Refugee Compensation: Why the Parties have been Unable to Agree and Why it is Important to Compensate Refugees for Losses
Source: Pp. 102-108 in Palestinian Refugees:
Old Problems - New Solutions, Joseph Ginat and
Edward J. Perkins (eds.). Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2001.
By Emanuel Marx Added on December 29th, 2001
The
opinions of both Palestinian and
Israeli statesmen regarding Palestine
Refugee Compensation have been set
out in Don Peretz' groundbreaking
survey (Peretz 1995). Rex Brynen
(1996), Elia Zureik (1996) and Shamay
Cahana (1997) brought the discussion
forward until 1997. One point emerges
clearly from these studies: that
both parties have skirted the issue
of why and how to compensate the
refugees, and left it to the final
status negotiations. So far Palestinian
spokesmen have put all the emphasis
on the Return ( 'auda ),
the reinstatement of all the refugees
to their former homes and properties.
Therefore they have never explored
alternative or additional options,
such as granting the refugees living
in camps ownership titles to their
homes, paying the refugees and their
descendants compensation for loss
of property and missed life chances,
resettling refugees in Palestine
and, of course, negotiating an agreement
on the return of a specified number
of refugees to Israel. (They may,
however, be doing it at this very
moment). As to the Israeli authorities,
they have for almost fifty years
stuck to the notion that over the
years, and especially from 1948 onward,
a de facto population transfer
has taken place, in which both Palestinians
and Jews from Arab countries were
dislodged from their land and property.
While frequently arguing that the
material losses on both sides were
equal and should be set against each
other, Israeli leaders never formulated
a comprehensive policy regarding
the treatment of Palestinian refugees.
This leaves us with two perplexing
questions:
- Why have the parties so far been
unable to formulate policies regarding
the compensation for refugees?
- Why is it so important to compensate
individual refugees for losses
sustained half a century ago?
Concerning the first question I
argue that the State of Israel's
continuing efforts to achieve a monopoly
on land have so far blocked any thoughts
of handing over land to Palestinians,
and that the Palestinian Authority's
insistence on the Return as the only
acceptable solution to the refugee
problem is an inevitable reaction
to this position. As to the second
question, I believe that people memorize
material losses as perpetual debts.
Debts that are not redeemed remain
open sores. Therefore it is incumbent
on states, which intend to make a
lasting peace to compensate the individuals
who suffered and sustained losses
in the course of acts of war. If
these persons are no longer alive
- their rights do not lapse but pass
on to their descendants.
The State of Israel's resistance
to both the return of Palestinian
refugees and the payment of compensation
is longstanding, as documented by
Shenhav (1999). It is based on the
argument that the 1948 war created
refugees both among the Palestinians
and the Jews in the Middle East.
In 1982, the then Minister Mordechai
Ben-Porath, himself a Jew of Iraqi
origin, chaired a Ministerial Committee
on a solution to the Palestinian
refugee problem. In his Foreword
to the committee's report Ben-Porath
restates this argument. His narrative
begins in 1948, when '590,000 Arabs
left for the Arab countries and were
there put into refugee camps. At
the same time 600,000 Jews from Arab
countries arrived in Israel'. He
ends with the to him obvious conclusion
that ' .the solution to the problem
of the Middle East refugees is by
resettlement.' (Aner 1984: 5). The
thinking lying behind this story
is that the events following the
establishment of Israel turned both
Jews from the Arab countries and
Palestinians into refugees. They
left behind property, most of which
was then taken over by the states
concerned. Thus two linked accounts
were created: the number of refugees
on both sides was almost equal and
the property left behind was presumably
of equal value and, anyway, it would
be difficult to recover. The State
of Israel absorbed the Jewish refugees
and thus compensated them for their
losses. If the Palestinian refugees
too were resettled in their present
locations there would no longer be
a need to compensate them. The Palestinian
refugee camps would be dismantled
and there would no longer be a refugee
problem. In line with this feat of
wishful thinking the Ministerial
Committee concluded that the refugee
issue should be discussed within
the framework of peace agreements
between Israel and the Arab countries.
(We must remember that the invasion
of Lebanon in 1982 created a political
climate that could disregard the
fact that a peace agreement between
Egypt and Israel had already been
concluded in 1977). At that time 'Israel
will demand that the Arab countries
absorb the refugees living in their
territories, as against [Israel's]
absorption of the Jewish refugees
from Arab countries' (Aner 1984:
45). The committee thus adopted Israel's
traditional position, but also introduced
a new idea, namely that on humanitarian
grounds Israel should resettle the
inhabitants of refugee camps in the
Occupied Territories.
The argument was not motivated by
a concern for the Jewish immigrants
from Arab countries, for the State
of Israel never demanded compensation
for their losses. They were always
considered immigrants who chose to
come to Israel and only in this special
context did they become 'refugees'.
Needless to say, these Jewish immigrants
had not appointed the State as their
attorney. The State's real concern
was, and still is, to remain in possession
of the land and property that the
Palestinians left behind. It has
by various means, whether legal sequestration,
administrative decree or by the forcible
removal of the original owners, established
ownership over 93 per cent of all
the land in the country. This trend
has not abated; the State still seeks
to increase its land holdings (Marx
2000). Its agent, the Israel Lands
Authority, does not usually sell
land. Instead, it gives Jewish users
49-year leases to parcels of land;
its regulations do not permit the
leasing of land to Arab citizens.
The State of Israel is incapable
of giving up land. Its leaders and
politicians cannot conceive the possibility
of restoring large areas of land
to the original Palestinian owners.
Perhaps this explains the seeming
paradox that in the absence of specific
policies regarding the Palestinian
refugees, Israel's reactions to the
demands made from time to time to
reinstate Palestinian refugees to
their lands have for 50 years remained
so consistent and unchanged.
To Israel's flat refusal to receive
or compensate the refugees, the Palestinian
representatives could only react
in one way: to demand the complete
reinstatement of all Palestinian
refugees to their former homes and
properties. They still feel that
Israel's proposals are unjust; if
they were implemented, only the Arab
States and the Israeli State would
benefit, whereas neither the Palestinian
State nor the individual Palestinians
who sustained the losses would receive
any compensation. It would also introduce
numerous states, each with its own
agenda, into negotiations concerning
solely the Palestinians and the Israelis.
The Arab countries would, for instance,
argue that the Jews left of their
own free will, that many Jews sold
their property before emigration,
and that therefore they were not
obliged to discuss the issue of compensation.
The history of the idea of the Return
parallels that of the Israeli refusal
to deal with the refugee issue. It
is enshrined in UN Resolution 194
(III) of 1948, paragraph 11 of which 'resolves
that the refugees wishing to return
to their homes . should be permitted
to do so at the earliest practicable
date, and that compensation should
be paid for the property of those
choosing not to return' (Ofteringer
1997: 140). It reappears in paragraph
9 of the Palestinian Compact of 1968,
as 'the liberation of the motherland
and return to it' (Harkavi and Steinberg
1988: 95), but without the option
of compensation. Various studies
of refugees testify to the paramount
importance attached to the right
of Return (Khalidi 1989: 196; Farah
1997: 270-277). A 1968 study of Jalazon
camp found that the idea of the Return
was not only accepted unanimously
by persons meeting in public, but
was also found to underlie much of
the camp's social organization. For
instance, the neighborhoods were
initially based on village origin
and people from the same village
still tend to intermarry (Ben-Porath
and Marx 1971: 15-16). A recent study
of the attitudes of Palestinian refugees
by a research team made up of Palestinians
and Israelis still finds that 'Return
is probably the one magic word that
can fulfill the Palestinians' longing
for the original homes and lands
that they have never really forgotten'
(Yahya 1998: 64).
These set attitudes are not likely
to change, precisely because they
have never been thoroughly examined
by either of the parties nor discussed
by both parties. The Multilateral
Working Group on Refugees set up
at the Madrid Peace Conference of
1991 was convened six times in five
years. At all these meetings the
Palestinian delegation regularly
raised the issue of the Return, while
the Israeli delegation as regularly
refused to discuss it (Cahana 1997:
7-27). A recent meeting of Israeli
and Palestinian academics and former
politicians, arranged by Harvard
University's Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs, attempted
to seek a compromise between the
positions. The Israeli representatives
were adamant: 'Israel would pay collective
compensation to the Palestinian State,
paralleled by Arab State compensation
for Jewish refugees from 1948' (Alpher
and Shikaki 1998: 1). And the men
who formulated this declaration were
academics, not politicians! The Palestinian
participants were more flexible;
they insisted that Israel recognize,
in principle, the right of Return,
but agreed to restrict the number
of returnees. They did, however,
demand that 'Israel would pay both
individual and collective compensation'
to Palestinians ( ibid. ).
It should be clear by now that the
twin issues of the return of Palestinian
refugees to Israel and to Palestine
and the payment of compensation to
those preferring not to return must
be discussed and some solution agreed
upon before the parties can implement
peace.
Why is individual compensation of
Palestinian refugees so critical?
And why is it more important for
the establishment of peace in the
Middle East than either the return
of the refugees or payment of collective
compensation? For states only conclude
peace treaties, while peace is made
between peoples. A lasting peace
between Palestinians and Israelis
must be based on a dense network
of links between the two peoples.
The peace treaties between the states
will regulate the borders and provide
security measures, establish controls
on the movement of people and goods,
and set up fiscal obstructions to
free trade. Such regulations would
be implemented by a growing bureaucratic
staff, which would make every effort
to entrench itself and to set up
elaborate control mechanisms. Peace
must then be fostered by the people
of Palestine and Israel, against
very heavy odds.
But before such relationships can
be established the people on both
sides must be reconciled and become
more tolerant to each other. The
hatred and resentment accumulated
over generations must be overcome,
and wounds must be healed. That there
is such a problem comes out clearly
in informal intercourse with Palestinian
refugees. The memories of a lost
home, of land and property left behind
and the social upheaval that accompanied
their flight, are indelibly etched
in their minds (Shamir 1980: 150;
Farah 1997: 291). Each household
keeps legal documents, such as tax
receipts and land registration documents,
which have become reminders of a
happier past. People may turn a simple
artifact, such as a house-key, into
a symbol that elicits detailed itemized
accounts of the property to which
it gave access. It may arouse memories
of the abrupt loss of property and
life chances. It may also remind
people of the injustice perpetrated
on them, and cause them to realize
that the world has forgotten them
and that no one has compensated them
for their losses. Such profound reactions
can be observed not only where people
witnessed the past, but also by members
of a second and third generation.
These sentiments are never far from
the surface. In meetings with refugees
the issue of their lost property
crops up regularly. No sooner is
the theme broached than their anger
flares up and they hold their interlocutor,
especially if he is as an Israeli,
partly responsible for their plight.
This issue must be attended to. Only
when the refugees are compensated
for these losses, will they be able
to turn a new page, though without
ever forgetting that they are refugees
(Marx 1992: 293).
Refugees who are not compensated
for their losses may pass their resentment
on to descending generations. The
best illustration are the refugees
created by the 1922 war between Greece
and Turkey, which ended with the
signing of the Lausanne treaty of
1923. The two governments consented
to a population transfer, as a result
of which over a million persons became 'Greeks'
and 350,000 people became 'Turks'
who lost their homes and property.
Hirschon's (1989) study of a settlement
of Asia Minor refugees in Pireus
found the 'Greek' refugees, fifty
years after their arrival in Greece,
still to be refugees. They still
considered themselves to be people
from Asia Minor and had little respect
for the local Greeks (Hirschon 1989:
23). Many of them still spoke Turkish
among themselves ( ibid. 29).
While the Greek State had housed
them in state-owned makeshift accommodation,
it had never compensated them for
their losses. The refugees resented
both the Greek and the Turkish authorities
for having left them in the lurch.
This resentment is spread throughout
the refugee populations in both countries.
It has poisoned the relations between
the countries and has fed into their
sporadic disputes. It flares up at
the slightest pretext. Thus the disagreements
between Moslem and Christian Cypriots
repeatedly brought the two countries
to the brink of war.
Compensation provides a substratum
on which economic and other relationships
may grow and thrive. If the Palestinians
and Israelis could establish dense
networks of economic relations, these
would reinforce peaceful relations.
But the chances for developing such
ties are quite slim. For in thirty
years of Israeli rule, the Palestinian
economy has been eroded. Not only
were local trade, industry and agriculture
supplanted by Israeli imports, but
the Occupied Territories were also
left without a labor force: the Israeli
labor market offered higher wages
for unlimited numbers of Palestinian
workers. In order to collaborate
with the Israeli economy, the Palestinians
must first develop an independent
and competitive economy. Their natural
outlets are, of course, the neighboring
Arab countries. But at the moment
the level of trade between the Arab
countries stands at about seven to
eight per cent (Feiler and Yisraeli
1996: 29 put the figure at under
seven per cent), largely because
of the divide between the rich oil-exporting
countries and the poor labor-exporting
ones. The rich states import goods
from all over the world, and seek
to control the import of labor from
their poorer Arab neighbors, relatives
who might eventually claim the rights
and benefits of citizenship. Therefore
they maintain strict border controls
and restrict the import of goods
from the poor countries.
Relations between Palestine and
Israel are likely to fall into the
familiar pattern: the poorer state
will export labor to the rich one,
while the wealthy one will swamp
the market with its products. The
Palestinian State will need to throw
up high tariff walls, in order to
protect itself against the inroads
of the Israeli economy. The import
restrictions are likely to remain
in force for as long as the Palestinian
economy is insecure. The Palestinian
State is likely to discourage labor
migration to Israel, because this
would withdraw the most skilled and
entrepreneurial segment of its manpower.
It seems that neither now nor in
the foreseeable future will the Palestinian
authorities be interested in the
movement of Palestinians to Israel.
It appears that Palestinian economic
interests are totally opposed to
the movement of Palestinians to Israel,
either as migrant workers or as settlers,
as distinct from the ideological
demand for a Return. If Israel were
to adopt a more flexible position
toward the return of Palestinian
refugees and agreed to compensate
them for losses, the Palestinians
would probably respond positively
and the seeming contradiction could
be reconciled.
References
Alpher, Joseph and Khalil Shikaki
1998 The Palestinian Refugee
Problem and the Right of Return .
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs.
Aner, Avner 1984 Ha-omnam pelitim
la-netzach? (Will they forever
remain Refugees?). Jerusalem: Information
Center, with Minister M. Ben-Porath's
Office.
Ben-Porath, Yoram and Emanuel Marx
1971 Some Sociological and Economic
Aspects of Refugee Camps on the West
Bank . Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Brynen, Rex 1996 The Funding of
Palestinian Refugee Compensation. Fofognet
Digest March 1996.
Cahana, Shamay 1997 Differing
and Converging Views on Solving
the Palestinian Refugees' Problems .
Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Davis
Institute for International Relations.
Farah, Randa 1997 Crossing boundaries:
reconstruction of Palestinian identities
in al-Baq'a refugee camp, Jordan.
Pp. 259-298 in Palestine, Palestiniens:
Territoire national, espaces communautaires ,
eds. R. Bocco, B. Destremau and J.
Hanoyer. Beirut: CERMOC (Les Cahiers
du CERMOC, No. 17).
Feiler, Gil and Yaacov Yisraeli
1996 Business Laws and Economic
Prospects in the Middle East and
North Africa . Tel Aviv: Federation
of Israeli Chambers of Commerce.
Harkavi, Yehoshafat and Mati Steinberg
1988 Haamana ha-falastinit (The
Palestinian Compact). Jerusalem:
Israel. Information Center.
Hirschon, Reneé 1989 Heirs
of the Greek Catastrophe .
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Khalidi, Rashid 1989 The way forward:
a Palestinian perspective. Journal
of Refugee Studies 2 (1): 191-199.
Marx, Emanuel 1992 Palestinian refugee
camps in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Middle Eastern Studies 28(2):
281-294.
Marx, Emanuel 2000 Land and work:
Negev Bedouin struggle with Israeli
bureaucracies. Nomadic Peoples
(NS) 3 (2)
Ofteringer, Ronald (ed.) 1997 Palästinensische
Flüchtlinge und der Friedensprozess:
Palästinenser im Libanon .
Berlin: Das arabische Buch.
Peretz, Don 1995 Palestinian
Refugee Compensation . Washington:
Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine.
Shamir, Shimon 1980 West Bank refugees
- between camp and society. Pp.147-165
in J. Migdal Palestinian Society
and Politics . Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Shenhav, Yehouda 1999 The Jews of
Iraq, Zionist ideology, and the property
of the Palestinian refugees of 1948:
an anomaly of national accounting. International
Journal of Middle East Studies 31:
605-630.
Yahya, Adel H. 1998 Palestinian
Refugees Remembered . Jerusalem:
IPCRI.
Zureik, Elia T. 1996 Palestinian
Refugees and the Peace Process .
Washington: Institute for Palestine
Studies. |