, it is possible to devise a strategy that
uses all three in as balanced a manner as is feasible and fair. To
paraphrase the late U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, such
a strategy would treat the Palestinian refugee question not as a
regional liability but as a net, and mutual, regional asset.6 Each
party to the Arab-Israeli conflict, whether it be Israel, the
Palestinians, the neighboring asylum countries, or the wider group
of Middle Eastern states, will lose a little and gain a little
more, which can add up to a regional boon in economic development
and political maturity.
The plan consists of four structural components:
- Absorption Targets. Each of the Middle Eastern
parties participating in the final peace treaty
negotiations--which will include Israel, the Palestinian
Authority, Jordan, Egypt, and, it is hoped, Syria, Lebanon, and
other Arab states, as well as any Western states that offer to
participate, will absorb an optimal ("target") number of
refugee families that will not be demographically, politically,
or economically disruptive to it or to neighboring states.7
This caveat is particularly important in the West Bank and
Gaza, the stability of which would be undermined by an overly
rapid flood of immigrants. The refugees will be absorbed on a
gradual basis over a seven--year period commencing after the
final peace treaty is adopted, which is supposed to be no later
than May 1999. (Specific target figures are proposed and
explained in the next section and in table 4.1.) During this
necessary transitional period, in which the refugees will move
in gradual waves rather than in one large-scale rush, housing,
jobs, and infrastructure can be readied and disorder
avoided.
After the seven--year period is over, population changes will occur naturally, within the standard of "normalcy" that the peace settlement strives for. In other words, no attempt will be made to destabilize a neighboring state by drastically altering one's own population, nor to attack the legitimacy of a neighbor's immigration or other demographic policy, especially given that both Israelis and Palestinians will continue to conceive of their territories as places of refuge for their respective peoples.8
- Choice, Compensation, and Palestinian Passports: All
refugees will be offered a fully informed, written choice of
available residential and compensation options, including
absorption in a state in the region, return to the Palestinian
territory (regardless of its legal status) in the West Bank and
Gaza, or, if qualified (according to criteria to be described),
return to their ancestral home in Israel. Each family will, in
writing, rank its residential preferences. In accordance with
international law norms, no one will be forced to reside
anywhere against her will.9 As Dag Hammarskjold noted in 1959:
"No reintegration would be satisfactory, or even possible, were
it to be brought about by forcing people into their new
positions against their will. It must be freely accepted, if it
is to yield lasting results in the form of economic and
political stability."10 In addition to receipt of compensation
(either in the form of a "reintegration allowance" or real
property, as will be outlined) for those who are eligible but
who do not return to Israel, all Palestinians, no matter where
they reside, will be offered a Palestinian passport that will
declare their Palestinian nationality and enable them to visit
and/or work in the West Bank and Gaza if they choose.
(Employing Palestinians with specialized job skills living in
Israel and Jordan, states contiguous to the West Bank and Gaza,
may be needed and probably preferred over the option of
importing non--Palestinian specialists.) This is consistent
with the 1988 Independence Declaration of the Palestine
National Council, meeting in Algiers, which called Palestine
the state of the Palestinians, "wherever they may be."11 In
other words, every Palestinian will be able to consider the new
Palestinian entity, no matter what its final legal status, and
no matter where she and her family reside, as her home. Such a
national passport "would express for every holder the emotional
and symbolic bond that unites the Palestinian people."12
- Citizenship and Rehabilitation: In addition to
Palestinian passports, the refugees will be offered citizenship
and full protection of their human rights in each of the
absorption states, including Israel, to which they go. Thus,
anyone who does not become absorbed in the West Bank or Gaza
will be eligible for dual nationality (or dual citizenship, if
the territories become an independent sovereign state), both as
Palestinians and as citizens of their country of residence.13
The value of possessing a state's citizenship was amply
demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War, in the contrasting
treatment of the Palestinian citizens of Jordan and the
expendable and expellable Palestinian workers of Kuwait.
The resettled refugees also will receive rehabilitative services, including health care, education, and job training, in order to encourage their full social, political, and economic integration. Given that Palestinian refugees have, for three generations, refused absorption in most of the places they have resided, this support will play a crucial role in the process of transition to true citizenship. The rehabilitation services will be supported by development funds awarded to the countries on the basis of their willingness to absorb optimal target populations and administered with the assistance of the respective specializing U.N. agency and relevant nongovernmental relief organizations.
- Temporary Decision--Making Bodies: In order to
facilitate the process of deciding on target numbers,
residential selection options, and compensation awards--and to
ensure that such selections and awards are made fairly--four
new bodies will be established: a joint population commission,
a compensation tribunal, a repatriation committee, and a
repatriation tribunal for appeal of the committee's decisions.
(See figure 4.1.) When all of the decisions, selections,
awards, and appeals are finalized, which may take about a
decade, these institutions will be phased out. Claims to
property or compensation will also be extinguished, so that
closure on the refugee issue can be achieved.
Figure 4.1 Decision-making Bodies
Target Populations
The main feature of the proposal is an adjustment in the
demographic distribution of Palestinian refugees in the region.
The recommended "target figures" are meant as approximations of
optimal conditions and not as strict quotas in the sense of either
a floor or a ceiling. Yet they are stated as specific numbers in
order to facilitate planning and resource allocation.
Perhaps the best way to explain and illustrate the plan's "target
absorption" aspects is graphically. The left side of table 4.1
repeats from table 2.1 (found in chapter 2) the estimated current
population of Palestinians by country or territory and the most
recent figures for those still residing in UNRWA camps, which are
identified be-- cause they represent the top priority for
resettlement. These consti-- tute the "from" side of the proposal.
The right side of table 4.1 corresponds to the "to" side. It
presents optimal population figures for the year 2005,
approximately seven years from the date of the permanent peace
agreement. Included in the far right--hand column are
approximations of the percentage of target Palestinians
vis--a--vis the country's or territory's total (Palestinian
refugee and non--Palestinian refugee) population.
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"From" |
"To" | ||
|
|
Estimated Total Current Population [a] |
Total in UNRWA Camps, 1996 [b] |
Proposed Targets for Year 2005 |
Proposed Percentage Palestinians to Total Population [b] |
|
West Bank |
1,200,000 |
133,886 |
2,400,000 |
98% |
|
Gaza |
880,000 |
389,035 |
450,000 |
99% |
|
Jordan |
1,832,000 |
256,977 |
2,000,000 |
40% |
|
Lebanon |
372,700 |
186,006 |
75,000 |
1.8% |
|
Syria |
352,100 |
96,447 |
400,000 |
16% |
|
Israel |
840,000 |
N/A |
1,000,000 |
19% |
|
other Mideast states |
446,600 |
N/A |
965,000 |
-- |
|
non-Mideast states |
452,000 |
N/A |
900,000 |
-- |
|
Totals |
6,375,400 |
1,061,351 |
8,265,000 [c] |
-- |
|
[a]These columns identical to columns I and III in Table 2.1 (Source: UNRWA General Information Sheet, January 1996). [b] BASIS: Proposed Targets for 2005 as percentage of projected total populations for 2005 of 5,000,000 (Jordan); 4,200,000 (Leabnon); 18,400,00 (Syria) and 5,600,000 (Israel). Percentages for West Bank and Gaza assume a small percentage of settlers will decide to stay. [c] SOURCE: US Bureau of Census projection for year 2005. See Don Peretz, Palestinians, Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p.16 | ||||
Working from a projected total worldwide Palestinian population
of 8,265,000 for the year 2005, each proposed target figure in
table 4.1 is based on the following assumptions:14
West Bank
The target population is 2,400,000 Palestinians. This target
doubles the current population of 1,200,000, which is enough to
cover natural population growth, the return of the approximately
350,000 displaced persons from 1967, plus others (mainly from Gaza
and Lebanon) who urgently need permanent homes.15 Assuming that
housing starts and development keep pace in the period up to the
year 2005, this target number should not overburden the economy or
infrastructure.
Gaza
Target population is 450,000 Palestinians. This figure cuts in
half what would have been the projected natural growth for 2005,
based on the current figure of 880,000. Although Gaza currently
has one of the highest densities of anyplace in the world, most of
it is confined to a small portion of the entire strip, which means
that there is room for the 450,000 who would remain there to
disperse more comfortably. Except for a small number of family
reunification cases and 1967 displaced persons, no new refugees
will be absorbed in Gaza during the seven-year transition
period.
Jordan
The target population is two million Palestinian refugees (as
distinct from the long--term Palestinians of Jordan who are not
refugees). This target is only 168,000 more than the current
Palestinian population of 1,832,000 and less than the projected
natural growth. Most Palestinians who now live in Jordan are
already citizens; most, particularly those with thriving
businesses and other means of earning a living, probably will
stay. Perhaps only a small number of the 13 percent who are still
in Jordan's refugee camps will seek to move elsewhere. Because
Jordan has already supported a disproportionate share of refugee
resettlement needs, it will not be expected to absorb additional
refugees from other areas, except for a small number who may have
family reunification needs.
Lebanon
The target population is 75,000 Palestinians, a figure much
reduced from the 372,000 current figure. Although Lebanon has
expressed the intention to expel all but a few thousand
Palestinians currently residing there, doing so would be a
violation of international law. Many of the refugees probably will
prefer to resettle in Jordan, the West Bank, or northern Israel,
where their families originally lived. The figure of 75,000, which
is identical to the number proposed for repatriation to Israel, is
essentially symbolic: if Israel can be persuaded to allow the
return of 75,000 Palestinians, Lebanon can also be expected to
grant citizenship to and permanently absorb that many
refugees.
Syria
The target population is 400,000 Palestinians. Because most of
the 352,000 Palestinians currently in Syria have been integrated
into the society in all but formal citizenship, it is assumed that
when they are granted that status, most will remain. The target is
based on projected natural growth, plus the resettlement of some
refugees from Lebanon, and the departure of a portion of the
96,447 who were still in camps as of 1996.
Israel
The target population is 1,075,000, which is composed of 1
million Palestinians who have been Israeli citizens since 1948
(based on projected natural growth from the 840,000 of the
mid--1990s and on the assumption that few will seek to move to the
West Bank) and another 75,000 Palestinians who will be permitted
to return and be offered Israeli citizenship. (Because this target
requires a more elaborate explanation, it will be described below
after the final two target locations.) The offer of citizenship is
important so as not to drive a wedge between the new returnees and
those who remained after the 1948 war.
Other Middle Eastern States
The target population is 965,000 Palestinians. This target is
based on half a million newly resettled Palestinians on top of the
natural population growth from the 446,600 who currently reside in
these other Arab states (some of whom may opt to move to the West
Bank, Israel, or elsewhere). It is hoped that once Syria signs
onto the peace process, other Arab states, particularly the
sparsely populated Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and
Kuwait, will also see it in their interest to participate, which
will include a commitment to absorb refugees. (Of these latter
states, the participation of Iraq is most in question.)
Non--Middle Eastern States
The target population is 900,000 Palestinians. This target
doubles the current figure of 452,000, most of whom are in Western
states such as the United States. It assumes that they are rather
well integrated in these states and that only a small portion will
seek to return to the Middle East. While Western states may prefer
to contribute development and compensation funds to the peace
process rather than absorb additional refugees, they may be
willing to participate in a pledging conference like that
undertaken in 1979 for the Indochinese boat people, which was more
successful in locating absorption spots than even its sponsors had
anticipated.16 The close to half a million Palestinians already
living very productive lives in Western states should encourage
these countries to agree to absorb more.
Further Assumptions Concerning Israel
Although there is currently much popular opposition in Israel
to the idea that even a single Palestinian refugee should return
to live within the Green Line, this sentiment can be overcome when
it is presented as part of a reciprocal and regional framework for
resolving the Palestinian refugee question and obtaining a
full-scale peace. Israel's decision to accept Palestinian refugees
could be described, instead, as the same process of "absorption"
that the Arab states would concomitantly be undertaking, rather
than as the oft--feared acknowledgment of a Palestinian "right" to
"return." Moreover, because there will be a top limit of 75,000
returnees, Israel need not risk being overwhelmed by a massive
influx of non--Jews. At least three additional reasons exist for
this seemingly optimistic belief in a change of popular heart.
First, the target number of Palestinians in Israel, composed of
existing citizens with but a small addition of newly absorbed
former refugees, will be only slightly over one million in the
year 2005, compared to the projected Israeli Jewish population at
that time of over four million. (These figures compare to the
combined 2005 target of just under three million Palestinians in
the neighboring West Bank and Gaza, although the relative ratios
may later change depending on birth and death rates, immigration,
and out-migration.) Moreover, there is a historical precedent for
Israel's agreement to absorb more Palestinians, namely, the 1949
Lausanne Conference described in chapter 1, during which Israel
agreed to accept 100,000 Palestinian returnees. Given the small
number of Jews living in Israel at that time, 100,000 was a much
greater relative percentage then than 75,000 would be to Israel's
Jewish population in the year 2005. Similarly, 100,000 was a
greater percentage of the total Palestinian population of 1949
than 75,000 is of the projected 2005 population.17 Therefore,
75,000 additional Palestinian citizens will not unduly endanger
Israel's demographic stability. Second, each Palestinian who seeks
to return to--or "be absorbed by"--Israel will be required to meet
certain criteria to be agreed upon in the final peace treaty, such
as the following:
