by Hilal Khashan

avril 1994/April 1994,

Abstract
This is an exploratory study, the objective of which is to provide information on the views of Lebanese respondents concerning the controversial issue of resettling Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The issue is examined in accordance with four pertinent variables: (1) the intensity of awareness on the issue of Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon, (2) its perceived impact on Lebanese politics, (3) proposed reaction to the possibility of its imposition, and (4) its expected impact on Lebanon's individual sectarian groups. The study is based on a stratified random sample of 986 Lebanese adult respondents. The data were collected during the months of November and December 1992. The findings show that many respondents do not seem to know much about the continuing debate on resettling Palestinians in Lebanon, although most of them tend to oppose the idea. They fear that resettlement will have damaging repercussions for the domestic situation in Lebanon, including the possibility of renewed civil war. The majority of respondents believe, however, that the resettlement of Palestinians should not be contested, even if it hurts the political and economic assets of Lebanon's confessional groups.

Plans for resettling Palestinian refugees in the Arab world date back to December 1948, when the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 194 calling for repatriation or compensation of the refugees as part of a comprehensive package for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. The main outcome of the resolution was the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was entrusted with the task of working out the logistics of the solution. Syria, Jordan and Egypt expressed their willingness to integrate many of the refugees in their societies, if Israel repatriated those remaining and offered specific territorial concessions. [1] But Israel declined, and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was quoted as saying: "Peace is vital--but not at any price." [2] Because the US decided not to pressure Israel to repatriate some of the refugees, it began to consider their resettlement and reintegration in neighbouring Arab countries. The UN General Assembly's creation, towards the end of 1949, of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was intended to speed up the resettlement process. However, the US--which provided more than 60 percent of UNRWA's annual budget--did not, and probably could not, force resettlement on the Arabs.

Some important developments occurred in the mid-1950s in the Middle East that had the effect of shelving all resettlement plans. Arab nationalism was on the rise: the Arab Socialist Ba`th Party emerged in Syria while, simultaneously, Nasir rose in Egypt and posed as the predominant Arab nationalist leader. The Palestine question added mightily to renewed interest in Arab nationalism; correspondingly, conciliatory public statements on Arab rights in Palestine became the main legitimizing force for the policies of Arab leaders. The mood in the Arab world was one of defiance towards, and confrontation with, Israel and its Western supporters. Resettlement and reintegration plans for the Palestinian refugees were dismissed as a Zionist and imperialist conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian question.

The resurgence of Arabism coincided with an increase in Soviet interest in Middle Eastern affairs. This was translated into large-scale military and economic aid to Egypt and Syria, the two Arab countries championing anti-Western slogans at the time. Thus the Middle East was thrown into the mire of superpower bipolarity, and with it the trauma of the Palestinian refugees receded to an issue of secondary importance. Officially, the Arabs appeared more concerned with recovering Arab rights in Palestine than with improving the miserable social and economic condition of most refugees. The refugees received little attention, then, beyond UNRWA's humanitarian operations.

With the Six Day War of 1967, Arab objectives shifted towards regaining their newly-lost territories. In turn, the PLO abandoned its slogan of destroying Israel and replaced it with another calling for the creation of a binational (Jewish and Arab) state in Palestine. However, Israel's outright rejection and the PLO's active involvement in the Lebanese civil war soon made the idea of a binational state seem unrealistic, spawning a further PLO shift towards seeking an independent state alongside Israel. Subsequent events such as the Camp David agreement, the decline of PLO power in Lebanon, Israel's 1982 invasion, and the inconclusiveness of the intifada all seemed to further diminish the expectations Arabs held of peace with Israel. The Gulf War over Kuwait and the collapse of the Soviet Union further undermined the Arab position and demoralized its exponents.

It was against this backdrop that the Arab-Israeli Peace Conference was convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991. It ushered in, among other things, a new era of serious debate about the destiny of Palestinian refugees still residing in the Arab world. This has occurred because the present Arab political context differs sharply from that of the 1950s and early 1960s. The setbacks of the last three decades appear to have made the Arabs more accommodating in their dealings with Israel. This has revived the question of resettling Palestinian refugees, an issue of direct concern to three Arab countries: Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It should be noted, however, that the standing of Palestinians in Syria and Jordan differs significantly from that of their brethren in Lebanon. In Syria, for example, the Palestinians have largely been integrated into society. This was made possible because the government, "through a series of laws, gradually paved the way for [the Palestinian refugees'] thorough integration into the Syrian socioeconomic structure." [3] This is demonstrated by the fact that more than 70 percent of Syria's 300,000 Palestinians live away from refugee camps. [4] Likewise, the Palestinians in Jordan were naturalized and are nearly indistinguishable from Transjordanians in the country's public life, and as many as 80 percent of them reside outside refugee camps. [5]

The objective of this exploratory study is to obtain systematic information on the views of Lebanese respondents regarding the issue of resettling Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In connection with this, answers are sought based on four variables related to resettlement: first, awareness of the issue; second, its perceived impact on Lebanese politics; third, proposed reaction to the possibility of its imposition; and fourth, its expected impact on Lebanon's individual sectarian groups. The author proposes that the respondents are significantly aware of the issue of resettlement, perceive its impact on Lebanese politics negatively, oppose its imposition, and expect it to have injurious consequences for Lebanon's sectarian groups, including their own.

Lebanese law bars Palestinians from employment in the public sector, and limits their entry into private organizations. One consequence of this policy is a 40 percent unemployment rate among Palestinians in Lebanon. [13] Another consequence is that those Palestinians who are able to obtain jobs in the private sector without securing a permit--i.e., illegally--have to endure abuse and underpayment. Fisk aptly describes the status of these Palestinians:

From the start, the Palestinians were treated with little love by the Lebanese... Some Palestinians with relatives in Lebanon were later to change their nationality and become Lebanese, but most of the refugees were classed as non-citizens.... They could not enter the civil service or acquire the privileges of Lebanese citizenship. It was almost impossible to obtain work permits. Poorly paid employment on Lebanese construction sites... was the fate of many of the farmers and labourers of Palestine. [14]

Unsympathetic official policy on Palestinian employment has caused many Palestinians to seek employment outside Lebanon, especially in the Gulf region. But Palestinian labour--particularly in the wake of the conflict precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990--is no longer welcome in most Gulf countries. This has mightily aggravated the socio-economic position of the Palestinian community in Lebanon, which has been declining steadily since the Israeli invasion of 1982.

Palestinian political influence has also dropped sharply since its highwater mark in the 1970s. After the Six Day War, the presence of armed PLO guerrillas was sanctioned by the Cairo Agreement of 1969. The agreement, though, was rejected by Lebanon's Maronites, and it led to their political and military mobilization against the Palestinian community. On the other hand, PLO military operations against Israel, and the latter's heavy-handed reprisals, took their toll on the Shi'i community. Support for the Palestinians began to erode among the Muslims, especially the Shi`is. [15] The outcome of the invasion left the Palestinians in Lebanon totally vulnerable. The immediate result of that vulnerability was the Sabra and Shatila massacre in which Phalangist forces slaughtered hundreds of Palestinians. The rift in PLO ranks in Lebanon in 1983 led to the encirclement of loyalists to Arafat in Tripoli by the Syrian-backed Fateh-intifada , a splinter group led by Abu Musa. Arafat eventually departed the city in the fall of 1983, but his confrontation with Syria on Lebanese soil escalated into the Camps War, in which the Shi'i Amal movement, acting as a Syrian proxy, fought the PLO. Palestinian civilians suffered immensely in terms of human casualties and material destruction. The PLO, on the defensive in the Beirut camps, reacted by expanding territorially east of Sidon at the expense of the Amal movement. Many Lebanese grew worried that the PLO was aiming to establish a substitute Palestinian homeland in east Sidon; memories of Palestinian activities between 1967 and 1982 were revived, particularly among Amal adherents whose leaders swore not to allow a repeat of the pre-1982 situation. It was in this atmosphere of belligerence that the debate on Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon commenced with seriousness.

Lebanese Christians have been more vocal than Muslims in demanding the expulsion of most Palestinian refugees from Lebanon and their resettlement elsewhere in the Arab world. In 1978, then-President Elias Sarkis dismissed outright any possibility of Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon:

... Lebanon will not accept any kind of settlement providing for the Palestinians to remain on its territory, because it is aware that this would encroach upon the very core of its interests, would be beyond Lebanon's ability [to absorb] and would harm the Palestinian issue itself ... [17]

Sarkis's position is shared by many Christians who believe a foreign conspiracy exists to expel the Lebanese from the southern and northern parts of their country as a prelude to resettling Palestinians and solving the problem with Israel at Lebanon's expense. [18] Al-Ma'ushi, for example, mentions a Palestinian scheme to establish a substitute homeland in Lebanon, after they realized that their war against Israel was hopeless. [19]

The Lebanese Army takeover of Palestinian positions in East Sidon in July 1991 put an end to the foreign conspiracy theory. However, new reasons for rejecting resettlement were raised. UNRWA's census project (conducted during the summer and fall of 1992), which coincided with a noticeable reduction in the agency's activities, was viewed as a first step towards ceasing all relief programs in preparation for the eventuality of resettlement. [20] In the wake of UNRWA's census, the Minister of Information announced during a visit to the Maronite patriarch that resettlement was unacceptable because it would upset Lebanon's sectarian balance. [21] Simultaneously, the Minister of Foreign Affairs warned that Lebanon will not accept any agreement on the Palestine problem that does not include the right of refugees to return to their homeland. [22] Christian apprehensions about resettlement increased on the eve of the agreement on Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho. The Higher Council of the Free Liberals Party saw in resettlement an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty, while the League of Greek Catholics believed it would hurt Lebanese interests. [23]

For their part, Lebanese Muslims offer other reasons for opposing resettlement. Thus Muhammad al-Juzu, the Sunni mufti of Mount Lebanon, insists that the Muslims "will not accept Palestinian settlement in Lebanon... not because the Palestinians are unwanted, but because [the] Zionist danger will increase if the Palestine question is given up." [24] Similarly, Shi'i cleric Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah rejects resettlement because it will liquidate the Palestinian cause. [25] Shaykh Muhammad Mandi Shamsuddin, another prominent Shi'i cleric, is unusual in advancing a different position: namely, that "permanent Palestinian settlement in Lebanon is unavoidable.... Let us accept that they [the Palestinians] should take part in our politics and all other aspects of life in the country." [26]

All interviewers had previous experience with the principal research from an earlier study. They attended two additional training sessions. In the first, the questionnaire was fully explained to them; in the second session, they were instructed as to how to enable respondents to express their views without intervention by the interviewer. To strengthen the validity of the study, the questionnaire was constructed under the direction of a panel of 20 professionals, such as college professors, journalists, and politicians. The research instrument was pretested (n=35) prior to formal interviewing; vague questions were modified, and seemingly leading questions were restructured. In view of the fact that the issue of Palestinian resettlement is a sensitive one in Lebanon, two reliability-test measures were applied to the data: (1) internal consistency, and (2) response bias. The test for internal consistency compared the percentage distributions of several pairs of similar items, and the responses were invariably constant. Testing for response bias provided exceptionally stable responses. Two sets of similar items, presented in reverse order, were checked to see if any tendency occurred for respondents to answer either first or last responses with greater frequency. No such tendency was found.

TABLE 1: Most Important Personal Contact with Palestinians (n=981)

	%
Friendship	32
Work	6
Marriage	5
Political	5
None	52

Table 1 suggests that personal contacts between the respondents and Palestinians are limited. More than half of the respondents disclaimed any relations with Palestinians, whereas two-thirds of those able to identify such an association spoke in terms of ordinary friendship. Concrete forms of identification included work, marriage, and political contacts, all of which were narrow in scope. Weak intergroup interaction is, of course, not unusual in Lebanon. It is understood that meaningful inter-group interaction has always been minimal in this endemically divided sectarian country. Therefore, we should not ignore the sectarian dimension when investigating the extent of Lebanese interaction with Palestinians.

TABLE 2: Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Most Important Personal Contact with Palestinians

Cramer's V = 0.17
Alpha = 0.05

	Sunnis n=268 %	Shi`is n=211 %	Druze n=73 %	Maronites n=222 %	Orthodox n=91 %	Catholics n=80 %	Armenians n=35 %
Friendship	42	38	38	17	33	20	23
Work	10	7	--	3	7	9	--
Marriage	11	4	--	3	1	1	3
Political	2	3	21	2	14	4	--
None	34	48	41	75	45	66	74

(Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.)

The results of the relationship between religious background and personal contact with Palestinians are presented in Table 2. Religion indeed appears to be related to the magnitude of contact between the respondents and members of Lebanon's Palestinian community. Sunni respondents report more interaction with Palestinians than does any other religious group, especially through marriage--the closest form of interaction. The very weak Sunni political contacts with Palestinians are noticeable, though not surprising. The Sunnis lag far behind other major Lebanese religious groups in terms of political organization and mass mobilization. This was demonstrated in the course of Lebanon's protracted civil war, during which the Sunnis played only a marginal role, especially when politics mixed inextricably with militia activity. That the strongest political contact with Palestinians was indicated by Druze respondents can be understood equally readily. The (predominantly leftist and Muslim) "Lebanese National Movement" was led first by Druze leader Kamal Jumblat, and, after his assassination, by his son Walid, for much of the duration of the civil war. Whereas the Druze Progressive Socialist Party provided the political cloak for this loosely-coordinated movement, the Palestinians supplied it with military muscle until its disintegration in 1984 following the rise of separate Shi'i movements. In fact, Palestinian military units continue to be stationed in Druze areas lying outside the effective control of Lebanese army units. As might be expected, the Maronite respondents indicate the least level of personal contact with Palestinians.

TABLE 3: Views on Lebanon's Naturalization Code (n=969)

	%
Code is appropriate	14
Code is too rigid	43
Naturalization should be ceased	43

A review of the respondents' perceptions of the Lebanese naturalization code (Table 3) is vital due to its potential policy implications regarding prospects for Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon. Responses to the question concerning the appropriateness of the naturalization code reveal the controversial nature of this issue in Lebanese politics. Only a minority of respondents believed that the code is appropriate, while the vast majority took a polar-opposite stand on the issue. Some believed that the code needed to be liberalized because it was too rigid, while others felt Lebanon should annul the naturalization code and cease naturalizing foreigners. Obviously, the sharp political divisions among Lebanese rival groups have manifested themselves in the respondents' views on naturalization.

One would expect the views on the naturalization code to be influenced by the respondents' religious affiliation. Cross-tabulation of the two variables revealed interesting relationships between religion and views on the naturalization code. Sunni, Shi'i, Druze and Greek Orthodox respondents were more likely than their Maronites, Catholic and Armenian counterparts to express the opinion that the code was too rigid and needed revision. Conversely, respondents from the last three groups were more inclined than the others to demand a repeal of the code (refer to Table 4 for text and distribution of responses). More light will be shed on the direction of these responses as the analysis proceeds.

TABLE 4: Relationship between Religious Affiliation and V iews on Lebanon's Naturalization Code

Cramer's V = 0.15 (Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.)
Alpha = 0.05

Awareness of the Issue of Palestinian Resettlement
As noted earlier, the question of Palestinian resettlement has been the subject of increasing discussion by Lebanese political figures and by the Lebanese mass media. Three questions pertaining to this debate were used in this study. The aim was to account for the respondents' familiarity with this critical issue, which receives greater public attention than the Lebanese government's controversial plans for reconstruction, political reform, and economic privatization. The results of the responses to these questions are presented in Table 5. The first question asked respondents whether they believed there were serious international plans to resettle Palestinians in Lebanon. Some 60 percent of respondents were able to express an opinion on the issue, with most holding the view that plans for resettlement are genuine. Uncertainty increased when the respondents were asked if they believed resettlement would be imposed on Lebanon. More than half the responses indicated uncertainty, but of those who expressed an opinion, the majority believed resettlement would be imposed. However, the percentage of uncertain respondents dropped sharply when respondents were confronted with an attitudinal question regarding their own position on resettlement. Three-quarters of the respondents rejected the idea.

The responses to the three questions concerning awareness of the issue of Palestinian resettlement revealed uncertainty about its prospects. Lebanese mass media, the major source of information available to the public on political issues, themselves reveal confusion as to the possibility of resettlement. There is a general impression among Lebanese that the future of the Palestinians will be decided by the US as the Arab-Israeli peace talks reach a decisive stage. [30] Even though many respondents did not know whether Palestinians would eventually be repatriated or resettled, they were nevertheless quick to point out their opposition to resettlement in Lebanon.

TABLE 5: Awareness of the Issue of Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon

Opposition to resettlement appeared to cut across the religious affiliations of the respondents. True, there are slight variations, especially between the Sunnis and the Maronites: the first leads in support and the second in opposition, as can be seen from Table 6. But the extent of discrepant responses is not significant, especially if one takes into consideration that the Muslims were strongly supportive of the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon when the civil war broke out in 1975. It is obvious from the responses that the Palestinian cause is no longer a divisive element in Lebanon's sectarian politics.

TABLE 6: Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Position on Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Cramer's V = 0.13
Alpha = 0.05

Perceived Impact of Resettlement on Lebanese Politics
Table 7 provides information on the respondents' perceived repercussions of resettlement. Almost three-fourths of the respondents foresee damaging repercussions. This question was probed further in an effort to acquire more detailed information regarding the respondents' opposition to resettlement. Thus, in response to an open-ended contingency question on what actually motivated them to oppose resettlement, many respondents made a number of projections which are given in Table 8. The most ominous concern is connected with the fear that resettlement will lead to the resumption of civil war. Lebanese officials seem to concur with the respondents on this aspect of the damaging repercussions of resettlement. During a meeting between the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador, the former stated that "[a]ll Lebanese groups reject the idea of resettling Palestinian refugees in Lebanon ... They fear that it might restart the civil war." [31]

TABLE 7: Implications of Resettlement on Domestic Situation in Lebanon (n=978)

The second worry was economic; it was offered by one-third of those who responded to this question. Lebanon is a country of scarce economic opportunities, even for its own citizens. Many ambitious Lebanese sought to satisfy their occupational expectations through working abroad. Widespread Lebanese emigration to the Americas, Australia, West Africa and, more recently, to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf attest to the country's precarious economic situation. Thus the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon was viewed by many as an unbearable economic burden on a country that is still unable to launch programs for the recovery of its shattered economy. However, it should be mentioned that Lebanese authorities have traditionally been much tougher when it comes to issuing work permits to Palestinians as opposed to other foreigners. It is documented that "out of 15,000 work permits given [in 1991] to foreigners, only 125 of them were given to Palestinians." [32] It is claimed that the reason for impeding employment of Palestinians in Lebanon--unlike other nationalities--can be associated with a scheme to make Palestinian residence in Lebanon unrewarding. [33]

TABLE 8: Projection of Damaging Repercussions of Resettlement (n=740)

A third group of respondents opposed resettlement on grounds that it would upset Lebanon's demographic balance. Resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, is bound to upset the demography of this confessionally-structured country. However, it should be noted that Lebanon's demography was already upset even before the Palestinians became a cause of concern in Lebanese politics. Lebanese Muslims outnumbered their Christian fellow citizens from the early days of the first republic (1943-75), but the Christians dominated the country's political and economic life. Muslim insistence on reforming the Lebanese political system--and the Maronites' adamant opposition--were the major causes of the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975. The Palestinians joined ranks with the Muslims against the Christians. Direct Palestinian military participation in the conflict exacerbated the demographic imbalance between Muslims and Christians. Civil war memories are still very much alive in the minds of the Lebanese people; apparently, these caused many respondents to worry about the implications of resettlement on the future of peace in Lebanon, as well as the fibre of Lebanese society.

Finally, a small fraction of respondents expressed concern about the possibility that resettlement would allow Palestinians to establish themselves as a new sectarian group in the Lebanese political system. The choice of this response deserves comment. If the Palestinians did emerge, as some fear, as a distinct political force, this would attest to the rigidity of the Lebanese political system and its inability to accommodate new social forces.

Proposed Reactions to the Possibility of Resettlement

The respondents are split over how their own religious groups should react to the possibility of foreign powers imposing resettlement. Table 9 demonstrates the acuteness of these differences in views. Some respondents see resettlement as unavoidable, and prefer that their group react positively to its implementation. Others prefer that their group acquiesce if resettlement is imposed. A substantial percentage of respondents remain defiant and demand that their group resist resettlement by military means. The confessional nature of Lebanese politics clearly affects respondents' views on this matter. The results of the relationship between religious affiliation and reaction to the imposition of resettlement are presented in Table 10.

TABLE 9: Views Concerning How Respondents Believe Their Own Religious Groups Should React to Imposed Resettlement (n=820)

The resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon poses a direct threat to Maronites and Shi`is. Thus, respondents from these two confessional groups are less likely to acquiesce in its imposition than are other respondents. Similarly, they are more prone to recommend a resort to military confrontation to block resettlement. Recently, Sa`id Aql, a Maronite parliamentary deputy from northern Lebanon, called for steadfastness in confronting any attempt to encourage the Palestinians to resettle in Lebanon. [34] Respondents displaying an intention to resist resettlement were moved by different forces and factors. Sunni opposition could result, at least in part, from pan-Arab considerations and the perceived inevitability of an all-out Arab-Israeli confrontation. It is unlikely that Sunnis would oppose Palestinian resettlement from the same confessional perspective as Maronites or Shi`is. Religious identification is very important for most Lebanese, and they give it precedence over identification with the state. In the 1960s and 1970s, Lebanese Sunnis sided with Palestinian coreligionists (who were attacking Israel from bases in southern Lebanon) against their own government (which was trying to control the armed Palestinian presence in the country). Resettlement is seen by many Sunnis--traditionally staunch advocates of Arab nationalism--as an admission of final defeat by Israel. It appears that Sunnis are not yet ready to accept the loss of the Arab cause in Palestine. The majority of Armenian respondents acquiesced in the prospect of imposing resettlement. Lebanese Armenians have generally preferred to detach themselves from the country's more controversial issues. They adopted this policy of political neutrality in the wake of their expulsion from western Anatolia following the genocide of 1915. In addition, Armenians constitute an immigrant group. They required the assistance of the French mandatory authorities to resettle in Lebanon after World War I, and in 1924 they were granted Lebanese citizenship. [35]

TABLE 10: Relationships between Religious Affiliation and Reaction to the Imposition of Resettlement

Despite the unpopularity of resettlement, more respondents were willing to accept it rather than rising against it. This is probably the case because many Lebanese feel they have little control over events in their country. [36] Many Lebanese tend to exhibit fatalism towards political events of consequence. The heated controversy over the legality of the 1992 parliamentary elections--a campaign led by Maronite Christians--subsided after it became obvious that the elections enjoyed regional support as well as international approval. Earlier, in September 1991, the numerous supporters of General Michel Aoun watched with bitterness as Syrian troops evicted him from the presidential palace. Lebanese mass-media outlets used to report fully the activities of Aoun's supporters, including the crowds of people who camped for weeks outside the palace as a demonstration of support for his stated policies. But these outlets ceased to carry reports reflecting the views of Aoun supporters once he was ousted.

Expected Impact of Resettlement on Lebanon's Sectarian Groups
The implications of resettlement for Lebanese society are a matter of public discussion. The major concern is the projected impact--political and economic--of resettlement on various Lebanese groups. To elicit respondents' views on these matters, respondents were asked to project the political and economic impact of resettlement on their religious groups (see Tables 11-12 for the text and distribution of the results). Less than one-quarter of all respondents foresaw either of the two potential impacts as positive, although a substantially higher percentage were unsure about the likely economic impact. The reasons for such disparate responses are not difficult to explain. In view of the confessional nature of the Lebanese political system, it is difficult to imagine a large percentage of confessionally-diverse respondents perceiving the political impact of resettlement in favourable terms. Apparently, respondents still remember the considerable negative political consequences of Palestinian militancy, from the mid-1960s onwards.

The politicizing of Palestinians and the maintenance of their military apparatus required heavy financial spending. The transfer by the PLO of huge financial assets to Lebanon invigorated the country's economy and helped to delay the onset of economic depression. Furthermore, it is widely believed that in order to make resettlement possible, UNRWA and other international and regional donors will pump large sums of money into Lebanon. [37] Thus, the prospect of resettlement and improved economic conditions in the country seem to be linked in many respondents' minds. This prospect mitigates what would otherwise be an unacceptable project.

TABLES 11-12: Relationship between Religious Affiliation and ProjectedImpact of Resettlement on Respondents' Own Groups

Political Impact

Economic Impact

When the results are broken down further by religious affiliation, several patterns emerge. The association was clear between views on positive political and economic impact and Sunni respondents. In addition, almost one-third of the Druze represented in the sample predicted some positive political impact from resettlement. Numerically, the Druze are a small confessional group in Lebanon, but their political weight and ambitions far exceed their actual size. Future affiliation with Palestinians, which proved propitious for the Druze during much of the last twenty-five years, might enhance the political bargaining position of the Druze in Lebanese affairs. By contrast, Maronites, Catholics, Armenians, and Shi`is emphasized the political costs of resettlement much more than they did the economic costs. In the case of the Christian groups, this is likely explained by reference to concerns that the Palestinians have in the past allied with their political opponents and threatened to tilt the demographic balance towards the Muslims. For Shi`is, tension and clashes between the Palestinians and the major Shi`i political organizations has undoubtedly heightened political concern.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
The issue of resettling Palestinian refugees in their country is unpopular among the Lebanese. Opposition to the idea from government officials, spiritual figures, confessional leaders, and mass-media commentators is shared by the public, as this study has demonstrated. Most respondents do not accept the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, and believe it will result in damage to the country. Many assume that resettlement will cause a resumption of the Lebanese civil war, and call for military resistance to prevent its imposition. Only Sunni respondents project that Palestinian resettlement will eventually be beneficial to them. Lebanon, devastated by civil war and burdened with foreign occupation, is unprepared to cope with resettlement. Magnifying the Lebanese dilemma over resettlement is the religious background of Palestinian refugees. Christians' blunt rejection of Palestinian resettlement--because of the refugees' Sunni Muslim background--has infuriated the Sunni Grand Mufti; although he himself does not support resettlement, he has opposed raising the sectarian dimension of the issue. [38]

Many Lebanese fear that resettlement might jeopardize the political development of their country in the post-Tai'f period. Although not all Lebanese factions consented to Tai'f when the accord was struck, it has nevertheless gained credibility as the agreement that finally placed the country on a stable political footing. [39] The Shi`is are particularly concerned that resettlement could threaten the process of implementing the Tai'f Agreement and the political gains it accorded them. Maronite wariness stems from the assumption that resettlement would eventually invite more Muslim demands for a bigger slice of the political system. The unwillingness of all Lebanese groups to return to the trauma of civil war; hope for a better future combined with worries about what that future might hold--all these factors seem to have united the vast majority of Lebanese in opposition to resettlement. Equally, however, the trauma of civil war might also explain why a majority would be prepared to respond positively or acquiesce--rather than resisting militarily--if resettlement were imposed on the country.

The future well-being of the Palestinian community in Lebanon seems to depend on two main factors. The first of these is the development of a viable Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza. The September 1993 Israeli-PLO agreement on a declaration of principles for peace makes no immediate provisions for Palestinian refugees, especially those of 1948. This--despite undertakings to address the issue later, in the course of final status negotiations--increases the likelihood that many or most Palestinians in Lebanon will ultimately settle permanently there. The UN has already begun preparing plans to integrate the refugees into Lebanese society. [40] However, even if the refugees are unable to exercise a "right of return" to historic Palestine, Palestinians in Lebanon might nonetheless acquire the identity of the new entity.

The second major determinant of the future status of Palestinians in Lebanon will be the emergence (or non-emergence) of a strong Lebanese central government. While such a government might feel it could ignore Palestinian pleas for greater rights, it might also feel self-confident enough to grant them. The Lebanese government might then accept resettlement as part of a peace package that includes generous financial aid for Lebanese economic reconstruction. In this case, Lebanon would probably insist that resettled Palestinians be granted non-Lebanese travel documents. However, if Palestinians in Lebanon did gain the formal political identity of the emerging Palestinian entity, they might continue to live in Lebanon as residents with comprehensive civil rights, minus the right of Lebanese citizenship and its privileges (such as voting and running for public office). This would put the Palestinians in Lebanon on a par with their brethren in Syria.

All this would be a major accomplishment. The concretization of any such plans, however, awaits further progress in the current peace process--especially along the Palestinian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks. It also depends on domestic developments within Lebanon. In the meantime--and the "meantime" may prove to be a lengthy one--the debate over Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon will continue.

About the Author: Hilal Khashan is an associate professor of political science at the American University of Beirut. He is the author of Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind (Lanham: University Press of America, 1992). He has contributed numerous articles on Arab affairs to journals such as the Journal of Conflict Resolution , World Affairs , Orbis , International Sociology , Armenian Review , Journal of Arab Affairs , Arab Studies Quarterly , Middle East Quarterly , Research in Higher Education , Bulletin of Peace Proposals , and Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies . In 1991 he received the 'Abd al-Hamid Shuman Prize in social sciences for young Arab scholars. He spent the 1991-92 academic year as a visiting scholar at the Annenberg Research Institute in Philadelphia, USA.

Notes

[1] Benjamin Shwadran, "Assistance to Arab Refugees," Middle Eastern Affairs 1, 1 (January 1950), p. 2. See also David Forsythe, "The Palestine Question: Dealing with a Long-Term Refugee Situation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , 467 (May 1983), p. 91.

[2] In Donald Neff, "US Policy and the Palestinian Refugees," Journal of Palestine Studies 18, 1 (Autumn 1988), p. 104.

[3] Laurie Brand, "Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration," Middle East Journal 42, 4 (Autumn 1988), p. 104.

[4] Map of UNRWA's Areas of Operations (Vienna: Public Information Office of UNRWA H.Q., 1992).

[5] Map of UNRWA's Areas of Operations .

[6] UNRWA (Beirut: UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1990), p. 6. Two of these camps are in northern Lebanon, one in the Biqa' valley, four in Greater Beirut, and five in southern Lebanon. Five other camps were destroyed in the course of the Lebanese civil war (three by the Lebanese Forces and two by the Amal movement during the Camps War of 1985-87).

[7] Maronite political writers are particularly outspoken in warning against the dangers of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. See, for example, Ibriza al-Ma'ushi, Lubnan: jabin la yanhani [Lebanon: Too Proud to Bend] (Beirut: n.p., 1978), p. vii.

[8] Neff, "US Policy and the Palestinian Refugees," p. 102.

[9] Hilal Khashan, "The Despairing Palestinians," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 16, 1 (Fall 1992), p. 5.

[10] Khashan, "The Despairing Palestinians," p. 5.

[11] Map of UNRWA's Operations .

[12] al-Wasat , 5 October 1992.

[13] al-Safir , 5 October 1992.

[14] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), pp. 68-69.

[15] For more information on this matter, see Rex Brynen, "Palestinian-Lebanese Relations: A Political Analysis," in Deidre Collings, ed., Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

[16] Brynen, "Palestinian-Lebanese Relations."

[17] Cited by John Cooley, "The Palestinians," in Edward Haley and Lewis Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 21.

[18] Hikmat Karam, Khafaya wa asrar harb al-sanawat al-khams: 1975-1980 [Secrets of the Five Years: 1975-1980] (Beirut: Mu'assasat Karam lil tiba'a wa al-nashr, n.d.).

[19] al-Ma'ushi, Lubnan: jabin la yanhani , p. vii.

[20] al-Safir , 6 October 1992.

[21] al-Nahar , 9 September 1993.

[22] al-Nahar , 9 September 1993.

[23] al-Diyar , 11 September 1993.

[24] al-Shira' , 5 October 1992.

[25] al-Diyar , 11 September 1993.

[26] al-Hayat , 17 September 1992.

[27] Women revealed a greater nonresponse rate (28%) than men (15%). Also, nonresponse varied considerably from one religious group to another, as follows: Druze (3%), Greek Orthodox (9%), Sunnis (11%), Catholics (20%), Maronites (25%), Shi`is (29%), Armenians (30%).

[28] The religious groups were represented according to the following order: 27% Sunnis, 22% Shi`is, 7% Druze, 23% Maronites, 9% Greek Orthodox, 8% Catholics, 4% Armenians. The respondents came from all regions of the country as follows: Beirut 31%, Mount Lebanon 21%, North Lebanon 14%, Biqa' 18%, South Lebanon 16%.

[29] The age distribution of the respondents included 52% in the category of 18-33 years, 35% in the category of 34-49, and 13% in the category of 50 years or older. Educationally, 3% of respondents were illiterate, 14% completed elementary education, 40% said they had completed secondary education or received vocational training, and 43% received college education. The socioeconomic status of the sample was also mixed since it included 13% upper-class, 36% middle-class, and 51% working-class respondents.

[30] al-Safir , 20 February 1993.

[31] al-Wasat , 12 October 1992.

[32] al-Wasat , 12 October 1992.

[33] al-Safir , 16 September 1992.

[34] Monday Morning , 21 December 1992.

[35] Indeed, some Palestinian refugee camps were once transit camps for Armenians.

[36] See Hilal Khashan, Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992).

[37] al-Nahar , 1 February 1993.

[38] al-Anwar , 9 September 1993.

[39] Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hut, "Mustaqbal al-'alaqat al-lubnaniyya al-filistiniyya" [Future of Lebanese-Palestinian Relations], Shu`un Filistiniyya 242-243 (May-June 1993), p. 30.

[40] Interview with Zacharias Backer, Head of Delegation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Lebanon, 17 November 1993.

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