What really happened at Taba
Ha'aretz By Yossi Beilin
Tuesday, July 16, 2002 Av 7, 5762
Israel Time: 05:26 (GMT+3)
When the eclipse finally ends, when reason returns
to our lives, and we stop beating each other up and
making fools of ourselves in actions like closing
Sari Nusseibeh's offices, we'll also go back to the
negotiating table, bruised and hurting, nerves wracked
and convinced that finally the other side understands
how powerful we are.
Then, in the negotiations over the issue of the Palestinian
refugees, the chairman of the Palestinian team will
open the yellowing pages of Ha'aretz from July 11,
2002, and quote from Ari Shavit's article (Taba's
principle of return). The article reports on a document
I wrote and gave the Palestinian delegation at Taba,
in which Israel apparently recognized the right of
Palestinians to return to its territory. The Palestinian
negotiator will say a precedent has been set and ask
the Israeli team why Israel is retreating from such
an important decision. For that reason, it would be
worthwhile for the Israeli team to also have my words,
so they aren't trapped.
Agreement to a right of return by Palestinians to
Israel means an end to the Zionist vision, meaning
the vision of a Jewish, democratic state. The main
motive for me and those who share my views, is the
need to guarantee a border for Israel before we find
ourselves, heaven forbid, ruling over more Palestinians
than Jews. I pray Shavit's article does not cause
unnecessary damage to this cause, which I hope he
shares. In the passion of debate, the other side should
not be granted another instrument to strengthen a
demand Israel cannot accept.
Since Shavit quotes from a document I wrote and that
was never published, because it was an internal memo
and part of an official negotiating process, I assume
it would not have been too great a bother for him
to ask me if the quote was accurate. I would have
told him that the document he was given contained
two distortions that greatly changed its meaning.
Unfortunately, I am not at liberty to present the
original document, but the one Shavit published was
different from the original.
As for the other aspects of the argument: Shavit
regards the statement that the agreement would be
recognized as implementation of UN General Assembly
Resolution 194, acceptance of the Palestinian demand
for implementation of the right of return, and therefore
a terrible precedent. First of all, UNGAR 194, promulgated
in December 1948, refers to Palestinian refugees "wishing
to return," and not to their right to do so.
That is why the Palestinians and all the Arab states
opposed it at the time. Ever since the 1980s, UN decisions
have referred to the right of return, which the Palestinians
obviously preferred. An agreement between the sides
that the solution to the refugee problem is to be
found in implementation of UNGAR 194 would, in effect,
close the book on the refugee case - an obvious Israeli
interest that also answers the Palestinian need to
solve the refugee problem without the need to declare
that their right of return has been recognized.
Secondly, if Shavit had read the Clinton Framework,
which was accepted by the government of Israel on
December 28, 2000, he would have discovered that in
the section on the refugee problem its says, "The
sides will agree that this is an implementation of
UN General Assembly Resolution 194." The Clinton
Framework was known as the basis for enabling the
Taba talks and it served as the mandate for the Israeli
delegation.
Shavit claims that an Israeli agreement to allow
a limited number of refugees to return, as part of
a solution to the problem, is the same as acceptance
of the principle of return. Contrary to the Clinton
Framework, he says, "The Taba document is a breathtaking
gamble. It opens the gates of sovereign Israel to
a real, uncontrollable process of return." But
again, a reading of the Clinton Framework would have
been useful. The Clinton Framework says, "Israel
could indicate in the agreement that it intends to
establish a policy so that some of the refugees would
be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel's sovereign
decision."
I don't know if that is how the refugee problem will
eventually be solved. It's possible other ideas will
arise. But setting a specific number of thousands
of refugees who would be allowed into Israel could
be part of a way to finally close this open wound,
and accepting a limited number of Palestinian refugees,
agreed upon in negotiations, does not contradict Israel's
rejection of the principle of the right of return.
It's also worth remembering that within the context
of an agreement, Israel would be freed of some 200,000
Palestinians living in Jerusalem with full suffrage,
so demographically, there is a clear advantage to
Israel.
I am convinced it is possible to reach an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement without granting the Palestinian refugees
the right of return. We were very close to such a
solution at Taba in January 2001, where it was proved
that it is possible to reach a fair agreement without
Israel agreeing to what it could never accept - unlimited
entry for refugees to its borders. It's no accident
that only after the Taba talks did leaders from the
Palestinian Authority begin making clear that they
would not press for implementation of the right of
return.
The writer headed the Israeli negotiating team on
the refugee issue at Taba.
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