Negotiating Truth: The Holocaust, Lehavdel, and al-Nakba
By Ian S. Lustick
University of Pennsylvania
The most unfortunate aspect of the
failed Camp David summit in the summer
of 2000 was not the
failure to produce a signed peace
agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. Afterall, this was
the very first time the two sides
had actually faced the toughest issues
between them-borders, settlements,
Jerusalem, and refugees. The odds
against such a spectactular success
on the first attempt were enormous.
As is known, the summit failed to
produce a final agreement and efforts
to revive the talks collapsed under
the weight of the violence that erupted
following Ariel Sharon's visit to
the Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif
in September, the heavy handed response
of Israeli police and soldiers, and
the intense, long-simmering discontent
of Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
Nor can one count as the most unfortunate
aspect of this failure the hundreds
of fatalities that have occurred,
nor the thousands of lives broken
in body or in spirit, nor the economic
wreckage of the violence, nor the
reinforcing spirals of distrust and
hatred that have been triggered,
nor even the ascendance of a government
in Israel whose leader 1son record
as thoroughly opposed to any of the
compromises that could conceivably
undergird a workable agreement with
the Palestinians. No, the single
most unfortunate aspect of the Camp
David failure is the widely believed,
terribly consequential, but utterly
wrong idea that Israeli proposals
more than met minimum Palestinian
requirements, and that the true impossibility
of reaching a peaceful two state
solution was demonstrated by Arafat's
rejection of the proffered solution,
epitomized by his insistence on implementing
the "right of return" of the Palestinian
refugees. That is to say, the propaganda
victory which the Israel government,
with President Clinton's strong assistance,
gained after Camp David, will cost
both Israelis and Palestinians dearly
in terms of the time and political
difficulty it will take to bring
the Israeli polity back to the point
of realizing the necessity and possibility
of achieving peace by establishing
two real states in the country.
Clearing away the misimpressions,
calculatedly exaggerated interpretations,
and obfuscatory recrimination that
have filled the air since the demise
of Camp David is itself a tremendous
analytic, communicative, and political
task. Some of the necessary work
is proceeding. Tragically, the suffering
in the streets of Israeli cities
and the rubble of so many Palestinian
cities and villages, is likely a
necessary element in the preparation
of Israeli and Palestinian audiences
receptive to renewed attempts to
achieve a negotiated peace based
on the "Clinton parameters."
In this context, of a struggle to
gather the shards of possibilities
scattered across the post-Oslo landscape,
it is worth considering certain aspects
of the Camp David II experience that
have received less attention than
is their due. Among these is one
particular demand made by the Palestinian
side regarding return of refugees.
Although most commentators have focused
on the demand for return itself and
the complex set of options that might
be used to parse, distribute, and
effectively limit the right, one
of the most significant aspects of
the negotiations was the demand that
Israel formally acknowledge its moral
responsibility for the creation of
the Palestinian refugee problem in
1948. Indeed, it appears that the
Barak government was prepared to
issue a statement of some sort that
would announce its regret for the
suffering entailed, and perhaps to
acknowledge that it shared responsibility
for the tragedy. But it would not
agree to accept primary responsibility
for the expulsion of the Palestinians
and their status as refugees.
More interesting than this refusal,
is the reason most commonly offered
for it. According to David Schenker,
in an article published during the
Camp David summit itself, Israeli
rejection of Palestinian demands
for "formal Israeli apology and admission
of responsibility for the refugee
crisis" were being rejected out of
a belief that to do so "would leave
the Jewish state exposed to future
financial and emigration claims." ()
What was most significant about
this rationale for rejecting the
Palestinian claims was that they
were not rejected because they were
deemed to be false. Nor were they
rejected because it was considered
that to accept them, to acknowledge
responsibility and offer an apology,
would not have contributed toward
peace and reconciliation. On the
contrary, in official Israeli arguments
that too many economic and legal
liabilities would arise from offering
such public and official statements,
one hears an implicit acceptance
of the justice and appropriateness,
if not the practicality, of the Palestinian
demand. In this light it is unsurprising
that in the follow-up negotiations
at Taba between Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators, in the fall of 2000,
attention was directly focused on
the practical means for addressing
the refugee problem, including the
kind of language that would be included
in an Israeli declaration regarding
the events of 1948.
The main purpose of this essay is
to highlight the political significance
of these discussions by considering
the negotiations between Israel,
the World Jewish Congress, and the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1951,
prior to the beginning of German
reparations payments and prior to
the onset of diplomatic relations
between Israel and West Germany.
After saying " lehavdel " one
thousand times, we may yet see in
the agony of Jews, wrestling with
the challenge of settling for infinitely
less than the justice and retribution
for which they yearned, an instructive "limiting
case" for analyzing the distress
of the Palestinians--called upon
to abandon their struggle for justice,
who seek public acknowledgment by
Israel of the evil inflicted on them
as an element in a comprehensive
peace package. And after another
thousand " lehavdel 's" we
may also learn from the artful avoidances
and measured doses of truth contained
in Konrad Adenauer's speech before
the Bundestag in September 1951.
From that carefully orchestrated
speech, we can learn something about
how necessary, but how limited and
symbolic, will be the Israeli proclamation
that will enable a solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem to contribute
its share to ending the Arab-Israeli
conflict. It is the same sort of
analysis that Israel's first Foreign
Minister, Moshe Sharett, used to
suggest, in 1952, "transferring some
of the money [from German reparations]
to the Palestinian refugees, in order
to rectify what has been called the
small injustice (the Palestinian
tragedy), caused by the more terrible
one (the Holocaust)."
In its early years Israel's economic
situation was extremely difficult,
although not desperate. As early
as 1945 Weizmann and others had considered
the possibility of obtaining substantial
financial support for the building
of the Jewish state and its economic
consolidation by demanding compensation
for the property of murdered European
Jews. Just one month after the end
of World War II Weizmann sent the
four powers occupying Germany a demand
for title to what he estimated to
be $8 billion worth of property whose
owners had died in the Holocaust.
The allies did respond to this overture,
though only in the amount of $25
million, to be allocated to many
Jewish relief organizations. Of more
significance than the amount of the
demand and Weizmann's failure was
that it was not directed toward the
Germans, but toward the allied powers
occupying Germany. Thus there was
no question of receiving property
directly from the German state, nation,
or collectivity and no issue, at
that point, of whether acceptance
of economic support from Germany
was morally acceptable.
In 1948 the dominant view in Israel
was categorical rejection of any
contact with Germany or Germans and
a strong tendency to view the Germany
of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who
himself had been anti-Nazi, no more
acceptable a point of contact for
Jews as the Nazi regime. As Tom Segev
reports, "(t)he foreign ministry
stamped on every Israeli passport
in English, a notification that the
document was not valid in Germany.
The Government Press Office announced
that Israelis who settled in Germany
permanently would not be allowed
to return." But many individual Jews,
especially German Jews who had private
property, business, and personal
ties to Germany, did established
contacts-contacts that required regularization.
And with the West accepting the Federal
Republic of Germany into diplomatic,
economic, and political relationships,
it became increasingly awkward, and
even impossible, for Israel to maintain
the kind of fierce ostracism and
boycott that the emotions of most
Jews in Israel still demanded.
Closed discussions within the Foreign
Ministry in late 1949 and 1950 focused
on the importance of using Germany's
need for Israeli goodwill, while
that need existed, in order to receive
substantial economic resources for
Israel's development. The primary
task was to find a diplomatic and
public relations formula that would
alleviate the moral distress of establishing
relations with Germany and accepting
German money. No Israeli leader argued
that accepting reparations would
close the moral account of the Jewish
people with Germany. What was argued
was the practical importance of getting
sizeable German payments while they
were available. Segev describes the
attitude of Moshe Shapira, Mnister
of the Interior, Health, and Immigration,
as representative-"everything depended
on how much money was at stake (for)
it would be pointless to soil oneself
with the taint of German contact
for a pittance, but if the sum was
substantial, it might well be worthwhile."
In fact the amount of money involved
was not the only factor. In order
to publicly consider the question
of amounts, Israeli and non-Israeli
Jewish leaders required a proclamation
by the leadership of the Federal
Republic of Germany-some kind of
public declaration of contrition
that would express the German nation's
acknowledgement of and sorrow for
the suffering of the Jews at German
hands as well as its condemnation
of Nazi policies, but that would not require
any explicit words of "forgiveness" on
the Jewish side.
In March 1951, Ben-Gurion's government
delivered a note to the four occupying
powers, demanding $1.5 billion as
a German indemnity, making clear "that
no amount of material compensation
would ever expiate the Nazi crimes
against the Jews." All that resulted
was a suggestion that Israel approach
Germany directly. When direct (and
highly secret) contacts began between
Israel and Germany in April 1951,
the Israelis demanded $1.5 billion
and a "ceremonial act" expressing
Germany's acknowledgement and acceptance
of responsibility for the horrors
inflicted upon the Jews during the
Holocaust. Although Adenauer did
not immediately agree to the amount,
and although he claimed to have already
condemned Nazi crimes on many occasions,
he accepted the Israeli demand for
a solemn expression of Germany's
moral perspective on the Holocaust.
Negotiations then proceeded between
the Adenauer government on the one
hand, and the Government of Israel
and the World Jewish Congress on
the other, over the wording of the
declaration to be made by Adenauer
on behalf of the German people. These
negotiations proceeded simultaneously
with discussions over exact amounts
and mechanisms of payment.
In some respects these negotiations
are reminiscent of the negotiations
between the World Zionist Organization
and the British Cabinet over the
wording of what eventually was issued
as the "Balfour Declaration." In
both cases the Jewish/Zionist side
suggested drafts for the proclamations
to be made by the British and German
governments that included much more
detailed and specific language than
the British (in 1917) or the Germans
(in 1951) were willing to include.
In both cases, the Jewish/Zionist
desire for success in the negotiations
was so strong, however, that it was
willing to accept much watered down
versions of a draft submitted to
the British Government by the Zionists.
In 1917 the Zionists swallowed the
excision of references to a Jewish
state, to Palestine (all of Palestine)
becoming the Jewish state, to recognition
of the sole leadership position of
the World Zionist Organization, to
the Zionist vision of the state as "reconstituting" Jewish
sovereignty in the country, etc.
The Zionists also accepted the inclusion
of unwanted references to the rights
of non-Jews in Palestine and to Jews
in other countries. In 1951 Israeli
negotiators pushed Adenauer to include
references in his speech to the guilt
of the German people, the existence
of groups in Germany still actively
anti-semitic, the role of the German
Army in the Holocaust, and the innocence
of the people killed by the Nazis.
They also wanted an explicit reference
to Israel. Adenauer did accept many
adjustments in his original draft,
but refused to describe the German
nation as "guilty of the extermination
of the Jews." He refused to mention
Israel by name and also refused to
include an explicit reference to
the "innocence" of the victims.
The atmosphere around Adenauer's
declaration to the Bundestag, on
September 27, 1951, was heavy and
tense. German public opinion appears
to have been opposed to paying much
of anything to the Jews, and Adenauer's
negotiations with Germans appear
to have been as difficult as his
negotiations with the Jews. Although
the negotiations had been conducted
in strict secrecy, word had leaked
out. After the speech it would be
clear how fiercely opposed was Israeli
public opinion to any deal with Germany.
Here is the crucial paragraph of
Adenauer's speech-a speech followed
by three minutes of silence with
all members of the Bundestag standing.
The government of the Federal
Republic and with it the great
majority of the German people are
aware of the immeasurable suffering
that was brought upon the Jews
in Germany and the occupied territories
during the time of National Socialism.
The overwhelming majority of the
German people abominated the crimes
committed against the Jews and
did not participate in them. During
the National Socialist time, there
were many among the German people
who showed their readiness to help
their Jewish fellow citizens at
their own peril-for religious
reasons, from distress of conscience,
out of shame at the disgrace
of the German name. But unspeakable
crimes have been committed in the
name of the German people, calling
for moral and material indemnity,
both with regard to the individual
harm done to the Jews and with
regard to the Jewish property for
which no legitimate individual
claimants still exist.
In relation to what we know now,
and was believed then, about Holocaust
and the involvement, support, or
acquiescence of the majority of Germans
in the war against the Jews, this
statement would seem to offer very
little in the way of acknowledged
truth, condemnation, contrition,
or apology. Two of its four sentences
describe the opposition of the "overwhelming
majority" of Germans to the Nazi's
extermination policies and the efforts
of "many" to protect Jews. Nor does
the statement include words that
point clearly toward an admission
of guilt (at this point most German
adults had also been adults during
the Nazi period), sentiments of contrition
or repentance, or an apology. The
most that can be said is that some
of these sentiments may be inferred
from the description of "unspeakable
crimes committed in the name of the
German people, calling for moral
and material indemnity."
The thinness of this symbolic declaration
is what is most striking. Yosef Sprinzak,
Speaker of the Knesset, denounced
the negotiations that ensured as "morally
absurd." The Maariv and
Yediot Acharonot newspapers, along
with the communist Kol Haam and Herut ,
were fiercely opposed. In an editorial
entitled "Amalek," published a week
after Adenauer's speech, the editor
of Maariv wrote that "a true peace
movement will arise in the world,
and it will ensure peace in Europe
by eradicating Germany from the face
of the earth." Mapam mobilized former
partisans and ghetto fighters to
oppose the negotiations. In a newspaper
poll, 80% of 12,000 respondents registered
their opposition. Declaring that "Every
German is a Nazi. Every German is
a murdered. Adenauer is a murderer.All
his assistants are murderers," Menachem
Begin led an enraged crowd on a violent
assault against the Knesset-battling
with police, overturning cars, shattering
store windows. Stones, broken glass,
and tear gas forced an end to Knesset
deliberations. Hundreds were wounded;
hundreds more arrested.
As thin as Adenauer's "ceremonial
act" was, and as violent and widespread
was the opposition to reconciliation
of any kind with Germany, the Bundestag
speech, combined with the promise
of substantial resources for Israel
and non-Israeli Jews, was sufficient.
Israeli politicians used the semblance
of truth, condemnation, and contrition
offered by Adenauer imaginatively
and energetically. Ben-Gurion never
tired of repeating that Adenauer
represented the "New Germany." To
counter fierce criticism that no
amount of money could represent adequate
indemnification for millions of murdered
Jews, Foreign Minister Sharrett made
much of his choice of " shilumim " (payments)
rather than " pitzuiim " (compensation
for injury) to describe the reparations.
Government ministers denounced Begin's
march on the Knesset as a mob attack
on Israeli democracy, helping to
transform the raging controversy
over accepting "blood money" into
a contest over the rule of law in
the Jewish state. To achieve a positive
vote in the Knesset, Mapai insisted
on party discipline, while freeing
most of its parliamentarians from
having to explicitly vote for reparations
by contriving a resolution which
did not endorse the reparations negotiations,
but left it up to the Knesset Foreign
Affairs and Security Committee to
do so. Subsequent negotiations resulted
in an agreement by September 1952.
The Luxemburg Treaty was signed on
September 10, 1952, by the representatives
of Israel, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the World Jewish Congress.
It has been meticulously implemented,
resulting in payments of $60-80 billion
worth of payments in cash and in
kind to Israel and to individual
survivors and their families.
There is much to be learned from
this episode for gaining perspective
on what is achievable, useful, and/or
likely in the Israeli-Palestinian
case-much more than can be assessed
in this brief essay. It bears repeating,
however, that such learning in no
way can be interpreted as suggesting
that the Holocaust and el-nakba were
intrinsically similar events. The
Holocaust was the result of a systematic,
premeditated plan for genocide. The
creation of the Palestinian refugee
problem was attendant upon the expulsion
of Palestinians from their homes
and refusal to allow them to return.
It was a tragic and unjust and opportunistically
accelerated unfolding of the logic
of circumstances.
This fundamental difference certainly
make it difficult to compare efforts
of Germans and Jews on the one hand,
and Israelis and Palestinians on
the other, to achieve reconciliation
based in part on truth, apology,
and/or political or economic compensation.
Much work would be required to sort
out the differences that would make
one more optimistic about prospects
for Israeli-Palestinian success.
Certainly the greater scale of horror
in the German-Jewish case might lead
to the conclusion that Jewish/Israeli-German
reconciliation would be much harder
to achieve than Israeli-Palestinian.
Other factors work in the opposite
direction. Compensation paid to Israel
and to individual victims of Nazism
had a largely positive, invigorating
effect on the German economy and
greatly improved its political and
diplomatic posture. While peace with
the Palestinians would most certainly
improve Israel's economic prospects
and its international standing, satisfying
Palestinian political demands and
demands for return of refugees will
pose threats to Israeli/Jewish demographic,
political, and security interests
that the German agreement with Israel
did not pose for Germany.
The Nazi regime was destroyed in
a war of its own making. Its successor
acknowledges it was German, but traces
no political, moral, or ideological
ancestry to it. Governments in Israel
arise as products of a regime that
proudly represents itself as the
creation of those same events, in
1948, which produced the experience
of el-nakba for the Palestinians.
Most Germans quickly drew back from
denying or defending the Nazi war
against the Jews, and debates over "revisionist" interpretations
of the Holocaust are marginal affairs
compared to the widespread conception
among Germans and others of the Holocaust
as an icon for the greatest crime
which could be committed by one people
against another. In Israel, "revisionist" histories
have greatly increased Israeli appreciation
of the suffering of Palestinians
in 1948 and the injustice of acts
of expulsion and of enforced exile
that produced and have maintained
that suffering. Still, these "findings" have
not achieved the emotionally reassuring
status (for Palestinians) of official
truth in Israel (though they are
much more widely accepted outside
of Israel).
In the final analysis, however,
it is the overwhelming difference
in the character and extent of the
crimes committed which mark these
cases as so different. If we can
learn from such comparison it must
be precisely because of, not in spite
of, this enormous difference. In
effect, the reparations agreement,
or at least the formulation used
by Adenauer and agreed to by Israel
for the symbolic statements that
would make that agreement possible,
serves as a limiting case. Given
that it is virtually impossible to
imagine a more horrible crime committed
by one nation against another than
that which Nazi Germany committed
against the Jews, we may therefore
infer that: A) if at least a workable
form of reconciliation has been possible
between Israel and Germany, it cannot
be said to be impossible with regard
to Israel and Palestine; B) if official
and symbolic acts as restrained,
self-serving, and historically pallid
as the formula read out by Adenauer
could be adequate to the political
task, it may not be necessary for
a future Israeli government to explicitly
and fully acknowledge the detailed
injustice meted out to the Palestinians
in order for its "ceremonial act" to
play a crucial political and psychological
role.
Despite the despair and panic that
now afflict many of those who aspire
to peace between Israelis and Palestinians,
in light of the relatively low standard
set by the German-Israeli case, we
may find some encouragement in the
progress that was made between Israeli
and Palestinian negotiators in 2000.
Prior to his departure for the Camp
David summit, in July 2000, Prime
Minister Ehud Barak stipulated to
his Cabinet the four "red lines" he
would not cross during negotiations
with the Palestinians. One of the
four was: "No Israeli recognition
of legal or moral responsibility
for creating the refugee problem." This
formulation is interesting in several
respects. First, it implies that
there is an outstanding demand for
an Israeli declaration on the events
of 1948 from the Palestinian side
that stands apart from their material
or political requirements. Second,
it does not explicitly rule out some
kind of response to this demand,
short of formally accepting "legal
or moral responsibility." Third,
it opens the door for formulas about
what occurred in 1948 that would
include shared Israeli responsibility,
Israeli sorrow and compassion for
the plight of Palestinian refugees,
acknowledgement of mistakes made
and false propaganda employed that
increased the number of refugees,
aggravated their emotional and psychological
difficulties, and readiness on the
part of Israel to contribute materially
and politically to a comprehensive
solution to the refugee question
in all its parts. Such exquisite
parsing of Barak's statement, to
accentuate the opening it gave to
negotiations despite the sparse and
negative form it took, can be justified
by considering the speech Barak gave
before the Knesset on October 4,
1999, expressing "regret for the
suffering caused for the Palestinian
people." how one other of the four
red lines, viz. "A united
Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty" could
just weeks later be interpreted as
consistent with Israeli proposals
that envisioned an end to Israeli
sovereignty claims over most of "el-Quds."
On the Palestinian side traditional
demands for the complete return of
all refugees were advanced in response
to initial bargaining positions by
Barak regarding Israeli sovereignty
over the Temple Mount and mere "administrative
autonomy" arrangements for Palestinians
in Arab neighborhoods of expanded
East Jerusalem. But these were effectively,
if not formally, withdrawn as Israeli
positions loosened-reflecting Palestinian
focus on the truth of Palestinian
suffering as a consequence of Israel's
creation, on the crucial need for
unlimited immigration into the Palestinian
state, and on a symbolic opportunity
for return of some 1948 refugees
to territory inside the Green Line.
In the joint statement released
by the Palestinian and Israeli delegations
at the conclusion of the Taba negotiations,
the refugee issue was included as
one of those four crucial questions
which had been addressed and with
respect to which gaps still remained.
Nevertheless these gaps were said
to have narrowed sufficiently to
warrant the belief that "in a short
period of time and given an intensive
effort and the acknowledgment of
the essential and urgent nature of
reaching an agreement, it will be
possible to bridge the differences
remaining and attain a permanent
settlement of peace."
Despite the reports of various participants,
no official record of what was or
was not agreed upon at Taba has been
released. However, in the summer
of 2001, Le Monde published
what appears to be a rather accurate
record of the final positions of
the two sides. In many respects they
correspond to the "Clinton Parameters"-thirteen
guidelines for or target formulations
for the achievement of a lasting
compromise that President Clinton
believed could actually be accepted
by both Israel and the Palestinians.
Interestingly, although Clinton
emphasized the need to compensate
and resettle refugees, and guarantee
full rights to immigrate into the
Palestinian state, he did not refer
explicitly to any statement of responsibility,
regret, or blame Israel might make.
The President did argue that "the
end of the conflict must manifest
itself with concrete acts that demonstrate
a new attitude and a new approach
by Palestinians and Israelis toward
each other" and also emphasized the
need to "find a truth we can share." In
his account of the Clinton parameters,
former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi
Beilin described the President's
approach as including Israeli acknowledgement
of the "suffering of the Palestinian
refugees" without accepting "sole
responsibility" for it. According
to Beilin, at Taba a great deal of
progress was made on various aspects
of the refugee question, and in particular
on the question of how Israel was
to express its sentiments with respect
to the "truth" that Israelis and
Palestinians would share.
Taba, agreements were reached
concerning the nature of personal
compensation, compensation for assets,
options of rehabilitation and absorption
in third countries, and compensation
for the host countries. Above
all, we were very close to an agreement
concerning the story of the creation
of the refugee problem, which described
the Israeli approach and the Palestinian
approach to the issue, and their
common denominator . (emphasis
added) Specific sums of money were
not agreed on, nor was the actual
number of refugees which would be
permitted to come to Israel. However,
the distance under dispute between
the parties was narrowed substantially,
and the Palestinian side agreed that
the number of refugees must be such
that it would not damage Israel's
character as a Jewish country.
The passages published in Le
Monde relevant to the question
of the official position Israel
would take as part of the peace
agreement are consistent with this
formula of two juxtaposed, and
partially overlapping narratives.
Both positions used very similar
language to recognize the centrality
and moral weight of the Palestinian
refugee question. The Palestinian
proposal has both sides acknowledging
that "a just resolution of the
refugee problem is necessary for
achieving a just, comprehensive
and lasting peace." The Israeli
proposal labeled the refugee question
as "central to Israeli-Palestinian
relations" and described "its comprehensive
and just resolution is essential
to creating a lasting and morally
scrupulous peace." But clear differences
remained.
The Palestinian position was articulated
under the heading of "Moral Responsibility."
- Israel recognizes its moral
and legal responsibility for the
forced displacement and dispossession
of the Palestinian civilian population
during the 1948 war and for preventing
the refugees from returning to
their homes in accordance with
United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 194.
- Israel shall bear responsibility
for the resolution of the refugee
problem.
The Israeli delegation preferred
to put forward their ideas on this
subject under the heading of "narrative"-emphasizing
Israeli recognition of the suffering
and tragedy of the Palestinian refugees,
their right to compensation, dignity,
and resettlement options, but acknowledging
Israeli responsibility for their
fate only as part of a wider array
of forces and actors.
- The State of Israel solemnly
expresses its sorrow for the
tragedy of the Palestinian refugees,
their suffering and losses, and
will be an active partner in ending
this terrible chapter that was
opened 53 years ago, contributing
its part to the attainment of a
comprehensive and fair solution
to the Palestinian refugee problem.
- For all those parties directly
or indirectly responsible for
the creation of the status of Palestinian
refugeeism, as well as those
for whom a just and stable peace
in the region is an imperative,
it is incumbent to take upon themselves
responsibility to assist in resolving
the Palestinian refugee problem
of 1948.
- Despite accepting the UNGAR
181 of November 1947, the emergent
State of Israel became embroiled
in the war and bloodshed of 1948-49,
that led to victims and suffering
on both sides, including the displacement
and dispossession of the Palestinian
civilian population who became
refugees. These refugees spent
decades without dignity, citizenship
and property ever since.
Clearly, progress was made. Here
the Palestinian side demands an Israeli
acknowledgement of its "moral and
legal responsibility" for the fate
of the Palestinian refugees and its "responsibility
for the resolution of the refugee
prolem." Significantly the Palestinian
formulation (as reported in Le
Monde ) does not include a demand
that Israel accept the Palestinian "right
of return." Nor does it insist on
an Israeli formulation that explicitly
places "sole" or even "central" or "primary" responsibility
for the fate of the Palestinians
or for the solution of the refugee
problem on Israeli shoulders. For
its part, the Israeli side was willing,
indirectly and implicitly, to acknowledge
that Israel was partly responsible,
ready to contribute "its part" to
the solution to the problem, and
willing to articulate a narrative
of the events of 1948 emphasizing
the direct and terrible consequences
of the war surrounding Israel's establishment
for Palestinians and omitting any
reference to the orders of Arab leaders
as responsible for the departure
of the refugees.
On the other hand, important gaps
remain between the Israeli and Palestinian
positions. The Israeli side was not
willing to explicitly acknowledge
legal, moral, or historical responsibility
for the fate of the refugees or to
assume sole responsibility for the
solution of the refugee problem.
This refusal is consistent with longstanding
fears in Israel that any such declaration
would expose Israel to virtually
unlimited property, rights of return,
and compensation claims. It also
chose to include reference to "all
those parties. responsible for" the
refugee problem, thereby implying
that the Arab states and perhaps
the Palestinians themselves played
a role. The Israeli proposal also
included explicit reference to Israel's
initial acceptance of the 1947 United
Nations partition plan and to the
mutuality of suffering that resulted
from the (implicitly alluded to)
failure of the Arab side to accept
it.
But in this back and forth we can
see the outlines of the kind of agreement
eventually reached by the German
and Israeli governments in 1951.
Not only did the German government
(of course not a Nazi government) not accept
responsibility (legal or moral),
but explicitly included claims that
the "overwhelming majority of the
German people abominated the crimes
committed against the Jews" and that
they "did not participate in them." Such "apologetics," including
the recollection of "many among the
German people who showed their readiness
to help their Jewish fellow citizens," were
swallowed by the Jewish/Israeli side,
even though most historians would
argue that a more truthful account
would not have been so generous in
its memory of German public opinion
and civic virtue during the Third
Reich. What Adenauer did say was
that what happened to the Jews was
awful ("unspeakable"), that his government
and the people of Germany were aware
that it was awful, and that it had
been done "in the name" of the German
people. That it had been done in
the name of the German people is
what, he declared, warranted the
New Germany's commitment to a measure
of indemnification (no claim was
made of full expiation, restitution,
or rights to Jewish forgiveness).
Based on the negotiations over the
reparations agreement-successful
via a much less than fully accurate
embrace by the successor regime of
what had actually occurred; and based
on the progress made in negotiations
between Israelis and Palestinians
so far, it is not difficult to imagine
a workable package of arrangements
and declarations to enable a mostly
internationally funded compensation,
resettlement, and return arrangement
to be agreed upon. The formulas utilized
would allocate a portion of responsibility
for the refugee problem to a portion
of Israeli actions and policies in
1948, thereby justifying a significant
but certainly not majority role for
the commitment of Israeli resources.
Israeli acknowledgement of and expressions
of regret for injustices committed
either "in connection with the establishment
of the State," "as a consequence
of the establishment of the State" or "in
the name of the State of Israel or
of Zionism," would not require Israelis
to deny their own truths-of an heroic,
necessary struggle for elementary
Jewish rights of survival and self-determination.
Two elements are likely to be key:
the political imperatives of consolidating
statehood and an expectation that
no denial of the truth of what befell
the Palestinians would be required
in order to achieve it. If Palestinians
are to receive a real state, with
unfettered access to it for refugees
living outside of Palestine, Palestinian
leaders will likely act just as did
Ben-Gurion, Goldmann, and Sharett-avidly
searching for formulas to make massive
packages of aid for that state, and
its newly arriving citizens, politically
acceptable. And if Israel were ready
to include within the curricula of
its schools the type of information
and explanation about Jewish-Arab
relations in 1948 available in the "Tekumah" series
of documentaries on the establishment
of the State, it would be well on
the road toward the kind of treatment
of the Nazi era, from the victims
perspective, that has featured in
German textbooks since the 1960s
(a decade after Adenauer's
speech to the Bundestag). That Israelis
would be gradually socialized away
from depending on narratives of national
pride that require the denial of
palpable Palestinian truths will
become a factor of immeasurable importance
in the subsequent normalization of
ties between the two nations who
claim the Land of Israel/Palestine. |
