Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon
Source: FOFOGNET Digest, various (July 1996).
Notes and comments on Rosemary
Sayegh's NACC paper:
RE: Leila Zakharia
RE: Rex Brynen
RE: Leila Zakharia
RE: Rex Brynen
RE: Elaine Hagopian
RE: Hussein Amery
RE: Salim Tamari
From: Leila
Zakharia,
Association Najdeh
Subject: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon
Date: July 5, 1996
It is true that Palestinians in Lebanon suffer from a crisis of representation.
But this is not for lack of representatives. There is a Palestinian political
leadership in Lebanon including most PLO groups as well as leading PLO members
such as Shafiq El Hout. The representation crisis is the result of the current
marginalisation of Palestinian refugees in the peace process and the Oslo
agreements. In Lebanon, various concerned actors have different motivations
for encouraging the marginalization process: 1) PLO members in Lebanon are
in the main opposed to Oslo, therefore the PLO leadership is at loggerheads
with its membership there. The democratic factor is not its guiding star
and even if it were, this would prove to be a liability in its relations
with Israel. 2) The Lebanese authorities, though in frequent contact at all
levels with the local Palestinian leadership (as well as those who belong
to factions outside the PLO) will not open formal dialogue to regulate and
adjust the relationship with resident Palestinians because of the conviction
that granting them civil rights would be one step towards their permanent
resettlement in the country. On the contrary both the lack of civil rights
and the restrictions on travel and residency are aimed at encouraging as
many Palestinians to leave the country as possible. A dialogue would impede
this objective.
This does not mean that alliances do not exist between Lebanese and Palestinian
civil society representatives. A committee on Palestinian rights (national
and civil) was formed earlier this year. It includes Lebanese and Palestinian
personalities, NGOs, with Lebanese former diplomats and government officials.
The going is slow but steady.
On travel restrictions: Hundreds of Palestinians who travelled abroad before
June 1995 for study or work have been unable to return to Lebanon even though
they are holders of legal resident status and their families reside there.
In a Catch 22 situation, their applications at Lebanese Embassies are generally
not denied but the approval from the Ministry of the Interior never comes.
Besides the humanitarian and psychological impact of family separation and
the financial burdens of the exit-entry visa, these measures have seriously
eroded the residency rights of Palestinians and have indirectly nullified
the validity of the Lebanese travel document issued them.
On space restriction and displacement: There is a mistaken belief among
some Lebanese sectors that the elimination of Palestinian camps would somehow
make the Palestinian problem disappear. This is short sighted and detrimental
to Lebanon itself. The continuing operation of UNRWA and its refugee camps
is the guarantor against forced Palestinian resettlement. In effect UNRWA's
mandate (in the political and legal sense) maintains international responsibility
for Palestinian refugees until the implementation of resolution 194.
Meanwhile, the ban on construction threatens at least 2O,OOO Palestinians
with virtual homelessness. This includes displaced families currently living
in temporary squatter premises and the inhabitants of two Beirut camps (Shatila
and Borj El Barajneh) located within the boundary of a new development site.
Palestinians have yet to be approached regarding proposed alternatives, if
any.
Employment: Though it is true that comprehensive surveys on most aspects
of the Palestinian situation are lacking, UNRWA surveys remain a basic indicator
of general trends. Its 1995 figures show that unemployment touched 40% of
the Palestinian work force, up by 6% from the previous year and that as a
result 60% of the population live below the poverty line. Unabated PLO cutbacks
also continue to contribute to the crisis. In February 1996, the Palestine
Red Crescent dismissed 75 staff members, including doctors and nurses, out
of 350 targetted for future dismissal. In Lebanon today, there are Palestinian
engineers who work as street cleaners and Palestinian doctors who face prosecution
for practicing their profession.
Education: The report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA to the 1995
Session of the General Assembly states that the need to increase the number
of UNRWA schools in Lebanon is one of the most critical problems facing the
Agency. This is corroborated by 1993 UNRWA statistics on school-aged children
not attending school:
Age Group |
% Out of School |
6 to 11 |
42.7% |
12 to 14 |
46.5% |
15 to 17 |
71.8% |
18 to 19 |
93.3% |
Although UNRWA cautions that these figures may be inflated due to lack
of accurate information on Palestinian attendance of Lebanese public and
private schools, the results do not surprise anyone in the Palestinian community,
particularly NGOs. Child labor was already in evidence several years ago.
A 1988 PLO study on working Palestinians in Lebanon reveals that 7.3% of
the sample group were 10 to 14 years of age. That was seven years ago. In
addition, 1995 UNICEF statistics on street children in Lebanon show that
18% are now Palestinians. A new phenomena that can only underline the scope
of the degradation suffered by Palestinians in Lebanon today.
UNRWA's Regular Budget in Lebanon: The Comissioner General's report for
1995 expressed deep concern for the deteriorating living conditions of Palestinians
in Lebanon. In addition to the need for schools, the problematic areas were:
lack of employment opportunities, the high proportions of families headed
by women (our note: close to 10,000 families or about 15% of the Palestinian
population) and the problem of housing displaced families. But take note
of this: while UNRWA's regular budget for 1996-97 was increased globally
by 5.14%, its budget in Lebanon rose only 1.69%. The lion's share went to
Gaza (10.7%), in addition to the Peace Implementatjon Program, followed by
Jordan (6.78%), with the lowest proportion (0.46%) in the West Bank. This
writer asked a well placed government official from a major donor country
to explain the discrepancies and got the reply: "this is what the Palestinian
authority wishes." Perhaps, but if donor countries were not in agreement
with the PA, then it would'nt happen.
Few Palestinians in Lebanon believe that the economic stranglehold they
are subjected to is caused primarily by the absence of civil rights. The
real responsibility lies with the decision-makers in a peace process that
ignores their inaleanable national rights and espouses unconditionally Israel's
diktat: the dissolution of the Palestinian refugee question through their
resettlement in Arab host countries and the termination of their national
claims.
From: Rex Brynen
Subject: Re: FOFOGNET Digest - 3 Jul 1996 to 4 Jul 1996
Date: Fri, 5 Jul 1996 03:01:18 +0200
Greetings from Jerusalem, one and all. Due to the joys of internet--and
thanks to my trusty laptop and a compatible phone system at the National
Palace Hotel that uses RJ-11 phone jacks--I'm never too far away from FOFOGNET...
Thanks, Leila, for your very useful comments on Rosemary's paper--if you
don't mind, I would like to archive them on the PRRN website when I get back
to Montreal
I would like to add a few comments on your comments, regarding the refugee
issue in the peace process:
"Few Palestinians in Lebanon believe that the economic stranglehold they
are subjected to is caused primarily by the absence of civil rights. The
real responsibility lies with the decision-makers in a peace process that
ignores their inaleanable national rights and espouses unconditionally Israel's
diktat: the dissolution of the Palestinian refugee question through their
resettlement in Arab host countries and the termination of their national
claims."
Undoubtedly the Oslo process marginalized refugees by focussing so intently
on the WBG. However, it is a mistake to see that process as one that "espouses
unconditionally Israel's diktat: the dissolution of the Palestinian refugee
question through their resettlement in Arab host countries and the termination
of their national claims." The logic of the process was one of establishing
eventual Palestinian sovereignty in (parts of?) the WBG, a logic evident
not only in revision of the Labour party platform but in the comments of
a number of israeli officials (admittedly, usually off-the-record). A sovereign
Palestinian entity would have the right, obviously, to control its own citizenship
and immigration policy, making it possible for Palestinian refugees to return
to Palestinian soil, albeit perhaps not their 1948 homes. The clearest statement
of this was Shlomo Gazit's JCSS paper on the refugee issue; Yossi Beilin
has said much the same thing on occasion. Still, as Salim Tamari's earlier
postings to FOFOGNET have made clear, Israeli negotiators were far from this
forthcoming at the negotiating table.
My fear is that all of this has changed with the change in Israeli government.
Palestinian sovereignty is not even remotely on this government's agenda;
on the contrary, its opposition to future Palestinian sovereignty is clear
and central to its platform. Given this--and given the dim prospects for
any forward movement on final status issues, especially the refugee issue--what
are the implications for those that deal with the refugee issue (NGOs/PA/UNRWA/RWG/host
countries/diaspora communities/etc.)?
From: Leila Zakharia, Association Najdeh
Subject: Re: FOFOGNET Digest - 4 Jul 1996 to 5 Jul 1996
Date: July 7, 1996
When there are opposing opinions, eventually one will
turn out to be mistaken, but how will we learn, if either one of them is
not spoken or worse of all not heard?
1. Natanyahu will not renege on Oslo because he does not need to. That
is exactly what is wrong with the Oslo agreement. What is binding for the
state of Israel, regardless of who is in power, is a cantonized self-rule
system. In return Palestinians have obtained continued Israeli occupation,
growing Israeli settlements, and final status negotiations which may allow
them to discuss core issues within the sole legal framework of Oslo. Gone
are UN resolutions on the Palestinian question and international conventions.
Promises, good intentions and positive expectations are not binding and
Israeli occupation and settlements remain concrete illegal facts. Palestinians
have the legal right to establish an independent state with full sovereignty
over every inch of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Did the Palestinians
feel that they were unable to cope with the responsibility of independance
and self-determination and therefore requested Israel to stay on board until
they got their act together? Who set the rules on this one?
Likewise, Resolution 194 is clear about the right of return, as well as
the UN charter and the International Declaration of human rights. Israel
under both Labor and Likud refuses to comply. Is this Israeli refusal instigated
by the Palestinian negotiator? Who set the rules on this one too?
Negotiations will not be fair and cannot lead to a just durable peace,if
they are not anchored in the laws and the universal values that govern the
relations between peoples and states. Negotiations involve compromises, but
these compromises are not imposed a priori by the other party. Certainly,
there are Israelis who support Palestinian rights, some completely, some
conditionally and Palestinians (in Israel, in the Occupied Territories, in
the Diaspora) cannot see the full fruition of all their aspirations unless
they have the support of a substantial segment of Israeli society. This may
or may not happen, and only the international legal framework can draw the
boundaries between what is or is not negotiable and what is or is not applicable.
2. The marginalization of Palestinian refugees is a political and not a
topical matter linked to the timing of negotiations. It is the result of
a negotiating process which, in form and content, has fragmented the Palestinian
people into separate residential groups and has transformed the Palestinian
refugee issue into a solely humanitarian concern. (My NACC 1995 intervention
on the issue is posted separately).
From: Rex Brynen
Subject: Re: FOFOGNET Digest - 4 Jul 1996 to 5 Jul 1996
Date: Sun, 7 Jul 1996 11:39:19 +0200
Comments on comments on comments on comments...
i) Much as some of us would have preferred an immediate transfer of the
WB/G to Palestinian sovereignty, such a process has never been "in the cards",
nor will it ever be. Call it unfair, call it wrong-headed, call it a rational
response to Israeli security concerns, or call it force majeure: however,
even under optimum conditions, Israel was never going to hand over the keys,
apologize, and depart.
Instead, an ambiguous process of interim self-government was required to
shift to eventual Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. In
many ways, the PLO's gamble at Oslo appeared to be paying off: by the beginning
of 1996, it was amply clear that the Labour Party establishment had largely
accepted the idea of a two-state solution, albeit one on Israeli terms. Unfortunately--and
a tiny minority of Hamas militants bear significant historical responsibility
for this--the Israeli elections turned out differently, either delaying or
endangering the process.
ii) Regarding UNGAR 194 and the Right of Return, several points can be
made. Before making them, let me underline that I happen to believe that
Palestinians (like Bosnians or Rwandans) have an unassailable moral right
to return to homes from which they have been forcibly displaced. However,
it has been amply clear since 1948 that Israel sees this as an existential
issue, that there are *no conceivable circumstances under which Israel will
allow a substantial number of refugees to return to 1948 territories*, and
that there is absolutely no possible outside compulsion that would lead them
to do so. One can cite UNGAR 194 as much as one wishes to, but it never really
has carried much weight with the international community (and indeed, as
a General Assembly resolution, it is not binding in the way that Security
Council resolutions are). As a further observation, very few refugees from
massive, sustained conflicts return to their actual original homes: few Bosnians
will (despite Dayton), and few Rwandans will.
Return to national territory is another issue, however.
As I noted earlier, the logic of the Oslo peace process--belatedly accepted
by the bulk of the Labour establishment, if not yet expressed in political
negotiation--was that a future sovereign Palestinian entity would have the
right to readmit whatever Palestinians wished to return to their national
soil in the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestinian negotiators, incidentally, can hardly be blamed for Israel's
opposition to the right of return: they have cited UNGAR194 at every turn.
But I also believe that they are wise enough to seek the best achievable
deal--the most "attainable justice", to paraphrase Rashid Khalidi's excellent
analysis of the refugee issue--within the realm of the possible. The return
of some Palestinians to 1948 territories, and of the bulk to Palestinian
sovereignty in the WBG, is achievable. A "pure" right of return to 1948 territories
is simply not possible.
iii) Some quick observations on points raised in Leila's
1995 NACC paper:
- While Madrid multilateral ground-rules may have originally barred non-WBG
Palestinians from participating in negotiations, the Palestinians (with
the general support of most of the international community) were successful
in having these rules abandoned. If the PA wants to assign (more) diaspora
refugees to RWG delegations, it is free to do so.
- The RWG did not make UNGAR 194 the basis for all negotiations because,
obviously, neither Israel nor the US would participate under those conditions--which
would effectively end the RWG. The Palestinians are free to insist on UNGAR194
as a precondition, but in practice they will then lose the refugee forum.
- Neither in the RWG nor elsewhere has the refugee issue been transformed
into a "a regional Arab-Israeli issue encompassing all regional refugee
questions". The RWG discusses Palestinians. Moreover, there is no requirement
that the RWG shy away from political issues, although (as Jill Tansley
and I discuss in our Isreal-Palestine piece) this has tended to be the
case for a variety of reasons.
- The Israeli-Jordanian Treaty talks about resolving the refugee issue "in
accordance with international law" (Article 8.2), and mentions the RWG
as only one of several fora. Nowhere does the treaty propose resettlement/absorption.
It does mention "settlement," a deliberately ambiguous term which could
refer to settlement in place or settlement in Palestine.
- "UNRWA's discontinuance" has never been an objective of the RWG, other
than in the sense that (as is obvious) UNRWA will be discontinued as the
refugee issue is resolved. It might be noted, that at one time or another,
the PA, Israel and the US have favoured both i) UNRWA's
early demise, and ii) UNRWA's non-early demise--depending on circumstances.
Other than those observations, however, I fully agree with Leila on the
issue of UNRWA.
From: Elaine Hagopian
Subject: Re: FOFOGNET Digest - 5 Jul 1996 to 7 Jul 1996
Date: Mon, 8 Jul
1996 10:17:52 -0400
I have read Rosemary's and Leila's pieces with interest.
I have also read Rex's reponses with greater interest. If Leila represents
the maximum moral and legal position, Rex is depressingly, and incorrectly "realistic".
At a later point when I have time, I will share my own thoughts with Fofognet.
For now, I want to say, the Leila has the more accurate interpretation. I
don't know why Rex believes that a real sovereign state would have developed
under Labor. Perhaps something called a state might have developed, but it
would have been based on extraordinary discretionary rights for Israeli intervention,
that it would not have looked any different from Netanyahu's self-rule. You
have to remember that Oslo was not a process for real peace, but an opportunity
to dispose of the Palestinian problem which Israel was unable to do with
dispersion, dispossession, and bombardment. This way it has "defanged" the
PLO and split up the Palestinians. Arafat is no so disgusting, that he threatens
the lives of critical Palestinians. Until Oslo is renegotiated and becomes
a real peace process. We are in for co-optation show. The potential problem
now is that Netanyahu may try to split Lebanon from Syria, something which
appears to many impossible. But..... Netanyahu may offer with Bill's support
to withdraw from South Lebanon, and to offer some American money to aid Palestinians
in Lebanon. The withdrawal part is what Lebanon and Syria have been requesting;
the rest is another nail in the Palestinian coffin. Netanyahu would like
to isolate Syria and arrest is power and influence in the region. Bibi would
love to penetrate Lebanon's reviving commercial activities, and do joint
stuff to penetrate the Arab regional investments.
From: Hussein Amery
Subject: FOFOGNET Digest - 7 Jul 1996 to 8 Jul 1996 -Reply
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 1996 08:48:05 -0500
Comments on Elaine's Analysis:
Given the rapid and fluid situation in the ME right now, I would tend to
agree with Elaine in some respects, such as doubting the sincerity of the
Labour Party's intentions.
On the other hand, withdrawing from Lebanon would hardly split Lebanon
from Syria. Israeli strategy in dealing with the Arabs should be characterized
as reluctant incrementalism. Given up pieces of territory, in exchange for
peace treaties, but always holding back from a full committment to total
piece -- which means the end of occupation. Syria basically controls Lebanon,
and an incremental peace with Israel, would therefore require Syrian approval
prior to opening negotitions.
Further, a look at the Likud Cabinet hardly displays any likely candidates
to spearhead a peace initiative.
For the Palestinians, I believe that Arafat, having tried just about every
other approach to pursuing Palestinian goals, has adopted the Israeli approach
to peace and turned it on its head -- one of incrementalism: in the acquisition
of land; acquisition of authority and of distribution of democratic rights.
From: Salim Tamari
Subject: Rosemary Sayigh and her critics (fwd)
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 15:23:51 +0200
I have been following with great interest the debate generated by Rosemary
Sayigh's essay on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. It is a pity that
Rosemary herself--who I understand is not connected--cannot follow this
debate. Perhaps people in Lebanon can make available a hardcopy of this
discussion to RS.
Now for a little nitpicking. In Leila Zakharia's otherwise worthy reponse
to Rex Brynen I was struck by the following sentence:
"Resolution 194 is clear about the right of return, as well as the UN charter
and the International Declaration of human rights. Israel under both Labor
and Likud refuses to comply. Is this Israeli refusal instigated by the Palestinian
negotiator? Who set the rules on this one too?"
[Salim Comments: Israeli refusal to comply with Resolution 194 is as old
as the state of Israel itself. I am surprised the author believes that this
refusal is instigated by the Palestinian negotiator. The only time Israel
came around to confront the issue of refugees before the representatives
of the Palestinian nation (diaspora and homeland) was in Ottowa in 1992,
when the multilateral negotiations began. Since that day the Palestinian
team has raised the need for implementing res. 194 in every plenary session.
In Tunis, Cairo, Oslo, Antalya, etc... (You can check that from the record)
Repeating the sacred words however does not bring the Messiah. Zakharia
seems to believe that Palestinian 'flexibility' in the negotiations has allowed
Israeli to marginalize the issue of refugees. I am sure there is a lot to
criticize in PNA performance, and I can add my bit here, but I do not think
this happens to be the guilty party in this context.
According to this logic Lebanese and Syrian intrasigence in the negotiations
should have brought about a substantial Israeli withdrawal.
The fact is, Israeli 'non-compliance' on the issue of refugees is a much
more complicated question, and cannot be resolved at the moral level--though
I agree with you that international agreements in negotiations must be based
on morality if they are to have binding effect. At the heart of the matter
is Israel's formidable military power, backed by Amerian strategic support.
At the begining of her intervention Laila makes the following suggestion:
"When there are opposing opinions, eventually one will turn out to be mistaken,
but how will we learn, if either one of them is not spoken or worse of all
not heard?
Indeed. I suppose you refer to yourself and Rex Brynen. But have you thought
of the other possibility, that BOTH opposing views might be mistaken? |