Palestinian Refugee Resettlement: Learning
from the Israeli Development Town and Mass Immigration Experience
of the 1950's and 1990's
Source: prepared for Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet , July 2000
by David Newman
With the impending establishment of the Palestinian State, one
of the first tasks to be carried out by the new State Authorities
will be the construction and development of an adequate housing
supply for the Palestinian refugees - both those residing in crowded
and sub-standard conditions within the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
as well as those living elsewhere who take up the option of returning
to the new State. Current estimates of the numbers of Palestinian
who will opt to return are varied, ranging from 500,000 by the
year 2010 (Palestinian Bureau of Statistics) to 700,000 (the Palestinian
Ministry of Planning) at a rate of approximately 100,000 per year,
although the actual rate of return will be dependent on the extent
to which economic development takes place. Given the fact that
of the approximately three million Palestinian residing, at present,
within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, many of them in poor housing
conditions, it will be necessary to create housing for between
50-80,000 people per annum over the first five years, while the
actual figure could end up being even larger. Given an average
famiyl sixe of 4-5 people per household, it will be necessary to
build approximately 15-20,000 housing units per annum at the very
least, with the figure rising to as much as 25-30,000 housing units
if the initial refugee return is significantly larger than expected.
Neither does this take into account the fact that the Palestinian
population is growing at a rapid rate due to natural growth, approximately
3.8 percent per annum (100,000 additional people each year) and
that many families will require larger housing units than those
they presently occupy.
The need to provide a supply of mass housing is not simply an
issue of physical construction. It requires an overview of the
entire regional planning process in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
a public sphere activity which is undeveloped at present and which
has also suffered, over thirty years of Israeli control, from lack
of adequate zoning, environmental and construction standards. Planning
requires the location and distribution of new housing sites and/or
completely new urban developments to tie in, as much as is possible,
with the present distribution of the settlement network - both
urban and rural -, enabling the future development of a settlement
hierarchy which can function as efficiently as possible with adequate
physical infrastructure (roads, electricity and sewage, communications
networks) while, at the same time, avoiding unnecessary duplication
of services if, and where, they already exist. Good planning also
requires adequate attention being paid to the social fabric of
new communities, the availability of economic and employment opportunities
within a relatively short commuting distance from the place of
residence, and the need to prevent wholesale destruction of the
environment and very sensitive ecological balance which, as of
now, is already in a poor state throughout the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
While political objectives may dictate the necessity to construct
a relatively large number of housing units in a short a time as
possible, it is essential that the Palestinian Authorities take
account of the long-term costs - be they social, economic and/or
environmental - which may arise from a non-integrated approach
to the overall process of planning and construction. This is even
more the case given the relatively small area of the Palestinian
State (assumingthat at its largest it will be no larger than the
equivalent total area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, approximately
5,000 square kilometers) and the high population densities, reaching
acute and almost unmanageable proportions in the Gaza Strip.
During its fifty-year history, the State of Israel has taken in
large numbers of immigrants, with peak periods being experienced
in the years immediately following the establishment of the State
in 1948, and again during the early 1990's with the mass influx
of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In the first instance,
the Jewish population of the country was doubled from approximately
600,000 inhabitants to over 1.2 million in the space of four years,
while in the latter case, the entire population of Israel (excluding
the West Bank and Gaza Strip) increased by nearly a fifth (from
five to six million) also in the relatively short time period of
five years. While the social and economic conditions of the country
were very different in these two time periods, there are nevertheless
a number of lessons to be learnt from each of these periods of
mass immigration which can serve as pointers - do's and do not's
- for the Palestinian State in dealing with the absorption of large
numbers of Palestinian refugees - not only in terms of the process
through which dwelling units are constructed but also in terms
of the long term social, economic, regional and environmental impacts.
This paper will discuss the process through which housing was provided
in Israel during these two periods of mass immigration, focusing
on the social and economic constraints of each time period, and
the extent to which lessons learnt from the first period (the 1950's)
were taken into account during the second period (the 1990's).
Finally, the paper will draw on the lessons from both periods of
mass immigration to focus on some of the pitfalls to be avoided
by the Palestinian Authorities in their desire to rehouse large
numbers of Palestinians, at the same time taking into account the
difference in political cultural, ethnic and social stratification,
and the physical extent of the area within which such housing solutions
can be implemented.
This analysis assumes the unlimited right of return of Palestinian
refugees to the new Palestinian State, but does not deal with Palestinian
repatriation within the borders of the State of Israel. Whether
such repatriation will take place or not is unclear at the moment
and, even if it were to take place it would probably be on a limited
scale and would be dealt with by the Israeli housing authorities.
As such, it is not relevant for the purposes of this paper.
The 1950's Experience and the Establishment
of the Development Towns
Between 1948
- 1952, the State of Israel absorbed
some 600,000 Jewish immigrants. The
immediate problem for the State authorities
was to provide them with sufficient
and adequate housing. In the short
term, this was dealt with through
the establishment of transit camps,
consisting of tents and/or prefabricated
huts, while many of the new immigrants
took over the abandoned properties
of the Palestinian refugees. In the
long term, the State planners founded
a series of new, "development",
towns dispersed throughout the country,
but mostly in the peripheral regions
of the Galilee in the North and the
Negev in the south in an attempt,
not only to provide housing solutions
to the rapid influx of immigrants,
but also as a means of providing
integrated socio-economic solutions
where, it was hoped, the settlers
Between 1948-1963, nearly thirty
new towns were constructed, the majority
of them during the 1950's as a means
of settling the mass immigration
which had arrived in the years immediately
following the establishment of the
State of Israel. In 1997, these towns
encompassed a population of approximately
800,000 inhabitants, some eighteen
percent of the country's population.
Israeli governments and planners
have generally favored a settlement
policy promoting population dispersal,
and over the years have combined
a mixture of planning policies and
investment incentives to persuade
both population and industries to
locate in the epripheral regions
of the country. This policy however,
ahs only been successful in times
of mass immigration, when there was
a high degree of government intervention
in the planning and housing construction
process, or as the result of the
flow of resources and population
during periods of "national emergency".
The founding of the development towns
in the negev and galilee regions
during the 1950's was the direct
result of mass immigration and the
government's desire to bolster the
demographic composition of these
regions.
The government became directly involved
in construction, especially in these
peripheral regions where the new
development towns and villages became
the new homes of penniless immigrants.
During periods of mass immigration,
the State is able to intervene and
determine just "where" people should
live, as contrasted to periods of
little -or no- immigration when the
private market begins to take over.
But the private sector is unable
to cater for the immediate housing
needs of hundreds of thousands of
people who arrive in a short period
of time. Huge amounts of capital
investment is necessary for the creation
of new towns or neighborhoods, including
the large infrastructural costs,
for populations who arrive with little,
if any, disposable resources of their
own. The development towns were mostly
built on public lands with the State
taking on the responsibility for
planning and infrastructure costs.
In the first stages of development,
much of the construction activity,
such as land reclamation, road building,
construction of housing, also provided
crucial employment opportunities
for the immigrants. The existing
housing and construction companies
commenced the building of permanent
housing but it soon became obvious
that this task was beyond their capabilities.
The government then assumed responsibility,
first through the creation of a Housing
Division in the Ministry of Public
Works, later to become a separate
and autonomous Ministry of Housing.
The impact of the State housing
agencies was of major significance
in the establishment and continued
management of the development towns.
These state agencies provided the
finance for the construction of the
housing, as well as being actively
and directly involved in the planning,
zoning and subcontracting of these
developments. The mass construction
activity was highly centralized and,
as such, tended to take on uniform
characteristics throughout the country,
both in terms of the type of buildings,
as well as the social composition
of the residents. Local authorities,
to the extent they attempted to do
so, were largely unable to make changes
or modifications. In the few cases
where the local authorities pressed
their demands, the State Agencies
simply commenced construction beyond
the existing municipal limits in
new neighborhoods which were eventually
annexed to the city, or awarded separate
independent municipal status. The
fact that all this activity was centralized
also meant that the residents of
these new townships and neighborhoods
could be brought from anywhere, not
just from the local region, thus
enabling the State to redirect new
immigrants to whichever location
they so desired and, as discussed
below, also achieve the political
objective of population dispersal
away from the metropolitan center
of the country and into the peripheral
regions. Thus the Northern and Southern
districts of the country received
a disproportionate share of the public
housing and new residents of the
country during this period.
At the national level, it was considered
ideologically "positive" to disperse
the new immigrants throughout the
existing urban network, not only
because it enabled the use of existing
infrastructure, services and roads,
and thus reduced the costs vis a
vis the establishment of the new
development towns on virgin sites,
but also because it was seen as contributing
to the social mix of new and old
settlers. However, at the local level
itself, this was not always met by
such strong support by the existing
residents, because of what was perceived
as their "oriental" customs and their
lower levels of social and economic
development. Within the rural sector,
spatial segregation between the existing
farming communities and the new ones
was strongly maintained, in many
cases separate schools and other
social support services being set
up for the two populations. It was
a classic case of a NIMBY ("not in
my backyard") syndrome, where national
objectives of state formation were
approved throughout the country (it
was the politically correct thing
to do) but opposition to the implementation
of these objectives was met at the
local level as, and when, it affected
existing residents in their own neighborhoods.
The need to build speedily resulted
in the construction of dwelling units
which, in a relatively short space
of time, were too small and inadequate.
Many of the first immigrant dwelling
units were no larger than an average
of 30 square meters, including one
or two rooms, a kitchen and a bathroom.
As economic conditions improved later,
so too was the size of the average
dwelling unit, but only after many
of the immigrant families - most
of whom had large families - suffered
from overcrowded and difficult conditions.
Between 1951-1961, public housing
agencies and companies built about
75 percent of the dwelling units,
although the public sectors share
in the investment was a little over
fifty percent, indicating that the
public housing stock was of a poorer
quality than that of the private
sector and that it largely catered
to the lower income and penniless
groups.
Despite the major government activity
involved in providing adequate housing,
by the end of 1951, one fifth of
the country's population still lived
in the temporary units which had
been provided for them. There was
a backlog of housing for a quarter
of a million people, giving rise
to a national housing crisis. It
took a further six to seven years
before this backlog was finally solved,
during which period many of the immigrants
lived in shanty town type conditions
under great hardship while, at the
same time new immigrants continued
to pour into the country, thus creating
even further demand for housing.
The need to meet this demand as quickly
as possible, and with the limited
resources even of the State, meant
that both the physical conditions
and size of the dwelling units, as
well as the social support services,
were kept to the minimum and were
far from adequate.
The dispersal of the development
towns throughout the peripheral regions
not only provided immediate housing
solutions, but also played an important
political role in the battle for
demographic hegemony between Arabs
and Jews, with the State authorities
attempting to achieve a Jewish majority
not only at the nation-wide level,
but in each and every region, especially
those which retained a large concentration
of Palestinian-Arab residents. Whereas
the agricultural communities - the
kibbutzirn and the moshavim - had
been (and continued to be during
the 1950's) a means through which
the Jewish state extended its control
over ever larger expanses of territory
on behalf of self defined national
political objectives, these communities
never amounted to more than a relatively
miniscule proportion of the population.
In terms of creating demographic
superiority, the State used the development
towns, and the absolute control it
had over determining where the new,
penniless, immigrants would be housed,
as a means of achieving this political
objective throughout the country.
It took a few years until the government
realized that it was not sufficient
just to build housing stock, but
that it had to provide for the long
term economic development of these
communities. This became even more
important as the first phase of construction
was completed and the immigrants
who had been employed on the building
sites now found themselves without
jobs. Despite the high levels of
government subsidies and tax benefits
to enterpreneurs, the development
towns have continued to suffer from
a lack of afequate employment opportunities.
Factoris areconstantly closing down
in these towns, resulting in the
highest levels of unemployment in
the country and, in turn, to greater
welfare dependency and out-migration
of the residents. This has been a
socio-economic and demographic pattern
which has chaarcterised the development
towns almost from their inception
and through until the present period.
In the long term, Israel's development
towns were transformed into the main
geographic and social cores of poverty
and disempowerment within the Jewish
community. They became centers of
ethnic discontent as a result of
their high levels of unemployment,
their distance - both geographic
and political - from the center of
power and decision- making, and their
general treatment by the Ashkenazic
political and social elites who perceived
the residents of these communities
in a paternalistic fashion, as people
who needed to be "civilized" into
the workings of a modem, European,
form of culture and Statehood. The
peripheral geographic location of
most of these towns meant that the
residents suffered from a situation
of "double peripherality", unlike
their counterparts who settled in
the poverty neighborhoods of Tel
Aviv and who were able to find alternative
employment sources within the wider
metropolitan region, despite the
fact that they too suffered from
similar social and cultural estrangement.
In a country where the two national
groups - Jews and Arabs - are highly
segregated in their own towns, villages
and urban neighborhoods, the settling
of the new immigrants in the development
towns only served to strengthen the
ethnic segregation of different communities
within the Jewish community. Prior
to the establishment of the development
towns, there was no clear spatial
distinction between the "old timer" and "newer" settlers
amongst the Jewish immigrants to
Palestine. The fact that the development
towns were constructed as a means
of providing housing for the many
new immigrants, together with the
fact that the vast majority of the
new immigrants were from North Africa
and Asian countries, resulted in
the emergence of a highly segregated
landscape. The immigrants, most of
whom were unskilled or were unable
to find employment whatsoever, were
also of lower income and, as such,
the public housing projects of the
1950's - be they the establishment
of new neighborhoods in existing
towns or the establishment of new
development towns in the periphery
of the country - were transformed
into homogeneous ethnic and lower
income class neighborhoods.
In addition to the social and ethnic
structural problems, the establishment
of the development towns left their
mark on the wider settlement landscape.
In retrospectr, too many separate
and independent towns were established,
rather than focusing on a fewer number
of large twons. As such they competed
with each other, often in a relatively
small geographic space, for scarce
public sector and industrial resources,
while - until the arrival of the
Russian immigration of the 1990's - most
of them failed to grow beyond the
critical threshold stages which would
have facilitated a more efficient
and cost effective delivery of municipal
services. It is therefore not surpising
that from the mid-1950's onwards,
greater attention was given to expanding
and consolidating the existing urban
and rural network, rather than creating
additional urban centers (the two
exceptions being the towns of Arad
in the south, and karmiel in the
north, both of which were founded
in the early 1960's). It also explains
why, during the epriod of mass Russian
immigration in the 1990's, the idea
of creating entirewly new towns was
never considered by the planners
or policy makers.
Learning from the Past? The Russian
Immigration of the 1990's.
The mass
immigration of residents from the
former Soviet Union during the 1990's
resulted in the arrival of XXXX people
during the decade. Between 1990-1996
alone, 700,000 new immigrants arrived.
By the end of 1995, Israel's population
had reached 5.6 million inhabitants,
a five percent annual growth during
the years 1990 and 1991, 2.7% growth
in 1992, and over ten percent growth
during the first half of the decade.
Given the development town experience
of the previous forty years, Israeli
politicians and planners were wary
about the way in which these immigrants
should be absorbed and provided with
housing and employment opportunities.
Despite the fact that the 1980's
had been a period of relatively little
immigration and the private sector
construction companies had become
more involved in providing for the
changing housing and residential
patterns of the country's population,
it nevertheless required the State,
once again, to provide the means
for finding an instant solution to
the mass housing needs of such a
large population. For a relatively
short period of time, caravan estates
were set up as a short term, transition,
phase, but these were phased out
within two to three years, not least
because the planners and policy makers
were aware of the long term resentment
against the State held by those immigrants
of the 1950's who had had to endure
a number of years in the temporary
encampments of that period. Moreover,
the greater sophistication of the
construction industry in the 1990's
meant that relatively high quality
housing could be provided within
a relatively short time period, given
the funding and support of the public
agencies. The government enabled
the Housing Ministry and Planning
Authorities to operate according
to Emergency Laws, reducing much
of the beauracratic delays of zoning
and planning committees, bringing
about the initial privatization of
land, but, at the same time, paying
scant attention to, and in some cases
even blatantly ignoring, the environmental
and ecological impact of this mass
development. Emergency construction
regulations focused on the need for
speed. The authorization process
for new plans was reduced to a maximum
of sixty days, the transfer of land
to the contracting construction companies
was made for only 20-30 percent of
its real value (or at no charge whatsoever
in the case of the development towns
of the periphery), and the government
signed comitments to purchase all
unsold housing units from the construction
companies.
Unlike the 1950's experience, completely
new towns were not constructed. Instead,
resources were poured into the establishment
of new neighborhoods within the existing
urban communities, with a major focus
on the development towns of the periphery.
However, this time, given a more
realistic assessment of the economic
and employment needs of the immigrant
population, resources were also poured
into creating housing in new neighborhoods
and suburbs in the major metropolitan
centers. The existing stock of empty
and available rental accommodation
in the private sector was also mapped
and incentives were given to home
owners to rent out their accommodation
rather than keep it empty. The increased
pressure on the housing stock resulted
in a rise in rental prices in the
private sector, thus making it worthwhile
for these properties to be rented
out, but it also resulted in exploitation
of many of the new immigrants who
were overcharged and ended up using
most of their available resources
for accommodation expenses. A system
of "direct absorption" was put into
operation, whereby many of the immigrants
were able to choose their own residence
in the private market from a stock
of available housing and were provided
with rent subsidies and other assistance
during the initial period of acclimatization.
The Ministry of Absorption, together
with the Jewish Agency, covered the
cost of rent for the first year.
In this way, while the State still
was responsible for mass construction
throughout the country, it was able
to pass over some of the responsibility
to the private market which became
a more active partner in the absorption
process than had been the case during
the 1950's.
From 1989-1991, the number of housing
starts throughout the country rose
from 20,000 to 84,000. Approximately
130,000 housing units were completed
during 1990-1992. In effect, the
establishment of new residential
units and neighborhoods within the
existing towns served to expand the
overall housing stock available,
not just for the new immigrants but
for the entire population. The 1980's
and 1990's was a period of rapid
change within the Israeli housing
market, with many of the country's
residents seeking to improve their
living conditions, either through
leaving the towns altogether and
moving to the many new suburban and
exurban communities which were springing
up throughout the country and where
residents were able to purchase plots
of land and construct their own large
detached houses, or through exchanging
their relatively smaller urban apartments
for larger and more modem apartments
in the new neighborhoods. Unlike
the public housing of the 1950's,
the new residential units were built
at much higher standards - both in
terms of facilities available and
the average size of the unit itself.
While in the 1950's the dwelling
units had been built at standards
which, even then, were below the
national average, many of the units
constructed in the early 1990's were
built at standards which were equivalent
to, and in many cases even better
than, the existing housing stock,
especially in the development towns.
While many of the new neighborhoods
had been inhabited exclusively by
the new immigrants during the 1950's,
this time it was not exclusively
so. By creating alternative models
of absorption, the immigrants were
provided with a choice, some of them
opting to use the 'direct absorption" process
within existing rental accommodation,
others preferring to be directed
to the new developments - mostly
in the periphery - by the State.
It was accepted by the State planners
that, while the mass Russian immigration
had provided the State with yet another
opportunity of increasing the demographic
presence in the periphery and the
development towns, this could not
be an exclusive policy and that many
of the immigrants should be allowed
to move into the private housing
sector within the metropolitan center
if they so desired, not least because
there were better employment opportunities
in these areas. Thus, many of them
chose to reside within the metropolitan
center of the country, despite the
higher costs involved, while others
preferred to use their available
resources in such a way as to pay
less rent and reside in the new neighborhoods
which had been established in the
development towns and other peripheral
locations. Others still rented accommodation
within the older parts of the existing
urban locations, enabling veteran
residents to move out of their older
dwelling units and improve their
living conditions by moving into
the new neighborhoods. As such, many
of the new residential developments
became much more mixed than had been
the case in the 1950's, populated
by both recently arrived immigrants
from the former Soviet Union, as
well as veteran residents who were
improving their physical living conditions.
Similarly, the older parts of the
existing towns also experienced a
mix, as the property vacated by residents
desiring to improve their living
condition was then taken up by the
immigrant population.
As far as the development towns
of the periphery were concerned,
many of them experienced an increase
in their population by a third, and
in some extreme cases almost doubling,
in the space of only three-four years,
thus exerting strong pressures on
the existing physical and social
infrastructure. The fact that the
Russian immigrant population was
largely composed of small, often
one-parent families, often accompanied
by an elder relative, a pattern which
could not have been more different
than the existing ethnic composition
of the development towns and the
poorer neighborhoods of the metropolitan
center where the average family size
was large and young, also meant that
the type of social and welfare support
which existed within these communities
was often incompatible with the needs
of the newly arrived population.
Thus, the influx of the new immigrants
placed a severe strain on the municipal
buidgets and service infrastructures,
While municipalities were obligated
to provide basic services to ne whouseholds,
they were unable to support this
increased spending because the newcomers
were either unemployed or undergoing
retraining courses, which meant that
they were mostly exempt from local
taxation. In addition, new immigrants
are entiteld to a variety of tax
concessions during their first years
in the country. Many local authorities
protested to the central government
that they would be unable to provide
even these basic municipal services
to the newcomers if they did not
receive increased fiscal assistance.
The arrival of the Russian immigrants
had a major impact on the social
composition of the development towns.
Until the 1990's, these places had
remained the focus of Mizrahi (Jews
from north African and Asian origin)
underprivilege throughout the country.
During the 1980's, these groups began
to undergo a process of local empowerment,
becoming much more active in the
management and administration of
their own local authorities, as well
as playing a more active role in
the party politics at the national
level. Sectoral, ethnic, parties
looked to the development towns as
an important power base during periods
of elections, bringing out the anti-establishment
resentment which these populations
retained, blaming the Ashkenazi elites
for their economic and social predicaments.
Many of the new neighborhoods were
almost immediately transformed into
homogeneousr ethnic communities,
with Russian becoming the spoken
language within the immediate vicinity,
Russian language newspapers being
sold at the local shops, while food
outlets began catering to the eating
habits of this new population. Within
a short period of time, Russian became
the third spoken language of the
country - after the two official
languages of Hebrew and Arabic.
The Russian immigrants looked with
disdain at their new neighbors within
the development towns, perceiving
them as "oriental", "uncultured and
uneducated" and not to be mixed with.
Despite their residential location
in many of these peripheral locations,
the Russian immigrants saw their
lot as being with that of the secular
European elites, the Ashkenazi population.
At both the local and national level,
they formed their own political parties,
often wresting power away from the
veteran populations and bringing
about a great deal of friction and
tension. At the national level, the
political parties set up for the
Russian immigrants gained a significant
number of seats in both the 1996
and 1999 elections, attaining a place
in the coalition governments and
even ministerial positions. Overall,
the integration and adaptation of
the Russian immigrant population
into the social, economic and political
system took place almost immediately,
as compared with the North African
and Asian immigrants of the 1950's,
who have only recently began to undergo
a process of empowerment.
In many cases tensions and frictions
developed between the veteran North
African and Asian residents of the
development towns with their newly
arrived Russian neighbors. The former
saw the latter as having benefited
from conditions and assistance which
were far superior to those they themselves
had received during the 1950's, the
fact that this was due to the vastly
improved economic condition of the
State, plus the fact that the authorities
did not want to repeat the mistakes
of the 1950's, was irrelevant to
the veteran residents who saw this
as yet another way by which the lot
of the "Europeans" had been preferred
to those of "Eastern" extraction.
Another source of friction was the
fact that the Russian immigration
was almost entirely secular, in many
cases non-Jewish altogether, while
the veteran population was largely
traditional and, in many cases, overtly
religious and orthodox. The introduction
of secular lifestyles by the newly
arrived immigrants became the focus
for much localized conflict in these
towns and neighborhoods.
As in the 1950's, the arrival of
the mass Russian immigration served
a number of longer-term structural
political objectives. In the first
place, they enabled many of the development
towns, which had been experiencing
stagnation, or even net demographic
migration outflow, to undergo sudden
and rapid growth, thus reaching the
sort of size thresholds which, given
the necessary resources, enables
them to provide a fuller and wider
range of public and municipal services.
Net migration patterns show that,
in the long term, the development
towns had displayed more out-migration
than in- migration, as the younger
generations left these places in
search of better economic and social
opportunities in the metropolitan
center of the country. The initial
inflow of the Russian immigrants
changed this picture almost overnight,
providing a new opportunity for the
government planners to check the
decline of the outlying populations.
The National Plan for Immigrant Absorption
proposed increasing the relative
weight of the population in the southern
region alone from seven percent (317,000
in 1989) to nine percent (550,000
by 1995). The population of the Tel
Aviv region would, according to this
same plan, decline from 23 percent
to 19.7 percent during this same
period. At the same time, there were
first indications that some of these
newly arrived inhabitants are, having
become acclimatized to their new
country of residence, already beginning
to move away from the peripheral
locations and into the metropolitan
center of the country. At the same
time, the vastly improved transportation
and communications infrastructure
of the country has served to reduce
the distance between so-called "peripheral" locations
and the metropolitan center of the
country, enabling residents of many
of the development towns to commute
daily into the metropolitan area
while enjoying the lower housing
costs of the periphery. The vast
improvement in the country's rail
network which ahs taken place during
the latter part of the 1990's is
also expected to have a structural
impact on commuting patterns and
distances of the Israeli population,
making the metropolitan center more
accessible to residents of the peripheral
regions.
Despite the increase of the Israeli
population by nearly a fifth during
the first half of the 1990's, the
average rate of unemployment did
not rise significantly beyond the
national average of 8-10 percent.
This was partly because the Russian
immigrants created their own sources
of demand, coupled with the fact
that this is a highly educated population,
many of whom were integrated into
the high tech and international market
sectors which have experienced growth
in Israel during the past decade.
At the same time, the high percentage
of skilled manpower, such as doctors,
engineers, academics and arts professionals,
was too great for the Israeli marketplace
to absorb, while many Israeli employers
(public and private sector) argued
that the levels of technology brought
from the former Soviet union was
not sufficiently advanced to attain
an equivalent job in Israel. Many
of the newcomers underwent retraining
programs.
As in the 1950's, the settling of
the Russian immigrants fulfilled
wider political objectives of the
State. Not only did the new immigrants
bring about major demographic growth
within the development towns, they
also served to change the Jewish-Arab
balance of the population, at both
the national and local levels. Due
to the available empty housing in
many of the development towns, some
of them - particularly those in the
north of the country - had become
targets for the local Arab-Palestinian
populations who suffered from a lack
of adequate housing in their own
towns and villages. The influx of
mass Russian immigration enabled
the authorities to "fill" up the
available housing with Jewish immigrants
and thus prevent what was seen by
many of the Israeli policy makers
and planners as the undesired "infiltration" of
Arab residents into these towns.
This was particularly apparent in
some of the older towns, which prior
to 1948 had been entirely populated
by the local Arab population and
which during the first forty years
of Statehood had become characterized
as having a "mixed" Jewish-Arab population,
albeit within increasingly segregated
neighborhoods. It was also apparent
within some of the development towns
in the north of the country which
were surrounded by Arab towns and
villages which were experiencing
rapid demographic growth but lacked
the opportunities (because of government
planning policy) to undertake their
own physical expansion. A classic
example was the case of Upper (Jewish)
Nazareth where, during the 1980's,
many of the available dwelling units
were inhabited by Arab residents
of Lower (Arab) Nazareth. This had
resulted in sporadic incidents of
anti-Arab incitement and racism by
some of the more extreme elements
within Upper Nazareth who desired
to maintain a total ethnic separation
between the two towns. The influx
of the Russian immigrants meant that
all available apartments were now
taken up, while new neighborhoods
were also constructed to cater for
the sudden increase in demand for
housing.
Despite the problems encountered,
the asborption of the Russian immigration
has been relatively successful, especially
when compared with the experience
of the 1950's and the initial establishment
of the development towns. Social
and economic integration has been
much more rapid, while the expansion
of the existing development towns,
many of which had stagnated for over
two decades, has helped bring about
a partial rejuvenation of these places,
although many social and employment
problems still exist. At the same
time, the influx of the new immigrants
has, in many places, brought about
new social and inter-ethnic tensions
which have only served to add to
the heterogeneity of the Israeli
Jewish population, at both the local
and national levels.
Overall, the mass immigration of
the 1990's has had a major impact
on the growth of the settlement network.
Nearly every urban community has
experienced substantial population
growth, although the overall dispersal
and size hierarchy of settlements
has remained much the same. But growth
has brought with it a number of functional
and structural problems. Investment
in industrial and employment infrastructure
is necessary to prevent out-migration
from the development towns. Should
this occur, the the effect on these
towns would be devastating, with
vacant housing, underused service
infrastructures, bringing about even
worse conditions than existed prior
to the arrival of the immigrants.
Some Lessons for Palestinian Refugee
Repatriation
The Israeli experience
of mass resettlement in both the
1950's and 1990's brings with it
a number of lessons which need to
be considered by the Palestinian
Authorities in preparing for the
need to rehouse hundreds of thousands
of refugees. Most of the immigrants
in the 1950's arrived from the Arab
countries of the Middle East and
North Africa, while a smaller ammount
arrived as holocaust survivors from
Europe. The immigrants arrived destitute,
lacking housing, jobs and financial
resources. While the "pull" factor
of the new Jewish homeland played
a role in their decision to come
to palestine, the major impetus for
their move was the "push" factors
and the feelings of insecurity in
their place of origin. By contrast,
most Palestinian refugee repatriation
would be "pull" migration, with refugees
in Syria and Jordan likely to flow
to the new Palestinian State in modest
numbers, the intensity of the flow
being shaped, in a large part, by
comparative economic opportunity.
Based on this reality alone, it would
seem that the Russian model, encouraging
flexible and timely response by the
construction sector largely on the
edges of the existing urban areas,
is a more relevant approach to refugee
absorption than the development town
model of the 1950's. the one exception
to this may be the case of the Palestinian
refugees in lebanon who may be subject
to greater "push" factors than those
residing in either Jordan or Syria.
While the economic conditions of
the new Palestinian State vis a vis
the refugees are more similar to
the conditions which prevailed in
Israel of the early 1950's, the methods
of construction and the available
technology are those of the 1990's.
The Israeli experience has shown
that it is not sufficient simply
to focus on the process of physical
construction but equally, if no more
so, to understand the social, economic
and environmental implications of
the construction process. The long
term social and economic consequences
of mass building, rather than the
obvious short term benefits to be
gained from simply providing the
physical housing infrastructure -
be it improving the housing stock
and conditions for those still residing
in refugee camps, or providing adequate
housing for those returning to a
Palestinian state from elsewhere
- must be taken into account. It
is also important to take account
of the fact that the total land area
in question - whatever the ultimate
territorial configuration of the
Palestinian State - will be about
one quarter of the size of Israel,
with a population of between a third
to one half (depending on the number
of refugees who return from outside
Palestine) resulting in extremely
high population densities. There
will be little choice but to focus
on urban and high rise developments
if any areas of open land are to
be retained - possibly in the Jordan
valley and/or in the southern reaches
of the West Bank region.
But given the small areal extent,
it will not be necessary to provide
employment opportunities within every
community as the journey to work
- including those who continue to
commute from the Gaza Strip and West
Bank into Israel - can be accomplished
in almost every case within a maximum
journey time of one hour to ninety
minutes. Given a scenario of open
boundaries between a Palestinian
State and Israel, many residents
of both the Gaza Strip and West Bank
would probably continue to commute
into Israel, certainly during the
earlier phases of Statehood when
the necessary investment in economic
and employment infrastructure has
not yet taken effect, despite the
obvious neo-colonial implications
of this type of economic relationship.
Paradoxically, the construction,
by the Israeli authorities, of the
bypass roads to serve the Israeli
settlements, has brought about a
significant improvement in many of
the West Bank roads, thus facilitating
more rapid means of commuting for
the Palestinian population.
Although the Palestinian population
is internally more homogeneous than
the different waves of Jewish immigration
to Israel, it is essential that the
Palestinian Planning Agencies do
not fall into the trap of creating
new neighborhoods to be populated
entirely by specific population groups.
There are at least four different
population groups which can be identified,
namely the veteran residents of the
West Bank and Gaza who have remained
in their homes, some of whom have
become well established in both social
and economic terms; the refugee population
who remain in refugee camps within
the West Bank and Gaza; the refugee
population in the refugee camps in
neighboring countries but who have
not been subject to Israeli rule;
and the refugee population - first,
second and third generations - who
reside elsewhere in the world and
have established themselves, attained
citizenship in their country of residence,
but retain a strong Palestinian identity
and attachment. The immediate needs
of construction are for the population
residing within the refugee camps,
first and foremost within the West
Bank and Gaza, and secondly within
the neighboring countries. While
any form of permanent construction
will be a vast improvement on their
existing living conditions, it is
essential that the planners do not
fall into the trap of the Israeli
planners of the 1950's, namely in
their haste to provide adequate housing,
the dwelling units were built at
small and sub-standard levels and
thus create feelings of dissatisfaction
and resentment against the State
Authorities. Given the fact that
there is not the immediate need to
provide housing within the short
term, it is advisable for refugee
repatriation to be planned in accordance
with the pace of construction activity,
so that it will not be necessary
to build temporary tent or caravan
sites - which may even worse than
the conditions in many of the existing
refugee camps which have taken on
characteristics of partial permanency
- within which refugees will quickly
become dissatisfied.
It is also essential for the right
mix to be found between the public
and private sector construction.
This may be particularly problematic
with respect to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip given the large number
of separate donor organizations,
all of which are ready to contribute
towards refugee resettlement. It
is essential to create a system of
coordination which will enable these
donor organizations to cooperate
and invest in joint projects but,
at the same time, without creating
an over-centralized and rigid planning
framework. Given this institutional
setup, it will be more likely for
relatively small scale housing projects,
rather than wholescale new towns,
to be developed.
Whichever type of housing development
is pursued, the construction of new
neighborhoods, perhaps even a completely
new town, should be planned with
a view to the overall housing conditions
within the new Palestinian State
and should not only be seen as providing
an immediate solution to the problem
of refugees. Construction at higher
standards in some places may bring
about a filtering down process within
the housing market, with veteran
residents of the West Bank towns
seeking to improve their living conditions,
enabling some of the refugee population
to move into the newly vacated accommodation
in the older parts of the towns,
this being a first step in the process
of social and economic integration
into the new State. This will also
allow for greater social mix, rather
than the concentration of all the
refugees in separate housing developments
(some of which will be unavoidable
whatever happens) and thus reducing
the possibility of future tensions
based on feelings of economic inequality
and discrimination.
It is also important to provide
alternative means of refugee housing
and absorption, enabling the client
population to choose the method which
is best suited to them, rather than
imposing a single centralized mode
of operation. To the extent that
the private rental sector has available
accommodation there is no reason
why those requiring resettling should
not be encouraged to receive rental
subsidies and take up residence,
rather than moving exclusively into
the new housing estates which will
be built. The extent to which alternatives
exist will largely depend on the
available resources of the refugee
families which may, in turn, be dependent
on the extent to which refugees recive
some form of compensation package
as part of the repatriation process.
Another possibility may also be the
transfer of the housing stock of
some of the Israeli settlements to
the Palestinian State, in which case
there would be some very high quality
detached housing available, perhaps
as a means by which veteran residents
of the towns would improve their
own living conditions, creating new
availability within the towns themselves.
However, this assumes that some,
if not all, of the settlements will
actually be evacuated as part of
the final agreement, and that Israel
will agree to sell, or transfer,
these settlements to the Palestinian
State rather than destroy them as
happened following the evacuation
of the settlements in Northern Sinai
in 1982.
At the regional level, it may be
necessary to establish a small number
of completely new urban developments,
in which case, the location of these
towns relative to the existing urban
infrastructure is critical. Given
the Israeli experience, it is preferrable
to establish a small number of relatively
large towns, each of which will quickly
reach the appropriate size thresholds
necessary for the efficient delivery
of a municipal service system. It
is essential to avoid the situation
whereby new towns will compete with
the existing towns, or with each
other, for the allocation of scarce
public resources. As such, a town
in the southern, less densely populated,
area of the West Bank, or in the
Jordan valley (climatic conditions
allowing) would be the most suitable
location for the establishment of
completely new urban developments.
Selected Bibliography
Berler, A. (1970) New Towns
in Israel . Israel Universities
Press: Jerusalem.
Coon, A. (1994) Town Planning
Under Conditions of Military Occupation .
Efrat, E (1989) Development Towns in Israel: Past or Future? Achiasaf
Press: Tel Aviv.
Efrat, E. (1998) Physical Planning
prospects in Israel during 50 Years
of Statehood . Galda & Wilch
Verlag: Berlin.
Falah, G (1996) 'Living
together apart: Residential segregation
in mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel', Urban Studies, Vol
33, 823-857.
Falah, G & Newman, D (1995)
`Small state behaviour: On the formation
of a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip', Canadian
Geographer , 39 (3), 219-234
Gonen, A. (1995) Between City and Suburb: Urban Residential Patterns and Processes in Israel. Avebury
Press: Aldershot.
Israel, National Council for Planning
and Construction (1991) Integrated Outline Plan for Construction and Development for Immigrant Absorption - Tama 31. Ministry
of Interior, Jerusalem. Two Volumes
(In Hebrew).
Lipshitz, G (1998) 'Spatial patterns
of internal migration to and from
development towns in Israel', In
In 0. Yiftachel & A. Meir (eds)
Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries:
Landscapes of Development and Inequality
in Israel. Westview Press: Boulder,
Co. pp. 171-188.
Newman, D. (1998) 'Population as
security: the Arab-Israeli struggle
for demographic hegemony', In N.
Poku & D. T. Graham (eds) Redefining
Security: Population Movements and
National Security. Praeger: London.
Pp. 163-186.
Newman, D & Falah, G. (1996)
`State formation and the geography
of Palestinian self determination', Tijdschrift
voor Economische en Sociale Geografie
(TESG) , 87 (1), 60-72.
Newman, D, Gradus, Y & Levinson,
E (1995) The Impact of Mass Immigration
on Urban Settlements in the Negev
1989-1991. Negev Center for Regional
Development, Working Paper No. 3.
Ben Gurion University of the Negev,
Israel.
Peled, Y (1998) 'Mizrahi Jews and
Palestinian Arabs: exclusionist attitudes
in development towns'. In In 0. Yiftachel & A.
Meir (eds) Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries:
Landscapes of Development and Inequality
in Israel. Westview Press: Boulder,
Co. pp. 87-113.
Shachar, A.S (1971) Israel's development
towns: evaluation of national urbanization
policy', Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol
10, 271-291.
Shachar, A.S & Lipshitz, G (1981)
'Regional inequalities in Israel', Environment and Planning A, Vol
13, 436-473.
Yiftachel, 0 (1998) 'The internal
frontier: territorial control and
ethnic relations in Israel', In 0.
Yiftachel & A. Meir (eds) Ethnic
Frontiers and Peripheries: Landscapes
of Development and Inequality in
Israel. Westview Press: Boulder,
Co. pp. 39-68.
Executive Summary
Housing options:
- The Palestinian Authority should
undertake an immediate mapping
of existing accomodation, to
include the size, facilities
and availability of rental accomodation.
The Authority should offer rent
subsidies to refugees, and tax
benefits to homeowners, so that
any existing dwelling units become
available on the hosuing market
immediately
- New housing estates at the
edges of existing urban centers
should be preferred to the construction
of completely new towns.
- Construction of new dwelling
units should take account of
the overall housing conditions
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
resulting in an integrated housing
solution, rather than the needs
of the refugees alone.
- Refugees should be allowed
to choose between alternative
housing solutions, dependent
on their available resources.
This should include both the
private and public sector of
the housing market.
- Public sector construction
should not build dwelling units
which are too small for the average
family size. Such a solution,
based on the need for "immediacy" will
only result in longer term dissatisfaction
and may give rise to social problems.
Employment options:
- Given the relatively small
areal extent of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, it is not necessary
to create employment opportunities
for all the refugees within immediate
proximity to their new place
of residence.
- Commuting to work, be it within
the Palestinian State, or to
Israel or Jordan, is an option
which must be examined. But it
must be undertaken in tandem
with the improvement and expansion
of the transportation and road
infrastructure.
- Where completely new housing
estates are constructed, the
refugees can be gainfully employed
in the construction work itself.
However, this is a short term
solution which will cease to
exist as soon as the dwelling
units are complete.
- In new housing estates, the
new communities will create some
of their own employment opportunities - in
shopping centers, public services
etc;. The residents of these
new estates should be preferred
in the competition for employment
in these places.
Social structure:
- In order to avoid the sort
of social problems which have
accompanied both periods of mass
immigration rehousing in Israel,
it is important to attempt to
create a wider spatial mixing
of Palestinian refugees with
veteran residents, rather than
the creation of homogeneous housing
estates to be inhabited only
by returning refugees.
- The construction of high quality
housing should enable veteran
residents of the West Bank and
Gaza State to improve their living
conditions, while vacating their
existing dwelling units for the
benefit of those refugees desiring
to live within the older cores
of the existing towns. This will
enable greater mixing in both
new and old areas of housing.
Environmental considerations:
- To the extent that it is possible,
mass construction should not
be allowed to damage even further
the delicate ecological and environmental
conditions which exist in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- No construction plans should
be approved by the Planning Authorities
without adequate sewage, transportation
and noise considerations.
- It is essential to preserve
the few remaining open spaces
in the region, in particular
the Jordan Valley and the southern
portion of the West Bank. Any
planning of new housing developments
should take this into consideration.
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