- The peace that nearly was at Taba
Source: Ha'aretz, February 14, 2002
by Akiva Eldar
In the current reality of terror attacks and
bombing raids, it is hard to remember that Israel
and the Palestinians were close to a final-status
agreement at Taba only 13 months ago.
The daily chronicle of exchanges of fire between
IDF soldiers and Palestinian fighters, F-16 bombing
raids and missile firings, terror attacks and assassinations,
has turned negotiations on a final-status agreement
into a distant memory. Anyone who reads the European
Union's account of the Taba talks, prepared by EU
envoy Miguel Moratinos and published here for the
first time, will find it hard to believe that only
13 months ago, Israel and the Palestinians were so
close to a peace agreement. This document, whose main
points have been approved by the Taba negotiators
as an accurate description of the discussions, casts
additional doubts on the prevailing assumption that
[former prime minister] Ehud Barak "exposed [Palestinian
Authority Chairman] Yasser Arafat's true face."
It is true that on most of the issues discussed during
that wintry week of negotiations, sizable gaps remain.
Yet almost every line is redolent of the effort to
find a compromise that would be acceptable to both
sides. It is hard to escape the thought that if the
negotiations at Camp David six months earlier had
been conducted with equal seriousness, the intifada
might never have erupted. And perhaps, if Barak had
not waited until the final weeks before the election,
and had instead sent his senior representatives to
that southern hotel earlier, the violence might never
have broken out.
The "Moratinos Document," as it is called
by the Taba negotiators, is a summary of the opening
stages of negotiations that took place in good faith.
The main difference between Taba and Camp David is
that in the United States, Israel presented its offers,
but the Palestinians merely responded with criticism.
At the Egyptian resort of Taba, however, the Palestinian
delegation also presented its proposals. Ideas were
exchanged and plans and even maps were presented.
Based on the progress achieved between Camp David
and Taba, it is possible that the next meeting between
Barak's and Arafat's envoys, or perhaps the one after
that, would have ended in a peace agreement.
The EU's special envoy to the peace process, Miguel
Moratinos, and his aides were the only outsiders at
the Taba Hotel. Moratinos interviewed the negotiators
after every working group session and recorded their
reports. During the six months after the Taba talks
ended, he sent his document to both sides again and
again for their comments. The version published here
is the final version accepted by both sides last summer.
But Yossi Beilin, one of Israel's chief negotiators,
did not hide his annoyance at the document's leak.
He said the dry words do not convey the positive spirit
that reigned in the hotel, nor do they accurately
present either the understandings reached or the gaps
that remain. Beilin pointed out that the document
reflects both sides' desire to convince their own
publics that they protected their peoples' interests.
Moreover, he said, this is a midpoint document: It
sums up where things stood at an arbitrary
point in time.
Beilin stressed that the Taba talks were not halted
because they hit a crisis, but rather because of the
Israeli election. At the time, the two sides were
discussing arranging a Barak-Arafat meeting in an
effort to close the gaps; they had also discussed
continuing the talks the day after the election, independent
of the outcome. Beilin himself continues to talk with
the Palestinians about ways to solve the various issues
that remain open. From his perspective, the basis
for negotiations was, and remains, the proposals made
by former U.S. president Bill Clinton.
Taba, January, 2001
This EU non-paper has been prepared by the EU Special
Representative to the Middle East Process, Ambassador
Moratinos, and his team after consultations with the
Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in
January 2001. Although the paper has no official status,
it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a
relatively fair description of the outcome of the
negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba.
It draws attention to the extensive work which has
been undertaken on all permanent status issues like
territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in order
to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same
time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences
between the two sides, which will have to be overcome
in future negotiations. From that point of view, the
paper reveals the challenging task ahead in terms
of policy determination and legal work, but it also
shows that both sides have traveled a long way to
accommodate the views of the other side and that solutions
The two sides agreed that in accordance with the
UN Security Council Resolution 242, the June 4 1967
lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel
and the state of Palestine.
1.1 West Bank
For the first time both sides presented their own
maps over the West Bank. The maps served as a basis
for the discussion on territory and settlements. The
Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian
side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented
some illustrative maps detailing its understanding
of Israeli interests in the West Bank.
The negotiations tackled the various aspects of territory,
which could include some of the settlements and how
the needs of each party could be accommodated. The
Clinton parameters served as a loose basis for the
discussion, but differences of interpretations regarding
the scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. The
Palestinian side stated that it had accepted the Clinton
proposals but with reservations.
The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals
provide for annexation of settlement blocs. The Palestinian
side did not agree that the parameters included blocs,
and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian
side stated that blocs would cause significant harm
to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly
to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks
The Israeli side maintained that it is entitled to
contiguity between and among their settlements. The
Palestinian side stated that Palestinian needs take
priority over settlements. The Israeli maps included
plans for future development of Israeli settlements
in the West Bank. The Palestinian side did not agree
to the principle of allowing further development of
settlements in the West Bank. Any growth must occur
The Palestinian side maintained that since Israel
has needs in Palestinian territory, it is responsible
for proposing the necessary border modifications.
The Palestinian side reiterated that such proposals
must not adversely affect the Palestinian needs and
The Israeli side stated that it did not need to maintain
settlements in the Jordan Valley for security purposes,
and its proposed maps reflected this position.
The Israeli maps were principally based on a demographic
concept of settlements blocs that would incorporate
approximately 80 percent on the settlers. The Israeli
side sketched a map presenting a 6 percent annexation,
the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. The Palestinian
illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the context
of a land swap.
Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but
the proportionality of the swap remained under discussion.
Both sides agreed that Israeli and Palestinian sovereign
areas will have respective sovereign contiguity. The
Israeli side wished to count "assets" such
as Israelis "safe passage/corridor" proposal
as being part of the land swap, even though the proposal
would not give Palestine sovereignty over these "assets".
The Israeli side adhered to a maximum 3 percent land
swap as per Clinton proposal.
The Palestinian maps had a similar conceptual point
of reference stressing the importance of a non-annexation
of any Palestinian villages and the contiguity of
the West Bank and Jerusalem. They were predicated
on the principle of a land swap that would be equitable
in size and value and in areas adjacent to the border
with Palestine, and in the same vicinity as the annexed
by Israel. The Palestinian side further maintained
that land not under Palestinian sovereignty such as
the Israeli proposal regarding a "safe passage/corridor"
as well as economic interests are not included in
the calculation of the swap.
The Palestinian side maintained that the "No-Man's-Land"
(Latrun area) is part of the West Bank. The Israelis
did not agree.
The Israeli side requested and additional 2 percent
of land under a lease arrangement to which the Palestinians
responded that the subject of lease can only be discussed
after the establishment of a Palestinian state and
the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
1.2 Gaza Strip
Neither side presented any maps over the Gaza Strip.
In was implied that the Gaza Strip will be under total
Palestinian sovereignty, but details have still to
be worked out. All settlements will be evacuated.
The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged
in 6 months, a timetable not agreed by the Israeli
1.3 Safe passage/corridor from Gaza to the West
Both sides agreed that there is going to be a safe
passage from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun) to the
Hebron district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip must be territorially linked. The nature of
the regime governing the territorial link and sovereignty
over it was not agreed.
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion
of having a Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods
and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods.
The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready to
discuss Israeli request to have sovereignty over those
Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed
after 1967, but not Jebal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud.
The Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty
over settlements in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area,
namely of Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev.
The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready
to accept Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods
of East Jerusalem, including part of Jerusalem's Old
City. The Israeli side understood that the Palestinians
were ready to accept Israeli sovereignty over the
Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the American
The Palestinian side understood that the Israeli
side accepted to discuss Palestinian property claims
in West Jerusalem.
2.2 Open City
Both sides favored the idea of an Open City. The
Israeli side suggested the establishment of an open
city whose geographical scope encompasses the Old
City of Jerusalem plus an area defined as the Holy
Basin or Historical Basin.
The Palestinian side was in favor of an open city
provided that continuity and contiguity were preserved.
The Palestinians rejected the Israeli proposal regarding
the geographic scope of an open city and asserted
that the open city is only acceptable if its geographical
scope encompasses the full municipal borders of both
East and West Jerusalem.
The Israeli side raised the idea of establishing
a mechanism of daily coordination and different models
were suggested for municipal coordination and cooperation
(dealing with infrastructure, roads, electricity,
sewage, waste removal etc). Such arrangements could
be formulated in a future detailed agreement. It proposed
a "soft border regime" within Jerusalem
between Al-Quds and Yerushalaim that affords them
"soft border" privileges. Furthermore the
Israeli side proposed a number of special arrangements
for Palestinian and Israeli residents of the Open
City to guarantee that the Open City arrangement neither
adversely affect their daily lives nor compromise
each party sovereignty over its section of the Open
2.3 Capital for two states
The Israeli side accepted that the City of Jerusalem
would be the capital of the two states: Yerushalaim,
capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state
of Palestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only
concern, namelythat East Jerusalem is the capital
of the state of Palestine.
2.4 Holy/Historical Basin and the Old City
There was an attempt to develop an alternative concept
that would relate to the Old City and its surroundings,
and the Israeli side put forward several alternative
models for discussion, for example, setting up a mechanism
for close coordination and cooperation in the Old
City. The idea of a special police force regime was
discussed but not agreed upon.
The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised
its concern regarding the area conceptualized as the
Holy Basin (which includes the Jewish Cemetery on
the Mount of Olives, the City of David and Kivron
Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that it was
willing to take into account Israeli interests and
concerns provided that these places remain under Palestinian
sovereignty. Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested
informally by the Israeli side, was to create a special
regime or to suggest some form of internationalization
for the entire area or a joint regime with special
cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side
did not agree to pursue any of these ideas, although
the discussion could continue.
2.5 Holy Sites: Western Wall and the Wailing
Both parties have accepted the principle of respective
control over each side's respective holy sites (religious
control and management). According to this principle,
Israel's sovereignty over the Western Wall would be
recognized although there remained a dispute regarding
the delineation of the area covered by the Western
Wall and especially the link to what is referred to
in Clinton's ideas as the space sacred to Judaism
of which it is part.
The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has
requested to establish an affiliation to the holy
parts of the Western Wall, but maintained that the
question of the Wailing Wall and/or Western Wall has
not been resolved. It maintained the importance of
distinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing
Wall segment thereof, recognized in the Islamic faith
as the Buraq Wall.
2.6 Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount
Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount has not been resolved. However, both sides were
close to accepting Clinton's ideas regarding Palestinian
sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif notwithstanding Palestinian
and Israeli reservations.
Both sides noted progress on practical arrangements
regarding evacuations, building and public order in
the area of the compound. An informal suggestion was
raised that for an agreed period such as three years,
Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be under international
sovereignty of the P5 plus Morocco (or other Islamic
presence), whereby the Palestinians would be the "Guardian/Custodians"
during this period. At the end of this period, either
the parties would agree on a new solution or agree
to extend the existing arrangement. In the absence
of an agreement, the parties would return to implement
the Clinton formulation. Neither party accepted or
rejected the suggestion.
Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as
a good basis for the talks. Both sides stated that
the issue of the Palestinian refugees is central to
the Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive
and just solution is essential to creating a lasting
and morally scrupulous peace. Both sides agreed to
adopt the principles and references with could facilitate
the adoption of an agreement.
Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties
should agree that a just settlement of the refugee
problem in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of
UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative
for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian
side discussed the proposed narrative and there was
much progress, although no agreement was reached in
an attempt to develop and historical narrative in
the general text.
3.2 Return, repatriation and relocation and rehabilitation
Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities
of resolving the refugee issue. The Palestinian side
reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should have
the right of return to their homes in accordance with
the interpretation of UNGAR 194. The Israeli side
expressed its understanding that the wish to return
as per wording of UNGAR 194 shall be implemented within
the framework of one of the following programs:
A. Return and repatriation
1. to Israel
2. to Israel swapped territory
3. to the Palestine state.
B. Rehabilitation and relocation
1. Rehabilitation in host country.
2. Relocation to third country.
Preference in all these programs shall be accorded
to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.
The Palestinian side stressed that the above shall
be subject to the individual free choice of the refugees,
and shall not prejudice their right to their homes
in accordance with its interpretation of UNGAR 194.
The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track
15-year absorption program, which was discussed but
not agreed upon. The first track referred to the absorption
to Israel. No numbers were agreed upon, but with a
non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years
of this program (40,000 in the first five years of
this program did not appear in the non-paper but was
raised verbally). The second track referred to the
absorption of Palestinian refugees into the Israeli
territory, that shall be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty, and the third track referring to the
absorption of refugees in the context of family reunification
The Palestinian side did not present a number, but
stated that the negotiations could not start without
an Israeli opening position. It maintained that Israel's
acceptance of the return of refugees should not prejudice
existing programs within Israel such as family reunification.
Both sides agreed to the establishment of an International
Commission and an International Fund as a mechanism
for dealing with compensation in all its aspects.
Both sides agreed that "small-sum" compensation
shall be paid to the refugees in the "fast-track"
procedure, claims of compensation for property losses
below certain amount shall be subject to "fast-track"
There was also progress on Israeli compensation for
material losses, land and assets expropriated, including
agreement on a payment from an Israeli lump sum or
proper amount to be agreed upon that would feed into
the International Fund. According to the Israeli side
the calculation of this payment would be based on
a macro-economic survey to evaluate the assets in
order to reach a fair value. The Palestinian side,
however, said that this sum would be calculated on
the records of the UNCCP, the Custodian for Absentee
Property and other relevant data with a multiplier
to reach a fair value.
Both sides agreed that UNRWA should be phased out
in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years,
as a targeted period. The Palestinian side added a
possible adjustment of that period to make sure that
this will be subject to the implementation of the
other aspects of the agreement dealing with refugees,
and with termination of Palestinian refugee status
in the various locations.
3.5 Former Jewish refugees
The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation
to former Jewish refugees from Arab countries be recognized,
while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility
or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side maintained
that this is not a subject for a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli
The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution
of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.
3.7 End of claims
The issue of the end of claims was discussed, and
it was suggested that the implementation of the agreement
shall constitute a complete and final implementation
of UNGAR 194 and therefore ends all claims.
4.1 Early warning stations
The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning
stations on Palestinian territory. The Palestinian
side was prepared to accept the continued operations
of early warning stations but subject to certain conditions.
The exact mechanism has therefore to be detailed in
4.2 Military capability of the state of Palestine
The Israeli side maintained that the state of Palestine
would be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals.
The Palestinian side was prepared to accept limitation
on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state
with limited arms. The two sides have not yet agreed
on the scope of arms limitations, but have begun exploring
different options. Both sides agree that this issue
has not been concluded.
4.3 Air space control
The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine
would have sovereignty over its airspace. The Israeli
side agreed to accept and honor all of Palestine civil
aviation rights according to international regulations,
but sought a unified air control system under overriding
Israel control. In addition, Israel requested access
to Palestinian airspace for military operations and
The Palestinian side was interested in exploring
models for broad cooperation and coordination in the
civil aviation sphere, but unwilling to cede overriding
control to Israel. As for Israeli military operations
and training in Palestinian airspace, the Palestinian
side rejected this request as inconsistent with the
neutrality of the state of Palestine, saying that
it cannot grant Israel these privileges while denying
them to its Arab neighbors.
4.4 Time table for withdrawal from the West Bank
and Jordan Valley
Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed
to a withdrawal from the West Bank over a 36-month
period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan
Valley in conjunction with an international force,
maintaining that a distinction should be made between
withdrawal in the Jordan Valley and elsewhere.
The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal
process from the West Bank expressing concern that
a lengthy process would exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli
tensions. The Palestinian side proposed an 18 months
withdrawal under the supervision of international
forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian side
was prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces for an additional 10-month period. Although
the Palestinian side was ready to consider the presence
of international forces in the West Bank for a longer
period, it refused to accept the ongoing presence
of Israeli forces.
4.5 Emergency deployment (or emergency locations)
The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate
five emergency locations on Palestinian territory
(in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response
allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional
on a time limit for the dismantling. In addition,
the Palestinian side considered that these two emergency
locations be run by international presence and not
by the Israelis. Informally, the Israeli side expressed
willingness to explore ways that a multinational presence
could provide a vehicle for addressing the parties'
The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment
of Israeli armed forces on Palestinian territory during
emergency situations, but was prepared to consider
ways in which international forces might be used in
that capacity, particularly within the context of
regional security cooperation efforts.
4.6 Security cooperation and fighting terror
Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to
promoting security cooperation and fighting terror.
4.7 Borders and international crossings
The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian
sovereignty over borders and international crossing
points would be recognized in the agreement. The two
sides had, however, not yet resolved this issue including
the question of monitoring and verification at Palestine's
international borders (Israeli or international presence).
4.8 Electromagnetic sphere
The Israeli side recognized that the state of Palestine
would have sovereignty over the electromagnetic sphere,
and acknowledged that it would not seek to constrain
Palestinian commercial use of the sphere, but sought
control over it for security purposes.
The Palestinian side sought full sovereign rights
over the electromagnetic sphere, but was prepared
to accommodate reasonable Israeli needs within a cooperative
framework in accordance with international rules and
Dispute over Ma'aleh
The importance of Israel's recognition of the June
4, 1967 border is that since 1967 (and even today),
Israel's official position has been that UN Security
Council Resolution 242 mandates withdrawal from "territories"
conquered in the Six Day War. The Arab position, in
contrast, is that the resolution requires withdrawal
from "the territories." Israel's official
refusal to recognize the June 4, 1967 borders is currently
an obstacle to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in his
efforts to reach an agreement with the chairman of
the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ahmed Qureia
(Abu Ala). There is no Palestinian confirmation of
Peres' claim that the Palestinians have accepted the
formulation that a final-status agreement will be
based on Resolution 242.
Israel agreed to recognize the June 4, 1967 border
as the basis for the border between Israel and Palestine
after the Palestinians agreed in principle to discuss
territorial swaps in the West Bank, as proposed by
Clinton, that would enable Israel to annex parts of
the West Bank adjacent to the Green Line (but not
parts of Gaza). The maps presented by the Palestinians
at Taba gave Israel 3.1 percent of the West Bank.
That is less than the lower limit proposed in the
Clinton plan (under which the Palestinians would receive
94 to 96 percent of the West Bank). Israel demanded
6 percent - the upper boundary of the Clinton plan
- plus an additional 2 percent in the context of a
leasing agreement. The Palestinians also rejected
Israel's demand that the "no man's land"
around Latrun not be considered part of the West Bank.
According to the document, Israel gave up all the
Jordan Valley settlements, focusing instead on its
security interests in that area. The dispute centered
around the large stretch of territory between Ma'aleh
Adumim and Givat Ze'ev, which contains both a fairly
large Palestinian population and East Jerusalem's
most important land reserves. The Palestinians retracted
their earlier readiness to include these two settlements
in the settlement blocs to be annexed to Israel after
realizing that Israel also insisted on annexing the
large tract that joins them - which would mean that
Palestinian citizens would suddenly find themselves
in sovereign Israeli territory. Barak instructed his
chief negotiator, Gilad Sher, to tell the Palestinians
that the map presented by then foreign minister Shlomo
Ben-Ami, which reduced the area of the settlement
bloc (including the Ma'aleh Adumim-Givat Ze'ev tract)
to only 5 percent of the West Bank, had no validity.
Another dispute that remained unresolved stemmed
from Israel's refusal to accept the Palestinian demand
for a 1:1 ratio between the area of the West Bank
annexed to Israel and the parts of Israel that would
be given to the Palestinians in exchange. Israel proposed
a ratio of 1:2, in its favor. In addition, the Palestinians
rejected Israel's proposal that the Halutza Dunes
in the Negev, the area of the "safe passage"
between the West Bank and Gaza, and the part of Ashdod
Port that would be set aside for Palestinian use all
be considered part of the land swap. They insisted
that the land they received be contiguous with either
the West Bank or Gaza, and that it not include any
land that was merely set aside for their use, over
which they would not have sovereignty. (Akiva Eldar)
How long is the Western
The Clinton proposal paved the way for understandings
in Jerusalem, but it also created the principal dispute
between the two parties.
An agreement was reached that East Jerusalem, which
would be called Al-Quds, would be the capital of Palestine.
Understandings were also reached regarding a division
of East Jerusalem's neighborhoods such that Jewish
neighborhoods would remain under Israeli sovereignty
(other than Har Homa, which the first Jewish families
are just moving into now, and Ras al-Amud), while
Arab neighborhoods would be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty. In addition, it was agreed that parts
of the Old City - the Muslim Quarter, the Christian
Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter - would be
to the Palestinians.
But the Clinton proposal did not help the parties
to draw mutually accepted borders between the Open
City - to which both sides agreed - and the surrounding
Palestinian areas, on one side, and Israeli areas,
on the other. The Open City is territory that citizens
of both countries can enter without passing through
any checkpoints. The Palestinians wanted it to encompass
of Jerusalem, while the Israelis wanted it limited
to the Old City only.
And the Clinton proposal complicated negotiations
on the most sensitive issue: the Western Wall. Clinton
had referred to "the holy parts" of the
Wall, thereby creating an opening for the Palestinian
claim that only the exposed part of the Wall (the
Wailing Wall) is considered holy to the Jews, and
therefore only this part should be left under Israeli
sovereignty. Palestinians claimed the Western Wall
tunnels were part of Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount).
Since the Taba talks ended, many meetings and seminars
have taken place in an effort to close the gaps, attended
by politicians and experts from both sides and from
other countries as well.
Symbols of sovereignty
Israel insisted that it retain sovereignty over the
"safe passage" between Gaza and the West
Bank, with the Palestinians receiving only usage rights
to the land. With respect to air space, however, Israel
adopted a more generous approach to the sovereignty
issue. Nevertheless, it demanded rights to the use
of Palestinian air space, including for air force
The document reveals that the Palestinians expressed
a willingness to accept the principle of limitations
on their armaments and even took Israel's security
needs into account (they agreed to three early warning
stations and two "emergency locations,"
compared to the five "emergency locations"
Israel had sought in addition to the early warning
But in all matters relating to the symbols of sovereignty,
the Palestinians took a harder line. They therefore
insisted that an international force man the "emergency
locations," rather than an Israeli one. And the
issue of control over Palestine's international border
remained unresolved for the same reason: the question
of who would man the border control posts.