POVERTY INTENSIFICATION STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
Source: FOFOGNET Digest
by Leila Zakharia January 1997
1. GENERAL CONTEXT
Since the Palestinian people have
not yet obtained an independent
and sovereign state in the West Bank, Gaza and Arab Jerusalem,
their socioeconomic and political situation remains particularly
complex and within that context the circumstances of Palestinian
refugees are especially unique. They have been stateless for fifty
years, and while their national representation is exercised by
the Palestine Liberation Organization, it is the United Nations
which has undertaken direct responsibility for their livelihood
and has provided them with essential services through a special
agency, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA), created in 1949 (UNGA Res. 302 -IV). Today, 3.3
million Palestinians in the diaspora are officially classified
as refugees through registration with the Agency.
The exceptional condition of
Palestinian statelessness and Palestinian
dispersal extends itself to all
political, economic, social and
humanitarian spheres. UNRWA's mandate
does not provide protection for
Palestinian refugees nor can they
appeal to the assistance of UNHCR
whose mandate specifically exempts
them from its protection. This
aberration is particularly significant,
not only for refugees living under
Israeli occupation in the West
Bank and Gaza, but also for those
Palestinian refugees who are temporary
residents in various countries,
mainly Lebanon, Syria and Jordan
(1). Thus, UNRWA's operations in
these countries, the refugees'
legal status and their rights are
subject to host government policies
without recourse to international
agreements delineating refugee
rights.
Palestinian refugees have access
to public services exclusively
through UNRWA and while they remain
in exile and stateless, the responsibility
of implementing UN Summit agreements
can only be exercised by the United
Nations particularly in reaching
the required agreements with host
governments for the implementation
of UN targets and goals. Strangely
UNRWA does not consider poverty
eradication as part of its mandate
and does not participate in UN
Inter Agency Task Forces.
The availability of systematic
and comprehensive statistical information
on Palestinians is limited. This
is underlined by the absence of
Palestine from UNDP's annual Human
Development reports which even
fail to incorporate existing indicators
compiled through other United Nations
agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO,
and UNRWA. The latter is the main
source of educational and demographic
statistics with other information
appearing in occasional studies
conducted by UN agencies, the PLO
and NGOs.
Notwithstanding these limitations,
all existing data concur that disquieting
socioeconomic trends are emerging
within Palestinian refugee communities
as underlined in UNRWA's 1992 report
to the UN General Assembly: "It
was disconcerting to see that after
45 years, most of the refugees,
not only in Lebanon and the Gaza
strip, but in other fields as well
continued to live in extreme poverty.
Many families were still deprived
of that basic element of life,
an adequate shelter, to provide
protection from the heat, cold
and rain. It was sad to witness
that under the pressures of demographic
growth and worsening political,
social and economic factors, the
standard of living was gradually
being eroded even further. The
future seemed bleak unless, in
the foreseeable future, a political
solution ending the plight of the
refugees could be found(2)."
In view of the variations in
the socioeconomic contexts of host
countries, this report deals with
Palestinians residing in Lebanon,
where limitations on basic civil
rights provide an additional dimension
to the common hardships of Palestinian
refugees. The Palestinian community
in Lebanon counts 350,000 registered
refugees, more than half of whom
live in twelve refugee camps and
their peripheries, located inside
or near five major Lebanese cities
and towns. They constitute 11%
of refugees registered with UNRWA
and 10.4% of the general population
in Lebanon. The complexity of the
Lebanon model, serves as an appropriate
background for investigating the
unique situation of monitoring
the implementation of UN summit
commitments through a United Nations
Agency, rather than a member country.
2. LOCAL, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Three consecutive
and momentous developments have
had profound impact on the current
socioeconomic situation of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon: in 1989, Lebanon
ended thirteen years of war, launching
the process of national reconciliation
and reconstruction. The conflict
had led to much humanitarian and
social devastation as exemplified
by the mass displacement of hundreds
of thousands of Lebanese and tens
of thousands of Palestinians. In
addition, the destruction of the
Lebanese infrastructure and of the
means of production "caused the GDP
to fall to 40% of what it should
have been had there been no war...
Record annual inflation rates of
above 100% were recorded between
1982 and 1992, reaching 500% in 1987."(3);
In the meantime, the Gulf war led
to the eviction of Palestinians workers
from Gulf countries and stopped the
flow of remittances on which hundreds
of Palestinian households, in Lebanon
and elsewhere, were dependent. In
addition, The PLO virtually stopped
all financial support for its social
and health institutions in Lebanon.
In 1991, the Middle East peace process was launched and in 1993 the Oslo
Agreement was signed between the PLO and Israel. The question of Palestinian
refugees was not included in the negotiating agenda nor in the agreements
that followed. As a result, Lebanon announced its refusal to accept the
long-term presence of Palestinians on Lebanese soil and requested their
eventual transfer to other countries. It tightened restrictions on the
employment and freedom of travel of Palestinians and curtailed post-war
UNRWA reconstruction projects of Palestinian camps. This Lebanese attitude
was instigated by Israel's well-known opposition to the repatriation of
Palestinian refugees to their original homes and villages in Palestine,
in contradiction with UN resolution 194 which affirms their right of return,
and by Israeli insistence on Palestinian permanent resettlement in Arab
host countries against their will.
In the same period, UNRWA introduced austerity measures because contributions
were not keeping up with refugee population growth and inflationary costs.
Unlike other UN Agencies, UNRWA is particularly vulnerable since it is
funded directly through voluntary pledges from individual UN member states.
Widespread Palestinian fears of United States and Israeli pressures to
dissolve UNRWA were corroborated at a donor meeting in March 1995. The
agency's five year plan (1994-1999) stated that discontinuance has become
inevitable even though "to discontinue its services unilaterally prior
to a resolution of the refugee problem would seem inconsistent with the
historical evolution of the Agency's mandate and role."(4)
In short, the last five years have witnessed the unprecedented political,
social and economic marginalisation of Palestinian refugees. As demonstrated
by the situation of refugees living in Lebanon, diminishing resources and
the increasing isolation of Palestinian civil society have further pauperized
wide sectors of the community. Community leaders, NGOs and UNRWA have repeatedly
warned that poverty levels will continue to rise unless Palestinian national
rights are respected, international commitments are reaffirmed, and an
agreement is reached with the Lebanese authorities to ease civil rights
restrictions.
THE ESCALATION OF POVERTY LEVELS
Although inflation arising from the years
of conflict has been curtailed, the Lebanese economy continues to suffer
from unemployment, substandard wages and decline in the local currency's
purchasing power. In 1993 close to one third of Lebanese (one million) were
poor of whom 7.25% were extremely poor. The extreme poverty line for an average
Lebanese family of five members was placed at 306 US$ and the absolute poverty
line at 618 US$(5). Lacking the right to work, the situation of Palestinian
households is more serious. Only 1% of the population manages to secure the
mandatory work permit and to benefit from regular jobs. Travel restrictions
also prevent them from seeking long-term jobs in other Arab countries. Since
1992, UNRWA has estimated that 60% of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live
below the poverty line. Data compiled in 1996 indicate that proportions have
risen to 80% with 56%(6) of the population living in extreme poverty even
when poverty indicators for Lebanon are reduced to 206$ and 418$ to account
for widespread access to UNRWA services (Table 1). UNRWA Social hardship
cases receiving special assistance from the Agency constitute another indicator
of extreme poverty levels: between June 1991 and June 1996, UNRWA Lebanon
Field Office serviced the highest proportion of such families ranging from
11.8% to 10% of the population as compared to Agency wide ratios of 6.7%
and 5.4%. On the whole only small Palestinian households or families with
multiple earners are able to maintain an acceptable living standard. With
only 18% percent of families living above the poverty line, the gap between
the richest and poorest income groups are narrow and range from two to six
times more earnings among the former.
The spread of poverty has not been accompanied by a correspondent rise
in unemployment indicating the high incidence of hidden unemployment or
underemployment. Most Palestinians can only work as casual laborers and
the average individual income ($44) is a quarter of the Lebanese minimum
wage ($161) while the average family income ($228) is below the poverty
line(7). The proportion of working adult males has remained relatively
stable between 1988 and 1996 and there is a marked rise in the proportions
of Palestinian women and children entering the labor force(8) (Table 2).
In eight years, the ratio of working children has doubled, and among them
a quarter are estimated to be girls(9). In the same period, the ratio of
working women has tripled from 5% to 16%. On average, women's earnings
are derisory with 69% of female headed households securing incomes below
the minimum wage as compared to 26% of all Palestinian households (Table
3 )(10).
Concerted efforts are deployed by NGOs and UNRWA to promote training
and income-generation. It is estimated that more than 40% of Palestinian
women have taken vocational training and that half of currently working
women are skilled. Yet only 29% manage to secure above minimum wage earnings
including university educated women (11). Clearly, these programs are unable
to combat poverty in the absence of minimum civil rights guarantees. The
quandary of Palestinians is that gaining these rights is conditional on
the existence of a political climate which reassures Lebanon that, in its
turn, the international community intends to respect and protect the repatriation
rights of Palestinian refugees and their national identity.
3. SOCIAL PROTECTION AND UNRWA'S SERVICES
The World Summit for Social Development
called for 'the further enhancement of international mechanism for the
provision of humanitarian and financial assistance to refugees and
host countries'. UNRWA is the archetype of such a mechanism and its
disappearance would undermine the credibility of international strategies
for the eradication of poverty. Yet, in compliance with the request
of its largest donor, the United States, UNRWA has taken concrete steps
towards eventual discontinuance, such as making provisions for staff
termination indemnities in its 1996-1997 biennial budget. Palestinian
refugees, stateless and without economic resources would lose their
only source of social protection. On the socioeconomic level alone,
it would place an immense strain on host countries, particularly Lebanon
where refugees account for one tenth of the population . Already, the effect
of current cutbacks on educational, health and relief services are a signal
of the dramatic reversals to be expected. As described by UNRWA, 'successive
rounds of belt-tightening were progressively downgrading the level of services
and giving rise to long-term costs... Schools suffered from chronic overcrowding,
high double shift rates, and insufficient teaching, administrative and
supervisory capacity. Health facilities remained overburdened with
doctors seeing an average of 94 patients per day."(12)
In addition, substandard infrastructures, camp overcrowding, and displacement
would remain unresolved with catastrophic results on the long-term well-being
of the Palestinian community.
a. Environmental Health
After their arrival
to Lebanon in 1948, Palestinian refugees were distributed into 15
refugee camps located on tracts of land leased by UNRWA. Since then, three
camps were destroyed and four others were extensively damaged either
as a consequence of Israeli attacks on Lebanon and its camps, or
because of the internal conflict in the country. Between 1974 and 1987,
close to two thirds of the Palestinian population had been forcibly dislocated
at least once and more than 35,000 persons became permanently homeless.
The toll of this disruption continues to reverberate on all aspects
of Palestinian daily life, including housing conditions, access to adequate
basic services, educational standards, and economic productivity.
A 1991 WHO assessment stated that "almost all Palestinian camps suffered
from serious problems relating to quantity, quality, maldistribution and
interrupted water supplies" (13) and that the resultant "unplanned house
connections" have increased the risk of water contamination. In eight out
of twelve camps, the quantity of water contracted by UNRWA from water companies
had not changed since the 1950s and 17% of camp inhabitants still relied
on public water taps for their daily supply. In addition, "onsite sullage
and excreta disposal is a threat to public health in most camps"(14) since
demographic growth within confined camp areas, the rise in water consumption,
coupled with the lack of improvements in the sewerage systems have overloaded
existing sewers, and have resulted in sewage overflow on roads and pathways.
As for solid wastes, these are dumped in uncovered collection points causing
extensive insect and rodent infestation
In mid-1995 UNRWA secured funds (nearly 17% of its budget) to overhaul
camp infrastructure but these environmental health projects cannot service
Palestinians living outside UNRWA administered camps. Therefore, the availability
of essential services will continue to be a major cause for concern as
23% of households do not have access to public water supplies, 42% are
not connected to a public sewage network and 23% use open sewage pipes.
In displaced and Palestinian agglomerations outside the camp 16.7% of housing
is constructed of mud and wood, and 10.2% is built of corrugated iron.
(15)
b. Housing
The question of housing for Palestinians residing in Lebanon is
a highly charged issue since it invariably provokes Lebanese fears of permanent
Palestinian resettlement in their country. Before the situation of internal
conflict arose, Lebanese Security forces strictly enforced administrative
measures prohibiting the horizontal and vertical expansion of Palestinian
camps. These measures were revived after the return of civil peace, although
the population has grown three-fold since its arrival in Lebanon and in the
interim has lost one fifth of refugee camp areas. In 1993, UNRWA declared
that '"Palestinian
families displaced by the years of fighting still lived in intolerable conditions
outside the camps, often squatting in damaged or unfinished buildings lacking
basic amenities such as clean running water, electricity and proper sanitation
facilities. The problem of rehousing them gained urgency following the Government's
decision to resettle displaced Lebanese involving the eviction of displaced
squatters."(16) By 1995, at least 1,127 displaced families (approx. 6000
persons) had been evicted from 8 out of 90 squatting sites. Compensation
was paid by the Lebanese authorities, however they rejected all suggestions
put forward by the Palestinian community to resolve the acute problem of
displacement and camp overcrowding. The reconstruction of destroyed camp
sites would not be allowed nor would they be replaced by other sites and
the prohibitions on the expansion of existing camp areas would continue.
The authorities also informed UNRWA that two camps in the Beirut area housing
20,000 inhabitants would eventually be demolished in the context of the ongoing
reconstruction projects of the Lebanese capital.
UNRWA managed to secure permission to construct shelters for a small
number of displaced Palestinians and evictees (nearly 500 shelters between
1991 and 1995), but these efforts barely cover one tenth of housing requirements
for the displaced alone. Camp dwellers suffer from conditions of extreme
overcrowding with average households consisting of two rooms at 2.4 persons
per room. To date, the Palestinian community has not been approached by
either the Lebanese authorities or UNRWA to discuss envisaged solutions
to outstanding housing issues and the fate of refugee camps in Beirut.
c. Education
Through its elementary and preparatory schools UNRWA has provided
an invaluable contribution to the education of Palestinian refugees, who
have enjoyed higher educational standards than prevalent in most Arab countries.
Education accounts for 47% of the Agency's operating budget and in the 1960s
it became one of the first school systems in the Middle East to achieve equitable
enrollment of boys and girls. This is best illustrated by literacy rates
among women. In Lebanon the incidence of literacy and semi-literacy has dropped
from 78% among Palestinian women aged 45 to 60 years to 13% among younger
women between 15 and 19 years of age(17). Nevertheless, the educational levels
of Palestinian refugees are witnessing signs of erosion with clear-cut reversals
in Lebanon where there is a 61% attendance of primary and preparatory schools
as compared to an 82% attendance for all Palestinian refugees (Table 4)(18).
Thus, despite the availability of free UNRWA education, growing numbers of
young children are staying out of school. Data appearing in 1996 reveal that
only one third of children currently aged 10 to 14 have ever been to school,
and that none have attended the preparatory level. Likewise, youths in the
older age group exhibit 50% primary school attendance but with reduced rates
of preparatory level education (17%) in comparison to their older counterparts
aged 20 to 25.(24%)(19).
Falling school attendance is coupled by a rising incidence of premature
school departure. Although UNRWA drop-out rates between 1990 and 1994 diminished
at the elementary level from 7.7% to 5.9%, they increased at the preparatory
level from 14 to 16% mainly due to a rise in girl drop-out ratios from
13% to 17.3%. These rates are the highest in all UNRWA fields at nearly
double the current Agency-wide ratios of 2.5% and 9.1% respectively(20).
Various surveys have indicated that the real Palestinian drop-out rates
in Lebanon are much higher, affecting 22% of pupils and 33% of girls attending
preparatory school. Interrupted schooling during the long years of conflict
and displacement are coupled with 50% of schools operating on double shift,
and 43% accommodated in unsatisfactory premises. All these factors are
discouraging many children from returning to school. According to UNRWA
teaching staff, schools are directed to achieve an 80% success rate at
the end of the academic year, and many pupils are promoted to higher grades
regardless of actual performance. Two recent surveys have confirmed that
financial causes affect only 10% of drop-outs since two thirds of working
children(21) and 50% of young girls(22) stated that they left school because
of poor scholastic performance or other school connected reasons (distance
from home, regulations, teacher indifference or maltreatment).
At the secondary level, poverty is the major cause of falling enrollment
rates from 28% in 1990 to 15% in 1995. The high cost of private education
in Lebanon along with the termination of PLO secondary schools and scholarship
funds have meant that few young Palestinians can enjoy the privilege of
extending their education towards the tertiary and technical levels. In
1993 UNRWA took the exceptional step of opening a secondary school in Lebanon
with plans pending for two other similar establishments. Although barely
absorbing one tenth of applications, the Agency has become the principle
venue of advanced education for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, including
vocational training and the provision of a few university scholarships.
High competition and the program's limited size have been detrimental for
women with very low female participation at 4% of vocational trainees and
33% of University scholarship holders.
The erosion of the educational standards of children and young girls
threatens to reverse the advances achieved in population literacy levels.
Varying estimates, ranging from 36% to 60%, concur that semi-literacy is
rising among Palestinian children. The half dozen NGOs offering short-term
intensive vocational training in Palestinian camps affirm that poor scholastic
standards are seriously obstructing the effectiveness and impact of their
programs. At the same time, existing adult literacy programs have been
unable to address the problem of child and youth semi-literacy since remedial
educational programs aiming at scholastic reintegration are also necessary.
The search for fundamental remedies is affected by imbalanced budget
distributions. UNRWA's spending on education in Lebanon is lower than in
other fields. Between 1994 and 1995 its education budget in Syria and Jordan
was raised by 6% and 9% respectively but remained the same in Lebanon,
despite a 4% rise in student enrollment, and the exceptional circumstances
of the Lebanon context. Between 1992 and 1995 there was a 40% drop in trainees
at the UNRWA/UNESCO in-service teacher training program which aims to upgrade
and standardize professional qualifications and, in 1996, the Agency froze
the employment of university educated teachers.
d. Health
In order of importance, health care services for Palestinians in
Lebanon are provided by UNRWA, UNICEF, the Palestine Red Crescent Society
(PRCS) and a number of NGOs. Available health services include, primary & preventive
health care, disease prevention and control, maternal and child health and
family planning. Life expectancy is estimated to be 72 for males and 76 for
females(23). Since all Palestinians, including those who hold work permits
cannot benefit from the Lebanese public health system, hospitalization and
specialist care is one of the biggest problems facing the community. PRCS
manages several hospitals, but has seen its funds vastly reduced by the PLO,
suffers from supply and equipment shortage and plans to reduce its staff
by 30% in 1997. Partial costs of hospitalization involving only 'specialized
emergency life-saving treatment' are covered by UNRWA through contractual
arrangements with nine private hospitals and two mental health institutions.
In 1995, Palestinians in Lebanon constituted two thirds of patients who were
assisted Agency-wide in this program. However patients make co-payments ranging
from 50 to 75 per cent for surgery and treatment that can cost on average
five to ten thousand dollars, involving long-term indebtedness for most Palestinian
families.
On the level of maternal and child health care, existing clinics appear
to cover a significant proportion of community needs with infant mortality
rates at 30-40/tho. and child mortality rates at 48.9/tho. The number of
pregnant women, infants and children monitored by UNRWA clinics is commensurate
with the annual birth incidence. The majority of births are attended by
professionals, with 55% occurring in NGO clinics and 20% at UNRWA contracted
private clinics. Only 1.4% of births rely on unregistered midwives(24).
At 4.1 per woman, the fertility rate in Lebanon's Palestinian community
is deemed to be diminishing due to higher educational standards, as well
as financial and war-related factors. Average birth rates have dropped
from 7.1 for illiterate women to 2.6 among women with secondary education(25).
Nevertheless, a recent random sampling reveals that 66% of married women
have borne between six to sixteen children and that 20% became pregnant
in adolescence. Two thirds of consequent pregnancies (second and above)
occurred while the women were still caring for an infant. The average miscarriage
rate was one per mother, with 22% having miscarried between two and eleven
times. In addition, nearly 20% had delivered stillborn children(26). They
exhibited limited knowledge of their physiological conditions since long
years of war have led to the neglect of reproductive health programs. It
was only in 1993, that a family planning program was introduced by UNRWA
and thus far, it services 4% of Palestinian women of reproductive age.
Community awareness of reproductive health issues remains very low and
reflects itself on women's inability to relieve and avert the results of
an increasingly strenuous and exacting mode of life.
Similar to trends around the world, the effect of poverty on women is
profound especially since one fifth of Palestinian families consist of
female headed households. Close to two-thirds of the emerging female labor
force are estimated to be women with children and 40% are heads of households.
PLO subsidies for destitute families, particularly widows, are irregular
and are often cut for long periods. Welfare assistance from UNRWA and NGOs
are estimated to cover only 20% of female headed households. As economic
obstacles increase, younger women are becoming less educated and less skilled
yet the average age at marriage is rising and one quarter of female headed
households are families supported by single women. These trends underline
that women of all marital situations and ages are becoming more burdened
while being less equipped and with access to few adequate support systems.
4. RIGHTS AND POVERTY ERADICATION STRATEGIES
The action plan for the eradication
of poverty formulated at the World Summit for Social development calls for
integrated strategies, improved access to productive resources and infrastructure,
meeting basic human needs, enhanced social protection and reduced vulnerability.
The case of Palestinian refugees, demonstrates that contrary developments
are in active operation. Currently, the top-down approach adopted at the
international and regional levels in the framework of Middle east peace negotiations
conforms with Israeli opposition to Palestinian rights. It is leading to
the elimination of Palestinian aspirations for better living conditions,
education and health, let alone the aspiration for self-sufficiency and human
rights.
The Copenhagen declaration also calls upon all concerned to "create comprehensive
conditions that allow for the voluntary repatriation of refugees in safety
and dignity' in accordance with the International Declaration of Human
Rights. This is contained in UNRWA's mandate which affirms that the agency
will not be disbanded until UN resolution 194 is implemented. It is then
strengthened by UN recognition of the right of return as an inalienable
national right for Palestinian refugees (UNGA Res. 3236, 1974). Refutation
of these rights and guarantees would undermine the credibility of international
commitments and international legitimacy. It would constitute a precedent
threatening many world-wide gains in human rights and sustainable development
Beyond the coordinated efforts of a group of NGOs, whose aggregate budgets
do not exceed three million US$, action plans to reduce and eliminate poverty
for Palestinian refugees have not been formulated by any of the concerned
actors: the PLO, UNRWA or the host government. Rather, existing strategies
focus on the permanent elimination of social protection through UNRWA's
dissolution. The vulnerability of the community is deepened by excessive
negligence in information and data collection, thus minimizing the acuteness
of its deprivation, denying it access to available poverty eradication
programs and hampering the elaboration of self-help initiatives. This is
exacerbated by the absence of participatory mechanisms between the community
and UNRWA in policy-making, program design and assessment, as well as means
to resolve host country restrictions.
In the face of existing obstacles and reversals, NGOs working with Palestinian
refugees have adopted advocacy and lobbying campaigns as well as research
projects to disseminate information and to explore methods for stopping
the degradation of Palestinian refugee conditions. Campaigns to preserve
UNRWA and improve its services are at the top of their agenda. They also
seek to upgrade the involvement of other United Nations Agencies and their
links with the community. These are the minimum requirements for launching
strategies to reduce and eradicate poverty and to empower Palestinian refugees
in starting self-reliance initiatives that will ameliorate their economic
circumstances.
FOOTNOTES
1) The distribution of the registered Palestinian refugee population
is as follows: 352,668 in Lebanon; 347,391 in Syria; 1,358,706 in Jordan;
532,438 in the West Bank; and 716,930 in Gaza. 2) Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA; Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fourty Eighth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/48/13)
3) Haddad, Antoine, Poverty in Lebanon; E/ESCWA/SD/1995/8/Add. 2; United
Nations; Executive Summary, p.1
4) The Role of UNRWA and Its Future; UNRWA Headquarters, Amman; March
1995 5) Op. cit, Executive Summary, p.1
6) Tabari, Samia & Zakharia, Leila; Data compiled for a research study
on Palestinian women in Lebanon, to be published in 1997.
7) Al Madi, Yussef Haidar, Palestinian Refugees in camps and communities
in Lebanon, UNICEF & PLO Bureau of Statistics, October 1996, p. 84
(Arabic version)
8) Compiled from various separate studies conducted by UNICEF and the
PLO Bureau of Statistics between 1988 and 1996.
9) Shaaban, Hussein; Palestinian children in the Labor Market (in Lebanon);
UNICEF, October 1996, p 45 (Arabic version)
10) Tabari, Samia & Zakharia, Leila; Palestinian Women in Lebanon:
Health, Work Opportunities and Attitudes; Centre for Lebanese Studies,
Oxford; August 1996, p. 26 & 29
11) Ibid, p.26
12) Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA; Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fifty First Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/51/13), p.10
13) El Sharkawi, Dr. Fahmi H.; Assessment of the Environmental Health
Conditions in Palestine Refugee Camps in Lebanon Field, April-June 1991;
WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean; p.5
14) Ibid; p.7
15) Al Madi, Yussef Haidar, Palestinian Refugees in camps and communities
in Lebanon, UNICEF & PLO Bureau of Statistics, October 1996, p. 52
(Arabic version)
16) Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA; Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fourty Eighth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/48/13), p.18
17) Tabari, Samia & Zakharia, Leila; data to be published in 1997
18) Stastical Yearbooks 1989-90, 1993-94 & 1994-95, Dept. of Education,
UNRWA Headquarters - Amman
19) Al Madi, Yussef Haidar, Palestinian Refugees in camps and communities
in Lebanon, UNICEF & PLO Bureau of Statistics, October 1996, (Arabic
version)
20) Op. cit.
21) Shaaban, Hussein; Palestinian children in the Labor Market (in Lebanon);
UNICEF, October 1996, p 82 (Arabic version)
22) Tabari, Samia & Zakharia, Leila; data to be published in 1997
23) Al Madi, Yussef Haidar, Palestinian Refugees in camps and communities
in Lebanon, UNICEF & PLO Bureau of Statistics, October 1996, p. 59
(Arabic version)
24) Ibid, p 67
25) Ibid, p.73
26) Tabari, Samia & Zakharia, Leila; Palestinian Women in Lebanon:
Health, Work Opportunities and Attitudes; Centre for Lebanese Studies,
Oxford; August 1996, p. 3 to 16 |
