by Simon Haddad

Background
The Palestinian Community in Lebanon
Lebanese Statements on Resettlement
Analysis of the Findings
Attitudes Toward Residential Integration
Attitudes Toward Integrated Education
Intermarriage With Palestinians
Views on Naturalization
Position on Palestinian Civic Rights
Awareness of the issue of Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon
Projection of the Nature of Damaging Repercussions of Palestinian Resettlement
Expected Course of Action Against an Imposed Settlement
Expected Political Impact of Resettlement
Proposed Resumption of the Civil War as a Result of Resettlement
Conclusion and Implications of the Study
References

Background
On the 18th of April 1948 began the Palestinian Refugee Crisis, when several thousands of Palestinians fled their homes and poured into neighboring Arab countries. As Israeli historian Benny Morris noted, along with the establishment of the state of Israel, the refugee problem was the major political consequence of the 1948 war, and became one of the intractable components of the Arab-Israeli conflict.( 1 )

In the early years after the creation of the state of Israel many Palestinians hoped that the international community would come to their rescue and restore their national and natural rights. Their only hope was that Arab states would resolve the problem whether by force or diplomacy. However, the most they were offered were a variety of resettlements schemes that they fiercely rejected, preferring to remain refugees than to give up all claim to their land.( 2 ) The most important piece of international legislation on Palestinian refugees is undoubtedly UN resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the essence of which is to guarantee Palestinian right to return home and to demand compensation.( 3 )  However, since this resolution could not be implemented, UN focus shifted to the humanitarian dimension in an attempt to improve the conditions of Palestinian refugees in the host countries. For this purpose, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was created to assist Palestinian Refugees in the fields of education, work, healthcare and relief.

By the mid-1960's, it was evident that it had little chance of success as it attempted to solve a political problem using an economic approach. The Arab states were not prepared to cooperate on the large-scale development projects originally foreseen by the Agency as a means of alleviating the Palestinians' situation. In 1949, at the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission at Luanne, Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees within the framework of a general settlement. The Arab delegations rejected the offer. In 1952, the UN Refugee Rehabilitation Fund offered the Arab states 200 million USD to find "homes and jobs for the refugees. The Arab states used some of the money for relief work, but did not even apply for the greatest part of the fund. The Arab governments were unwilling to contribute to any plan that could be interpreted as encouraging resettlement.( 4 )  They preferred to hang to their own interpretation of Resolution 194, which they believed would eventually lead to repatriation. Palestinians' only other hope was that the Arab states would resolve the problem, whether by force or diplomacy.

In the prevailing climate of Arab nationalism of the 1950's and 1960's, many Palestinians still believed in the Arab Nationalist ideal and saw the restoration of their homeland-taking place within the broader framework of the unification of the Arab world, chiefly under the leadership of Egypt's President Nasser. The latter had pledged himself to sweep all traces of Zionism, Imperialism and the forces of reaction in the Arab world:( 5 ) 

"The refugees will not return while the flag of Israel flies over the soil of Palestine. They will return when the flag of Palestine is hoisted over Arab Palestine." (Radio Cairo, 19 July 1957)

The Arab States and the Palestinians have traditionally demanded that the refugees be repatriated. The official Israeli position on the other hand, has always been, that there can be no returning of the refugees to Israeli territories, and that the only solution to the problem was their resettlement in the Arab states or elsewhere.( 6 ) 

After the 1967 defeat of the front line Arab regimes, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took advantage of the outcome of the war to assert an increasing political and military role. The 1967 defeat of the front line Arab regimes had, among others, two major implications for the Palestinians: first, approximately 360,000 Palestinians were forced to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Second, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) took advantage of the outcome of the war to assert an increasing political and military role.

In September 1970, the Jordanian government launched an attack known as the Black September against refugee camps in response to Palestinian military activities in Jordan. The result was the relocation of the PLO power base to Lebanon.

The PLO's strong political and military presence in Lebanon during the 1970's often referred to as "Palestinian state within a state" came at the expense of large segments of the Lebanese population. With PLO power nearly broken after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the refugee camps were left without any protection. While the Israeli military campaign succeeded in crushing the PLO in Lebanon, it failed to eliminate Palestinian presence. However, Palestinian social and economic situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate until the present day.

More than a decade after the Gulf War, the position of the Palestinians is worse than ever. The PLO's rash support for Iraq weakened its position. This justified Kuwaiti reprisal against Palestinians with the Palestinian community in Kuwait shrinking from 400,000 in 1990 to some 100,000 in August 1991.( 7 )

The PLO became substantially weaker and isolated in the Arab world. Thus, they were forced to negotiate with Israel culminating with the Oslo Declaration of principles. While Palestinians welcomed the attainment of self-rule and the prospect of a state, the refugees in Lebanon had little reason for rejoicing. In fact, the accords did not mention the 1948 refugees who constituted the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon. The question of the refugees was addressed in two ways; the first through a multilateral working group under Canadian supervision. The second approach to the issue was to include it as an item on the agenda of the "final status" negotiations.

By excluding the refugees, the Oslo Accords revived the issue of resettlement and increased prospects that resettlement would be imposed as a solution by force. The Oslo Accords therefore stirred fear and concern among Lebanese. Resettlement scenarios presented by local and international forces increased these fears and further complicated the situation. The perception behind resettlement schemes is that no final Israeli-Palestinian settlement is possible without a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees.( 8 )  On the other hand, the Canadian government is also suspected to be carrying behind the scenes plans for resettling Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and namely in the Quraï region and in other parts. Preparations to meet this objectives are said to be taking place under the auspices of the Refugee Working Group presided by Canada. Lebanese officials and various parties have expressed their categorical rejection of "implantation" or twain . Some reject resettlement based on their position of solidarity and concern for Palestinian national rights. Others base the rejection on hostility to Palestinians. A third group is concerned with the disruptive impact of resettlement on Lebanese society.

The objective of this study is to examine the views of Lebanese respondents with regard to the issue of resettling Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. In connection with this, the study will explore respondents' views on the following variables related to resettlement: first, the intensity of awareness on the issue of Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon; second, expected position on the optimal political alternative as a result of its imposition; third, expected course of action opposing its imposition; fourth, the likelihood of the resumption of the civil war as a direct repercussion of resettlement. The author proposes that the respondents are well aware of the issue of resettlement, perceive its political impact negatively, oppose its imposition, and they expect the resumption of the civil war as a result of its imposition. They are likely to reject the Tail arrangement and support an alternative form of government.

The Palestinian Community in Lebanon

Socio-economic Situation
There are no definitive figures concerning the number of Palestinians in Lebanon today. Different sources suggest that the actual size of the Palestinian community in Lebanon ranges between 200 and 400 thousand. Without a census and with the lack of comprehensive survey, political interests and motives play a part in the debate over accurate figures.( 9 )

Since their arrival in Lebanon nearly 50 years ago, the experience of Palestinian refugees was one of marginalization, suffering, repression and armed violence. They were considered a threat to the Lebanese people and were treated as second-class citizens. Unlike Palestinian refugees elsewhere, Palestinians in Lebanon have been denied basic social and economic rights for a substantial portion of their 52 years in exile. The Palestinians were kept apart from the Lebanese population, not allowed to assimilate even if they wanted to.

Until the late 1960's, the Lebanese government had at no point in time enacted any legislation governing or guaranteeing Palestinian civil rights. Palestinian refugees were treated the same as foreigners. Travel restrictions were tight, passports rarely given, and the only documents issued by the government were only temporary.

Only a small fraction has been able to acquire Lebanese citizenship. The greatest majority remains stateless; they were treated as foreigners, they have rights of property ownership, investment and employment by permit. Obtaining a work permit remains a complex and lengthy process that offers neither social security nor insurance benefits nor a regular wage increase, and becomes invalid when its holder is laid off the job. Moreover, employment in large institutions is largely closed to Palestinians because it is governed by sectarian rules.( 10 )  Palestinians, however continue to be excluded from more than 72 professions. These restrictions force them to work in the informal sector with low wages, insecurity and no benefits.

With regard to education, Palestinians are excluded from Lebanese governmental educational institutions for higher education. Further, Palestinians are also finding it impossible to enter the government secondary schools.

Restrictions on building and reconstruction in the camps contribute to the insecurity of Palestinians in Lebanon. They continue to live in indecent, semi-destroyed and unfurnished buildings. Rebuilding in the camps has been strictly and legally controlled, with severe overcrowding as a result. Today, between 150,000 and 200,000 Palestinian refugees live in 12 registered refugee camps that are prepared to accommodate 50,000 refugees.( 11 ) The Lebanese state reluctance to absorb the refugees has led to the perpetuation of the refugee camps set in 1948 and 1967.

Political and Military Role
Initially impoverished, fragmented, dispirited, and without adequate leadership to address their concerns, the Palestinian refugee community was quiescent until the mid-1960's. Lebanese political leadership refusal to commit its troops to the June 1967 war enraged many Lebanese Muslims and Syria. In the aftermath of the war, Palestinian guerrillas infiltration from Syria to wage commando raids against Israeli borders prompted severe retaliation. On the other hand, Lebanese army attempts to regulate the Palestinian armed movement in the country was widely opposed by the Muslim and leftist leadership. In November 1969, following a series of clashes between Palestinians and the Lebanese army, the Lebanese government was compelled under internal and external pressures to conclude the Cairo Agreement. The immediate effects of this Accord were to set free the hands of the PLO militarily and to acknowledge many important social rights for the Palestinians such as the right to employment. The PLO assumed the responsibility of managing the affairs of the Palestinian community in the country.

Meanwhile, the PLO was evicted from Jordan, and had their leadership and guerillas main base relocated to Lebanon, where the Cairo Agreement endorsed their presence. The influx of several hundred thousand Palestinians upset Lebanon's delicate confessional balance, and polarized the country into two camps: proponents and opponents of the PLO presence.

Public order deteriorated with daily acts of violence between Christians who opposed Palestinian presence and Palestinians. The military intervention of the Lebanese army bombarding refugee camps prompted the Mel kart Agreement. Under the provisions of this document the Palestinians had been accorded a greater degree of autonomy than some Lebanese citizens. Inspired by this precedence, Lebanese Muslims organized under the leadership of Kamala Jumbled encouraged by the Palestinian tried to wrest similar concession from the central government.

This period of autonomy was brought to an end with the 1982 Israeli invasion that forced the PLO to leave Beirut. The Palestinians in the camps were left as a result at the mercy of Lebanese militias. The only change was that of the common opinion which looked at the Palestinians as responsible for the outbreak of the civil war. Right wing Lebanese Forces militiamen were quick to seize the opportunity. With the supervision of the Israeli Army they massacred 2,000 Palestinians in Sara and Sheila camps.( 12 )  

However, these incidents did not prevent the resurgence of Palestinian political and military presence in 1984, threatening this time the powerful position the Shies and Amal had established for themselves in post 1982 Lebanon. Originally hostile to PLO operations in 1970's, Amal was encouraged by Syria to turn its attention to the Palestinians in the camps of Sara, Sheila, and Bur Al-Baronet. They suspected an Israeli-US plot being implemented by Gasser Arafat to restore the anomalous state of affairs that previously existed prior to 1982. Heavy fighting erupted between the two parties in 1985 which was labeled the "wars of the camps." The clashes resulting in heavy casualties were brought to an end with the deployment of Syrian troops in Beirut. Nevertheless, the Palestinians managed to maintain control over the camps.

In July 1991, Lebanese Army units clashed with Palestinians in Southern Lebanon camps of Rawhide and Mieh-Mieh. The troops were executing a government order to disband Palestinian Pro-Arafat militias. Over 60 people were killed, 150 were wounded and 450 Palestinians were taken prisoners. The PLO accepted to hand over their heavy weapons in exchange for the army stopping the surrounding of the camps and allowing for a "serious political dialogue" concerning Palestinian civil rights, but not political ones.( 13 )

In 1994, the mass granting of citizenship to some 400,000 people by the Lebanese government served to renew the internal debate concerning the Palestinian refugees. Opponents argue that it did not fit nationality requirement and that there were many undeserving cases. Among the accusations, is that Lebanese citizenship was granted to 25,000 Palestinians and possibly to a larger number. They also maintained that it tipped the country's sectarian balance with the clear complications that political structures based on equality are being lined up for review and alteration to the disadvantage of Christian groups and to the Maronites in particular. In connection with the naturalization decree, official attempts at correcting the confessional balance with the naturalization of some 50,000 people (most of them were Christians) were countered by the Maronite Church opposition and threats to mobilize the masses.( 14 )  It is in the midst of this heightened atmosphere that the controversial issue of Palestinian resettlement is being discussed.

Lebanese
What frightens Lebanon most is while Syria and Israel enter peace talks that could reshape the region is whether Lebanon's interests and the lingering problem of Palestinian refugees on its territory will be forgotten at the negotiation table.( 15 )

Lebanon would like the peace talks to provide for the Palestinian departure, but it has real concerns about whether that will happen and lacks leverage to accomplish the goal. The Lebanese government has insisted several times lately that Palestinian refugees will not be allowed to stay in Lebanon.

Beirut constantly repeats the 1998 mantra of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri "Lebanon will never, ever integrate the Palestinians." They will not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would take the Palestinians off the international agency that has supported them since 1948.

On the pretext of "rejecting the naturalization of the refugees and their permanent settlement Palestinians" Lebanon continues to deny them their basic rights. In the absence of a definite plan to deal with this crucial issue, Lebanon has refused to participate in the multi-lateral meetings entrusted with the examination of the Palestinian problem and is, consequently, absent from the negotiations.

Lebanese Politicians have always suspected Canada's involvement in an attempt to settle permanently Palestinians in Lebanon. In 1998, Lebanese newspapers exposed information related to "implanting" up to 200,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. This could be done only after weakening Christian political opposition and aggravating the economic crisis in the country to ease the implementation of the plan.( 16 )

Chamber of Deputies Speaker Nabih Berri fears Israel's plan to force the assimilation of Palestinians in their host countries, particularly in Lebanon with the help of the Canadian government: "Canada is part of a conspiracy against the Lebanese and Palestinian people and responsible for resettling Palestinians at the expense of Lebanon and Palestine".( 17 )

Canadian officials have regularly denied the existence of "secret plans relating to the fate of the Palestinians in Lebanon. "There is no hidden plan, nor secret scheme, nor was there ever." ( 18 )

The Lebanese government insists on the "repatriation of Palestinian refugees," or anything that will remove the non-citizen Palestinian population in the country. This is due both to sectarian politics and the legacies of past conflict. The Palestinian's great contribution to Lebanese national post-taïf reconciliation has been that "they have taken all the blame for the civil war."

Recent statements by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had ruled out the return of hundred thousands of refugees to Israel. "I don't think there are any circumstances under which they will be able to return to Israel, a solution for them should be found in the countries where they are now living". But Lebanon has expressed its complete disagreement. It has made the return of the refugees a precondition for peace with Israel. Lebanon President Emile Lahoud stressed "our position is that we insist on an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and the Golan Heights and a guarantee of the right of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to return home."

In reply to Barak's statements, Prime Minister Selim Al-Hoss declared, "Lebanon categorically rejects his statements and insists on having its say regarding the fate of the refugees. We will not allow others to decide their fate because we are directly involved."( 19 )

Speaking before the UN General Assembly Hoss cautioned the international community that peace cannot exist in the Middle East if the Palestinian refugees are allowed to stay in Lebanon. "Installation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is rejected both by the Palestinians and the Lebanese. It would represent a potentially tenuous situation that would put the security and stability of the Middle East in peril." ( 20 )

Lebanese unanimous rejection of Palestinian implantation in Lebanon is reflected in the country's constitution, which states that there will be "no partition and no implantation." The State's position emanates from Lebanon's worries of the disruptive effect on the country's sectarian sensitive mosaic and upsetting its demographic structure. Politicians and important popular figures suspect it as an Israeli plan whose objective is to cause the disintegration of the Lebanese State.( 21 )

Hoss comments were intended to allay right wing Christian fears that a resettlement of the predominantly Muslim Palestinians would upset Lebanon's delicate sectarian balance. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir openly expressed these fears. "The peace that is being promised may have adverse consequences. If the resettlement of Palestinians in vast under-populated Arab countries is not acceptable then the effects on a small highly over-populated country like Lebanon would be even more dire," he said during a sermon. Elsewhere, Sfeir added, "Lebanon has suffered for 25 years because of Palestinian presence and today we hear rumors that the past situation is likely to be recreated . the memory of the Cairo Agreement and Fathland are still alive."( 23 )  For Sfeir, the issue of the Palestinian refugees in the country is hampering Lebanon's peace and tranquility.

Hoss position seems to find a wide backing by other politicians of different religious and political backgrounds. As early as 1997, Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri categorically rejected resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon . a stand not subject to any discussion or compromise.  "We are all, as Lebanese, against permanent resettlement, and no one can accept this disaster, this question is categorically rejected by all parties in Lebanon." MP Ahmed Karami declared.( 24 )  While the foreign media have been suggesting that resettlement is going to be imposed on the Lebanese we think that the Lebanese people because of their unity and solidarity can stop any resettlement plan" he added. Others like MP Kamil Ziadé consider that Lebanon will refute "the implantation of Palestinians" because of its economic and demographic repercussions.

Christians consider that resettling the Palestinians permanently is beyond the capacity of Lebanon to absorb. It may threaten its very existence by endangering its natural unity and economy. Many advance the argument that Lebanon stands among the countries with the highest population density and the least resources and wealth.( 25 )  They emphasize that Lebanon is a country of emigration and not immigration and settlement, losing people as a result of war and the bad economy. The chaotic naturalization of transient residents in addition to the settling of Palestinian refugees would increase Lebanon's population by 25%. No country can absorb that demographic change.

Sample
The study was based on a stratified random sample of 1,073 Lebanese respondents and was carried out during the period December (1999) to January (2000). The sample includes 385 female respondents (36%) although interviewing women in any part of the Arab World is not an easy task. Respondents from the six major Lebanese religious groups drawn from the different Lebanese regions were interviewed. An effort was made to reflect the expected representation of each confessional group in proportion to their actual size in Lebanon's population as nearly as possible.( 26 )

The response rate based upon the number of completed interviews, as compared with those attempted was 80 percent. In most essential respects the sample reflected the most important characteristics of the Lebanese population over the age of 18.( 27 )  The only demographic feature that differs from the population is education, with better-educated individuals being over represented in the sample.( 28 )

Analysis of the Findings

Table 1: Perception of Palestinians (N=716)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.22
Alpha = 0.05

The questions included in this part are believed to have a direct impact on "The Resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon". The literature or refugees stresses the distinction between voluntary immigrants (who choose to migrate) and refugees (who were forced to migrate). However, this supposed voluntary/involuntary divide doesn't apply to the status of Palestinians who have been living in Lebanon for more than 50 years. Instead, the questions in this part explore the different dimensions and practices that facilitate or hamper social and civic integration of Palestinians in a manner that minimizes or increases adverse impact on Lebanese population and measure the potentials for community tensions. ( 29 )

Table 2: What is your most important contact with "Palestinians"? (N=1,047)

Measures of inter-group perceptions and tolerance of Palestinians are being discussed in this part. They constitute a first step in the integration process of immigrants or refugees in any society.

The thermometer scale was employed for the purpose of obtaining a high level of accuracy in measuring the intensity of inter-group perceptions of Palestinians. The attitudes shown in table 1 suggest strong lack of warmth toward Palestinians with the exception of Sunnis and Druze respondents. The pattern of responses could be explained in relation to the nature of political conflict in Lebanon. While Palestinians are continuously portrayed as "trouble-makers" and are blamed for their role in the Lebanese civil war, Christian and Shii groups regard them as a potential political threat. Maronite vision of Lebanon as a Christian homeland where the Maronite community assumes a "privileged position" is endangered by Palestinian presence on Lebanese soil. Maronites always adopted a hostile standpoint from the Palestinian resistance, for their exploitation of the internal contradictions of Lebanese society to their own ends. Christians, unlike Muslim groups, seem to perpetuate a negative image of the Palestinian people in the post-civil war period. During the civil war, Palestinian refugees were themselves often targets for violence. First they where attacked by Christian right wing militias in 1982 in Sabra and Shatila camps. And later on, the "war of the camps" initiated by Syrian backed Shiite-Amal militias had devastating results on the Palestinians. While it occurred in the latter half of the 1980's, this war was supposed to ensure a dispersal of the refugees, the destruction of the camps, and such a diminishment of their number so that they would never regain political power or autonomy in Lebanon.( 30 )  This explains in part Shiis respondents' misperceptions of Palestinians.

Table 2 suggests that personal contacts between respondents and Palestinians are very limited. Two third of the respondents disclaimed any relations with Palestinians, while most of those who reported an association spoke only in terms of simple friendship. Other areas of contact included occupational, residential, civic and political contacts, all of which were narrow in scope.

Table 3: Relationships Between Religious Backgrounds and Most Important Personal Contact With Palestinians?

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.15
Alpha = 0.05

Table 4: Intensity of Inter-group Interaction With Palestinians (N=872)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.23
Alpha = 0.05

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the relationships between the religious background of the respondents and the propensity for inter-group contract. Sunnis respondents reported frequent contacts with members of the Palestinian community more than any other Lebanese group. This finding is confirmed in Table 4 where Sunnis and Druze respondents manifest highly positive propensity for interacting comfortably with Palestinians. During the Lebanese civil war, the Sunnis have expressed a moderate attitude refusing to build a militia and to get involved militarily in the Lebanese conflict. Instead, they allied themselves with the Palestinians with an aim of reforming the Lebanese political system but without any success. Ever since the tripartite agreement in 1985 the Sunnis were excluded and became marginalized in the Lebanese political scene. In 1976, Kamal Jumblat, Druze leader of the Lebanese National Movement and an important segment of the Muslim elite felt that the PLO's military presence in Lebanon offered them a rare opportunity to extract significant political concession from the Maronite ruling state.

On the other hand, Druze standpoint has to do mainly with the outcome of the 1983 mountain war when their successful alliance with Palestinian factions proved to be the turning point for Druze victory over the right wing Lebanese Forces militia.

As might be expected, Christian respondents reported infrequent personal contact with Palestinians.

Attitudes Toward Residential Integration
The questions included in this part aim at measuring patterns of residential integration or segregation. The dimension of social interaction between Palestinians and their host population is conceived as an accurate measure of integration if resettlement is to occur. Integrated housing, where different groups live side by side is believed to lessen prejudice as compared with segregated housing or regional separation of minority groups. Segregated housing, whether coerced or voluntary, means segregation in much else. It means foremost that children will go to schools attended largely or entirely by members of their own group. Rosemary Sayigh suggests that evidence from the third generation of refugees in Lebanon indicates marked discrimination in universities, the work place and social life, and indicates the presence of uncrossable boundaries. Based on the 1992 FAO Survey, Sayigh asserts the presence of "signs of the tenacity of refugee/non-refugee boundaries." ( 31 )

According to Sayigh "Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a manner reminiscent of turn-of-the century American hyperbole that immigrants carried tuberculosis. Segregating Palestinian would facilitate normalization of post-war Lebanon with national health restored through the isolation of an infection presence."

Table 5: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Palestinian Neighborhood (N=1,065)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.13
Alpha = 0.05

Table 6: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Living in a Palestinian Neighborhood (N=1,060)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.21
Alpha = 0.05

On the first question, Lebanese respondents were divided. While the results excluded the presence of a pre-determined negative attitude toward residential contact with Palestinians, they serve to show that 50 percent of the respondents, in contrast to 41 percent, do not see living side by side with Palestinians as a menace.

Lebanese visibility of Palestinians is reduced also due to past-civil war history of living together. Refugee camps had been scattered among the different Lebanese regions and some like Shatila and Bourj Al-Branch Beirut, and Ain Al-Helweh in Saida, had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas.

However, only 20 percent of the respondents manifested willingness to live in Palestinian neighborhoods in contrast to 71 percent who manifest avoidance of Palestinian localities. Among the different sects, only one-third of Sunni and Druze respondents manifested willingness to living in Palestinian neighborhood. Inside Palestinian camps, violent clashes are frequently reported. Probably fear of endangering their own life and property explains Lebanese respondents negative stance.

Attitudes Toward Integrated Education
The patterns of the responses displayed by Lebanese respondents show that they are divided on this issue. While 43 percent do not object Palestinian students attending same schools and colleges, (as opposed to 45 percent), with Lebanese students, only 30 percent are willing, (in contrast o 63 percent) do not object sending their children to Palestinian schools. The bivariate analysis ascertain that Muslim groups manifest greater readiness to accept both propositions. In an attempt to justify Christian hesitation whether in welcoming Palestinian students or sending their students to Palestinian schools, the cultural component should be considered. In theory, schools, at every level, are likely to promote the dominant culture of the society in consideration and to undermine all others.

The Palestinian struggle for self-determination and liberation was upheld by Palestinian intellectuals. Formal education provides only the means for pursuing a revolutionary consciousness of liberation. While in Lebanese schools and colleges, teachers may reluctantly tell something about Palestine, in Palestinian schools, Palestinian history of struggles and revolution tend to be preponderant.( 32 )  This could explain Christian avoidance of the latter type.

Table 7: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Lebanese Students Attending Same Schools (N=1,050)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.23
Alpha = 0.05

Table 8: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Sending Students to Palestinian Schools (N=1,061)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.21
Alpha = 0.05

Intermarriage With Palestinians

Table 9: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Accepting Relative Marrying Palestinians (N=1,058)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.19
Alpha = 0.05

The findings suggest that 28% of the respondents do not object intermarriage with Palestinians while 27% are unsure. However, a large minority (45%) expressed their opposition. While the percentage of respondents supporting marriages with Palestinians may seem relatively low, it is in fact acceptable when taken in the Lebanese social context. Marriages between members of Lebanese communities are infrequent in practice. While civil marriages are infrequent in Lebanese society, most people are accustomized to marrying within the same religious faith and probably the same sectarian group. The fact that Armenians are until today not well integrated in Lebanese society enhances this proposition.

Table 10: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Government Banning Intermarriages (N=1,059)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.19
Alpha = 0.05

While only one fifth support the proposition (21%), a two-third majority of the respondents objected to the government banning intermarriages. In fact, this question, if supported, would have enhanced the accusations of Lebanese displaying prejudice against Palestinians, the results disclaimed this possibility. However, Christian groups inclination to sustain this hypothesis is explained on different grounds. While difference in faith should be considered, a long history of bloodshed between Christians and Palestinians could not be kept a part for many of them.

Views on Naturalization
An estimated 400,000 people were granted citizenship as a result of the 1994 decree, which the Maronite League opposed on the basis that it granted citizenship to undeserving applicants: the decree was at the time opposed by Lebanese from all faiths by the same token. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir railed to block attempts to enact a new controversial decree.

Only 4 percent of the respondents felt that the Nationalization Decree was appropriate. In contrast 41 percent said it was too rigid and 55 percent that it should be ceased.

Greek-Catholic and Greek-Orthodox respondents seem to side with the Maronites on this particular proposal. The Malachite Bishop of Zahlé, an overwhelmingly Catholic concentrated region, claimed that the government was encouraging 50,000 Christians from Syria, Jordan and other countries to apply for citizenship even though they had no intention in living in Lebanon and therefore would be of no benefit to the country or its economy. Their usefulness, if the plan is a serious proposition, would be as a make weight for the numbers gone.( 33 )

As to the major deficiency in the naturalization decree a substantial majority felt that Lebanon's national interest was not guaranteed in the decree. In contrast, only 18 percent of the respondents felt that the alleged naturalization of few Palestinians was the deficiency. On the other hand, only 17 percent of the respondents seem to attribute the major deficiency in the Naturalization decree to its exclusion of Lebanese emigrant citizenship right. For years there have been arguments, mainly from Christian politicians that Lebanese emigrants should be able to vote in elections through the embassies of their countries. At present citizens residing abroad must return to Lebanon to cast their votes. The aim was to preserve the estimated balance of the population.

Compared to the results depicted by the 1994 study, respondents of all sects seem to maintain an increasingly negative attitude from the 1994 naturalization decree. The pattern of the responses could be explained by reference to several factors:

1. Analysts and politicians have increasingly focused on the negative aspects of the "naturalization" decree. For this purpose, several conferences were held to discuss the implications of the 1994 decree on Lebanon. While all participants in these meeting agree on the adverse repercussions of naturalization, they also have used this question to discredit the previous government responsible for its enactment.

2. The medias have extensively portrayed the Palestinian refugee presence "as a time bomb expected to detonate any time causing the disintegration of Lebanese society.

3. Actual Official Lebanese statements serve to mobilizing the public against attempts at naturalization.

4. President Hrawi's intention, towards the end of his mandate, to enact a supplement to the 1994 decree and the wide opposition and antagonism it created.

5. Interior Minister Michel Al-Murr said a new clause has been added to the naturalization draft law to prevent Palestinians from gaining citizenship. This change is intended to quell the fears of some groups such as the Maronite League," Murr said. Barak's statement raise fears in Lebanon that they will have to pay the price for a regional settlement. ( 34 )

Position on Palestinian Civic Rights
The official policy of the Lebanese government falls actually within the framework to stimulate Palestinian emigration from Lebanon to end with the lightest possible Palestinian demographic and political burden.

An overwhelming majority of the respondents (68%) agreed that Palestinians in Lebanon should be entitled to some or most social and economic rights. Conversely, only a slight minority (8%) and one-fourth of the respondents felt that Palestinians should be eligible to citizenship or to no rights at all respectively.

Christian groups were more reluctant to acknowledge Palestinian rights. The sectarian structure of the Lebanese political system in which Christian Maronites were dominant in the past prevented the acceptance of Palestinians into Lebanese society. This continued to be the rule even after Maronite dominance was greatly reduced by the end of the civil war. Those who insist on denying Palestinians their most essential rights justify their attitude on the basis of refusing resettlement. In all, the majority of respondents seem to accept the idea of granting Palestinian social rights and to have put behind sectarian attitudes behind. On this point, they seem to disagree with the Lebanese official unjustified standpoint.

Table 11: Relationship Between Religious Background and Granting Palestinians Basic Rights (N=946)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.19
Alpha = 0.05

Awareness of the issue of Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon
Compared to the findings of the study conducted by Khashan( 35 )  in 1994, the results confirm the growing feeling among Lebanese of conspirational plans aiming at imposing resettlement. Interestingly only 12% (as compared to 11% in 1994) are willing to accept resettlement in case of its occurrence. Rejection of resettlement under the pretext of a conspiracy against the Lebanese republic is not only the official banner but also the declared position of all political forces and religious authorities.

The percentage of "unsure" respondents to the questions "whether there are plans for resettlement" and "whether resettlement will be imposed" has dropped to 14 percent and 17% in contrast to 40 and 53 percent in 1994.

Lebanese media determination to disseminate proposed resettlement schemes related to the peace negotiations and US, Canadian and Israeli alleged support for such proposal contribute further to enhancing Lebanon's worries.

Table 12

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Members of the International community have taken positions that enhance Lebanon's suspicion. France and the US have advised the Lebanese officials to cease their public statements on the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees and to take a more logical stand in order to find a real solution for this humanitarian and security problem. Accordingly, this issue cannot be resolved outside the bilateral talks between Lebanon and Israel and without the intervention of great powers. "Insisting on refusing resettlement is not a practical solution. The Palestinians will not be repatriated but this doesn't mean they will be nationalized . other alternatives will be considered." ( 36 )

Lebanese newspapers have been emphasizing their government's worries concerning the 360,000 Palestinian refugees in the country. The probability that they may be allowed to stay indefinitely has increased Lebanese suspicions. ( 37 )

Projection of the Nature of Damaging Repercussions of Palestinian Resettlement

Table 13

On average, 75 percent of the respondents acknowledge that resettlement will have a disruptive effect on Lebanon socio-political sensitive balance. This balance is upset even by the slightest change of one of its components. The permanent presence of Palestinians in Lebanon continues to worry a substantial portion of the Lebanese population.

The second worry was economic; it was mentioned by 17 percent of those who responded to the question. Opponents of Palestinian resettlement have always justified their position on economic basis. Lebanon suffers actually from a chronic social and economic crisis. According to the data provided by the UN survey, 41 percent of Lebanese adult population has expressed willingness to emigrate from the country. In fact, 22 percent said they have already applied for emigration. One major cause was said to be unemployment has reached 27 percent.( 38 )

Expected Course of Action Against an Imposed Settlement

Table 14: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and expected course of action (N=1,008)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.16
Alpha = 0.05

Judgments about which activities were considered legitimate and effective in reaction to resettlement varied markedly. Nearly three of ten (28%) people believed their group should "do nothing" and more than five in ten (53%) approved of non-violent protest. Military resistance, in sharp contrast, was regarded as effective by only one-fifth of the respondents (19%). Thus, although their course of political action extends well beyond acquiescing to "imposed resettlement," an overwhelming majority of the Lebanese draws a line when it comes to disruptive and violent confrontation. The bivariate analysis indicates that Christian groups are more likely to be military active than their Muslim counterparts. Among Lebanese groups, Christians have always considered Palestinian presence in Lebanon and PLO's behavior an infringement of the country's sovereignty. During the civil war the right-wing parties (Kataeb, NLP) were the first to engage in military confrontations with armed Palestinian movements. Actually, only a minority (25%) is willing to engage in such activities in the absence of real mobilization and commitment to strong political parties and leaders. In post-war Lebanon, Christian parties were not able to assume any important role whether in public life or at the community level. However, it would be no easy thing to accept resettlement. This is confirmed by the planned conference of Lebanese spiritual leaders of all denomination that aims to foil the resettlement of Palestinians, and also by a wide variety of Lebanese political forces for the call made by National Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun for a national convention to resist resettlement. ( 39 )

The Muslims for their part, and especially the Shiis, who form the core of the resistance movements against Israeli Army in the South, manifest clear disapproval of the use of violence against Palestinians. How can they justify their fiercefull struggle which has been going on for 17 years against the Israeli enemy by confronting the Palestinians? In general, all six group low predisposition toward armed action has to do partly with the increased jurisdiction assumed by Lebanese authorities. Almost eleven years after the implementation of the Taïf Accord that terminated the state of war in the country, Lebanese citizens have been more and more accustomed to the prevailing authority of the Lebanese State and to dismiss more and more resorting to weapons for solving conflicts.

Expected Political Impact of Resettlement
The findings demonstrate that while only 34 percent expressed their support 47 percent of the respondents oppose living under the existing political system as laid down by the Taïf Accord if resettlement is imposed on Lebanon. Conversely, as few as 19 percent were undecided on the political outcome of resettlement.

As a result of Palestinian resettlement Lebanese communities start expressing their dissatisfaction with the existing political arrangement. Most Christians rejected the Taïf regime as they felt politically underrepresented, alienated and excluded both from Christian participants in government and from Christian parties, which had accepted the new order but dissented on details. They have already lost their supremacy and Palestinian resettlement will contribute to undermining their position further. Their preferred option is clearly decentralization which they have been experiencing and putting forward since 1975 as their best "projected solution" for the Lebanese conflict. While the Taïf Agreement calls for administrative reorganization on the basis of geography or decentralization, this part was disregarded in practice by successive Lebanese governments.

Sunni respondents seem to accept more than any other group the legitimacy of the Taïf arrangement. The Sunni community recovered some weight in Taïf Lebanon, with the resurgence of the older upper class, the eclipse of militias, Maronite misfortunes and an enhanced role of Sunni Prime Minister.

Despite their rising power under the Taïf System, the Shii feel "cheated" by the arrangement. Although winners, at least on the political level, since they achieved greater visibility and enlarged participation composed to their marginalized position in the pre-war period. However, there are important numbers of Shiis that are less supportive to the existing government in the event of Palestinian resettlement in the country. They already consider that the Taïf reforms have given too much power to the Sunnis. Palestinians would contribute further to the enhancing Sunni political position. Shii would then prefer an alternative political arrangement where they would retain their privileged. The resettlement of their Palestinian coreligionist is expected to strengthen their political power. For those who reject the Taïf distribution of offices, the alternative would be a political system where the actual allocation of top political position is reversed in favor of the Sunnis. Surprisingly, neither Sunni nor Shiis respondents displayed any considerable preference for a religious (Islamic) state as an alternative.

Druze support for the actual political arrangement depends on continuous benefits in term of political power and resources. Actually the Druze are assuming a political position beyond their demographic strength. In case this equation is subjected to change they would opt for their preferred option, decentralization which they experienced in the Shuff mountain (1983-1990). Their second preference is a secular political system and the abolition of confessionalism from politics. Given their small number, they always preferred to carry a secular objective in order to gain an important share in Lebanon's political life.

Table 15: Relationship Between Attitude Toward Taïf and Religious Affiliation (N=1,046)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.2
Alpha = 0.05

Table 16: Relationship Between Religious Background and Alternative Political Solution (N=659)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.23
Alpha = 0.05

Proposed Resumption of the Civil War as a Result of Resettlement

Table 17: Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Proposed Resumption of Civil War (N=1,057)

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Cramer's V = 0.28
Alpha = 0.05

A large minority of Lebanese respondents (48%) believes that resettling the Palestinians would cause the eruption of a civil war. In contrast to one-third of the respondents who dismissed that possibility.

Many Lebanese blame the Palestinians for providing the fuel for the civil war that laid waste to Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. And while they are reluctant to recall the murderous fighting that went on between Lebanese militias, they are quick to point fingers at the Palestinians, whose cross border attacks on Northern Israel prompted the Israeli to invade Lebanon in 1982. Today, Palestinian camps remain political and military "ghettos," with several hundred armed men belonging to different Palestinian factions. The situation is complicated further in light of the recession of Syrian-Israeli talks. Syria, who assumes full hegemony over Lebanese public life and political decision-making, supports the maintaining of Palestinian armed presence as part of their strategy. Undoubtedly, the Syrians would choose to reactivate the Lebanese-Israeli front, in the event of the failure of the peace talks, through their pro-Syrian Palestinian fighters in the camps. In connection with Syrian strategy, the Lebanese government finds itself compelled to acquiesce to unabated armed Palestinian presence in refugee camps which reenacts the civil war day.( 40 )  The pro-Arafat Palestinians for their part, refuse to hand out their weapons in the absence of a clear understanding with Lebanese authorities concerning the camps: "Weapons may be needed to cope with particular instances" according to Chafic Al Hout ( 41 ),  The former representative of the PLO in Beirut.

The bivariate analysis demonstrates a tendency among Christian respondents to expect the resumption of the civil war. The Palestinization of the country in the past prompted them to take up arms and to think of the unthinkable: an alliance with Israel and a full commitment to partition. Today Lebanese Christians are thinking, out of fear and on the basis of equal treatment to all, to keep their arms. Palestinian resettlement will push Christian political position to bring demands for fair, just and equal representation in the system and in the light of new demographic shifts. ( 42 )

Conclusion and Implications of the Study
The study has shown that the issue of Palestinian resettlement triggers wide opposition among Lebanese. Opposition stems from all Lebanese groups to "resettling the Palestinians" in the sense of granting them citizenship and political rights and in the sense of massive naturalization. On the other hand, the other aspect of resettlement, related to granting Palestinians their civic rights is welcomed by the majority of Lebanese. While the country's constitution, government officials, spiritual leaders and the mass medias outright rejection of resettlement is based on the first definition in the constitution nowhere is stated that Palestinian social and economic rights are to be denied. On the contrary granting Palestinians their civic rights would serve to alleviate their socio-economic situation in Lebanon and reduce the country's economic problem.

Accordingly, allowing Palestinians to improve their social and economic situation would not be only conform to the Lebanese democratic tradition but would enable Palestinians to assume the stand of a community in the Diaspora, like any other Arab community in Lebanon. The Lebanese government would be able to correct the anomalous situation of the Palestinians with its corresponding restrictions without considering this step a move towards indirect resettlement. ( 43 )

The other dimension of the problem is related to the disruptive impact of resettlement, namely the demographic, economic, political and historical reasons and consequences. According to the Raghid Solh,( 44 ) "most of those who reject resettlement dwell on the demographic impact on Lebanese society". The resettling of Palestinians who are Sunni Muslims in their majority would disturb the delicate balance between religious groups. This was confirmed by the survey. The economic impact of resettlement was only stressed by a minority of the respondents. As for those who stress the political and historical reason for rejecting resettlement they emphasize the link between the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon and the wars and troubles it has been through. They see in Palestinian armed presence a dangerous impetus for another civil war.

While the majority of Christians would seek, in case resettlement was imposed, an alternative political arrangement than the existing one, the Sunnis and the Druze seem the least affected by Palestinian resettlement.

In fact, Druze leader Walid Jumblat had suggested back in 1994 that several thousand Palestinians thrown out of East Beirut be resettled in a deserted village on the southern margin of the Shuff; i.e., Quraï. Jumblat received backing from Hariri, who shared his opinion about the impracticality of expelling Palestinians from the country.( 45 )  While this proposal expressed a common Druze-Sunni interest; Which seems to be confirmed by the findings since Sunni and Druze respondents appear to be more hospitable and open to the idea of resettlement than any other group. Conversely, the vast majority of Christians displayed a high propensity for rejecting resettlement more than other Lebanese groups.

The future of the Palestinian community in Lebanon seems to be lying somewhere between "integration" and "conflict." Most of the Lebanese groups do not object granting them basic social and economic rights such as the right to employment, public education, health but many also fear the political and demographic repercussion of resettling them permanently on the sensitive sectarian balance. While their fate hangs to an unresolved process of negotiations, the Palestinian resettlement issue in Lebanon continues to fuel the debate.

References

1 ) Robert I. Friedman. Zealots for Zion . New York: Random House, Inc., 1992, p. 197.

2 ) Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk Sluglett. The Times Guide to the Middle East . London: Times Books, 1991, p. 210.

3 ) Nur Masallah. The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Israeli Plans to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees 1948-1972 . Ramallah: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Center [shaml], 1996.

4 ) Martin Gilbert. The Arab-Israeli Conflict . London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992, p. 54.

5 ) Ibid , p. 54.

6 ) Masallah. Op. Cit.

7 ) Sluglett and Sluglett. Op. Cit. , p. 222.

8 ) According to the Mideast Mirror , October 13, 1999, and to Al-Nahar , 9 November 1999, American officials have raised a number of proposals involving the transfer of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to other countries. The region (Iraq, Gulf States and Jordan). If none of these plans work out, American officials will seek reluctantly to arrange the naturalization of most refugees in Lebanon.

9 ) Palestinians in Lebanon . Conference Report. Report on the Conference held at Oxford from 27 th to 30 th September 1996. Center for Lebanese Studies.

10 ) Naser H. Aruri and Samih Farsoun. "Palestinian Communities and Arab Host Countries." The Sociology of Palestinians . Ed. Khalil Nakhlé and Elia Zureik. London: Groom Helm Ltd, 1980, pp. 131-132.

11 ) Steven Edminister. "Trapped on All Sides." The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon . Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees Publication, 1999.

12 ) Charles Winslow. Lebanon: War and Politics in Fragmented Society . London and New York: Routledge, 1996;

Robert Fisk. Pity the Nation . London: Andre Deutsche, Ltd., for the war period 1975-1989.

13 ) Edgar O'Balance. Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992 . Great Britain, London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1998, p. 212.

14 ) Daily Star . November 28, 1998.

15 ) Herald Tribune . December 13, 1999.

16 ) Al-Nahar . September 28, 1998.

17 ) Al-Nahar . November 27, 1994.

18 ) Daily Star . July 8, 1998.

19 ) Al-Nahar . August 16, 1999.

20 ) Al-Nahar . September 24, 1999.

21 ) Michel Edde. Speech held by former minister on at the Université Saint Joseph. November 26, 1999.

22 ) Al-Hayat . March 13, 2000.

23 ) Al-Nahar . February 12, 1997.

24 ) Al-Nahar . July 29, 1999.

25 ) Naamatallah Abi-Nasr. Conference on the "Palestinians in Lebanon: Between Naturalization and Resettlement," University of Kaslik, December 1999.

26 ) The religious groups were represented according to the following order: 29% Maronites, 9% Greek-Orthodox, 10% Greek-Catholics, 27% Shiis, 18% Sunnis and 7% Druze.

27 ) The age distribution of the respondents included 40% in the category of 18-25 years, 32% in the category of 26-35 years, 18% in the category 36-45 years and 11% in the category 46 years and older. The socio-economic status of the respondents was also mixed since it included 6% upper class, 62% middle class and 32% working class respondents.

28 ) Educationally 9% of the respondents completed elementary education, 33% said they had completed secondary education and 58% received college education.

29 ) Morton Weinfeld. Draft Paper by the Trans-Atlantic Learning Community: Migration Group. Miami April 1, 1998; The Social Integration of Immigrants and the Response of Institutions . Canada: Department of Sociology, McGill University.

30 ) Julie Peteet. Identity Crisis: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon . Worldwide Refugee Information, U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999.

31 ) Rosemary Sayigh. "Dis/Solving the Refugee Problem." Middle-East Report . Summer 1998.

32 ) Khalil Nakhlé. Palestinian Intellectuals and Revolutionary Transformation in the sociology of the Palestinians . Ed. Khalil Nakhlé and Elia Zureik. p. 195.

33 ) Daily Star . November 7, 1998.

34 ) Al-Nahar . July 28, 1999.

35 ) Hilal Khashan. Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon: Behind the Debate . Montreal Studies on the Contemporary Arab World. April 1, 1996.

36 ) Al-Hayat . September 30, 1999.

37 ) On the 9th of November 1999, a local newspaper, Al-Nahar , spoke of US plans to pressure Lebanon to accept a portion of its Palestinian community as permanent citizens. Later, the Herald Tribune (December 13, 1999) highlighted once more Lebanon's concerns towards its Lebanese population. In addition, numerous articles reported US and Canadian plans and involvement in preparing for "implantation" have been reported in Lebanese media particularly in Al-Diyar (March 8, 2000).

38 ) Al-Anwar , November 27, 1999.

39 ) Mideast Mirror . September 1, 1999.

40 ) Hilal Khashan and Simon Haddad. The Coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese Tracks: Beirut's Options . Forthcoming Article appearing in "Security Dialogue" (June 2000)

41 ) MTV Television . Beirut, November 13, 1999.

42 ) Conference in the University of Saint Esprit. Kaslik-Lebanon. Lebanese Identity Between Naturalization and Implantation. November 26, 1999.

43 ) Interview with Mahmoud Soueid, Director of the Institution for Palestinian Studies in Beirut, on the 25 th of November 1999, MTV Television. Soueid stressed that granting Palestinians civil rights doesn't mean giving up their right to return because in Israel, Palestinians were given this right and they did not lose their identity. This proposition was during the "Conference on the Palestinians in Lebanon" at Oxford (1996). Those who supported granting "civil rights to Palestinians" maintained that if Palestinians were allowed to work in the formal sector they would contribute taxes to the state and thereby benefit the Lebanese economy.

44 ) Raghid Al-Solh. Interview in the Mideast Mirror . September 1, 1999.

45 ) Sarkis Naum. "Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: National, Sectarian and Confessional Consideration." Al-Wasat . 29 August 1994