The Palestinian Predicament in Lebanon
Source: Middle East Quarterly, Sept 2000 v7 i3 p29
by Simon Haddad
What to do with the Palestinian refugees has been
a core issue the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948.
And of all the countries hosting Palestinians, Lebanon
probably confronts the most sensitive and serious
problems.
Lebanese authorities consider Palestinians a threat
to the sensitive balance of religious and ethnic
communities in their country. So, fearing that the
Middle East peace process will try to implant Palestinians
in Lebanon against the will of the Lebanese, the
government continues to deny the Palestinians basic
social and economic rights in order to discourage
them from remaining there. As a result, Lebanon hosts
the highest percentage of Palestinians living in
camps (55 percent or 200,000 people).(1) But then
Lebanon's worries stem also from the continued presence
of these armed Palestinians in the camps, because
they represent a potential for instability, threatening
to reenact the civil war days unless a solution for
the Palestinians is found: "If Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon were not given the right to return home,
they will become a time bomb."(2)
In light of the foregoing, it is important to understand
how Lebanese citizens look at the Palestinians resident
in their country, and especially the prospect that
they might settle permanently there. Toward this
end, the author conducted a survey exploring several
aspects of this question in late 1999 and early 2000.
Survey questions probed the awareness of issues,
attitudes, and expectations of likely results. The
study has shown that barriers to social integration
of Palestinians exist among the native population,
although to varying degrees. Christians are manifestly
more reluctant to tolerate Palestinians than their
Muslim counterparts. Unexpectedly, though, there
is a shared consensus on granting the refugees their
basic rights, in a clear opposition to the Lebanese
government's actual strategy. However, most Lebanese
are aware of the ongoing debate over Palestinian
settlement in the country, tend to oppose the idea,
and call for preventing its imposition. Most Lebanese
communities view the Palestinians as a major destabilizing
force capable of upsetting the precarious sectarian
balance of inter-group relations, and possibly even
bringing on a renewal of civil war.
The Predicament
A community of Palestinians numbering
about 400,000 lives in Lebanon,(3) representing not
less than 10 percent of the country's population.
Moreover, conditions in the camps are grim because
Palestinians in Lebanon suffer from discriminatory
official policies preventing them from improving
their living conditions.
Only a small fraction of Palestinians have acquired
Lebanese citizenship, with a mere 3,000 naturalized
until the 1980s. Although 60,000 were granted citizenship
in 1994,(4) the overwhelming majority of Palestinians
remain stateless and are treated as foreigners who
have no rights of property ownership, investment,
or employment--at most, they have privileges granted
by a complex and lengthy permit process. Large institutions
are essentially closed to Palestinians because these
are governed by rules that make allocations in accordance
with sectarian affiliation.(5) Moreover, Palestinians
continue to be excluded from more than seventy-two
professions. Basic Lebanese labor law says that non-Lebanese
must obtain work permits for all regular jobs: construction,
sanitation, agriculture. A second law restricts the
practice of most professions--medicine, engineering,
pharmacy--to Lebanese, forcing Palestinians to take
jobs that offer low wages, insecurity, and no benefits.(6)
Travel restrictions on Palestinians were always
tight, passports rarely given, and the only documents
issued by the government were temporary. Then, on
September 22, 1995, the Lebanese government made
visas obligatory for Palestinian refugees residing
in Lebanon who are holders of Lebanese travel documents.
This meant that Palestinians who left the country
faced the possibility of being refused a reentry
visa to come back. However, that decision was annulled
on January 12, 1999, when the government decided
to treat Palestinian refugees who are holders of
Lebanese travel documents on the same basis as full
Lebanese passport holders, facilitating their movement
to and from foreign countries.
In the past, high levels of education enabled Palestinians
to compete for jobs even though they were disadvantaged
as non-nationals. Educational achievement was also
a source of collective pride and individual motivation--an
interim substitute for a country and a passport.
Today, after years of destruction and disruption,
Palestinians in Lebanon are facing an educational
crisis. While the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) provides Palestinians in Lebanon with
primary education, they find it extremely difficult
to enter the government secondary schools, which
is a prerequisite for access to the university, and
they continue to be excluded from public institutions
for higher education. The resulting lack of education
has jeopardized the economic independence and productivity
of Palestinians.(7)
The Lebanese state's reluctance to absorb the refugees
means that 150,000 to 200,000 Palestinians live in
twelve registered refugee camps intended to accommodate
just 50,000 refugees. Restrictions on building and
reconstruction in the camps contribute to the insecurity
of Palestinians in Lebanon, forcing them to live
in buildings partially or totally destroyed during
the civil war,(8) in as much as rebuilding has been
strictly and legally controlled.
It bears noting that Palestinians living in other
Arab countries, such as Jordan and Syria, are not
so marginalized. In Jordan, Palestinians constitute
approximately 60 percent of the total population
and 95 percent of them hold citizenship.(9) They
are a powerful force in the nation's economy and
can work in any occupation of their choice; indeed,
they have served as generals in the army and prime
ministers. Palestinians in Syria are integrated into
society at all levels and rarely suffer discrimination
in employment, ownership, or political activity.
Although they are not eligible for citizenship, they
do enjoy a full legal equivalency with local nationals
in almost all areas, including employment and governmental
services.(10) There are, however, some restrictions
on Palestinian property ownership and mobility in
Syria, as well as tight controls over political activities.(11)
To be sure, in other parts of the Arab world (Iraq
and Egypt particularly), Palestinians have been subjected
to harsh treatment and restrictions, but their numbers
in those countries are much smaller than in Lebanon.
Reluctance for Palestinian Settlement
Why this especially
poor situation of the Palestinians resident in Lebanon?
One Lebanese writer, Raghid as-Sulh, has listed four
reasons for opposing the permanent settlement of
Palestinians:
- Original Intent : Granting the refugees
sanctuary was undertaken as a humane, emergency
measure; it was never intended to be permanent.
- Economic : Lebanon is a small country
with limited resources, which makes it unable to
absorb the Palestinian refugees, especially following
the devastation inflicted by the civil war.
- Political and historical : Lebanese
see themselves as having paid a much higher price
for the Palestinian cause than any other country,
for they blame the Palestinians for all the wars
and troubles their country has been through. Lebanese
feel they cannot be asked to pay more in the form
of the consequences incumbent on settling the Palestinians
in Lebanon.
- Demographic : Absorbing the Palestinians
would alter the country's complex sectarian balance
and unsettle the political structures that have
been crafted to reflect that balance. Specifically,
in a country divided between Muslims and Christians,
an influx of Palestinians would dilute the power
of the Christians, and particularly the Maronite
Christians.(12)
Formally speaking, Lebanese officials reject the
prospect of permitting Palestinians to become naturalized
Lebanese because this "would constitute a negation
of the Palestinian right to return to their homeland."(13)
But most Lebanese have other motives for resisting
this prospect: they see citizenship for Palestinians
upsetting the delicate confessional balance in the
country's political structure that is predicated
on demographics. Reflecting the complete lack of
popular support for Palestinian citizenship, Interior
Minister Michel al-Murr recently announced that a
new clause has been added to the naturalization draft
law to prevent Palestinians from gaining citizenship.(14)
At the same time, as Table 1a shows, well over a
majority of Lebanese believe that Palestinians should
be allowed some social and economic rights, such
as the right to work.
Table 1
Greek Greek
Maronites Catholics Orthodox
a. "Do you think that Palestinians
should be granted": (N=946)(*)
Citizenship 3 8 2
Civil and social rights 63 59 62
No rights 34 33 35
b. Feelings of closeness to Palestinians (N=716)
Closest 6 6 7
2nd closest 3 5 7
Neutral 17 12 24
2nd least close 3 12 9
Least close 71 66 53
c. Level of Lebanese comfort in interaction
with Palestinians (N=872)
Warmest 8 5 2
Warm 9 21 22
Neutral 20 16 23
Cold 15 18 13
Coldest 49 40 39
d. "Would you support sending Lebanese students to
schools where Palestinians are a majority?" (N=1,061)
Yes 14 18 21
No 78 76 72
Unsure 8 6 7
e. "Do you think that the Lebanese government should
ban intermarriage with Palestinians?" (N=1,059)
Yes 32 28 34
No 56 57 53
Unsure 12 16 13
f. "Do you agree with the claim that if resettlement
was imposed another civil war will break out?" (N=1,057)
Yes 66 62 57
No 16 18 22
Unsure 18 20 22
g. "What is your expected course of action
if resettlement was imposed?" (=1,008)
Acquiesce 23 28 27
Protest non-violently 52 44 51
Resist militarily 26 28 22
h. "What would be your preferred
political alternative?" (N=1,008)
Decentralization 61 68 59
Religious State 5 3 4
Authoritarian State 2 3 1
Other 32 28 35
Sunnis Shi'is Druze
a. "Do you think that Palestinians
should be granted": (N=946)(*)
Citizenship 15 9 10
Civil and social rights 75 69 82
No rights 10 23 9
b. Feelings of closeness to Palestinians (N=716)
Closest 27 13 17
2nd closest 18 10 27
Neutral 24 22 29
2nd least close 4 13 3
Least close 27 42 24
c. Level of Lebanese comfort in interaction
with Palestinians (N=872)
Warmest 33 20 22
Warm 28 28 43
Neutral 21 14 14
Cold 8 11 6
Coldest 10 28 15
d. "Would you support sending Lebanese students to
schools where Palestinians are a majority?" (N=1,061)
Yes 51 37 55
No 41 58 40
Unsure 8 5 6
e. "Do you think that the Lebanese government should
ban intermarriage with Palestinians?" (N=1,059)
Yes 6 16 13
No 82 70 83
Unsure 13 14 4
f. "Do you agree with the claim that if resettlement
was imposed another civil war will break out?" (N=1,057)
Yes 22 44 22
No 60 37 63
Unsure 18 19 15
g. "What is your expected course of action
if resettlement was imposed?" (=1,008)
Acquiesce 44 26 26
Protest non-violently 49 59 61
Resist militarily 7 16 13
h. "What would be your preferred
political alternative?" (N=1,008)
Decentralization 20 25 56
Religious State 9 5 -
Authoritarian State 11 5 3
Other 60 64 41 (*) Here and in all tables "N" represents the number of respondents; figures
are in percentages and columns may not add up to 100 because results were rounded
to the nearest whole number.
In sum, the Palestinians' adverse conditions appear to result from a deliberate
strategy to discourage Palestinians from remaining in Lebanon. Seeing Palestinians
as a threat to the Lebanese people, Beirut has treated them as second-class
citizens, denying them basic social and economic rights since 1948 and keeping
them apart from the Lebanese population, so as not to be able to assimilate.
The authorities constantly repeat the mantra of former prime minister Rafiq
al-Hariri, uttered in 1998, that "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians.
They will not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration
would take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency which
has supported them since 1948."(15)
I. Close Relations?
The integration of Palestinians in Lebanon depends in good
part on the attitudes of others in that country.(16) How do they feel? As Table
1b suggests, there is little warmth toward Palestinians, with the exception
of Sunni and Druze respondents.
This pattern of responses can be explained by the history of Lebanon's political
conflicts. Most Christians have always been hostile to the Palestinians, due
mainly to Palestinian exploitation of the internal tensions of Lebanese society
for their own ends. When Palestinians entered the country in 1948, communal
tensions were already endemic. After 1967, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) gained significant political and military power and increasingly touched
a resonant chord of sympathy among Sunni Muslims, who had "their own home-grown
grievances against the institutionalized domination of their state apparatus
by the Maronites."(17) Thus, many Lebanese blame the Palestinians for providing
the fuel for the civil war that laid waste to Lebanon from 1975 to 1990 and
are reluctant to recall the murderous fighting that went on between Lebanese
militias.
Lebanese are also quick to point fingers at the Palestinians for the cross-border
attacks on northern Israel after 1969. After these raids prompted the Israelis
to invade Lebanon in 1982, the situation reversed and Palestinian refugees
went from being a political threat to being targets for violence by Christian
right-wing militias, notably in the Sabra and Shatila camps.
As for Shi'i hostility to the Palestinians, it resulted from the Syrian-backed
Shi'i militias having in 1985 launched "the war of the camps," with devastating
results for the Palestinians. It was supposed to ensure a dispersal of the
Palestinian refugees, destruction of the camps, and such a diminution of their
numbers that they would never regain political power or autonomy in Lebanon.(18)
This enmity may explain in part Shi'i respondents' feelings toward Palestinians.
Sunni and Druze respondents seem much more ready to interact with Palestinians,
as indicated by Table 1c.This pattern of responses may be explained by the
history of political conflict in Lebanon. Sunnis expressed a moderate attitude
during the Lebanese civil war, refusing to build a militia or get involved
militarily in the Lebanese conflict. But Israel's eviction of the PLO from
Lebanon in 1982 resulted in a serious decline of Sunni influence in the country,
the first manifestation being the Sunnis' exclusion from the tripartite agreement
of 1985.(19) As for the Druze, in 1976, their leader Kamal Jumblat felt that
the Palestine Liberation Organization's military presence in Lebanon offered
the Druze a rare opportunity to extract political concessions from the Maronite
ruling class. Military and political alliances between Druze and Palestinian
leadership facilitated closer ties between the Druze and Palestinian communities.
On the other hand, the Druze standpoint in the poll probably has to do mainly
with the outcome of the 1983 mountain war, when the Druze alliance with Palestinian
factions proved to be the turning point for the former's victory over the right-wing
Lebanese Forces militia.
II. Integration?
Integrated housing, where different groups live side by side,
is believed to lessen prejudice, compared to segregated housing or the regional
separation of minority groups.(20) Segregated housing results in segregation
in much else. It means, for example, that children go to schools attended largely
or entirely by members of their own group. In Lebanon, Rosemary Sayigh finds
that
evidence from the third generation of refugees in Lebanon indicates marked
discrimination in universities, the work place, and social life, and indicates
the presence of uncrossable boundaries.
Julie Peteet offers an American comparison:
Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a manner reminiscent of turn-of-the
century American hyperbole that immigrants carried tuberculosis. Segregating
Palestinians would facilitate normalization of post-war Lebanon with national
health restored through the isolation of an infectious presence.(21)
The first question regarding residential integration was: "Would you accept
Palestinians to live in your neighborhood?" This question is designed to tap
respondents' perceptions of Palestinians and whether they consider residential
contact a threat because "Palestinians residing in their neighborhood" may
result in tension or hostility. The responses show that 50 percent of the respondents
do not consider living side-by-side with Palestinians a menace, as opposed
to 41 percent who do. By contrast, only one-fifth of respondents "accepted
living in a Palestinian neighborhood." Since violent clashes inside Palestinian
camps are frequently reported, fears of endangering their own life and property
probably explain Lebanese respondents' desire to avoid Palestinian localities.
In the past, refugee camps had been scattered among the different Lebanese
regions, and some like Shatila and Burj al-Brajnat in Beirut, and `Ayn al-Hilwa
in Sidon, had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas. Contacts between the
camp population and Lebanese were frequent and normal. People did not seek
deliberately to avoid contact with Palestinians (as they do today).
The survey also asked, "Do you think that Lebanese and Palestinian students
should go to the same schools or separate schools?" Some 43 percent favored
common schools and 45 percent preferred separate schools. To understand the
findings, one must remember that schools promote the dominant culture of the
society and undermine other cultures. In Palestinian schools, the Palestinian
history of struggles and revolution tends to be preponderant(22) and provides
the means by which a revolutionary consciousness is inculcated. This explains
Christian and Muslim avoidance of the common school, as attested by Table 1d,
since many among them do not identify with the Palestinian cause.
Respondents were also asked "Would you accept a relative of yours marrying
a Palestinian?" One-third said yes; approximately a half said no. While the
percentage saying yes may seem low, it fits into a context in which most people
marry within the same religious faith, and probably within the same sectarian
group; marriages between members of any different Lebanese communities are
infrequent. It is noteworthy that proposals for introducing civil marriage
in 1998 came under scathing attack from all spiritual leaders representing
various Lebanese communities except the Druze sect. Therefore, if one wishes
to marry from outside his religious faith, he would have either to convert
or become a dissident.
The Christians' response to the far more stringent question in Table 1e, the
question of banning intermarriage with a Palestinian, may seem to indicate
religious prejudice. In this case, however, difference in faith is only part
of the story; the long legacy of bloodshed between Christians and Palestinians
undoubtedly contributes greatly to this attitude.
III. Civil War?
The permanent presence of Palestinians in Lebanon worries a
substantial portion of the Lebanese population, especially Christians. In particular,
Lebanese agree that permanently settling Palestinians in their country would
unhinge Lebanon's delicate sociopolitical balance, which is upset by even the
slightest change of one of its components. The Lebanese government's involuntary
acquiescence in the presence of armed Palestinians in the refugee camps exacerbates
this view.(23) The pro-Arafat and Palestinian rejectionists refuse to hand
over their weapons in the absence of a clear understanding with Lebanese authorities
concerning the camps: "Weapons may be needed to cope with particular instances,"(24)
says Shafiq al-Hut, the PLO's former representative in Beirut. Fear and a sense
of equal treatment lead Christians likewise to hold on to arms. The net result:
a high degree of expectation exists that a permanent Palestinian presence would
mean a new civil war, as expressed by 47 percent of the respondents. (See Table
1f.)
Absent a true mobilization and a commitment to strong political parties and
leaders, only a minority of Lebanese are willing to take part in military activities
to prevent the imposition of settlement. However, this does not mean Lebanese
will passively accept Palestinian settlement, as confirmed by the conference
of Lebanese spiritual leaders, in September 1999, which aimed to foil the permanent
settlement of Palestinians. In addition, a range of Lebanese political forces
joined in the call by National Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun for a national
convention to take joint action or necessary non-violent steps to resist settlement.(25)
All six communal groups show a low predisposition toward armed action, something
that has to do in part with the increased jurisdiction assumed by Lebanese
authorities. (See Table 1g.) The Ta`if Accord of 1989 established a modicum
of security in much of the country and Lebanese citizens have grown increasingly
accustomed to the authority of the Lebanese state and are less likely to resort
to violence to resolve conflicts. Within this agreement, however, there are
differences. Most Lebanese Christians see the Palestinians as an infringement
of the country's sovereignty; thus, during the civil war, right-wing Christian
parties were the first to clash with Palestinian guerillas. In contrast, Muslim
Lebanese, and especially the Shi`is, clearly disapprove of violence against
Palestinians, perhaps because they, like the Palestinians, are engaged in a
conflict with Israel.
IV. Political Impact?
Respondents were asked, "As a consequence of Palestinian settlement (in case
Palestinian settlement was imposed) would you continue to support the Ta`if
agreement?" Only 34 percent said yes; 47 percent said no. In 1989, under Arab
sponsorship, Lebanese parliamentary deputies met in Ta`if in Saudi Arabia and
ratified the "Document of National Understanding" or what is commonly known
as the Ta`if agreement. The accord ended fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon
and established internal conditions for peace. The Ta`if accord not only attempts
to achieve intercommunal equilibrium but embraces a consensual, sectarian logic
and dictates procedures that distribute public offices among the various communities,
that provide communities with a veto, and that regulate conflicting sectarian
interests. Basically, although not all parties consented to the accord, its
imposition as a solution in the form of communal contract was made possible
because no party (community) emerged victorious during the war and also because
no community can claim a demographic majority. Maintaining the peace, therefore,
was and is a matter of maintaining a balance of sharing power and of preserving
the rights of communities that view themselves as the bedrock on which the
Lebanese state is constructed.(26)
Under the existing political arrangement, most Christians feel politically
underrepresented, alienated, and excluded both from the government and from
the Christian parties that have accepted the new order while dissenting on
details. In the past, the Palestinization of the country prompted Lebanese
Christians to take up arms and think the unthinkable: an alliance with Israel
and a full commitment to partition. Palestinian settlement would push the Christians
to bring demands for fair, just, and equal representation in the system in
the light of new demographic shifts.(27) It is assumed that Palestinian settlement
would tip the sectarian balance in the country leading to an increased Sunni
population. This would lead to demands for increased political representation
for the Sunni community who would, in a sense, become dominant. In turn, this
could aggravate the situation for other groups.
Sunni respondents, more than any others, seem to accept the legitimacy of
the Ta`if arrangement. The Sunni community recovered some weight in Lebanon,
with the resurgence of the older upper class, the eclipse of the militias,
Maronite misfortunes, and an enhanced role of a Sunni prime minister.
Although the Shi`is won at least on the political level, since they achieved
greater visibility and enlarged participation compared to their marginalized
position in the pre-war period, there are important numbers of them who consider
that the Sunni community has been the major beneficiary from the Ta`if reforms.
They fear that the settlement of the Sunnis' Palestinian coreligionists will
strengthen their political power.
Druze support for the actual political arrangement depends on continuous benefits
in terms of political power and resources. The Druze maintain a political position
beyond their demographic strength. If that position is subject to change, their
preferred option is decentralization, which they experienced in the Shuf Mountain
between 1983 and 1990. (See Table 1h.) Given their small numbers, their second
option is a secular de-confessionalized state where they would be able to gain
an important share in politics.
Implications for Arab-Israeli Diplomacy
The survey results have shown that
permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon triggers wide public
opposition and may pose a threat to the country's security and political stability.
Although not all Lebanese factions consented to the Ta`if agreement, it nevertheless
marked a turning point in the fifteen-year conflict. The accord managed to
reestablish a modicum of security in the country. As a result, Lebanon moved
into a reconstruction phase. Resettling the Palestinians would invite more
Sunni political demands that would threaten Shi`i gains accorded by Ta`if and
also threaten to undermine Maronite power further. The unwillingness of all
Lebanese groups to return to the trauma of the civil war, hopes for a better
future, and worries of what the future might hold--all of these factors seem
to unify the Lebanese in opposition to settlement. Equally, however, the trauma
of the civil war might also explain why only a minority is prepared to resist
militarily if settlement was imposed on the country.
The study also shows that, more than any other group, Druze and Sunni respondents
are ready to accept settlement. This is noteworthy because settlement has long
been seen by many Sunnis--traditionally strong advocates of Arab nationalism--as
an admission of final defeat by Israel. Not all of them appear ready to accept
the loss of an Arab cause that is linked to the repatriation of the refugees.
For Israel, however, whatever the legal and moral merit of the Arab claims
of the "right of return," this will not under any conceivable set of circumstances
be realized. No Israeli government will ever accept changing substantially
the demographic balance of the Jewish state--since the state's very raison
d'etre is its Jewish character. Former prime minister Shimon Peres has voiced
the Israeli position on this point:
a maximalist claim; if accepted, it would wipe out the national character
of the state of Israel, making the Jewish majority into a minority. Consequently,
there is no chance it will be accepted, either now or in the future.(28)
By the same token, Maronite Christian opposition to Palestinian settlement
in Lebanon is openly expressed by Maronite patriarch Cardinal Nasrullah Sfeir
on the basis that it will tip the delicate sectarian balance in the country:
the peace that is being promised may have adverse consequences. If the resettlement
of Palestinians in vast underpopulated Arab countries is not acceptable, then
the effect on a small overpopulated country like Lebanon would be even more
dire.(29)
In line with these popular attitudes, Lebanese officials continue to refuse
settlement and to insist on repatriation. While Israel has refused even to
consider repatriation, Lebanon has made resolving the refugee crisis a precondition
for peace. If the present attitudes hold, they would constitute an obstacle
to the U.S.-brokered negotiations between the Arabs and Israel.
The current negotiating process, which began in Madrid in 1991, addresses
the Palestinian issue in two ways. First, because the matter affects all Arab
states hosting Palestinians, one track of multilateral talks is devoted to
the issue. Secondly, it was placed on the agenda of the "final status" negotiations
between the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis. What most frightens Lebanon
is the likelihood that its own Palestinian population will be neglected in
both tracks of the negotiations. Beirut would like the various peace talks
to provide for the Palestinians' departure, but it doubts that will happen
and it lacks the leverage to accomplish its goal. For example, Lebanon has
no presence in the talks between Israel and Syria that bode to reshape its
neighborhood. Lebanon is absent from the multilateral talks' Refugee Working
Group, chaired by Canada, since that group's main objective is to improve the
conditions of Palestinian refugees without considering their repatriation,
an approach unacceptable to Syria, the main power broker in Lebanon. It has
also withdrawn from the bilateral talks between itself and Israel because Israel's
prime minister Ehud Barak ruled out the return of hundreds of thousands of
refugees to Israel, suggesting instead that "a solution for them should be
found in the countries where they are now living."(30) Beirut has expressed
its complete disagreement and has made the return of the refugees a precondition
for peace with Israel.
An Imposed Settlement
What about the future? Certainly, a number of respondents
do not know whether Palestinians will be repatriated, or settled; they are
nevertheless quick to point out their opposition to the latter. Opposition
to settlement appeared to cut across the religious affiliations of the respondents,
as can be seen from Table 2, and this is the declared position of all political
forces and religious authorities in the country. True, there are slight variations
between Sunni and Christian respondents, particularly the Maronites: the former
leads in support and the latter in opposition. Should some of those giving "unsure" responses
among the Sunnis turn out to support settlement, the Palestinians could well
become a divisive issue in Lebanon's sectarian politics.
Table 2
Greek Greek
Maronites Catholics Orthodox
Are there plans for resettlement?
(N=1,042)(*)
Yes 58 59 58
No 26 26 32
Unsure 16 15 10
Will resettlement be imposed?
(N=1,048)
Yes 66 59 66
No 17 23 16
Unsure 18 18 18
Will you accept resettlement?
(N=1,052)
Yes 4 7 8
No 84 79 73
Unsure 12 14 19
Is your opinion likely to change in the future?
(N=1,049)
Yes 27 30 22
No 60 55 57
Unsure 14 15 20
Sunnis Shi'is Druze
Are there plans for resettlement?
(N=1,042)(*)
Yes 50 61 59
No 37 27 27
Unsure 14 12 14
Will resettlement be imposed?
(N=1,048)
Yes 57 59 75
No 23 28 13
Unsure 21 14 13
Will you accept resettlement?
(N=1,052)
Yes 27 11 15
No 48 74 72
Unsure 26 15 17
Is your opinion likely to change in the future?
(N=1,049)
Yes 32 26 39
No 45 60 52
Unsure 23 13 9 (*) Here and in all tables, "N" equals number of respondents; figures are
in percentages; columns may not add up to 100 because results were rounded
to the nearest whole number.
Table 2 also shows that the regular Lebanese media reports of alleged U.S.,
Canadian, or Israeli support for a Palestinian settlement scheme as part of
the Arab-Israeli negotiations has made an impact. Lebanese respondents appear
aware of these supposed efforts and widely reject such plans. The claim that
foreign plots exist to impose the settlement of Palestinians on Lebanon has
increased worries among Lebanese about the probability that Palestinian refugees
may stay in the country indefinitely.(31) There is a widespread impression
that the future of the Palestinians will be decided by the United States as
the Arab-Israeli peace talks reach a decisive stage.
In fact, U.S. proposals to settle refugees in Arab states have so far proven
unworkable. They were met with official rejection in the case of Jordan's King
Abdullah: "Everybody wants to solve this problem but it will not be at the
expense of Jordan."(32) The Gulf states also rejected the proposals as a potential
danger to political stability.(33) As permanent status negotiations resumed,
the Palestinian Authority has shown no enthusiasm for taking the Palestinians
in Lebanon into a future Palestinian state. Interestingly, like Lebanon, Syria,
and Jordan, the Palestinian Authority considers itself one of the countries
hosting refugees.(34) Arafat prefers to hold onto the Palestinian right of
return in order to keep the pressure on Israel and also because of economic
obstacles facing those who want to relocate to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
One proposed solution to the refugee problem is emigration to Western countries.
In a study involving Palestinian refugees from the Ain Al-Hilwa camp near Sidon,
Hilal Khashan found that 98 percent of the respondents wished to emigrate to
the West.(35) Probably, that would also be the most popular alternative among
the population at large. To date, Canada has offered to absorb 15,000 Palestinians.
Still, there will continue to be a significant Palestinian presence in Lebanon
and some very tentative steps have been taken to address this fact. In October
1992, Lebanese foreign minister Faris Buwayz stated that the permanent settlement
of 50,000-100,000 Palestinians in Lebanon should be viewed as acceptable.(36)
One solution is for a portion of the Palestinian community to have its legal
status normalized through extended Palestinian citizenship coupled with permanent
residency status.(37) The U.S. green card or the French carte de sejour could
serve as a model: full civil and economic rights but not political rights (voting,
office-holding) thus promoting socioeconomic integration without hampering
political stability.
Notes
(1) Steven Edminster, "Trapped on All Sides," The Marginalization of Palestinian
Refugees in Lebanon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999),
p. 14. (2) President Emile Lahud, The Daily Star (Beirut), Apr. 26, 2000.
(3) Palestinians in Lebanon, Report on the Conference Held at Oxford, September
27th to 30th, 1996 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1996), p. 10. Without
a census and with the lack of comprehensive survey, political interests and
motives play a part in the debate over figures.
(4) Julie Peteet, "From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon," Middle
East Report, July-Sept. 1996, p. 29.
(5) Naser Aruri and Samih Farsoun, "Palestinian Communities and Arab Host
Countries," The Sociology of Palestinians, ed. Khalil Nakhle and Elia Zureik
(London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 131-32.
(6) Julie Peteet, "From Refugees to Minority," pp. 28-29.
(7) Rosemary Sayigh, "Palestinians in Lebanon: Uncertain Future," Peace For
Lebanon? From War To Reconstruction, ed. Deidre Collins (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 105-06.
(8) Edminster, "Trapped on All Sides," p. 14.
(9) Rex Brynen, "Palestinian Refugees and The Middle East Peace Process," paper
presented for the New Hampshire International Seminar/Yale Maria Lecture in
Middle Eastern Studies, University of New Hampshire, Apr., 3, 1998, p. 4.
(10) Naser Aruri and Samih Farsoun, "Palestinian Communities and Arab Host
Countries," The Sociology of Palestinians, ed. Khalil Nakhle and Elia Zureik
(London: Groom Helm Ltd., 1980,) pp. 117-120.
(11) Brynen, "Palestinian Refugees," p. 5.
(12) Mideast Mirror (London), Sept. 1, 1999
[Graphic omitted] (13) The Daily Star, Nov. 27, 1999
(14) An-Nahar (Beirut), July 28, 1999.
(15) International Herald Tribune, Dec. 21, 1998.
(16) Morton Weinfeld, draft paper (Miami: Trans-Atlantic Learning Community,
Migration Group, Apr. 1, 1998); The Social Integration of Immigrants and the
Response of Institutions (Toronto: McGill University, Department of Sociology,
1998), p. 2.
(17) Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power,
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 47.
(18) Julie Peteet, "Identity Crisis: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon," Worldwide
Refugee Information (Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999), p.
3.
(19) Agreement signed in Damascus on Apr. 28, 1985, involving the leaders
of Amal (Shi'i), Lebanese Forces (Maronite), and Progressive Socialist Party
(Druze).
(20) G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison Wesley,
1954), pp. 268-69.
(21) Rosemary Sayigh, "Dis/Solving the Refugee Problem," Middle East Report,
Summer 1998, pp. 22-23; Julie Peteet, "Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon: From
Refugees to Minority," Middle East Report, July-Sept. 1996, p. 28.
(22) Khalil Nakhle, "Palestinian Intellectuals and Revolutionary Transformation," The
Sociology of the Palestinians, ed. Khalil Nakhle and Elia Zureik (London; Groom
Helm Ltd., 1980), p. 195.
(23) Hilal Khashan and Simon Haddad , "The Coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese
Tracks: Beirut's Options," Security Dialogue, June 2000, pp. 201-214.
(24) Murr Television (Beirut), Nov. 8, 1999.
(25) Mideast Mirror, Sept. 1, 1999.
(26) Joseph Maila, "The Ta`if Accord: An Evaluation," Peace For Lebanon?,
pp. 31-44.
(27) Naamatullah Abi-Nasr, former president of the Maronite League, "Lebanese
Identity: Between Naturalization and Implantation," conference at the University
of Saint Esprit (Kaslik, Lebanon), Nov. 26, 1999.
(28) Shimon Peres, with Arye Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt,
1993), p. 189.
(29) Al-Hayat, Mar. 13, 2000.
(30) The Economist, Aug. 28, 1999.
(31) An-Nahar, Nov. 9, 1999; International Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 1999.
(32) The Scotsman (Edinburgh), Oct. 7, 1999.
(33) Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Jan. 2000.
(34) As`ad Abd ar-Rahman, chairman of the PLO Refugee Department, news conference,
Ramallah, Feb. 28, 1999.
(35) Hilal Khashan, "The Despairing Palestinians," Journal of South Asian
and Middle Eastern Studies, Fall 1992, p. 16.
(36) L'orient Le Jour (Beirut), Oct. 2, 1992.
(37) Nawaf Salam, "Between Repatriation and Resettlement: Palestinian Refugees
in Lebanon," The Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1994, p. 26.
Appendix: Research Methodology
The study was based on a quota sample of 1,073 Lebanese respondents drawn
from the country's six major religious communities, interviewed in Arabic between
December 5, 1999, and January 25, 2000.
In most respects the sample reflected the important characteristics of the
adult Lebanese population, with the exception of gender and education. The
sample includes 688 male (64 percent) and 385 female respondents (36 percent);
the female number is lower because interviewing women in Lebanon is not an
easy task. Better-educated individuals were deliberately over-represented in
the sample, with 58 percent college-educated, 33 percent who said they completed
secondary education, and 9 percent who completed elementary education. Less-educated
Lebanese generally have a problem in forming political opinions.
The age distribution of the respondents included 40 percent in the category
of 18-25 years, 32 percent in the category of 26-35 years, 18 percent in the
category 36-45 years and 11 percent in the category 46 years and older. The
socioeconomic status of the respondents was 6 percent upper class, 62 percent
middle class, and 32 percent working class. The representation of each confessional
group is, as close as possible, in proportion to its actual size in Lebanon's
population: 29 percent Maronites, 9 percent Greek-Orthodox, 10 percent Greek-Catholics,
27 percent Shi`is, 18 percent Sunnis, and 7 percent Druze.
As a measure of consistency, a pretest was administered to 35 people of varying
ages and socioeconomic backgrounds. They were asked to complete the questionnaire
and give their comments and critiques. Consequently, proper additions, deletions,
and adjustments were made on the final version. In general, respondents attested
that the questions were easily understood.
Respondents were interviewed by individuals of the same religious background
who were instructed to be objective during the administration of the questions
and not to interfere or to attempt to influence the responses. The response
rate, based upon the number of completed interviews, as compared with those
attempted, was 80 percent. In practice, not all selected people were interviewed.
Some refused and others completed only part of the questionnaire.
After the compilation of the data, the "congruence with reality" and "response
bias" tests were applied to the data to ensure the reliability of the responses.
In all of Table 1, the Cramer V value establishes a meaningful association
between the independent variable which is "religious affiliation" and the dependent
variable which is the question, permitting a breakdown by religious affiliation.
Table 2 lacks this statistically meaningful association but the breakdown by
religious affiliation is provided for comparison.
Simon Haddad is lecturer in the political studies and public administration
department at the American University of Beirut.
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