Migration and the Reproduction of Poverty: The Refugee Camps in Jordan

Marwan Khawaja*

ABSTRACT

This study examines the link between poverty and migration into and out of camps, using 1999 household survey data on the refugee camp populations in Jordan and a binomial logistic regression. The findings show a clear clustering of poverty in the camps, where about one-third of households are poor. Results from several nested regression models show that in-migration is not the cause of persistent poverty in the camps. On the other hand, human capital variables, especially education, economic activity, and “social inheritance”, as well as demographic factors such as household headship and dependency rate have significant effects on poverty incidence. Some theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most widely held assumptions in studies of international migration and stratification is that migrants initially face considerable economic hardship in the labour market of the host society, and that this hardship tends to decline over time after a period of adjustment. Studies conducted in Western societies have repeatedly confirmed these conclusions for both labour and refugee migrants (Evans and Kelly, 1991; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Portes and Bach, 1985). Initial migration selectivity is one of the most salient factors responsible for the lag in an immigrant’s incorporation into the labour market of host societies. Refugees reside where they are primarily because of political factors, and most are essentially in hardship by definition. Although refugee migration caused by conflict is primarily a family migration, it is subject to some selectivity in terms of demographic and human capital characteristics.

* Center for Research on Population and Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.
Although disadvantaged in terms of wealth or assets, the refugee population in Jordan had generally higher educational levels than the host population, and brought higher skill levels to labour markets in Jordan (DeJong and Tell, 1997; Plascov, 1981: 33-34, 37). These human capital advantages made it possible for refugees to gain access to relatively high-wage occupations and industries in urban areas during their early years in the host country. Today, few disparities between the refugee and non-refugee populations exist in Jordan, as was documented by the Jordan Living Conditions Survey (Arneberg, 1997; Hanssen-Baur et al., 1998). In fact, in some fields such as health and education, the refugees have visible advantages (Khawaja, 2003; Khawaja and Tilt, 2002). However, the socio-economic achievement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan cannot be attributed only to initial migration selectivity.

There were various other mechanisms that facilitated the “insertion” of refugees in Jordan’s labour market, or otherwise contributed to their upward mobility. For one thing, the Palestinian refugees were granted citizenship rights in the early 1950s, thus enhancing their incorporation into the mainstream of Jordanian society. Unlike their counterparts in neighbouring countries (e.g. Lebanon, Syria), the vast majority of Palestinian refugees residing in Jordan have Jordanian citizenship (Brand, 1988). Second, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), as well as the Government of Jordan actively facilitated the temporary emigration of skilled refugees to the Gulf countries, with obvious consequences for their overall welfare (ElNajjar, 1995; Plascov, 1981). According to Plascov (1981: 45), “UNRWA’s placement and vocational training schemes made the Jordanian Palestinians the most important manpower reservoir for the developing oil countries.” Furthermore, the expansion of education in Jordan, and relatively strong welfare and social service programmes maintained by UNRWA, tended to equalize opportunities for the younger generation of refugees (Plascov, 1981: 69-70) and, therefore, group differences in socio-economic achievement should have been erased as time elapsed.

However, evidence from recent studies shows that the conditions of camp refugees are circumstantially different than that of non-camp refugees despite the similarity in their legal standings (Arneberg, 1997; Hansen-Bauer et al., 1998). Substantial differences in income and labour market outcomes between the two groups at the national level have already been documented (Arneberg, 1997). It is as yet unclear whether these differences are due to class-selective geographic mobility from or to the camps, to individual socio-economic characteristics, to demographic composition, or to institutional barriers in the labour market. Some or all of these factors can aggravate the economic standing of camp refugees.

This study examines the connection between migration and poverty concentration in Jordan’s refugee camps, using household-level data. We expect that families
who have moved into the camps recently will be poorer than camp dwellers, contributing to the current economic stagnation of the camps. However, camp refugees born in the camps (not lifetime migrants) will fare better than those born outside the camps (first-generation refugees). Although our primary concern is with movement into and out of the camps, regional (temporary) labour migration should also play a role in our context. Inter-regional migration, including a return from the Gulf, is expected to influence the economic well-being of refugee families in a positive way. This is due to various factors, including savings and remittances from work abroad, experience, and initial migration selectivity in terms of education and skill levels. While the focus of this study is on the link between migration and poverty, the relative weight of human capital and demographic factors in the reproduction of camp poverty are also investigated.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH

Empirical studies of the relative economic standing of camp refugees are quite rare. Until recently the requisite data have not been available to document the “survival” experience of refugees – they are typically not identified as a separate group in official statistics (Jordan) or excluded altogether from sampling frames (Lebanon, Syria). There are, however, some exceptions. Perhaps the most recent attempt to examine the relative status of refugees in Jordan’s camps is Arneberg’s (1997) descriptive portrait of their living conditions. This study used national level data from 1996 to compare a wide range of issues relating to the living conditions of the host and refugee populations, including camp residents. Her findings question the economic viability of the camps. Although she finds a striking similarity between the refugee and non-refugee population on a number of indicators, including income and unemployment, camp refugees are quite different, especially with regard to economic hardship and related matters.

Figure 1 displays the distribution of household income by refugee status as reported by Arneberg (1997: 56). Three patterns can be documented. First, the distribution of income is quite similar for (non-camp) refugees and the host population, especially at the higher end of the distribution. Second, the camp refugees have a much lower income with a clear clustering of poverty in the camps – more than one in every four households has an annual income of less than 900 Jordanian dinars (approximately $1,300). Third, the gap between camp refugees and other groups is especially large in the middle-income categories, indicating that the camps have a disproportionately small middle class. While there is evidence indicating the presence of a rather vibrant economy in the camps, with a small affluent class of professionals and self-employed persons, the overall findings in this study point to a clustering of poverty and underemployment. What explains the deprivation of and relatively low levels of income earned by camp refugees?
Selectivity in both initial settlement patterns and subsequent migration into and out of the camps is singled out as one of the main reasons for this outcome. The original camp settlers are believed to have been mostly of poor, rural origin, but subsequent upward mobility enabled some to move out, “leaving the poorest families behind” (Arneberg, 1997: 8). Movement of poor, or otherwise vulnerable, refugees to the camps preserves the stagnant character of the camp economies. Additional factors mentioned in the study include camp attachment and, hence, “discrimination in the labour market”; high unemployment rates, especially among young males; and little “access to land or capital” (Arneberg, 1997: 7-8, 57). However, none of these claims has been tested previously, using appropriate techniques.

In another study, Dejong and Tell (1997) examine the employment situation, and economic misfortune, of refugees living in two poor “squatter settlements” of East Amman. This study is based on a 1990-1991 small household sample and about 120 in-depth interviews in the two communities. Their findings also demonstrate the uniqueness of the refugees’ employment experience when compared to the national situation. The authors trace the current employment patterns of refugees living in the settlements to their socio-economic roots in their places of ori-
gin, during the Mandate period, and to various unique features of the Jordanian economy. The differential insertion in the Jordan labour market is largely determined by the refugees’ socio-economic origin, their levels of education, vocational skills, and other resources they brought with them. Yet, what mattered most in an economy with an overdeveloped public sector are the differential social ties, and “wasta” in particular, that families enjoy, or lack, in accessing jobs (Miles, 2002: 425). Additional factors include migration to the Gulf, and the subsequent development of “a quasi-ethnic division of labour” between Palestinians who are largely employed in the private sector and Jordanians who are largely employed in the public sector (Dejong and Tell, 1997: 205). This ethnic division of labour was made possible by an implicit state policy of preferential recruitment of Jordanians into some government services, including the army, during the aftermath of the 1970 civil war (Brand, 1995: 53). Camp refugees are employed largely in informal economic activities, with low wages, long hours, and the “least flexible working conditions” (Dejong and Tell, 1997: 210). And, thus, poverty among the employed segment of this population is quite common.

These studies of economic conditions of disadvantaged refugees single out factors previously employed in two models of poverty patterns in American inner-city neighbourhoods: the “middle-class flight thesis” and the human capital (or status attainment) models. The first model attributes poverty in urban communities to class-selective migration patterns. Wilson (1987) is one of the architects of this thesis, arguing that the movement of middle-class blacks from inner city neighbourhoods resulted in the concentration of a much poorer segment of the Black population in these communities (Wilson, 1987: 47). A closely related dimension, mentioned by Wilson, is the economic downturn that swept inner city neighbourhoods, impacting employment prospects and wage levels negatively (see also Waldinger, 1996). This is consistent with several earlier arguments stressing the movement of jobs away from central cities to suburbs (Kain, 1968), or the decline of manufacturing jobs during de-industrialization in the American context (Harrison and Bluestone, 1981). There are many empirical studies examining the merit of this thesis, but the evidence has been mixed (Massey et al., 1994; Wilson, 1996; Jargowsky, 1997; Quillian, 1999).

The second model of poverty is derived from the human capital perspective (Becker, 1975). As shown by previous research, human capital variables are expected to play a pivotal role in enhancing the economic well-being of families. This perspective is essentially similar to the well known status attainment model in sociology (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Duncan et al., 1972). While the outcome variable of interest in these two models is different (income vs. status), they both emphasize labour market returns to individual attributes. Family income, or the lack thereof, is determined by a host of individual characteristics, including education, experience, and vocational skills (or employment in a secondary labour market).
Thus, if this model holds true, adults who are lacking in human capital characteristics would be more likely than others to fall into poverty.

In addition to the familiar human capital variables, we include a variable indexing Gazans to capture the unique effects of the social origin of this group. This is an important dimension because it denotes the non-competitive character of the labour market (i.e. legal or institutional restrictions) facing those from Gaza. For, Gaza Strip was under the administration of Egypt during the inter-war period of 1948-1967, and thus Gazans displaced by the 1967 war are not entitled to Jordanian citizenship (see Zureik, 1997). Unlike other refugees, those originating from Gaza are, therefore, largely excluded from formal employment and public services.

The differential propensity of families to supply members to the labour market is obviously a function of demographic factors. Thus, it would be important to control for the effects of demographic composition of households, particularly for the economic burden of dependency. Thus, we expect loners, female-heads, and families with larger number of dependents to experience poverty more frequently than others. Finally, we include a control for residential disadvantage to capture the differential access to jobs, particularly in the construction sector, available to camp refugees. Here refugees residing in the metropolitan area of Amman are expected to fare better than those living elsewhere.

While our purpose is not to provide, and test, a comprehensive model of poverty determination, we expect the above factors to play a complementary role in accounting for poverty in the camps. Judging from the shape of household composition in the camps (Khawaja and Tiltnes, 2002), we do anticipate a greater weight for the demographic variables in explaining the persistence of poverty in this rather unique context.

THE CONTEXT

Jordan is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the Middle East. According to a recent survey, about 20 per cent of the total population was born in other countries, and more than 70 per cent of those aged 50 years or older in Amman were born in Palestine (Randall and Kalaldeh, 1998). While the country includes many ethnic (or nationality) groups, its ethnic diversity is mainly due to the influx of Palestinian refugees during the 1948-1949 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars as well as the return of labour migrants from the oil-producing Arab Gulf states in the aftermath of the Gulf war, which began in August 1990.

As a result of the 1948-1949 war, an estimated 750,000 Palestinians fled, or were otherwise expelled from, their homes to seek refuge in neighbouring areas, mainly in Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Syria (Morris, 1987). Two years
later, Jordan annexed the West Bank making the expanded Kingdom the largest recipient of Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinian refugees became Jordanian citizens. From 1950 until 1967 Jordan ruled the West Bank of the Jordan River, while Egypt administered the Gaza Strip. The eruption of the 1967 war created another wave of refugees mainly from the West Bank of the Jordan River. As a result of the 1967 war, an estimated 350,000 displaced persons sought refuge in Jordan, about half of whom were originally refugees from the 1948 war (DPA, 2000). Thus, many Palestinians experienced the second forced displacement in less than 20 years. Jordan faced a third major wave of migration in 1990 when an estimated 300,000 Palestinians (many of whom refugees) and Jordanian citizens entered the country as a result of the Gulf war. The refugee population grew rapidly over the years, with an estimated 42 per cent of the 1999 total population of 5 million in Jordan being refugees (see Arneberg, 1997). According to UNRWA (2002) statistics, about 40 per cent of the total number of Palestinian refugees registered with the Agency in its five “fields” (Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza, and Syria) of operations were residing in Jordan. The demographic make up and living conditions of this rapidly growing population poses one of the most difficult issues in the current debate concerning final status peace negotiations, as an estimated one-third of all refugees in Jordan live in camps under precarious conditions (Khawaja and Tiltines, 2002).

Immediately after the war in 1949, the United Nations’ general assembly (Resolution 302) established UNRWA to handle the affairs of Palestinian refugees, and authorized it to provide shelter and assistance to all refugees. UNRWA (1995) defines a Palestinian refugee as any “person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief.” Today, UNRWA provides basic services to about 3.8 million registered refugees in its fields of operation. While registered refugees living outside refugee camps are entitled to UNRWA services, the refugee camp population is the main beneficiary of the services provided.

There are a total of 13 Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. Five of the camps – Irbid, Wihdat, Hussein, Maadaba, and Zarqa, the oldest – were established soon after the 1948 war or in the early 1950s; the remaining eight camps were established to house Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1967 war (DPA, 2000; UNRWA, 2002). The camps were created at the outskirts of the main cities of Jordan. Camp sites were chosen at “random” due to the sudden or otherwise unorganized nature of the refugee movement (DPA, 2000: 20). Some of the camps were established on places where the refugees or displaced persons initially arrived in Jordan while others were built some years after refugee arrival when the Government granted UNRWA land plots to provide shelter to Palestinian refu-
The refugee camps are quite heterogeneous in terms of infrastructural conditions, density, area, economy, and, of course, population size (DPA, 2000). It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough historical, legal, or political narrative of the refugee camps. However, a few relevant points are in order.

First, the camps’ populations are concentrated in the area of metropolitan Amman, and to a lesser extent in Balqa, Madaba, Zarqa, Irbid and Jarash governorates in the north (DPA, 2000). No camp is located in the southern part of Jordan. While all of the camps can be considered urban in character, those located in the north are more rural in terms of the population’s involvement in agriculture. Second, the size of the refugee population in the camps remains uncertain. UNRWA and the Government of Jordan each have their own estimates. We estimated the camp population to be approximately 300,000 in mid-1999, using the updated census frame and data from the 1996 Jordan Living Conditions survey. Third, while the camps are undoubtedly separate communities, not all of them can be considered independent administrative units in the Jordanian official statistical classification system. Some camps have become neighbourhood-like areas of much larger cities. The camps of Wihdat and Hussein in the capital city of Amman are cases in point. Finally, UNRWA does not officially recognize three of the camps although all registered refugees living there are entitled to its services.

**DATA AND MEASURES**

Our source of data is the survey of living conditions in Jordan’s camps. This is a household survey of about 3,100 households selected randomly from 12 camps. The number of households selected in each camp was proportional to the estimated population size of the camp, except that the sample allocation in two of the camps, Wihdat and Azmi al-Mufti, was larger than the proportion in order to allow for separate in-depth analysis. Households were selected from a detailed frame provided by the Jordan Department of Statistics (DOS). The frame is based on the 1994 census data and updated by detailed maps available at the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA). All camps were included with the exception of Hussein camp due to practical reasons, specifically the lack of adequate maps.

As with other living condition surveys carried out by Fafo Institute (1996), the instrument consists of three questionnaires: one for the household, one for a randomly selected adult from each household, and the third for all ever-married women aged 15 and older at the time of the survey. The migration data are obtained mainly through a complete migration history of adults aged 15 years or older in the individual questionnaire. Fafo, along with Yarmouk University, implemented fieldwork in the spring and summer of 1999 (see Khawaja and Tiltines, 2002). A total of 2,590 households were interviewed, with an overall response rate of 95 per cent.
We have made several important choices in how to use the survey data to examine the link between migration and poverty of camp refugees in Jordan, all of which are consequential. The first is how to measure refugee status. Here, we have relied on respondents’ straightforward self-identification. The survey includes a direct question on refugee status, asking respondents to classify each person in the household as: (1) Refugee from 1948, (2) Displaced from 1967, (3) Refugee from 1948 and displaced from 1967, (4) From Gaza, and (5) None of the above.

The first three groups are self-explanatory (Arneberg, 1997: 10-14), but the last two need some clarifying. The fourth category includes both refugees from 1948 as well as displaced persons from Gaza. The last group is a residual category and includes persons with various nationalities, including Iraqis, Egyptians, Syrians, or Jordanians, but it might also include Palestinians (some of whom are Jordanians of Palestinian origin) who are neither 1948 refugees nor displaced by the 1967 war. While there are other choices for identifying refugees, the criterion used here is probably the most defensible and allows for comparisons with previous studies of refugees (or ethnic groups) both in Jordan and elsewhere (Al-Qudsi, 2000). An obvious alternative is to use UNRWA registration. Yet, the registration is voluntary and many Palestinian refugees residing in Jordan are not registered.

Our findings indicate that about three out of every four persons in the camps are refugees from 1948. Of those, nearly one-third were also displaced in 1967. The displaced non-refugee population amounts to about 16 per cent of the total camp population, and Gazans nearly 7 per cent. Less than 3 per cent of the population belong to other categories, mostly Arab nationals. Since this study is primarily about the Palestinian population in the camps, we chose to exclude other nationals in this study.6

Another issue concerns the definition of refugee households covered by the analysis. One way is to define refugee household by the refugee status of the head, irrespective of the status of other household members (Arneberg, 1997); another is to include only households consisting of only refugee members. Here, we have included all households with at least one refugee, displaced, or Gazan as a member; thus excluding households with all their members of other nationalities.7

**Identifying the poor – by a relative measure**

As conventionally defined, being poor means lacking a means of subsistence capable of providing what could be considered an adequate standard of living. Here, poverty is defined in terms of material poverty or economic deprivation. While this view of poverty has been criticized as too narrow (Sen, 1985; Townsend, 1992), the material dimension of poverty expressed in monetary values is too important an aspect of poverty to be neglected.
Identifying the poor requires a measure of (1) the standard of living, in order to separate households according to the resources they have, and (2) the minimal needs, marking the cut-off that separate households into poor and non-poor. Both determine the adequacy of the poverty line chosen. Disposable income is undoubtedly the most commonly used indicator of the standard of living, and it is used here as a measure of resources. There are various ways to measure “need” and each is clouded with controversies (Khawaja, 1998). A common way is to rely on “expert knowledge” regarding the minimal required caloric intake, a food basket, or selected expenditure items deemed necessary for adequate living situations or sheer survival. An alternative way is to ask respondents directly about the minimum amount of money necessary to make ends meet. We did just that.

Figure 2 compares median monthly income levels and those of “needed income” by household size. The medians increase more or less consistently by household size as would be expected from theory. The total monthly (unadjusted) median income is lower than the needed income, regardless of household size. Overall, about 60 per cent of households reported lower total income than the minimum necessary to make ends meet. The gap might be affected by household composition as well – gender differences or the presence of children versus adults.

FIGURE 2
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, JORDAN CAMPS, 1999

Here, we use both of these items to arrive at a relative measure of poverty. A relative measure of poverty sets the poverty standard at a fixed proportion, usually 50 per cent, of some measure of well-being such as the median adjusted income (Buhmann et al., 1988). Thus, the poor are compared to the rest of households in the refugee camps. However, the distribution of income in the camps is fairly comparable to the national one, save the lowest bottom, and hence the poverty line used here may reflect the nationwide situation. The steps involved in constructing the poverty line are summarized briefly below.

1. The most common family was determined directly from the survey data based on a joint distribution of children and adults. The most common family consists of six persons (two adults and four children).

2. The minimal income standard was set for the most common family using the item on “needed income” discussed above. The minimum is defined as the twenty-fifth percentile of needed income for the reference family. This is clearly an arbitrary line, but all poverty lines are.

3. The resulting line is adjusted for household size using a simple equivalence scale derived empirically from the data on “needed income”.

The poverty line for a family of six persons in camps is estimated at JD 1,250 per year.8 Since need tends to increase with household size, additional household members imply higher poverty lines. The monthly poverty line ranges from JD 55 for a single-person household to about JD 120 for a family of nine persons living in the camps.

**Independent variables**

Our main independent variable is recent migration into the camps. While this is our primary variable, we use three other conventional migration indicators. Migration into the camps is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent moved into the camp since 1980 or not. While the 1980 cut-off time point is used mainly for sample size consideration, the early1980s mark an important turning point in the economy of Jordan as labour migration to the Gulf was beginning to drop. The remaining measures are the usual lifetime and period migration, both of which are also dichotomous variables. However, in the multivariate analysis we distinguish between internal and inter-Arab migrants because they are assumed to influence the outcome variable differently. Unlike lifetime migration, which captures mainly first-generation refugees, inter-Arab period migration is a measure of return from the Gulf.

We use several measures of human capital and status attainment variables, most of which have been previously used in empirical research. These include educational
attainment, occupation, labour force participation, and social origin. Three distinct levels (less than basic education, basic, and secondary level or higher), measure educational attainment. Basic and secondary educational levels correspond to the completion of ten and twelve years of education, respectively. The highest educational category includes persons with post-secondary education.

Labour force activity is measured according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) guidelines (see ILO, 1990). Respondents were classified into three possible states at the time of the survey: employed, unemployed, and out of the labour force. Given the relatively low levels of unemployment in the camps, at about 14 per cent, we use a dichotomous variable distinguishing labour force participants and economically inactive persons.

Occupation is measured by a one-digit grouping of the 1988 ILO occupational classification system. Because our concern is with worker’s skill levels, we employ a dichotomous variable distinguishing between skilled and unskilled workers. Unskilled workers are defined here as those working in elementary occupations and farms. Our last measure of human capital, social origin, is not strictly an indicator of skill but reflects the social origin of the respondent as referred to in the status attainment literature. In this context, refugees from Gaza are a distinct category of people, largely without citizenship rights and thus without the legal standing (in terms of services and labour market entitlements) of other refugees (Zureik, 1997).

Demographic composition of households is an important factor in any analysis of poverty outcomes, owing to the dependency burden and to the differential ability of households to supply workers in the labour market. Age of respondent is measured in five categories, distinguishing between young, prime working ages, and older persons (aged 65 and older). In the multivariate models, we use age in completed years and age squared in order to capture the non-linear effect of age on poverty. Household composition is measured by a simple typology, distinguishing persons living alone, in nuclear households, or in extended household structures. Since the measure of poverty used is adjusted by household size, a finer classification is unnecessary. However, we include an additional indicator of the burden of dependency, measured as the percentage of household members who are children (less than 15 years) and older persons (65 years or older). Our final measure captures headship status, measured as a dichotomous variable of female and male headship status.

The last variable is residential, included here to capture the macro-economic context. In this study, we include a single dichotomous variable indexing residence in the Metropolitan areas of the capital, Amman, or the northern districts of Irbid and Zarqa.
FINDINGS

In order to put the subsequent analysis in context, a brief examination of levels and patterns of migration by camp residents is warranted. The survey provides unique and detailed data on the migration experience of camp refugees in Jordan. In addition to the traditional lifetime and period migration variables, the available data enable us to examine circular and temporary movements over time (Khawaja and Tiltønes, 2002). Our main purpose in this section is to document some characteristics of the movers, with an eye on the movement of people into and out of the camps.

The survey results indicate that the camp population is highly mobile. Figure 3 presents a summary of migration indicators for the camp population. The Figure shows that more than one out of every three persons was born elsewhere. However, international (especially labour) migration among adults is somewhat lower – about 2 per cent of the total population were living abroad in 1995, about 6 per cent of adults worked abroad, and only 3 per cent of adults are returnees from the Gulf countries.

![Figure 3a: Summary of migration indicators, Jordan camps, 1999](image-url)
The migration history data, which cover the entire life of a representative sample
of adults, also indicate a highly mobile population overall. Indeed, more than half
of the adults moved at one point in their life. Figure 3 also displays the distribution
of adults by the number of moves they made according to gender.

Several observations can be made from these (rather highly) aggregated figures.
First, repeated migration, while found, is not very common – half of the movers
migrated only once. Second, women are slightly more likely to change their place
of living than men. This is mainly due to brides’ moving upon marriage, divorce,
and the death of a spouse. Third, there is very little regional variation in geo-
graphic mobility.

About 15 per cent of the adult population made a recent (since 1980) move to the
camps. A comparison between the newcomers and the camp host population shows
little variations in demographic characteristics. However, the evidence shown in
Figure 4 indicates that the recent movers to the camps are slightly more likely to
come from female-headed families or single-headed with others (including chil-
dren), suggesting that the newcomers are particularly vulnerable economically, as
compared to the stayers. Service availability and low housing costs are some of
the incentives for the vulnerable to move into the camps. On the other hand, the
newcomers to the camps are slightly more educated than the stayers. While the
movers have 9 years of schooling completed, the stayers have about 7.8 years of
schooling.
More insight can be gained by examining changes in the educational profile of movers at the time of move. Figure 5 compares the educational profile (at the time of move) for adults who moved into the camps with those who moved out during the 1980s and 1990s. Close to 70 per cent of moves to the camps in the 1990s were made by adults with less than basic education. The educational profile of those moving from the camps during the same period is clearly higher, with 58 per cent having less than basic education and 18 per cent with at least secondary education. The educational profile of movers in the 1990s is higher than the 1980s, but this is partly explained by changes in the educational attainment of the population as a whole.

The data reviewed here for those who attempted to move out include former labour migrants to the Gulf, and they are merely suggestive. We lack data on those who moved from the camps and live elsewhere. Based on the findings reported here, we can safely conclude that there has been a tendency for both less educated and more educated adults to move into the camps during the most recent past.
How many adults live in poverty? Our estimate is that about 27 per cent of all adults live below the poverty line. However, there are clear variations in the rate between groups and across regions (Table 1). As expected, the results show that migrant persons are generally poorer than non-migrants, but the findings are mixed with regard to those who moved into the camps more recently. Those who moved into the camps since 1980 have the same rate of poverty as those who did not. However, the poverty rate among persons who were living elsewhere in 1995 is 30 per cent compared to 25 per cent among the stayers. Higher poverty rates are observed among persons who were born elsewhere (32%) than in their current camp (27%), reflecting perhaps cohort effect as a significant proportion of lifetime migrants are first-generation refugees.
Human capital variables affect poverty in the expected direction – persons who are lacking in human capital are more likely than others to be poor. Levels of poverty are high among persons with low education, those who are out of the labour force, those in low-status, unskilled occupations, and those who originate from Gaza. All of the percentage point differences reported here are substantial. However, the relatively high poverty rates among the economically active (and the employed among them) and the skilled are surprising. For example, nearly one out of every fourth economically active adult in the camps is poor. One possible explanation for this finding is the low wages received by camp refugees, as compared to those outside the camps.

### TABLE 1
POVERTY RATE BY BACKGROUND VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Per cent in poverty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent mover to camp (since 1980)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mover</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayer</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>1370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifetime migrant</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayer</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Period migrant (since 1995)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human capital</strong></td>
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<td>Less than basic</td>
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<td>Secondary or more</td>
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<td>Labour force participation</td>
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<td>Out labour force</td>
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<td>Unskilled occupation</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>1466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazan origin</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other places of origin</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Per cent in poverty</th>
<th>N*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic composition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(continued)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male head</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loner household</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear household</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>1101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended household</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman region</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern region</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Weighted sample.

Similar patterns for demographic composition are observed. We find substantial differences in poverty based on age, headship status, and household configurations. Rates of poverty are relatively high among older persons, those who live in female-headed households, and those who live alone. These results are consistent with previous generalizations, but there are some exceptions. While the highest poverty rate of 43 per cent is observed for those in their retirement age, adults in their prime working age, 25 to 44 years, have higher poverty rates than others. It is unclear why the poverty profile of working-age adults is especially high, but the finding indicates the presence of vulnerable households in the camps. Gender differentials, and female-headed households in particular, are probably behind the observed pattern. Equally surprising is that nuclear households are poorer than extended households. This is not common elsewhere and could be explained by the relatively high number of elderly couples compared to newlywed, childless couples in the camps. Migration mechanisms are at play here in that younger, childless couples probably leave the camps upon marriage while older childless couples remain in the camps or moved in because of affordable housing, availability of services, or both.

Place of residence is indeed an important variable affecting income almost everywhere, and Jordan is no exception. The northern camps are clearly poorer than the camps of the metropolitan area of Amman.

**Multivariate analysis**

In this section, we use multivariate logistic regression analysis to both verify the findings from the bivariate analysis reported above and to examine the relative
merit of migration and human capital variables controlling for other demographic characteristics of adults and their households. The analytic strategy pursued here is to run a series of logit models starting with the migration variables alone, and subsequently adding individual-level and household-level covariates. Our ultimate purpose is to uncover whether migration status impacts poverty, net of other relevant determinants as specified in the theoretical section above.

Table 2 presents the results of three hierarchical models of poverty among camp refugees. The first logit model includes only migration-related variables. Unlike in the descriptive analysis, the period migration variable is a three category indicator, distinguishing between internal migrants, international migrants, and non-migrants. The results shown for Model 1 are mixed. Only lifetime migration increases the odds of poverty significantly, controlling for the effects of other migration variables. Persons born outside the camps are 1.3 times more likely to be poor than those born in the camps, reflecting perhaps the predominance of the first-generation refugees in this group of migrants. Internal migration to the camps (since 1995) also increases poverty, but the relationship is statistically non-significant. Return international migrants are less likely to be poor as expected; but those who moved to the camps since 1980 show similar outcomes. Thus, the findings here are quite different from the earlier bivariate results, particularly with regard to the suppressed effect of internal mobility into the camps since 1980. Evidently, the finding documented earlier regarding the impact of this variable on poverty is due to migration since 1995. We can conclude that with the exception of the vulnerability of older refugees (lifetime migrants), poverty does not seem to be the product of poorer persons moving into the camps more recently.

An alternative expectation is that poverty is the product of human capital characteristics of individuals in the camps. These include their education, work experience, their involvement in the labour market, secondary or unskilled occupations, and social inheritance. Model 2 tests the effects of these variables, after taking into account the impact of migration-related factors. The results generally conform to expectations. The effects of labour force participation, education, and social origin are significant and in the expected direction. Those economically active are 0.7 times less likely to be poor than the non-active persons. Likewise, the impact of education is strong and consistent – adults with less than basic education are 2.4 times more likely to be in poverty compared to those with at least secondary education.9 And, as expected, those originating in Gaza are 1.6 times more likely to be poor compared to other refugees. The disadvantage of Gazans in the Jordan labour market is well known and is derived mainly by the difficulty of obtaining regular employment in the formal sector. Until very recently the majority of Gazans lacked citizenship rights because Gaza was not part of Jordan prior to the 1967 war.
# TABLE 2
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF POVERTY ON MIGRATION STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Logit</th>
<th>Model 1 Odds ratio</th>
<th>Model 2 Logit</th>
<th>Model 2 Odds ratio</th>
<th>Model 3 Logit</th>
<th>Model 3 Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent move to camp</td>
<td>-0.138 (0.176)</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.207)</td>
<td>0.99 (0.211)</td>
<td>-0.076 (0.198)</td>
<td>0.93 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifetime migrant</td>
<td>0.290* (0.123)</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.186)</td>
<td>0.97 (0.199)</td>
<td>-0.181 (0.189)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period, internal 1995</td>
<td>0.151 (0.241)</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.262 (0.249)</td>
<td>1.30 (0.257)</td>
<td>0.141 (0.257)</td>
<td>1.15 (0.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period, international 1995</td>
<td>-0.188 (0.476)</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.015 (0.507)</td>
<td>1.01 (0.514)</td>
<td>-0.175 (0.514)</td>
<td>0.84 (0.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>0.009 (0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.017 (0.021)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In labour force</td>
<td>-0321* (0.138)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.329* (0.142)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out labour force</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than basic</td>
<td>0.866* (0.170)</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.882* (0.173)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>0.614* (0.189)</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.638* (0.189)</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary or more</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazan origin</td>
<td>0.472* (0.213)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.469* (0.222)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other places of origin</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled occupation</td>
<td>0.438 (0.226)</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.417 (0.230)</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The effect of occupation shows the same magnitude in impacting poverty, but it is statistically non-significant. Also non-significant is the impact of experience, captured here by age and age-squared. We expected poverty to decline with age, but to increase during retirement age. The signs of the effects of these two variables are in the opposite direction in line with the descriptive results reported above. One possible explanation for the observed pattern is gender differential in the labour force participation by age. Generally, women’s involvement in the labour force declines sharply upon marriage and childbirth. Another plausible explanation is the impact of remittances and public assistance on lifting the aged out of poverty. We suspect that such a finding is perhaps specific to the camps, and to their apparently disadvantaged youth.

The effects of these human capital or status attainment variables seem to fully account for the impact of migration. Adding these variables to the model altered
the effects of the migration indicators, becoming all non-significant, as shown in the table. Furthermore, the effects of lifetime and international period migration changed signs. While still statistically non-significant, the effect of recent migration to the camps increased in this model as compared to the first one. This is explained by the fact that recent in-migrants have slightly higher educational levels and their households have higher rates of dependency. The dramatic change in the effect of lifetime migration is also not surprising, since all of those over 50 years of age are migrants by definition (i.e. first-generation refugees). Thus, controlling for age reversed the sign, and significance level, of this indicator becoming now negative. Likewise, the effect of recent international migration changed signs becoming positive, but remaining statistically non-significant. The only indicator that maintained its effect after controlling for the effects of human capital variables, is period internal migration. Those who moved to the camps from other places in Jordan since 1995 are 1.3 times as likely to be poor, but there are very few such poor migrants in the camps as judged by the significance level of this coefficient. We can conclude from these findings that poverty in the camps can be attributed largely to human capital differentials, but not migration per se.10

Does this conclusion still hold after controlling for the effects of demographic composition? Generally yes. Introducing the household and other demographic variables to the previous model shows that the effects of the human capital variables are remarkably robust – they remained essentially the same as before. Model 3 reveals that the effect of migration variables also remained basically the same, with the exception of international migration where it restored its negative impact on poverty. However, none of the migration variables are statistically significant, implying that poverty may not be caused by the movement of economically less fortunate persons into the camps.

On the other hand, Model 3 shows that the demographic composition variables behave as expected. The coefficients for household structure, female-headship, and economic dependency are all significant and in the expected direction. Adults living in female-headed households are twice more likely to live in poverty compared to those in male-headed households. The results show loners are the most vulnerable, and they are over seven times more likely to be poor than adults in an extended living arrangement. Adults in nuclear households are also poorer than their extended household counterparts, controlling for the effects of other confounding variables. Evidently the descriptive results showing a relative advantage of living in extended households are spurious, as the effect of economic dependency was not controlled. The coefficient for the burden of economic dependency, reflecting the relative number of non-workers in households, is positive and statistically significant. Thus, more dependency implies more poverty at the household level, other things being equal. Taken as a whole, these findings underline the importance of the camps’ skewed household structures in impacting poverty.
The northern camps are poorer as expected. Model 3 reveals that adults living in and around the capital city of Amman are 0.8 times less likely to live in poverty compared to those living in the north. This finding reflects the expected advantage of the labour market in the metropolitan area of Amman, with higher wages and a more diversified job pool available to camp residents. The higher “geographic capital” in the Amman area stems also from a high population density, with significant bearing on the camps’ internal labour market. In other words, the sheer location of the camps yield benefits to camp residents not only by more access to higher wages outside the camps, but also by facilitating the expansion of a private “enclave” economy (Portes and Bach, 1985; Logan et al., 1994) within the camps themselves. Indeed, evidence from the survey shows that camp residents employed within the camps have slightly higher wages on average than their off-camp counterparts (Khawaja and Tiltnes, 2002), and this is largely due to UNRWA employment in education and health services.

DISCUSSION: REVOLVING DOORS

Do the findings reported here imply that class-selective migration is irrelevant in the reproduction of poverty in the refugee camps? Of course not. The changing composition of the camp population, mainly through selective migration, is an important explanation for the clustering of economic hardship there. Contrary to commonly held views we argue that migration is not the ultimate cause of economic stagnation of the camps.

It has already been shown that there was a substantial mobility into and out of the camps over the life course. Yet, mobility was highly selective. The skilled and educated segment of the camp population were able to move out of the camps for jobs in the service sector in Jordan and abroad, following the migration flow to the Gulf since the mid-1970s (El-Najjar, 1993). Thus, flight of successful persons might have contributed to the persistence of poverty in the camps, leaving poorer or less successful persons behind. Class-selective migration is found in many contexts, but it is difficult to capture in empirical analyses (Jencks and Mayer, 1990; Quillian, 1999). However, migration into the camps is selective in the opposite direction, preserving the relative size of the better-off segment of the camp population. It has been shown here that the newcomers have at least the same level of education as the camp residents, but are more likely to be vulnerable (e.g. females with children). While this dual, revolving door process and the inflow of economically better-off persons relative to the original dwellers should increase the status of the camp population over time, it keeps the camps at the bottom of the spatial economic hierarchy in Jordan. Furthermore, it contributes to the persistence of economic polarization within the camps because the “ordinary” middle class does not circulate (i.e. they tend to only move out of the camps).
What is the root cause of economic hardship in the camps? Social origin (or more precisely, inheritance) of camp dwellers is one source of economic distinction. Although we lack direct evidence to support this claim, we do believe that some portion of the persistence in group differences is derived from the life histories of families and the inheritance of low-status occupations or “entrepreneurship” within families through the entire period of refugeness. To a large extent, it is not surprising to find that the camps house disproportionately poor households – that is how they have always been. Thus, the largely rural origin of the camp dwellers currently residing in a mainly urban environment, often mentioned in various ethnographic works (see Hovdenak et al., 1997), is certainly one part of the explanation.

There are other institutional explanations for this phenomenon that cannot be examined with the data at hand. One explanation is the influence of economic growth on employment opportunities since the mid-1980s (Miles, 2002: 415). Jordan experienced several years (since 1996) of negative growth in per capita income (Shaban et al., 2001) despite, or perhaps, because of structural adjustment policies. The camp population is especially vulnerable to nationwide economic problems. Skill “deficit” and institutional disadvantages (i.e. stigma of the camp) in the labour market are possible causes of this vulnerability. Another possible explanation for the high level of poverty among camp refugees is alteration in the form or geographic distributions of jobs. They may also lack the necessary social networks to locate good jobs (Granovetter, 1995; Dejong and Tell, 1997). For, “connections remain critical to securing good jobs in the Jordanian context” (Miles, 2002: 425).

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

More than 50 years have passed since the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem during, or immediately after, the 1948-1949 war. One can no longer consider refugee status in Jordan as a fundamental determining factor of Palestinian life chances, and of extreme economic hardship in particular. For, thanks to UNRWA and Jordan’s integrative state policies, the refugees enjoyed access to free education, relatively egalitarian job opportunities, and easy-crossing national borders for work abroad. As a result of, or despite of these factors, the refugee population has become more differentiated over the past 50 years or so (see Doan, 1992), with those residing outside the camps having generally better living standards than their camp counterparts.

In a nutshell, the camps typically have a skewed demographic composition and house a disproportionately high number of poor, or otherwise disadvantaged, refugees. The camps have a rather unique demographic composition, with a younger
population but a relatively large proportion of older persons, and hence of loners and childless married couples (Khawaja and Tiltnes, 2002). Female headship and extended living arrangements are also more common in the camps than elsewhere in Jordan. The flight of middle-aged men, and/or the selective in-migration of single mothers mainly cause such distorted demographic composition. As revealed by the distribution of income and our relative measure of poverty, the camp can best be described as extremely polarized communities with many poor households, a few rich entrepreneurs, and a shrunken middle class. What is the source of this polarization?

The analysis reported in this paper sheds some light on this question, focusing on the mechanisms behind the production of poverty in the camps. Two accounts have been examined: migration selectivity and human capital. Descriptive analysis reveals that, as expected, in-migrants are generally poorer than non-migrants. However, the findings do not show that those who moved into the camps more recently are poorer than the stayers. Female headship, households consisting of loners, and spouses with children are poorer than the national average. And location, as measured by living in or around the capital city, has important bearing on poverty status.

Multivariate analysis generally confirmed the descriptive results. There are a few surprising findings however. Migration related factors are found spurious, reflecting the effects of age and human capital characteristics of camp refugees. Human capital characteristics are generally found to be crucial determinants of poverty, even after controlling for other variables. Findings from the final, inclusive model show that factors relating to the demographic composition of households, including dependency, have the largest impact on poverty in the camps, other things being equal. Taken as a whole, the findings indicate that the movement of the less fortunate persons into the camps does not cause poverty there.

Yet, we argued that migration plays a pivotal role in the reproduction of poverty in the camps. This is because our analysis only considered persons at the place of destination, thus neglecting the other side of migration – those who moved out of the camps. Arguably those who move out of the camps are upwardly mobile middle-class persons. We argued that this “revolving door” process does not necessarily produce stagnation of the camp communities, but it does keep the camps at the bottom of the spatial hierarchy in Jordan.

It is hardly news to report that the camps are highly impoverished areas, and that conventional human capital and demographic characteristics are important determinants of poverty in the camps. What is surprising is the rather “mixed” socio-economic profile of the poor. On the one hand, there is a disproportionately large group of vulnerable households (e.g. elderly persons) unable to commit
any of its members to gainful employment. On the other hand, poverty is relatively high among the employed, and among those in their prime working age. The implication of this finding is that both skill-based programmes, as well as welfare-assistance programmes, are needed in order to lift the poor out of economic hardship.

And this is perhaps an important lesson for refugee camps elsewhere. Although the Jordanian context is quite unique with regard to the fortune of Palestinian camp refugees, it shares many features with camp life in other settings. The availability of UNRWA and public welfare services, skill “deficit” among camp refugees compared to the general population, hyper movement into and out of the camps, and co-dependency among camp residents, are some of the common characteristics of camp populations elsewhere in the region, and indeed of many other impoverished communities. With a few exceptions, the populations living in refugee camps as opposed to other areas are more needy or disadvantaged in terms of standard of living in Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Eliminating public welfare assistance or UNRWA support without compensatory policies will certainly impact camp residents negatively in all of these contexts. Furthermore, policies that improve human development of the poor segment of camp refugees continues to be a priority in Jordan, and perhaps elsewhere.

However, the findings reported here should be viewed in light of the study’s methodological limitations. For one thing, the study focused on the contribution of immigration to the camps to the production of poverty among refugee households, but not out-migration of economically mobile individuals from the camp. Although this is an important dimension of migration that has not been investigated previously in the context of Palestinian refugees, it may be that the study missed some of the important mechanisms behind the production of poverty in camp households. This limitation cannot be easily overcome in this context by including households from non-camp areas because a significant proportion of those who left the camps are emigrants or temporarily working in the Gulf countries. Second, this study did not consider numerous variables that may be important in providing a thorough analysis of poverty in Jordan camps. For example, although the study included some household level variables, it did not assess other important kinds of familial configurations extending beyond the household unit such as financial and in-kind assistance provided by relatives. Third, this study did not consider changes in institutional variables such as discrimination in the labour and housing markets. We should finally point out that our findings are largely based on a one-time cross-sectional survey data. Yet, the issues investigated here, particularly economic hardship and geographic mobility, are highly dynamic processes. A fuller understanding of some of the issues addressed here requires tracking the economic fortune of camp families continuously over time, but this is left for future research.
NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Faculty of Health Sciences Seminar, American University of Beirut, and Economic Research Forum 10th Annual meetings, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The author thanks Penny Johnson, Ray Jureidini, Rosemary Sayegh, Elia Zureik, and seminar participants at the American University of Beirut for comments on earlier drafts. This paper was written while the author was at Fafo Institute, Oslo. Needless to say, the interpretations and conclusions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Fafo Institute or its employees.

2. There is no equivalent term for \textit{wasta} in English. It refers to the act of a person occupying an “influential” position in state or society (i.e. a notable) in mediating on behalf of someone else to secure a job among other things (see Cunningham and Sarahrah, 1993).

3. Although the US context is very different than the one addressed here, these models can be fruitfully used in examining stratification issues pertaining to disadvantaged immigrant communities everywhere.

4. Jordan has a sizeable number of Iraqis, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, Circassians, Chechens, and Armenians.

5. It should be pointed out that Palestinians started migrating to the East Bank of Jordan for work during the 1920s and 1930s, and thus not all Palestinians in Jordan are refugees (Plascov, 1981: 33-36).

6. Clearly the size of the non-refugee population in the camps, while it may be growing, is rather small in both absolute and relative terms. We re-estimated poverty levels and their determinants after including this group of non-refugees, but the results are essentially the same and have no impact on the conclusions reported here. Results are available from the author upon request.

7. We excluded non-Palestinian households from the analysis because our focus is on the economic standing of Palestinian refugees. However, the results reported here concerning migration hold even after including this small group of non-Palestinians in the camps.

8. This may translate into a per capita poverty line of about JD 208 per year, well below the estimated national poverty line of JD 313 (Shaban et al., 2001), but such a comparison is misleading because our measure is constructed taking into account a reasonable elasticity of household size.

9. There is essentially no difference between secondary and college education, and this is striking. One explanation for this outcome is the low return to education expected in a secondary labour market or largely informal economies (see Gordon, 1972).

10. Of course, we have tested other models not reported here. Of particular importance are those including interaction terms between human capital and migration variables, but none of these terms is significant. Results are available upon request.
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Cette étude examine le lien entre la pauvreté et la migration à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur des camps, en s’appuyant sur les données d’une enquête menée en 1999 au sein des ménages d’un camp de réfugiés en Jordanie et sur un modèle de régression logistique binomiale. Manifestement, la population des camps, où environ un tiers des ménages sont pauvres, reproduit certains schémas dans lesquels les pauvres constituent des groupes. Les résultats obtenus à partir de plusieurs modèles de régression riches montrent que l’immigration n’est pas la cause de la pauvreté persistante à l’intérieur des camps. D’autre part, les variables en termes de capital humain, telles que l’éducation, l’activité économique et l’huiéritage social”, de même que les facteurs démographiques tels que la qualité du chef de famille et le taux de dépendance exercent des effets significatifs sur l’incidence de la pauvreté. L’auteur examine certaines applications théoriques et politiques des conclusions de l’étude.

MIGRACIÓN Y REPRODUCCIÓN DE LA POBREZA: LOS CAMPAMENTOS DE REFUGIADOS EN JORDANIA

Este estudio examina el vínculo entre la pobreza y la migración hacia y fuera de los campamentos, utilizando una encuesta de datos realizada en 1999 en las familias en las poblaciones de los campamentos de refugiados en Jordania y una regresión logística binomial. Los resultados muestran un claro hacinamiento de la pobreza en los campamentos, donde alrededor de un tercio de las familias son pobres. Los resultados a partir de varios modelos de regresión anidada demuestran que la migración interna no es la causa de la pobreza persistente en los campamentos. Por otra parte, las variables de capital humano, especialmente la educación, la actividad económica y “el patrimonio social” así como los factores demográficos tales como quién es el jefe de familia y cuál es el porcentaje de personas a cargo tienen considerables efectos en la incidencia de la pobreza. En este artículo se abordan algunas repercusiones teóricas y pragmáticas de los resultados.