The Political Management
of Change in UNRWA
by Bob Bowker The prospect
that a framework agreement may be concluded between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority during the course
of the next year has led to more focussed attention
upon the future of UNRWA. This paper examines the
capacity of UNRWA, the major donors to the Agency,
and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to change the approach
which UNRWA has traditionally taken to its role, in
the event that a framework agreement of a comprehensive
peace settlement is successfully negotiated.
Assumptions and Judgements
This paper is based on certain assumptions and forecasts
concerning the direction of the negotiations between
Israel and the PA towards a framework agreement, or
a final status agreement that provides for further
negotiations on some issues. It assumes that :
- the compromises which will be made in the wider
framework of the peace process under way between
Israel and the PA will make changes in the present
situation of the vast majority of the Palestinian
refugees unlikely;
- that situation will be largely accepted, in practice,
by Jordan, Syria and Lebanon whose respective political
attitudes and policy approaches towards their refugee
populations will remain largely unchanged;
- the refugee community will demand the continuation
of UNRWA as a symbol of international responsibility
for their situation, and as a concrete acknowledgment
of their aspirations for redress - even though the
international community has long recognised privately
that such aspirations cannot be fulfilled in practice.
They will be supported in that demand by their host
governments; and
- the PA will probably seek to accommodate those
demands in some form, rather than to agree formally
that the right of return to Israel had been abandoned
- or to signal the PA’s acceptance of that
reality by supporting the winding up of UNRWA.
If those assumptions are valid, it can be expected
that UNRWA, as a UN agency whose operational effectiveness
is linked to its careful management of relations with
the PA and host governments, as well as the refugee
community of which it is in some ways a part, would
be unlikely to take the lead in proposing steps towards
changing its functions, let alone proposing its own
demise.
The mandate of UNRWA is sufficiently flexible for
the Commissioner-General to respond to changing circumstances
on the ground by adjusting Agency programs without
prior reference to the General Assembly. He did so,
for example, in January 1988 in response to a request
from the UN Secretary-General to improve the assistance
provided to the refugee population following the outbreak
of the intifada and the subsequent adoption by the
Security Council of Resolution 605 (1987) which strongly
deplored Israeli violations of the human rights of
the Palestinians. UNRWA also willingly engaged in
the delivery of development assistance to the Palestinians
through the Peace Implementation Program which was
launched in 1993 following the signing of the Declaration
of Principles.
In both cases, UNRWA provided, at the time, the most
effective option available to the international community
to give concrete expression to its concerns - to ensure
the safety and protection of Palestinians under occupation
on one hand, and to make the results of the peace
process felt by the Palestinian refugee community
on the other.
In both the examples mentioned above, however, UNRWA
acted in ways which were broadly in line with its
basic orientation. Its measures were certain to enjoy
not only broad international support but also, and
perhaps more importantly, the support of the refugee
community in general. The moves were also certain
to have the endorsement of the host countries. Such
support would probably not be forthcoming, as noted
earlier, for measures by the Agency which were seen
to be at odds with refugee political aspirations and
host government interests.
Where measures might be envisaged which would depart
significantly from its established role, UNRWA would
certainly, and reasonably, expect there first to be
a clear international consensus calling upon it to
change its approach. That consensus would seem unlikely
to eventuate in view of the positions of the host
countries and the PA described above.
UNRWA would also expect that such a consensus would
be embodied in an appropriate UN General Assembly
resolution which took account of the widely-perceived
linkage between the right of Palestinian refugees
to return, as popularly believed to be established
in UNGA Resolution 194, and UNRWA’s own continuing
role.
Such a resolution would seem unlikely to secure passage
through the UN General Assembly if the PA and host
governments were to be embarrassed politically by
it, or if they, or the refugee populations they currently
host, were likely to be financially disadvantaged
by changes to UNRWA’s functions.
Key judgements, some of which are elaborated
below, are that
- UNRWA should continue to receive donor support
because of its operational efficiencies, and its
unique place in the political mythology of the Palestinian
people;
- Maintaining UNRWA in some form, despite reservations
in some quarters, would be more likely to serve
the wider interests of key countries among the major
donor group (securing a stable outcome to the peace
process as a whole and supporting the development
of the public services of the emerging Palestinian
state) than seeking formally to wind up the Agency.
It would also be a more politically feasible approach;
- At the same time, conclusion of an agreement,
or of a further significant step in that direction
between Israel and the PA would mark an appropriate
moment for the role of UNRWA to change to reflect
the contemporary political realities of the region,
and to address more effectively the financial pressures
that have plagued the Agency;
- Instead of delivering its own programmes, UNRWA
should become, over time, a service manager and
center of excellence, that maintains, for both humanitarian
and political reasons, an effective and ongoing
commitment to supporting those refugees who are
genuinely vulnerable;
- Donors, the PA and UNRWA should seek, accordingly,
to develop a joint strategy that strengthens Palestinian
national capacities and puts UNRWA on a more financially
sustainable basis, by allowing the PA, host governments
and NGOs to play a growing part in the services
currently provided by the Agency.
The issues to be considered further in this paper
are first, whether extending ongoing support to UNRWA
along such lines is likely to run counter to wider
political objectives; and second, the approaches that
could be taken to securing outcomes of that nature.
UNRWA and the Outcomes
of the Peace Process
Since it started operations in 1950, UNRWA has been
a key element in the sustenance of Palestinian refugee
identity against external alternatives, both Israeli
and Arab. In addition to its outstanding humanitarian
role, UNRWA’s existence has kept alive among
refugees the hope, if not the belief, that the international
community has not abandoned its perceived responsibilities
for securing a just settlement of their demands for
redress.
In addition, UNRWA facilities have provided the institutional
means, including pockets of civil society, through
which refugee aspirations have been preserved. Those
aspirations, and the Palestinian refugee political
culture of which they are part, have emphasised the
distinctiveness - or at least the particularity of
interests and concerns - of refugees from other Palestinians.
There have been other factors at work in that process,
of course, but the central place of UNRWA in the Palestinian
refugee experience is undeniable.
Despite periodic concerns about the outlook for the
peace process, and even with occasional reversion
to conditions of bilateral and regional tension, instability
or emergency, however the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
is drawing to an end. No matter how inconclusive and
unsatisfactory that end may be to some of the protagonists,
priority needs to be given to strengthening Palestinian
national institutions generally, rather than sustaining
refugees as a distinct body whose aims and aspirations
are fundamentally incompatible with the basis - flawed
or otherwise - on which peace is being achieved.
If a peace agreement is concluded, therefore, Israel
and many non-Arab donors are likely to question the
appropriateness of continuing formal support for the
right of Palestinian refugees to return to what is
now Israel; and to UNRWA as a symbol, among Palestinian
refugees, of the unresolved nature of the refugee
issue.
While understandable at first glance, such concern
exaggerates the consequences of the fact that the
refugee issue has proven to be insoluble on the terms
demanded by the Palestinian side.
Leaving the issue unresolved would not make any significant
difference to the situation on the ground for either
Israel or the Palestinians. But pressing for the acknowledgment
of the realities facing the Palestinians on this issue
runs a strong risk of creating the reverse effect
of what those calling for such measures presumably
intend.
The memories and mythologies that are part of the
Palestinian identity will not be altered or obliterated
through unambiguous statements that the right of return
has been abandoned. Such statements are unlikely to
be made. If they were to be made, they would seem
certain to be disavowed in many quarters. The ensuing
debate would satisfy no-one.
At the same time, those realities should not be ignored
or discounted. It is highly unlikely that a right
of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel proper
will be acknowledged by Israel. It is inconceivable
in the foreseeable future that a right of return to
Israel would be acted upon. But with Lebanon an important
possible exception, no regional government faces instability
because of the fact that the refugee problem remains
unresolved, nor are they likely to give disproportionate
weight to that fact in determining the nature of their
approaches to dealing with Israel.
The political case for winding up UNRWA as a means
of reinforcing the peace between Israel and the Palestinians
is therefore weak. Continuation of the Agency in some
appropriate form is a preferable approach.
Sustainability
If a settlement is reached between Israel and the
PA on the issues of primary concern to them, the international
community is capable of accepting de facto an outcome
on the refugee question that leaves the refugees largely
where they are now located. The fate of the refugees
under those circumstances would fall to the host countries
and the PA to determine.
Even if there was agreement on the movement of large
numbers of refugees to a Palestinian state, there
would be lengthy lead times involved in planning for
and providing viable infrastructure to accommodate
such refugees in new surroundings. Much work has yet
to be done before associated but vexed issues including
compensation, citizenship and residency rights might
be resolved.
With or without a settlement, most donors would continue
to consider the services currently provided by UNRWA
to be important, for humanitarian reasons. Most would
also see those services as contributing to the interests
of the international community, and the PA leadership,
in avoiding civil strife and confrontation between
Palestinians and Israelis.
In the absence of UNRWA, or some successor body,
it would be up to the host countries and the PA to
cater for the needs of the refugee population by allocating
resources for that purpose among their other domestic
priorities. Most of the services provided by UNRWA
would need to continue.
The questions to decide would be the mechanisms through
which, in future, those services would be provided;
and who would provide the resources required.
With a peace framework in place, the focus among
Western donors, at least, is likely to concentrate
increasingly upon strengthening the sustainability
of the emerging Palestinian state.
Under the changed political circumstances of the
region, and questioning the appropriateness of maintaining
the distinctiveness of the refugee population, at
least in areas under Palestinian control, some Western
donors may encourage UNRWA to transfer its responsibilities
to that state.
Pressure may mount in particular for the PA to take
over UNRWA’s responsibilities in regard to education,
health and social welfare. Donors may further decide
that the strengthening of civil society and Palestinian
NGOs warrants higher priority for funding than UNRWA
programs - unless UNRWA decides to strengthen its
own (highly successful) efforts in some of those areas.
Some donors may also insist on UNRWA bringing its
criteria for eligibility for services into line with
the new political situation, arguing that the Palestinian
state should have the capacity to provide for the
refugees within its territory, and that the Agency
for its part should henceforth accord higher priority
to protecting the well-being of Palestinian refugees
on the basis of need, rather than their refugee status.
Donors could seek to apply the same approach to UNRWA’s
role in Syria and Jordan, where specific local arrangements
surrounding the presence of the refugee population
have allowed refugees varying degrees of access to
national social infrastructure.
At the same time, the particular vulnerability of
Palestinians in Lebanon may also lead some donors
to press for those refugees to secure a larger proportion
of UNRWA funding than under existing, political status-based
Agency criteria for refugee registration and participation
in UNRWA programs.
Fresh Approaches
It would be a major challenge to bring such changes
about, even if they were supported by key donors as
part of a wider approach to the refugee issue which
addressed other issues such as citizenship, rehabilitation,
resettlement and compensation.
A first step would need to be the reaching of agreement
among key donor countries (unanimity among all donors
on the issue is unlikely) that the time had arrived
for UNRWA and the PA, and where possible, UNRWA and
the host governments, to enter into firm arrangements
for the transfer, over a specified period, of UNRWA’s
functions to the PA and to those regional governments.
Key donors are generally averse to covering recurrent
costs, rather than development programs. They would
have to be persuaded that their interests - including
both their humanitarian relief objectives and their
development policy objectives - would be served by
supporting, probably for a specific period, a transitional
financing arrangement for UNRWA, the PA and host governments,
akin to their support for the PA post-Oslo, to underpin
the transfer of responsibility for UNRWA programs.
Donors would need to agree in principle to commit
substantial resources, either individually or perhaps
through a World Bank mechanism, to assist each of
the parties involved jointly to identify the steps
which would need to be taken to make that transfer
technically possible. That would include, in particular,
the planning and upgrading of skills and institutional
capacities that would be required.
A second step would be to persuade the PA and the
host governments to accept, in principle, establishing
a transitional program and financing package with
the donor countries, despite the awkward political
questions it would raise about allocating priorities
between refugees and non-refugees, and the sharing
of responsibilities with UNRWA in the transition period.
Political resistance at the highest level of the
PA to such a change would be likely. Given the challenges
to achieving concrete outcomes from negotiations with
Israel on key refugee concerns, the PA would not wish
to add to the problems it would face in managing its
relations with the refugee community. It would be
likely to claim to be tightly constrained, politically
and financially, from assuming UNRWA’s responsibilities.
It would probably assert, with considerable vigour
and passion, and some justice, that those responsibilities
remain the obligation of the international community
to uphold.
Although there have been important exceptions, previous
attempts by UNRWA to explore with the PA the ways
in which the PA’s institutions might undertake,
on a mutually beneficial basis, a larger share of
the functions currently provided by the Agency have
been rebuffed for political reasons.
The obvious, but by no means conclusive argument
which could be put to the PA and the host countries
to seek their agreement, would be that to reject such
an approach would be to risk a breakdown or effective
cessation of existing UNRWA services for financial
reasons. Unless donors reverse their aversion to funding
recurrent costs, which seems unlikely in view of the
political and developmental arguments in favour of
according priority instead to state-building, UNRWA
can expect to be at least 50 per cent worse off in
resource terms in ten years time.
The PA and host governments might not be readily
persuaded to come that view, however, especially in
the light of the success that UNRWA has enjoyed over
recent years in galvanising additional donor support
when necessary, including through astute management
of the politics of its financial crises.
Coordination among key donors on their approach to
the issue would be essential, and protracted negotiation
would be very likely. The price of agreement would
be high, including potentially in terms of the influence
to be accorded to the PA and host governments over
resource allocation decisions by the Agency in the
interim period. That is something which the Agency,
mindful of its responsibilities as a UN body, its
operational needs, and the wider political aspects
of the question has been careful not to compromise
in the past.
If the first two steps were completed successfully,
a third step would be for UNRWA, the donors, the PA
and host governments to establish the details of sectoral
packages for the harmonisation and eventual handover
of services. Those would need to cover the identification
of needs, the priority areas to receive support, the
duration of that support, and the nature of the respective
inputs of resources that UNRWA, the donors and host
governments and the PA would make.
The aim would be to achieve a sufficiently high degree
of convergence and complementarity between PA/host
government activities and those of the Agency that
the services currently received from UNRWA could be
sourced increasingly by refugees themselves from host
government agencies and NGOs. The stabilisation of
enrolment rates in the UNRWA education program in
Jordan in recent years illustrates the potential for
refugees voluntarily to seek greater use of host government
facilities provided they are of comparable quality.
A Refocussed UNRWA?
While the political case for continuation of UNRWA
in an appropriate form is strong, the time is long
overdue for UNRWA to reconsider its traditional concern
to deliver its programs itself, and to shift to a
situation where it delivers some of those services
itself, and manages and supervises the delivery of
some others.
The main reasons it has largely failed to do so to
date, despite the vastly different political circumstances
that now apply in the region, and the greater capacity
of governments to provide for the refugee population
compared to the early 1950s, are essentially political.
They also relate to the Agency’s operational
ethos.
If changes are to be introduced, they will need to
be dealt with at a political level as well as through
addressing the technical challenges they would entail.
The present approach of the Agency, which is derived
from assumptions that all registered refugees are
entitled to assistance by virtue of their political
status, and that the Agency should deliver services
itself, is unsustainable financially because of demographic
factors. It is out of step with the direction of government
philosophy and practice in many donor countries. It
does not take adequate account of the capabilities
of government and Palestinian community-based bodies
to undertake a larger share of those functions, and
the longer-term need for those functions to be managed
on a sustainable basis.
Where a role for the PA and host governments is not
a serious possibility at this stage, outsourcing to
Palestinian and host country NGOs, or partnerships
between national NGOs and international NGOs, might
still provide significant strengthening of Palestinian
and national institutions. It may also allow additional
access to resources from some donor countries by tapping
development as well as the relief budgets of certain
aid agencies.
Among possible fresh approaches that could be considered,
in the UNRWA/PA context at least, are the following:
- establishment of a cooperation agreement between
UNRWA and the PA encompassing secondment of staff
from the PA to UNRWA schools and clinics, with the
PA to be given additional financial assistance from
the donors for that purpose (to cover salary and
allowance differentials), and with UNRWA to be actively
engaged in a cooperative effort with the PA for
the upgrading of PA teaching qualifications and
performance to meet UNESCO standards. UNRWA-employed
staff (as distinct from contracted teachers) would
eventually be used mainly for senior level management
and training;
- increased outsourcing to the PA of refugee education
and health services. Refugee children should be
able to go to school wherever there is capacity
in PA schools to absorb them - as currently happens
to some extent in the West Bank.
- concluding an agreement with the PA whereby,
in lieu of the VAT currently owed by the PA to UNRWA
(amounting to some $20 million) eligible refugees
would be covered by PA health insurance, enabling
them to attend PA clinics - as many already do -
rather than UNRWA having to open and to staff additional
health facilities.
- subject to it being economically viable (which,
on careful examination it may not be) outsourcing
to the private sector and NGOs of UNRWA medical
services including cardiology, gynaecology, diabetes,
dentistry and pathology services; and paying NGOs
and the PA to run non-camp clinics on behalf of
the Agency;
- and possibly introducing partnership arrangements
for the construction of additional schools for UNRWA
and the PA (and for refurbishment of Agency schools)
on a leaseback basis, perhaps in association with
the World Bank.
Implementation
As noted above, political resistance to change would
be inevitable. Affected parties would ensure an active,
vocal resistance in some quarters. But carefully managed,
those sensitivities should not prevent a well-considered
series of reforms from going forward.
It would be critically important to arrive at a package
supported by donors from which the PA and host governments
would derive advantages overall, provided they were
prepared to work positively and constructively with
the Agency. Selling the package would require serious
engagement on the substantive issues at the most senior
political level of the PA in a way that combined firmness
about the need for change in approach on one hand,
with, on the other hand, an emphasis on the shared
benefits of cooperation.
Central to achieving a satisfactory outcome would
be the protection of the vast majority of refugees
from additional financial or other burdens. It would
be difficult to justify advocacy of a resolution to
the refugee issue that left the most vulnerable of
the refugees worse off than before. That would, in
turn, make securing political support for needed changes
even more problematic than at present.
With political considerations in mind, the approaches
proposed should not encompass movement towards cost
recovery. The value in pursuing such an approach may
be limited, even under ideal conditions, in regard
to public health and primary education. To raise the
cost recovery issue under the political conditions
of the next few years would be to eliminate any real
prospect of gathering the political momentum for other
changes in approach that are, ultimately, more important
to the donors’ long-term interests.
Key to the successful introduction of such a change
in approach would be to ensure that the PA and UNRWA
were fully consulted and had time and, where necessary,
additional technical support to consider what supplementary
assistance may be required as bridging arrangements
were made.
Though it should be planning for change, UNRWA, for
its part, could not expect to be invited by host countries
or the PA to be relieved of its present responsibilities,
or to be asked to deliver its programmes differently.
Donors would have to initiate any moves in that direction.
They would need to insist upon the impossibility of
sustaining UNRWA’s present approach any longer
in the changed political circumstances of the region,
and to draw attention to the absence of any alternatives
in a realistic time frame for the Agency.
If Consensus Was Not
Possible
If a consensus approach could not be developed, an
alternative (and less attractive) approach would be
for the key donor countries still to maintain UNRWA
as an institution, but to cap financial support for
the Agency at present levels, thereby effectively
bringing about an increasing requirement for the PA
to absorb its functions in the West Bank and Gaza.
Under such an approach, demographic realities and
sensible management would require the Agency to reassess
its priorities in the allocation of the resources
available to it, and to concentrate its resources
upon maintaining programs primarily for the benefit
of the elements of the refugee population at greatest
risk in each field.
Though the situation might be resisted initially
in some parts of the PA and UNRWA, provided they were
aware that a firm decision had been taken on the part
of key donors to proceed in that direction; provided
the Agency made necessary adjustments in a timely
fashion, and set its initial level of eligibility
to receive benefits at a level that accommodated the
bulk of the refugee population; and provided particular
attention was paid by UNRWA to protecting the interests
of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the political
repercussions of such a move would be manageable.
The Agency might survive within a fixed budget through
measures to restrain the growth of demand - moving
towards cost recovery; and lowering the quality of
services through delays; further crowding; and generally
lowering the attractiveness of Agency services compared
to host country provided services where available.
Doing so would be no more than a reinforcement of
actual practice among the refugee population in some
places. In the West Bank and Lebanon, for example,
there is evidence that some refugees are willing to
use non-Agency services where those are available,
even at a higher cost.
The overall effect, however of curtailing the performance
of the Agency by default, rather than adjusting its
role by design, would go beyond running down the performance
of UNRWA to unacceptable levels. It would further
lower its morale, and ultimately erode the likelihood
of sustaining donor financing for those functions
which it would need to continue to provide to those
refugees in greatest need.
It would be more appropriate to rebase UNRWA’s
approach, to attune it to changing circumstances,
and to move as quickly as possible to more cost-effective
and sustainable methods of delivery of Agency services
where research indicated that would be feasible, and
where agreement could be reached with the PA and host
governments on the approach to be taken.
Conclusion
Over time, whether the memories and mythologies which
drive Palestinian refugee aspirations fade as a political
force will depend on the evolving nature of the relationship
between the refugees and the host countries where
they will ultimately reside. Though unlikely to be
abandoned, those mythologies may gradually become
less dominant when confronted by new experiences of
constructive dealing with Israel and with the Palestinian
Authority at individual and governmental levels. The
challenges associated with such processes will of
course remain formidable.
It is clear that there would be few interests served
on the Palestinian side, and considerable capacity
for political turmoil, especially in the Lebanese
context, if premature and probably fruitless efforts
were made to bring the refugee issue to formal closure
on a basis which ruled out the principle of the right
to return.
The approach suggested in this paper - and the fall-back
approach also outlined - would not prevent a reorientation
of UNRWA’s present functions in directions that
lent support to those Palestinian refugees, particularly
in Lebanon, who would appear likely to gain least
from the outcomes of the peace process. The approach
would also contribute in areas of UNRWA’s special
competence to development goals for a Palestinian
state from which refugees in that state would also
benefit.
The challenge for the donor community, and for the
Agency’s leadership, is twofold. The first task
is to define a strategic vision characterised by responsiveness
to change, but with predictability and the capacity
to preserve core functions where they are needed most.
The second task is to communicate that vision to key
audiences in order to secure a more predictable footing
for the Agency.
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